{ "id": 2577427, "name": "MARY RODGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOOK-SUPERX, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Rodgers v. Hook-Superx, Inc.", "decision_date": "1990-10-25", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201490\u20140170", "first_page": "861", "last_page": "865", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 861" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3084005 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472056 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403826 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0040-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 436, "char_count": 7156, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.334579586916811e-08, "percentile": 0.4401822268402521 }, "sha256": "b9e39666d85d84b6183f30f66809c5dd75ff3eb84508e406b4e0a065639de7bf", "simhash": "1:832bad54a94a2c4a", "word_count": 1198 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:30.653748+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARY RODGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOOK-SUPERX, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Mary Rodgers appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 Hook-SuperX, Inc., and Hook Drugs, Inc., motion for summary judgment. We affirm.\nPlaintiff brought a negligence action against defendants as a result of an April 25, 1986, robbery outside their store. It is undisputed plaintiff entered the Hook\u2019s store located at Ill. East Main Street, Danville, Illinois, in order to make a purchase. When leaving, plaintiff exited through the front entrance and onto a private sidewalk which surrounded a portion of the front of the store. Here, plaintiff was confronted by two men who took her purse and knocked her to the ground.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged defendants had a duty to protect her from criminal attacks by third persons which defendants knew or should have known were reasonably likely to occur. Plaintiff alleged defendants should have known it was reasonably likely she would be attacked as, just prior to attacking plaintiff, the two men had been inside the store harassing a customer. Plaintiff additionally cited the rumor that approximately two months earlier a similar robbery had occurred in the area. Last, plaintiff alleged defendants were negligent in failing to provide adequate lighting.\nDepositions were taken of plaintiff and of defendants\u2019 employees, Nellie Anderson, cashier, and Bipin Desai, assistant manager and pharmacist. After taking these depositions, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding no material issue of fact existed and, as a matter of law, defendants had no duty to protect plaintiff from the actions of third parties. The trial court stated that to impose upon defendants such a duty would be tantamount to making a business of this nature an absolute guarantor of every individual who walks into the store.\nSummary judgment should be rendered with great caution. However, where a plaintiff fails to establish an element of the cause of action through the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, summary judgment for the defendant is proper. (Joiner v. Benton Community Bank (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 40, 411 N.E.2d 229.) There can be no liability in court for negligence unless the defendant has breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. (Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc. (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39.) Generally there is no duty to protect another against the criminal attacks of third persons. However, an owner or occupier of land in Illinois owes a duty to invitees on his premises to reasonably guard against acts of third parties when such attacks are reasonably foreseeable. (Burks v. Madyun (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 917, 435 N.E.2d 185.) The question here then is whether the attack upon plaintiff, an invitee of defendants, was reasonably foreseeable.\nPlaintiff stated in her deposition she had not seen the two men who later robbed her while she was in the store. While exiting the store, she saw the men through the store window. Plaintiff walked by the two men and thought they were merely visiting or getting ready to go into the store. Plaintiff lived across from the store and had visited the store at this location since 1947. She had not previously been aware of any problem with criminal activity in the area. Plaintiff stated the night of the incident she heard the cashier at Hook\u2019s tell a police officer a similar incident had happened about two months earlier.\nPlaintiff could not remember whether an outside overhead light was on at Hook\u2019s. She did recall there was some sort of light but could not remember whether it was coming from inside the store. She recalled when the store was Harding\u2019s it had florescent lights along the edge of the roof. Plaintiff stated the night of the robbery these lights were not on.\nIn her deposition, Nellie Anderson stated she was a cashier at Hook\u2019s on April 25, 1986. She remembered plaintiff coming into the store at around 8 p.m. While plaintiff was in the store, two men entered the store together. They began verbally harassing a young female customer. Anderson asked the two men to leave the store. The men gave no response or protest and promptly left. Anderson saw the two men go out the front door of the store. They stood there for a few minutes until heading off in the direction of Dairy Queen. Several minutes later, plaintiff came through the checkout line. After plaintiff left the store, Anderson heard war whoops and saw the men she had earlier asked to leave the store jumping up in the air outside. Plaintiff then came in and said she had been mugged in the parking lot. Anderson stated there was no written policy at Hookfs on how to handle troublemakers in the store. Her understanding was that if the cashier or manager could not get them to leave, they were to call 911.\nAnderson thought there might have been a prior purse snatching in the area but was not positive. She heard about the incident from a customer and was otherwise unaware of any incidents in the area. Anderson stated both the overhead light and the receptacle for lighting that went around the outside of the building were on that evening.\nIn his deposition, Bipin Desai stated he was the pharmacist and assistant manager at Hook\u2019s in the evening hours on April 25, 1986. Desai recalled on this evening two men had been in the store harassing a customer. Nellie Anderson had asked the men to leave and they had complied. Plaintiff had been in the store at the same time as these two men, and Desai estimated she left the store about five minutes after they did. Desai stated it is the store policy of Hook\u2019s to ask troublemakers to leave. Desai stated the front lighting and lighting around the building were on that evening. Desai had checked the lights at 5 p.m. that day as part of his routine schedule.\nThe trial court did not err in finding defendants owed no duty to plaintiff. As in the factually similar case of Taylor v. Hocker (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 639, 428 N.E.2d 662, the circumstances here are such that the attack upon plaintiff by a third party was not reasonably foreseeable. The allegations regarding a previous purse snatching and the actions of the two men while inside the store are insufficient to make the attack upon plaintiff reasonably foreseeable.\nThe fact a dispute exists between plaintiff and defendants\u2019 employees regarding the exterior lighting does not alter the result in this case. Plaintiff stated in her deposition she saw the two men through the store window before exiting the store. She thought the men were merely visiting or entering the store. The claimed lighting inadequacy does not appear to be a cause or factor of the criminal attack. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLUND and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carlton M. Kagawa, of Lowenstein, Hubbard, Smith & Kagawa, of Dan-ville, for appellant.", "Dukes, Martin, Helm & Ryan, Ltd., of Danville (John E Martin, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARY RODGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOOK-SUPERX, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 90\u20140170\nOpinion filed October 25, 1990.\nCarlton M. Kagawa, of Lowenstein, Hubbard, Smith & Kagawa, of Dan-ville, for appellant.\nDukes, Martin, Helm & Ryan, Ltd., of Danville (John E Martin, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0861-01", "first_page_order": 883, "last_page_order": 887 }