{ "id": 2574720, "name": "OPPORTUNITY CENTER OF SOUTHEASTERN ILLINOIS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. E. ALLEN BERNARDI, Director, Department of Labor, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Opportunity Center of Southeastern Illinois, Inc. v. Bernardi", "decision_date": "1990-10-16", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201489\u20140657", "first_page": "945", "last_page": "951", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 945" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "482 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167435 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179946 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 1101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173748 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 1320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547150 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0987-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 535, "char_count": 12604, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.646299337626634e-08, "percentile": 0.4912890674321167 }, "sha256": "90c520c3fea839df0aae1b46b809a785ea70fcb9f656bd6d3f58f58eada68f3d", "simhash": "1:ea2f08d3eadcafc0", "word_count": 2078 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:30.653748+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "OPPORTUNITY CENTER OF SOUTHEASTERN ILLINOIS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. E. ALLEN BERNARDI, Director, Department of Labor, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOWERTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Opportunity Center of Southeastern Illinois, Inc. (the Center), and Rose Contracting and Engineering, Inc., filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to determine whether the Opportunity Center is a \u201cpublic body\u201d under the Prevailing Wage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 1 et seq.).\nOpportunity Center is a private, not-for-profit corporation whose purpose is to provide social, educational and rehabilitation programs for handicapped and developmental^ disabled adults. The Center contracted with Rose Contracting and Engineering, Inc., to provide remodeling services on the Center\u2019s building.\nDefendants are the Department of Labor (the Department) and E. Allen Bernardi, the Director.\nThe Department had issued subpoenas to both the Opportunity Center and Rose Contracting, requesting both to produce time cards, books, payroll records, checkbook stubs, and other documents. The subpoenas indicated that the Department of Labor was investigating whether plaintiff was paying wages by the prevailing rate of hourly wages on the remodeling project, pursuant to the Prevailing Wage Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 1 et seq.).\nPlaintiffs, Opportunity Center and Rose Contracting, filed motions to quash the subpoenas together with a complaint for declaratory judgment.\nThe circuit court of Richland County held that the Opportunity Center was not a \u201cpublic body\u201d within the meaning of the Prevailing Wage Act and, therefore, was not subject to the Act\u2019s provisions. After considering the Department of Labor\u2019s motion for reconsideration, the circuit court also held: (1) that the Opportunity Center was not authorized by law either to construct public works or to enter into any contract for the construction of public works; and (2) that the construction involved in this cause was not a \u201cpublic work\u201d under the Act.\nThe Department of Labor appeals both orders.\nThe Prevailing Wage Act\u2019s declaration of policy states:\n\u201cIt is the policy of the State of Illinois that a wage of no less than the general prevailing hourly rate as paid for work of a similar character in the locality in which the work is performed, shall be paid to all laborers, workers and mechanics employed by or on behalf of any and all public bodies engaged in public works.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 1.\nAlthough the Opportunity Center admits it received one-half of its funds from the public, it nevertheless argues that the Center is not a public body because it is not \u201cauthorized by law to construct public works.\u201d\nThe Department of Labor argues that the Center is a public body because it is supported in part by public funds, i.e., contracts, local tax monies and grants. The Department relies on People ex rel. Bernardi v. Illini Community Hospital (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 987, 516 N.E.2d 1320, wherein the court held that a not-for-profit, nonsectarian hospital, which received public tax money, was a public institution and public body for purposes of the Prevailing Wage Act. In its reasoning, the court focused on the phrase \u201cor any institution supported in whole or in part by public funds.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 2.\nIn Illini, the hospital contracted to have a canopy constructed over its emergency room entrance. The contract did not call for workers to be paid the prevailing wage. The Department brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the Prevailing Wage Act, and argued that since the hospital received public funds, i.e., tax money, by definition it was a public body under the Prevailing Wage Act. The hospital argued that the statute was ambiguous and should be interpreted as applying only to taxing bodies, and that the percentage of tax money received was small when compared to its overall budget. Most significantly, the hospital also argued that the Act should not apply because only private funds were used to construct the canopy, and therefore, the project was not a public work.\nThe Illini court ruled that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous: by definition a public body is one supported in whole or part by public funds. The heart of Illini is that an institution need not be wholly supported by public funds to be within the scope of the Prevailing Wage Act and even though the hospital may not be a \u201cpublic\u201d hospital for purposes of other statutes, this did not control the definition of public body under the Prevailing Wage Act.\nThe court in Illini noted that the purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act is to ensure that workers receive a decent wage, and that this, in turn, is advantageous to the public because it encourages the efficient and expeditious completion of public works. Hence, the court concluded that the purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act best would be served by requiring the hospital to pay the prevailing wage. Illini, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 990, 516 N.E.2d at 1321.\nWe turn, now, to the issue at hand \u2014 whether the not-for-profit Opportunity Center is a public body under the Prevailing Wage Act.\nThe Act defines \u201cpublic body\u201d:\n\u201c \u2018Public body\u2019 means the State or any officer, board or commission of the State or any political subdivision or department thereof, or any institution supported in whole or in part by public funds, authorized by law to construct public works or to enter into any contract for the construction of public works, and includes every county, city,\" town, village, township, school district, irrigation, utility, reclamation improvement or other district and every other political subdivision, district or municipality of the state whether such political subdivision, municipality or district operates under a special charter or not.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 2.\nCourts, when interpreting a statute, must determine and give effect to the legislative intent in enacting the statute. (Maloney v. Bower (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 473, 498 N.E.2d 1101.) In determining the legislative intent, courts must consider the language of the statute and the purposes sought to be achieved. (Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 337, 504 N.E.2d 84.) Courts should first look to the language of the statute because it is the best indication of legislative intent. Where the language is unambiguous, a court must enforce the law as enacted. (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076.) Courts avoid interpretations which render portions of statutory language meaningless or superfluous. Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 489 N.E.2d 1374; Ekco, Inc. v. Edgar (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 557, 482 N.E.2d 130.\nThe Opportunity Center is supported by contracts with the State; it received over one-half of its revenue through contracts with the Illinois Department of Health and Developmental Disabilities and its predecessor, the Department of Mental Health. The Center also is publicly supported by local tax monies, $90,000 for fiscal years 1985 and 1986; and it received funding through grants issued by the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services.\nAccording to the parties\u2019 stipulation of facts, the Center received from the Department of Mental Health over 50% of its receipts in each year from July 1, 1973, through June 30, 1987.\nUnder the plain meaning of the statute, the fact that the Center is a \u201cprivate\u201d institution does not prevent it from being a \u201cpublic body\u201d under the terms of the Prevailing Wage Act. The definition states: \u201cany institution supported in whole or in part by public funds.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 39a \u2014 2.\nThe Center is a public body because it is an institution which is supported in whole or in part by public funds under the teaching of Illini.\nNevertheless, the Center maintains that it is not \u201cauthorized by law to construct a public work,\u201d and that Illini did not address this part of the definition of a \u201cpublic body.\u201d\nIf the Center is not authorized by law to construct a public work, can it be a public body?\nThe Act states that a \u201cpublic body\u201d is \u201cany institution supported in whole or in part by public funds, authorized by law to construct public works or to enter into any contract for the construction of public works.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 2.\nSince the Act defines a \u201cpublic body\u201d in part using the term \u201cpublic works,\u201d we must first determine what is a \u201cpublic work.\u201d\nThe Act defines \u201cpublic works\u201d:\n\u201c \u2018Public works\u2019 means all fixed works constructed for public use by any public body, other than work done directly by any public utility company, whether or not done under public supervision or direction, or paid for wholly or in part out of public funds. \u2018Public works\u2019 as defined herein includes all projects financed in whole or in part with bonds issued under the Industrial Project Revenue Bond Act[,] *** the Industrial Building Revenue Bond Act[,] *** the Illinois Development Finance Authority Act[,] *** or the Build Illinois Bond Act *** and all projects financed in whole or in part with loans or other funds made available pursuant to The Build Illinois Act *'**.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 39s \u2014 2.\nA \u201cpublic work\u201d has two elements: (1) it is a \u201cfixed work\u201d; and (2) is for a \u201cpublic use.\u201d\nFirst, then, in this case, we must determine if the Center\u2019s remodeling project is a fixed work. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint stated that the remodeling was to be done on improvements situated on real estate at a certain location. The Act does not define \u201cfixed work.\u201d However, we believe that real estate is a \u201cfixed work\u201d within the meaning of the Act, and real estate was what was involved in this construction project.\nSecondly, we must determine if the project was constructed for \u201cpublic use.\u201d The Act does not define \u201cpublic use.\u201d\nWe believe that \u201cpublic use,\u201d however, does not turn on whether the institution is publicly or privately owned. Nor do we believe that \u201cpublic use\u201d turns on whether the greater portion of those who use the facility are paying for their use from their own private funds. Because the Act does not define \u201cpublic use,\u201d and because the Act has a specific purpose, we instead believe that the term \u201cpublic use\u201d must be determined so that the broad purpose of the Act is not thwarted.\nIf the Act is read as the Center urges, so that the words \u201cauthorized by law to construct public works\u201d are words of limitation, then the purpose of the Act would be thwarted. If those words are words of limitation, then unless an institution, public or private, was specifically and expressly granted the authority by the legislature to construct a public work, prevailing wages would not have to be paid even though public money was being spent, thereby thwarting the broad purpose of the Act. We hold, therefore, that the words \u201cauthorized by law to construct public works\u201d are not words of limitation.\nThe purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act is to ensure that workers receive a decent wage; hence, the question of whether the Center is for \u201cpublic\u201d or \u201cprivate\u201d use must be determined by asking whether the institutions are supported in whole or in part with public money. By resolving the issue in this way, the broad purpose of the Act best is served. Therefore, we hold that when public money is spent on a \u201cfixed work\u201d that is being constructed by a public body, the Prevailing Wage Act applies.\nAccording to the parties\u2019 stipulation of facts, the Center contracts with the Department of Mental Health and other governmental agencies to provide services to handicapped and developmental^ disabled adults and is supported, in part, by public money. We further find that the Center is a public body because it receives one-half of its money from public funds and can contract for the construction of public works. Therefore, the Prevailing Wage Act covers this project.\nWe, therefore, reverse the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nLEWIS, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOWERTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and William H. London and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.", "Jeffrey E. Fleming, of Olney, for appellee Opportunity Center of Southeastern Illinois, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "OPPORTUNITY CENTER OF SOUTHEASTERN ILLINOIS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. E. ALLEN BERNARDI, Director, Department of Labor, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 89\u20140657\nOpinion filed October 16, 1990.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and William H. London and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.\nJeffrey E. Fleming, of Olney, for appellee Opportunity Center of Southeastern Illinois, Inc." }, "file_name": "0945-01", "first_page_order": 967, "last_page_order": 973 }