{ "id": 2568973, "name": "In re A MINOR (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Champaign News-Gazette, Appellant); In re A MINOR (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Champaign News-Gazette, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Champaign News-Gazette", "decision_date": "1990-11-15", "docket_number": "Nos. 4-90-0167, 4-90-0168 cons.", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "497", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 480" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5398338 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984146 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3352624 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2902646 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 So. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7560319 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/520/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 N.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ohio St. 3d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1424564 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "18-19" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/52/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 R2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10396662 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848" }, { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/769/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.W.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10665991 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/410/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ga. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1200951 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/253/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180397 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "2671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 A.2d 1252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8005120 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/443/1252-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Vt. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 4719593 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "1127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/140/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 555", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787572 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 524", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216556 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 596", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192549 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "2618" }, { "page": "607" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "2620" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "2622", "parenthetical": "O'Connor, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123481 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309-12" }, { "page": "357-59" }, { "page": "1046-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179887 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" }, { "page": "704" }, { "page": "2808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643989 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614371 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203186 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/478/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "294" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250-51" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0506-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1308, "char_count": 40605, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.021105239706143e-07, "percentile": 0.5452630635994609 }, "sha256": "4f93b8e5e21d6be9c89b80c239634927c3414a849d62ee8cdf319703801bac70", "simhash": "1:e1fe3492e27cd6ee", "word_count": 6808 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.258665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re A MINOR (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Champaign News-Gazette, Appellant).\u2014In re A MINOR (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Champaign News-Gazette, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an interlocutory appeal by the Champaign News-Gazette, Inc. (News), from an order excluding the News from the juvenile proceedings involving the two minors in these cases. The News argues the trial court erred in excluding its reporters from the proceeding pursuant to section 1 \u2014 5 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5). We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nThe docket entries in the record reveal the two minors, who were the victims of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of a parent, were taken into shelter care on February 23, 1989. According to the News, one of its reporters was in the courtroom on March 13, 1989, the day scheduled for the adjudicatory hearing for both minors, to report on the proceedings. Upon identifying himself to the trial judge as a reporter for the News, he was ordered to leave the courtroom. The reporter\u2019s request for an immediate hearing on the exclusion order was denied.\nThe News filed a motion for reconsideration of the exclusion order. At a hearing on April 18, 1989, the trial judge stated the court had an obligation to protect minors and there is a policy of confidentiality embodied in section 1 \u2014 5 of the Act with respect to juvenile proceedings. The judge further noted section 1 \u2014 5 of the Act provides the media may be admitted to proceedings if, in the opinion of the court, they have a direct interest in the case. Further, the media should make an advance application for admission to juvenile proceedings. Finally, the judge stated the News could be admitted to the proceedings if it agreed not to further reveal the identity of the minors.\nFollowing the hearing on April 18, 1989, an order entitled \u201cCONFIDENTIALITY ORDER ENTERED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 37, SECTION [1-8] AND SECTION [1-5(6)]\u201d was filed on April 20, 1989. The order stated, pursuant to section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(6)), \u201call persons and agencies present in the court for hearings [regarding the two minors] are prohibited and enjoined from further disclosing the minor[s\u2019] identities].\u201d Further, pursuant to section 1 \u2014 8 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 8), all parties to the proceeding were prohibited from disclosing the content or substance of any court record involving the two minors. A written order addressing the issues raised by the News and setting forth the court\u2019s decision announced in court on April 18 was filed on January 31, 1990. The News appeals from the order entered on January 31, 1990.\nThe jurisdiction of this court for appeal purposes is based upon the trial court\u2019s order of January 31, 1990. The issues set forth in the appellant\u2019s brief are whether advance application to the trial court must be made before being admitted to juvenile court proceedings and whether the News may be excluded from the proceedings if it discloses the identity of the juveniles, even if identity is obtained from other sources. The appellant addresses the January 31, 1990, order in its brief. The failure of the trial court to make specific findings at the March 13, 1989, hearing is waived. We, therefore, address the issues as they pertain to the January 31, 1990, order.\nThe parties\u2019 arguments focus on section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act, which reads as follows:\n\u201cThe general public except for the news media and the victim shall be excluded from any hearing and, except for the persons specified in this Section, only persons, including representatives of agencies and associations, who in the opinion of the court have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court shall be admitted to the hearing. However, the court may, for the minor\u2019s protection and for good cause shown, prohibit any person or agency present in court from further disclosing the minor\u2019s identity.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(6).)\nThe News contends this section evidences that juvenile proceedings are open to the media. Specifically, the News argues section 1 \u2014 5(6) clearly excepts the news media and the victim from the class of the general public. The News argues the term \u201cthis Section\u201d refers only to section 1 \u2014 5(6), not section 1 \u2014 5. Relying on this analysis of the language in section 1 \u2014 5(6), the News maintains it is excepted not only from the group of the general public but also from those persons whom the court may exclude if it finds they do not have a direct interest in the case or the work of the court. The News relies on In re Jones (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 506, 263 N.E.2d 863, which considered section 1\u2014 20(6) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 37, par. 701\u2014 20(6)), predecessor to section 1 \u2014 5(6), for support.\nThe News also argues that given the language of section 1 \u2014 5(6) and the history of juvenile proceedings in Illinois, it has a first amendment right of access to juvenile proceedings. Relying on Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 2735, the News contends it can only be excluded after a finding that there is an overriding interest essential to preserving higher values. The News further maintains the trial judge\u2019s requirement in this case of an advance application for admission has no basis in the Act and is unconstitutional. Finally, the News argues the threat of exclusion, if it discloses the minor\u2019s identity, constitutes a prior restraint of the press.\nThe guardian ad litem for the minors argues the trial court correctly found three classes of persons are mentioned in section 1 \u2014 5, which concerns \u201cRights of parties to proceedings\u201d: (1) the minor, his parents, guardian or custodian, who are parties respondent; (2) the general public except for the news media and the victim; and (3) except for those persons mentioned in section 1 \u2014 5, those persons, in the court\u2019s opinion, with a direct interest in the case or work of the court. The guardian contends the News\u2019 reliance on Jones is misplaced and, further, that historically juvenile proceedings have not been open to the general public.\nThe guardian distinguishes the cases relied upon by the News by pointing out that it is undisputed that the News did not obtain the minors\u2019 identities through common reportorial techniques. Further, the minors involved in these proceedings are victims of physical and sexual abuse, unlike the delinquent minors or criminal defendants involved in the cases the News relies on. Finally, the guardian points out that the United States Supreme Court cases addressing freedom of the press with regard to judicial proceedings have yet to consider this right with regard to juvenile proceedings involving abused or neglected children.\nIn its reply brief, the News maintains it is not arguing it has an absolute right to be admitted to all juvenile proceedings, or that the well-being of the minors herein is not compelling enough to justify closure of the proceedings. Rather, the News argues that because no request for closure or factual findings supporting closure were made in these cases, the order must be reversed.\nWe first address the News\u2019 construction of section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act. Statutes should be evaluated as a whole, and each provision should be construed in connection with every other section and in light of the statute\u2019s general purpose. (Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 235, 247, 520 N.E.2d 46, 54.) A reading of section 1 \u2014 5 in its entirety does not support the News\u2019 analysis that the term \u201cthis Section\u201d in section 1 \u2014 5(6) refers only to section 1 \u2014 5(6). In section 1 \u2014 5(1) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(1)), the same term, \u201cthis Section,\u201d is used. To confine the term \u201cthis Section\u201d to the paragraph it appears in does not comport with the principles of statutory construction. We find the News\u2019 analysis of the language in section 1 \u2014 5(6) to be without merit.\nWe now consider the first amendment right of freedom of the press regarding juvenile proceedings. Our analysis begins first with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on freedom of the press in judicial proceedings. The Court has held that a State may not prohibit a newspaper from publishing any information regarding criminal defendants, juvenile delinquents, and crime victims where the information had been obtained through common reportorial techniques. (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975), 420 U.S. 469, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 95 S. Ct. 1029; Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 96 S. Ct. 2791; Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977), 430 U.S. 308, 51 L. Ed. 2d 355, 97 S. Ct. 1045; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 102 S. Ct. 2613.) Further, in The Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989), 491 U.S. 524,105 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 2603, the Court stated the publication of information lawfully obtained and of public significance cannot be constitutionally punished, absent a need to further a State interest of the highest order. The rationale underlying the Court\u2019s decisions is the recognized constitutional right of access to criminal trials, embodied in the first amendment, which the press and the general public enjoy. (See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) , 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S. Ct. 2814; Globe, 457 U.S. at 603, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 255, 102 S. Ct. at 2618.) This right of access is not absolute. (Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 570, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 704, 96 S. Ct. at 2808.) The State may deny access but its justification for doing so must be backed by a compelling governmental interest. Further, the denial must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 257, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.\nThe Court had stated, in two of its decisions to date, that its holdings should be confined to the facts of the case and the issue presented. Specifically, in Globe, the court held that a State statute mandating closure of criminal proceedings when a minor victim of a sex offense was testifying was too restrictive because it did not give discretion to trial courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is called for. Thus, the court left open the question of whether a State statute giving discretion to trial judges to close criminal proceedings in certain cases would survive a constitutional challenge. In her concurring opinion in Globe, Justice O\u2019Connor stated:\n\u201cI interpret neither Richmond *** nor the Court\u2019s decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.\u201d (Globe, 457 U.S. at 611, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 102 S. Ct. at 2622 (O\u2019Connor, J., concurring).)\nIn Florida Star, the Court rejected an invitation to hold that truthful publication of information may never be punished and stated:\n\u201cOur cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily.\u201d The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532,105 L. Ed. 2d at 455,109 S. Ct. at 2608.\nThe Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the constitutional right of access in criminal trials extends to juvenile proceedings. However, several State courts have considered the issue. In In re J.S. (1981) , 140 Vt. 458, 438 A.2d 1125, at issue was a State statute prohibiting the general public from juvenile proceedings and prohibiting publicity regarding the proceedings except with the consent of the minor and his parent. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the Richmond right of access to criminal trials did not extend to juvenile proceedings involving delinquent minors. In so holding, the court reasoned that juvenile proceedings have traditionally been closed and the statute evidenced the legislature\u2019s intent that these proceedings be closed. Further, the court noted the purposes served by open criminal trials were inapplicable to juvenile proceedings, considered rehabilitative and not criminal in nature. Finally, the court stated the confidentiality inherent in juvenile proceedings overrides any first amendment rights.\nIn Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg (R.I. 1982), 443 A.2d 1252, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined the trial court\u2019s order barring the press from juvenile proceedings, where the name of the minor was lawfully obtained by the press, violated the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Oklahoma Publishing and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), 443 U.S. 97, 61 L. Ed. 2d 399, 99 S. Ct. 2667. However, in considering the constitutionality of a statute barring the general public from court hearings in juvenile proceedings, the court reasoned the press had no constitutional right of access to these proceedings under the United States Constitution and, therefore, the State legislature could exclude the press by statute from the proceedings.\nIn Florida Publishing Co. v. Morgan (1984), 253 Ga. 467, 322 S.E.2d 233, a Georgia statute excluded the general public from delinquency, deprivation, and unruliness hearings in juvenile court. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the exclusion statute, reasoning there was no historically based constitutional presumption of openness in juvenile proceedings. The court further opined that the presumption of closed proceedings, involving juveniles, is not conclusive and the press must be given an opportunity to show the juvenile\u2019s interest in a closed proceeding is not \u201coverriding\u201d or \u201ccompelling.\u201d\nIn Associated Press v. Bradshaw (S.D. 1987), 410 N.W.2d 577, the South Dakota Supreme Court, noting first the media\u2019s right of access to juvenile proceedings was not compelled by the United States Constitution, stated the media had a qualified right of access under a State statute. The statute at issue in Bradshaw provided the general public was to be admitted to juvenile proceedings except when the child, parent, or attorney requested a private hearing. In that event, the trial judge was given discretion to admit those persons with \u201c '*** a direct interest in the case, witnesses, officers of the court and news media representatives.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d at 579, quoting S.D. Codified Laws Ann. \u00a726 \u2014 8\u201432 (1984).) The court stated the statute gave judges discretion to admit one, all, or a combination of the enumerated parties and the press had no greater right than that of the general public under the statute. The court further noted the qualified right of access required the balancing of first amendment rights with the State\u2019s interest in preserving the juvenile\u2019s anonymity and in protecting the juvenile.\nIn In re N.H.B. (Utah App. 1989), 769 R2d 844, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that while the United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of public access to juvenile proceedings, it had repeatedly \u201cevinced an appreciation for the purposes served by closure.\u201d (N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 848.) The Utah statute at issue in N.H.B. provided the general public was excluded from juvenile proceedings except where a petition was presented alleging the commission of a crime by a juvenile which would be a felony if committed by an adult. The court concluded the statute, which presumed the proceedings were closed, whs constitutional under the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution.\nRecently, in In re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St. 3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a State statute which provided that the general public may be excluded and only those persons who have a direct interest in the case may be admitted to juvenile proceedings. The court determined juvenile proceedings are not presumptively open and the statute allowed trial judges to close juvenile proceedings \u2014 but only after hearing evidence on the issue and finding (1) there was a reasonable and substantial basis for believing that access would endanger the child or endanger the fairness of the proceedings; and (2) the potential harm outweighed the benefits of public access. (T.R., 52 Ohio St. 3d at 7, 556 N.E.2d at 442.) The proceedings before the court in T.R. involved the legal custody of a minor. The trial judge closed the proceedings to the media, sealed the court records, and issued a gag order to the parties and their counsel. The court upheld the validity of the closure order, reasoning the trial court\u2019s analysis that the harm to the child outweighed the benefits of access was not an abuse of discretion.\nWe are persuaded by the great weight of current authority that juvenile proceedings, unlike criminal proceedings, are not presumptively open to the public. Accordingly, we reject the argument that the press has an absolute right, under the United States Constitution, of access to such proceedings. Our conclusions, however, do not address the media\u2019s right of access under section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act. We now consider that section of the Act.\nUnlike the State statutes considered to date by other State courts, section 1 \u2014 5(6) excepts the news media from the general public who are excluded from juvenile proceedings. Section 1 \u2014 5(6) further provides that except for those persons specified in section 1 \u2014 5, only persons \u201cwho in the opinion of the court have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court shall be admitted to the hearing.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(6).) Two supreme court cases have considered the predecessor to section 1 \u2014 5(6), section 1 \u2014 20(6), without reaching the question presented in this appeal. In Jones, a delinquent minor waived his right to a public trial and the trial court ordered the general public and the press excluded from the proceedings. The order was later modified to allow the news media admittance but was subject to the condition that nothing regarding the proceedings was to be published. On appeal, the minor claimed error in the admittance of the media and argued his personal right to a public trial could be waived.\nThe Jones court reasoned section 1 \u2014 20(6) evidenced the legislature\u2019s intent that \u201copenness should prevail throughout [juvenile] proceedings.\u201d (Jones, 46 Ill. 2d at 509, 263 N.E.2d at 864.) Further, the court noted the ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist on the opposite of that right. Finding no prejudice to the respondent in allowing the press access to the proceedings, the court found no error in denying the minor a purely private trial.\nIn In re a Minor (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 247, 537 N.E.2d 292, the supreme court determined the trial court\u2019s power to exclude the news media under section 1 \u2014 20(6) was unconstitutionally applied where the identity of the delinquent minor was learned through lawful and routine newspaper reporting. The orders entered in Minor were similar to those entered here: the media was (1) prohibited from publishing the minor\u2019s name; and (2) banned from the proceedings unless it agreed to comply with the nonpublish order. The court noted the order was not necessary to protect the minor because the minor\u2019s identity had already been revealed.\nThese cases are distinguishable from the case presented. Here, it is undisputed that the news media had not learned the minors\u2019 identities through accepted reportorial techniques prior to the adjudicatory hearing when the News asked for admittance to the proceedings. This fact distinguishes this case from Minor. Additionally, this case involves two victims of abuse, unlike Jones and Minor, which involved alleged delinquents.\nThe News relies on Jones for its argument that juvenile proceedings are presumptively open in Illinois. We do not read Jones so broadly. The Jones court was presented with the issue of whether a delinquent minor had a right to a private trial. After considering the language of section 1 \u2014 20(6), the Jones court reasoned the legislature intended for openness to \u201cprevail throughout the proceedings.\u201d (Jones, 46 Ill. 2d at 509, 263 N.E.2d at 864.) We do not believe this statement is in conflict with a finding that the press has only a conditional right of access under the statute. In our view, the language of section 1\u2014 5(6) suggests the legislature intended to give trial courts control over persons admitted to juvenile court hearings.\nFurther, we note that since Jones was decided in 1970, section 1\u2014 20(6) has been amended to include the following sentence at the end of the successor section:\n\u201cHowever, the court may, for the minor\u2019s protection and for good cause shown, prohibit any person or agency present in court from further disclosing the minor\u2019s identity.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801-5(6).)\nThe addition of this language further evidences an intent to give trial courts the discretion to deny access to anyone for the minor\u2019s protection.\nOur conclusion is further supported by other provisions of the Act. Section 1 \u2014 8(C) of the Act provides:\n\u201cJuvenile court records shall not be made available to the general public but may be inspected by representatives of agencies, associations and news media or other properly interested persons by general or special order of the court. The State\u2019s Attorney, the minor, his parents, guardian and counsel shall at all times have the right to examine court files and records.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 8(C).)\nAlso section 2 \u2014 22 directs as to \u201cfactual contents and the conclusions of the reports prepared for the use of the court and considered by it\u201d at dispositional hearing as follows:\n\u201cFactual contents, conclusions, documents and sources disclosed by the court under this paragraph shall not be further disclosed without the express approval of the court pursuant to an in camera hearing.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 22(2).)\nSection 1 \u2014 8(C), which directs that the news media may only inspect court records by general or special order of the court, evidences that juvenile records of proceedings are to remain confidential. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 8(C).) Allowing the press unfettered access to court hearings where confidential records are generated would render this provision meaningless. (See T.R., 52 Ohio St. 3d at 16, 556 N.E.2d at 449.) Section 2 \u2014 22 also stresses the importance of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings.\nThe cases from other jurisdictions which have considered this issue and held there is a conditional right of access have also concluded that the media may only be excluded from the proceedings after a hearing at which it was concluded (1) the State\u2019s interest in protecting the minor is compelling, and (2) the potential harm to the minor on opening the proceedings outweighs the benefits of public access. (T.R., 52 Ohio St. 3d at 18-19, 556 N.E.2d at 451; N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 852; Brad shaw, 410 N.W.2d at 579; Florida Publishing, 253 Ga. at 473, 322 S.E.2d at 238.) Two States have determined the State\u2019s interest in protecting the juvenile is compelling and overrides the benefits of public access. T.R., 52 Ohio St. 3d at 21, 556 N.E.2d at 453; J.S., 140 Vt. at 464, 438 A.2d at 1127.\nHere, the trial court concluded that because of (1) the nature of the abuse, and (2) size of community where the minors resided, and would likely continue to reside, extensive publicity of the proceedings would adversely affect the two minors for the rest of their lives. The State\u2019s interest in protecting these minors is compelling and the articulated reasons for closing these proceedings are sound. We find the trial court properly exercised its discretion under section 1 \u2014 5(6).\nThe News also contends the trial court\u2019s requirement that the media make advance application for admittance to a juvenile proceeding is not authorized by section 1 \u2014 5(6) and is an unconstitutional prior restraint of the press. In his order, the trial judge stated advance application by the media would prevent any delay in the proceedings when the media entered the courtroom and would ensure all parties understood \u201cthe ground rules\u201d before the proceedings began. The trial judge did not indicate what the advance application would entail.\nWe believe the trial judges do have the discretion to determine the best way to conduct juvenile proceedings. Establishing a procedure to identify efficiently all persons seeking admission to a juvenile proceeding falls within this discretion. However, a formal written application for admission, upon which a hearing may have to be conducted, in our view, causes more delay in the commencement of proceedings designed to protect minors.\nThe News also argues the portion of the trial court\u2019s order requiring it, before admittance to the proceedings, to state it would not further identify the minor constitutes a prior restraint of the press. A prior restraint occurs when the State attempts to prohibit the broadcasting or publication of material already in the possession of the media. (T.R., 52 Ohio St. 3d at 19, 556 N.E.2d at 452, citing Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. McCrary (Fla. 1988), 520 So. 2d 32, 35.) The Supreme Court has held that once truthful information is publicly revealed or in the public domain, a court may not constitutionally restrain its dissemination. (Smith, 443 U.S. at 103, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 99 S. Ct. at 2671; Oklahoma, 430 U.S. at 309-12, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 357-59, 97 S. Ct. at 1046-47.) In the case presented, the order is broad enough to require that the News represent it will not further publicize the minor\u2019s identity no matter from what source the information was obtained. To the extent the order concerns information the News may obtain through common reportorial techniques, it may not be restrained from publishing the information. However, the court may prohibit the News from publishing any information regarding the minors\u2019 identities which was obtained from the courtroom.\nFinally, we consider the News\u2019 claim that the procedure used to bar the media in this case was improper. Consideration of this issue requires an examination of the purposes and policy of the Act.\nSection 1 \u2014 2 of the Act sets forth the purposes and policies of the Act, which include, inter alia, the protection of minors and the strengthening of a minor\u2019s family ties, whenever possible. (111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 2.) The relation between the juvenile court and the minor is that of parens patriae (People v. Zepeda (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 23, 29, 265 N.E.2d 647, 650), and it is the duty of the court to attempt to act solely in the best interests of the child and for his own protection. (In re Frazier (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 119, 123, 376 N.E.2d 643, 646, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 204, 390 N.E.2d 884.) To these ends, a court will even intervene on its own motion and take note of legitimate and substantial errors in the proceeding involving minors even though the minors may be represented by counsel. In re Carson (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 387, 388-89, 294 N.E.2d 75, 76-77.\nThe News argues there must be a request for their exclusion by the parties before it may be denied access. We disagree. The court as parens patriae has a duty to protect a minor when danger of harm is perceived.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nSPITZ, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN,\ndissenting:\nIn my judgment the majority has incorrectly analyzed the issues before this court. As a result, it has reached the wrong conclusion. Respectfully, I dissent.\nTo correctly analyze the issues before this court, three questions must be asked: (1) Do the news media have a statutory right to be present during juvenile court proceedings? (2) If the news media have such a right, do courts possess the authority to impose conditions upon the exercise of that right? (3) Do courts have the authority to prohibit the news media from publishing or disclosing information obtained while a media representative was present during juvenile court proceedings? As the following discussion reveals, the answer to each of these questions is clear, requiring that the orders before us on appeal, purporting to impose restrictions upon the news media, be reversed.\nI. DO THE NEWS MEDIA HAVE A STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE PRESENT DURING JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS?\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give meaning to the intention of the legislature. When the text of the statute being construed is clear, ancillary sources need not be consulted. In my judgment, this is such a case. Section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(6)) states in pertinent part the following: \u201cThe general public except for the news media and the victim shall be excluded from any hearing and ***.\u201d The language appearing after the word \u201cand\u201d in no way affects or modifies the language appearing before that word. The 17 words appearing before the word \u201cand\u201d can mean only one thing: the news media and the victim have the right to be present at a hearing conducted under the Act.\nI feel a bit awkward in making this emphatic assertion in view of the newspaper\u2019s position in this case, conceding that it does not have \u201can \u2018absolute right\u2019 to be admitted to all juvenile proceedings.\u201d It may be that the newspaper thought this position to be tactically advantageous, but as a matter of law, I believe it to be clearly wrong.\nWhile I am sympathetic to the newspaper\u2019s claim that it has a first amendment right of access to proceedings under the Act, this court need not pass upon that question in this case. Similarly, we need not concern ourselves with a lengthy review of what courts from other States have held regarding media access to their juvenile court proceedings. We need not concern ourselves with these subjects because the policy-making branch of our State government, the Illinois General Assembly, has already determined the policy regarding access of the news media to juvenile court proceedings: the news media may be present if they wish. This legislative judgment is in violation of no State or Federal constitutional principle and, accordingly, it must be obeyed. It is utterly inappropriate for courts which disagree with legislative judgments to frustrate those judgments by construing statutes in a fashion to achieve ends thought desirable by the courts but not intended by the legislature.\nBy its holding in this case, the majority has usurped legislative prerogatives by judicially amending section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act to make it read, in effect, as follows: \u201cThe general public except the news media and the victim shall be excluded from any hearing unless the court for good cause shown believes they should be excluded as well.\u201d Had the legislature intended to add the emphasized language, it could have done so.\nIn re Jones (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 506, 263 N.E.2d 863, is the only decision of the Illinois Supreme Court which construed this section. While the majority concedes that the Jones court reasoned the legislature intended \u201copenness to \u2018prevail throughout the [juvenile] proceedings\u2019 \u201d (205 Ill. App. 3d at 489, quoting Jones, 46 Ill. 2d at 509, 263 N.E.2d at 864), that barren concession hardly conveys the feeling of emphasis on this point found in Jones.\n\u201c[I]t is clear that the legislature intended that openness should prevail throughout the proceedings. We are of the opinion that section 1 \u2014 20(6) [the predecessor statute to section 1 \u2014 5(6), which was being construed in Jones] serves the dual function of not only protecting a respondent\u2019s right to a \u2018public trial\u2019 but also preserves the right of the general populace to know what is transpiring in its courts.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Jones, 46 Ill. 2d at 509, 263 N.E.2d at 864.\nThe only other case in which the supreme court has addressed section 1-20(6) is In re a Minor (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 247; 537 N.E.2d 292, in which the issue before the court was whether a newspaper which learns through ordinary reportorial techniques of the identity of a minor charged in a closed criminal proceeding may be forbidden from reporting that information once it has entered the public domain. (Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 250, 537 N.E.2d at 293.) The court held the answer to that question was no. (Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 250-51, 537 N.E.2d at 293.) While Minor did not directly address whether the news media have the right of access to juvenile court proceedings under section 1\u2014 5(6) of the Act, that opinion nonetheless contains an .indication of the supreme court\u2019s view on this subject.\nIn setting forth the factual circumstances in Minor in which the reporter for a local newspaper learned of the alleged delinquent\u2019s identity from her discussions with police officers and Watseka city council members, the court stated the following:\n\u201cThe next day, *** the minor was taken before the trial court to be charged in connection with the shooting. Under the mistaken impression that the courtroom was closed to the press, [the reporter] chose not to attend. During and immediately after the hearing, however, she spoke about the case with an Iroquois County juvenile probation officer, who told her what had happened at the hearing and about the minor\u2019s family life. In the course of the conversation the probation officer, like the police chief, freely used the minor\u2019s name.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 252, 537 N.E.2d at 294.)\nThe emphasized language from the above quotation is a strong indication that the supreme court believes that the courtroom in which the juvenile proceedings in Minor were taking place was open to the press.\nII. DO THE TRIAL COURTS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON NEWS MEDIA ACCESS TO JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS?\nThe majority states that \u201c[i]n our view, the language of section 1\u2014 5(6) suggests the legislature intended to give trial courts control over persons admitted to juvenile court hearings.\u201d (205 Ill. App. 3d at 489-90.) In support of this conclusion, the majority cites section 1 \u2014 8(C) of the Act, which concerns the confidentiality of court records. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 8(C).) In my judgment, this section not only fails to support the majority opinion, but in fact undermines it.\nSection 1 \u2014 8(C) of the Act demonstrates that the legislature is fully capable of distinguishing between the general public on the one hand and the news media on the other in according special rights to the news media which the general public does not possess. That section provides that juvenile court records \u201cshall not be made available to the general public\u201d but may be inspected by the news media upon general or special order of the court.\nCiting section 1 \u2014 8(C) of the Act, the majority states the following: \u201cAllowing the press unfettered access to court hearings where confidential records are generated would render this provision meaningless.\u201d (205 Ill. App. 3d at 490.) Section 2 \u2014 22(2) of the Act states that dispositional reports prepared for juvenile delinquency hearings \u2014 the equivalent of presentence reports used in sentencing hearings for adults \u2014 shall not be disclosed \u201cwithout the express approval of the court pursuant to an in camera hearing.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 22(2).) Section 5 \u2014 3\u20144(b)(7) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) similarly provides that presentence reports shall be opened for inspection to noncourt personnel \u201conly as ordered by the court.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 3\u20144(b)(7).) A comparison of section 2 \u2014 22(2) of the Act with section 5 \u2014 3\u20144(b)(7) of the Code thus reveals that in sentencing hearings regarding both juvenile delinquents and adult criminal defendants, the presentence reports are not to be disclosed, absent a court order. Yet I am confident the majority would not hold that the news media may be denied access or given only restricted access to sentencing hearings in felony cases based upon a claim that \u201c[allowing the press unfettered access to [sentencing] hearings where confidential records are generated would render [the confidentiality statute] meaningless.\u201d\nThe legislature is perfectly capable of saying what it means regarding the sensitive subjects of protection of juveniles and news media access to juvenile court proceedings. Thus, when the legislature in section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act provides for the right of the news media to be present and does not provide for any authority in the trial courts to limit or restrict news media access in any way, this legislative judgment should be respected. The only way to avoid concluding that the legislature meant what it said is somehow to decide that the legislature overlooked the concerns expressed by the majority as to the evils that would befall the juvenile court system if news media access were unlimited. Such a claim is simply untenable in view of the great detail set forth in section 1 \u2014 8 of the Act regarding the confidentiality and accessibility of juvenile court records.\nThe trial court\u2019s claim that it needs \u201cadvance application\u201d by the media whenever the media wished to attend juvenile court proceedings in order to \u201cprevent any delay in the proceedings\u201d is without merit. This claim is in no way connected to the legitimate needs of trial judges to have the discretion to determine the best way to conduct juvenile proceedings. In the hundreds of appeals to this court from proceedings under the Act, no problem has ever been shown in having persons seeking admission to such proceedings identify themselves so that the trial judge might determine whether their presence was appropriate. This record is devoid of any basis to conclude that establishing a procedure to identify such persons is necessary or desirable, much less the requirement of a formal written application for admission. By suggesting such a procedure, the majority is proposing a cure for no known disease.\nIII. DO COURTS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT THE NEWS MEDIA FROM PUBLISHING OR DISCLOSING INFORMATION OBTAINED WHILE A NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WAS PRESENT DURING JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS?\nIn my judgment, this third question is the easiest of the three to answer, and I do so with an emphatic, \u201cNo.\u201d\nThe last sentence of section 1 \u2014 5(6) of the Act states the following: \u201cHowever, the court may, for the minor\u2019s protection and for good cause shown, prohibit any person or agency present in court from further disclosing the minor\u2019s identity.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(6).) In this provision, the legislature has authorized the imposition of restrictions on persons present during proceedings under the Act, such as attorneys or the members of a juvenile\u2019s family, but in doing so, the legislature must be presumed to have intended not to act in violation of the United States Constitution. In my judgment, to hold this provision applicable to the news media would be to violate the first amendment; therefore, this statute must be construed so that the courts are not given authority to impose restrictions upon publication or disclosure by the news media of matters learned by having news media representatives present in the courtroom.\n\u201c[T]he first amendment strips the State of the power to proscribe the publication of information which has already been lawfully revealed and which has been obtained by lawful means.\u201d (Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 268, 537 N.E.2d at 301.)\nAs discussed in part I of this dissent, the news media have the right to be present during juvenile court proceedings; accordingly, anything learned through their presence has, by definition, been lawfully revealed to them and \u201cobtained by lawful means.\u201d Any court orders purporting to limit the use of information obtained through media presence would be an improper effort to impose a prior restraint upon the freedom of the press and would be in violation of the United States Constitution.\nFor the reasons stated, the orders on appeal should be reversed in their entirety.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Traci E. Nally, of Meyer, Capel, Hirschfeld, Muncy, Jahn & Aldeen, P.C., of Champaign, for appellant.", "No brief filed for the People.", "Stephen R. Pacey, of Pacey & Pacey Lawyers, P.C., of Paxton, guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re A MINOR (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Champaign News-Gazette, Appellant).\u2014In re A MINOR (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. The Champaign News-Gazette, Appellant).\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201490\u20140167, 4\u201490\u20140168 cons.\nOpinion filed November 15, 1990.\nSTEIGMANN, J., dissenting.\nTraci E. Nally, of Meyer, Capel, Hirschfeld, Muncy, Jahn & Aldeen, P.C., of Champaign, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for the People.\nStephen R. Pacey, of Pacey & Pacey Lawyers, P.C., of Paxton, guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 502, "last_page_order": 519 }