{ "id": 2573801, "name": "PETER GUERTIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HAZEL GUERTIN, Defendant-Appellant (First Midwest Bank/Illinois, f/k/a National Bank of Joliet, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Guertin v. Guertin", "decision_date": "1990-10-12", "docket_number": "No. 3-90-0127", "first_page": "527", "last_page": "532", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 527" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3495355 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1587108 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/116/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2405353 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/1/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5022298 ], "year": 1878, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/40/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.E. 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5021195 ], "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/299/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E. 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2595913 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/361/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3351006 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 1193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3498847 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 N.E.2d 1220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3583529 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0259-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 610, "char_count": 11053, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.799061946816056e-07, "percentile": 0.8366846870222936 }, "sha256": "d4e9ddce99bb637023d1685b0e7cce3d7c6e7aaea04cdbcf6064ea55ac3be58c", "simhash": "1:61b2b4367e5cb579", "word_count": 1838 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:30.653748+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PETER GUERTIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HAZEL GUERTIN, Defendant-Appellant (First Midwest Bank/Illinois, f/k/a National Bank of Joliet, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Hazel Guertin (Hazel) appeals from the trial court\u2019s issuance of an indirect civil contempt order. We vacate the contempt order.\nPeter Guertin, Jeanette Wheeler, Arthur Guertin (now deceased) and Wilfred Guertin (now deceased) are siblings. Hazel was the wife of Arthur Guertin. From 1975 until his death in 1988, Wilfred lived in a boarding house near Arthur and Hazel in Joliet, Illinois. Wilfred was blind and dependent upon Arthur and Hazel for assistance.\nShortly after moving to Joliet, Wilfred purchased three certificates of deposit with the First National Bank of Joliet (n/k/a First Midwest Bank/Illinois). These certificates of deposit totalled $55,000 and represented the bulk of Wilfred\u2019s net worth. In 1987, Wilfred executed his last will, distributing his property equally among his then-surviving brothers and sister. However, prior to execution of the will, Wilfred made Arthur and Hazel joint tenants with him on the certificates of deposit.\nAfter Wilfred\u2019s death, Peter and Jeanette speculated that the inclusion of Arthur and Hazel as joint tenants on the certificates of deposit could have been the result of undue influence exerted by Hazel or that Wilfred did not know that he was adding them as joint tenants. Peter and Jeanette filed an unverified equitable bill of discovery in order to depose Hazel and First Midwest Bank to aid in possible claims.\nHazel filed a special and limited appearance, moving to dismiss the petition on the basis that the court possessed no jurisdiction over the subject matter in that the petition was merely one to seek discovery to determine whether a cause of action existed against a known defendant. The motion was denied. Hazel moved for an order authorizing an interlocutory appeal. This also was denied. Hazel then moved this court for leave to appeal in order to avoid having to be held in contempt for this court to consider the issue. The appellees filed both a motion to dismiss the appeal and a motion to impose sanctions pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611). Both motions were allowed.\nWhen this cause was remanded to the trial court, Peter and Jeanette set Hazel\u2019s deposition. Hazel did not appear, and the court held her to be in civil contempt. She was ordered to pay total fines and costs of $100. Hazel appeals, requesting that this court vacate the trial court\u2019s order holding her in indirect civil contempt.\nGenerally, a court order is conclusive and must be obeyed until it is modified or set aside. While contempt is a proper means for a court to enforce its orders, contempt will not lie where the court lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order. (Jenner v. Wissore (1988), 164 Ill. App. 3d 259, 517 N.E.2d 1220; People v. Huntley (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 64, 493 N.E.2d 1193.) Jurisdiction in a particular case constitutes not only the power of a court to hear and determine the matter before it, but also the power to render particular judgment in it, and every act of a court beyond its jurisdiction is void. Talandis Construction Corp. v. Illinois Building Authority (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 715, 377 N.E.2d 237.\nThe relief sought in this case was requested in the form of an \u201cequitable bill of discovery.\u201d Appellees speculated that Hazel had exerted undue influence over Wilfred and sought to depose her and the bank officials before the filing of a complaint. The issue before us is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the appellees\u2019 motion. If the trial court had jurisdiction, the order of contempt should be enforced. If the court was without jurisdiction, then its action was void ab initio and the court\u2019s contempt citation must be vacated.\nAt common law, the courts had no power to require a party to an action to answer interrogatories. The equitable bill of discovery was used to enable a plaintiff to obtain information and prepare his cause for trial on the ultimate issues. (16 Ill. L. & Prac. Discovery \u00a72 (1971).) These bills were made ancillary to already pending claims for substantive legal or equitable relief. See, e.g., Ashton v. Macqueen (1935), 361 Ill. 132, 197 N.E. 561; Brandenburg v. Buda Co. (1921), 299 Ill. 133, 132 N.E. 514; Kendallville Refrigerator Co. v. Davis (1891), 40 Ill. App. 616; Philadelphia Fire Insurance Co. v. Central National Bank (1878), 1 Ill. App. 344.\nWe have found only one case where a court allowed a party\u2019s motion for an equitable bill of discovery in the absence of any pending claims for relief. In City of Chicago v. Hart Building Corp. (1969), 116 Ill. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496, the contemnor (Keefe) had served as a receiver appointed by the court to manage certain properties. Keefe attempted to conceal his self-dealing in the receivership properties through subterfuge. The City of Chicago, alleging that Keefe had breached his fiduciary duty, brought an equitable bill of discovery against Keefe seeking certain information. Keefe initially moved to strike the pleading, arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction over him or the subject matter since his final report had been approved and he had been discharged as a receiver. Additionally, he contended that as the city\u2019s petition was not ancillary to and in aid of any pending civil suit at law, the bill was an improper pleading. The trial court rejected these arguments and refused to strike the City\u2019s bill. Keefe eventually gave a full account of what had transpired and he was held in contempt of court.\nOn appeal, Keefe contended once again that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over him. The appellate court rejected Keefe\u2019s argument. Acknowledging this to be a unique application of the bill, the court in Hart Building limited its holding by stating \u201c[wjithin the unusual facts of this case, we hold that no error was committed when the City commenced these proceedings with its petition for disclosure, thereby compelling Keefe to produce the necessary information.\u201d Hart Building, 116 Ill. App. 2d at 49.\nWe have found only one case in which a court applied the Hart Building decision. (See People v. B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 137, 490 N.E.2d 74.) We note that in that case, as in Hart Building, an individual had made misrepresentations to a court in a previous matter. As did the court in Hart Building, the court in B.R. MacKay & Sons indicated that it was \u201cthe unusual facts present\u201d in the case and the predicament that \u201c[t]o rule otherwise would allow respondent to profit from its own wrongs\u201d that provided the impetus for the unusual decision. B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d at 140-41.\nUnder the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) discovery, including the taking of depositions, is to be conducted in accordance with the rules. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 1003 (a), (b).) Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the Code and the supreme court rules to determine if the equitable bill of discovery has been codified.\nSupreme Court Rule 224 (134 Ill. 2d R. 224) is entitled \u201cDiscovery Before Suit to Identify Responsible Persons and Entities\u201d and provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(i) A person or entity who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in damages may file an independent action for such discovery.\n(ii) The action for discovery shall be initiated by the filing of a verified petition in the circuit court of the county in which the action or proceeding might be brought or in which one or more of the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought resides. *** The order allowing the petition will limit discovery to the identification of responsible persons and entities ***.\u201d\nSupreme Court Rule 224 is inapplicable to the instant case as the identity of the defendant is already known. Additionally, it must be noted that Rule 224 requires a verified petition. The petition in the instant case was unverified. Accordingly, even if this rule had been applicable, the appellees failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the rule.\nAppellees contend that section 2 \u2014 402 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 402) represents a codification of the common law equitable bill of discovery and that their motion falls within the purview of section 2 \u2014 402. We disagree with both of these assertions.\nSection 2 \u2014 402, entitled \u201cRespondents in discovery\u201d states in part:\n\u201cThe plaintiff in any civil action may designate as respondents in discovery in his or her pleading those individuals or other entities, other than the named defendants, believed by the plaintiff to have information essential to the determination of who should properly be named as additional defendants in the action.\nPersons or entities so named as respondents in discovery shall be required to respond to discovery by the plaintiff in the same manner as are defendants and may, on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if the evidence discloses the existence of probable cause for such action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 402.\nInitially, we note that the appellees\u2019 brief cites no authority for the proposition that section 2 \u2014 402 is a codification of the equitable bill of discovery. We have found no authority to support this proposition. It is our opinion that the equitable bill of discovery, utilized in a time when courts were without power to compel discovery, has been rendered obsolete by our current system of pleading and practice. By the very clear language of section 2 \u2014 402 (see italics in the statute) it is contemplated that a complaint has been filed with at least one named defendant before a party may employ section 2 \u2014 402. We therefore reject the appellees\u2019 argument that section 2 \u2014 402 applies to the instant case.\nWe find no other grounds, either in the Code or the rules, to support the trial court\u2019s granting of appellees\u2019 motion to depose Hazel prior to the filing of a complaint. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the trial court was without jurisdiction to compel Hazel\u2019s deposition. The trial court\u2019s action was void ab initio and must be reversed. As the underlying action was outside the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction, the contempt citation must be vacated.\nFor the reasons listed above, the order of the circuit court of Will County requiring Hazel to make herself available for deposition is reversed. The contempt citation issued against Hazel for failing to comply with the deposition order is vacated.\nOrder reversed; contempt citation vacated.\nSCOTT and BARRY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bennett J. Braun, of Stefanich, McGarry, Wols & Okrei, Ltd., of Joliet (Roman Okrei, of counsel), for appellant.", "Timothy J. Rathbun, of McKeown Law Office, of Joliet, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PETER GUERTIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HAZEL GUERTIN, Defendant-Appellant (First Midwest Bank/Illinois, f/k/a National Bank of Joliet, Defendant).\nThird District\nNo. 3-90-0127\nOpinion filed October 12, 1990.\nBennett J. Braun, of Stefanich, McGarry, Wols & Okrei, Ltd., of Joliet (Roman Okrei, of counsel), for appellant.\nTimothy J. Rathbun, of McKeown Law Office, of Joliet, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0527-01", "first_page_order": 549, "last_page_order": 554 }