{
  "id": 2575869,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD E. DENNING, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Denning",
  "decision_date": "1990-10-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-90-0131",
  "first_page": "720",
  "last_page": "721",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 720"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 152",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5576995
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/138/0152-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "sha256": "5e48bd0250fa8a16ceb73ffc5e8b1c704dc574ec340531334252f2c3f2381181",
    "simhash": "1:9822e41a63ca9ef4",
    "word_count": 535
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:30.653748+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD E. DENNING, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GORMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a guilty plea, the defendant, Donald E. Denning, was convicted of perjury (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 2(a)) and sentenced to 30 months\u2019 probation. The defendant\u2019s probation was subsequently revoked, and the trial court sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The defendant appeals. We affirm.\nThe record reveals that as a condition of the defendant\u2019s probation, he was ordered to serve six months in home detention. Under the conditions of his confinement, he was not allowed to be absent from his home for any reason other than medical treatment or for purposes of purchasing groceries or other necessities. The defendant was to receive the same good-time credit for home detention he would have received for incarceration in the county jail.\nA petition to revoke the defendant\u2019s probation was subsequently filed. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and extended the defendant\u2019s probation an additional 30 months, conditioned upon his serving 60 days in the county jail.\nThe record further reveals that four separate revocation petitions were filed within a period of two years. The trial court ultimately sentenced the defendant to three years\u2019 imprisonment, with credit for the time he had spent in custody. However, the defendant was not given credit for the time he had spent in home detention. The defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to 91 days of additional credit for that time.\nA similar issue was recently addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Ramos (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 152. In Ramos, the defendant was placed under a home detention bond and was not allowed to leave his home without the prior consent of his probation officer or the court. The supreme court held that the term \u201ccustody\u201d as used in section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20147(b)), which deals with sentencing credit, was not intended to encompass the period during which a defendant is released on bond, regardless of the restrictions imposed on him during that time. The court reasoned that home confinement differed in several respects from confinement in a jail or prison. In particular, it noted that an offender detained at home is not subject to the regimentation of penal institutions and, once inside the residence, enjoys unrestricted freedom of activity, movement, and association.\nWhile we note that here the defendant\u2019s home confinement was a condition of his probation and not part of a trial bond, we find this distinction meaningless. In light of the supreme court\u2019s decision in Ramos, we find that the defendant is not entitled to an additional 91 days\u2019 credit for the time he served in home confinement.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GORMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Gary Spencer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morrison (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD E. DENNING, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-90-0131\nOpinion filed October 24, 1990.\nKenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nGary Spencer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morrison (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0720-01",
  "first_page_order": 742,
  "last_page_order": 743
}