{ "id": 2565433, "name": "BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Bi-State Development Agency v. Department of Revenue", "decision_date": "1990-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 5-89-0230", "first_page": "668", "last_page": "672", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 668" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5072114 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2629468 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610672 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415218 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461709 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436215 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 1097", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1099" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5074070 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" }, { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516337 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0371-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 9445, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.554209040847965e-07, "percentile": 0.6757056106359869 }, "sha256": "f4b4eefcc01671f2105393fb936b6bff9a9fd86ae0494eeef3b010589314dd22", "simhash": "1:e0a46bbf4a8dc458", "word_count": 1483 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.258665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nBi-State Development Agency (hereinafter Bi-State) is the product of a compact entered into between Illinois and Missouri in 1949. Bi-State is authorized to plan, construct, maintain, own and operate bridges, terminals, airports and terminal facilities. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 63r \u2014 1.) With regard to taxation in Illinois, all property owned or held by Bi-State shall possess the same tax status as any property owned or held by a city in Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 63s \u2014 10.\nPursuant to its statutory authority, Bi-State owns the St. Louis Downtown Parks Airport, located in St. Clair County, Illinois. In 1984, Bi-State acquired a parcel of real estate adjacent to the airport and entered into a \u201cFarm Operating License Agreement\u201d (hereinafter Agreement) with Dan Trost, allowing Trost to farm the parcel. The agreement was for the period from September 28, 1984, to September 27, 1985, and from year to year thereafter unless otherwise terminated.\nIn August of 1986, Bi-State filed an application for property tax exemption for 1986 for the parcel of land owned by Bi-State and farmed by Trost. The Board of Review recommended that the Illinois Department of Revenue (hereinafter Department) approve a full exemption for the property. The Department denied the application for exemption on the basis that the property was not being put to an exempt use. An administrative hearing was then conducted, at Bi-State\u2019s request, and the administrative law judge acting on behalf of the Department issued a disposition finding Bi-State\u2019s interest in the parcel exempt from real estate taxes for 1986. In addition, the administrative law judge found that the agreement between Bi-State and Trost was a lease, and recommended that the value of the leasehold interest in the parcel be assessed to Trost for tax purposes for 1986.\nBi-State filed a complaint for administrative review with the circuit court, praying that the circuit court reverse the decision of the Department insofar as the Department assessed a tax on the value of the leasehold interest held by Trost. On March 14, 1989, the circuit court entered an order reversing the decision of the Department issued by the administrative law judge and ordered the Department to approve the application for property tax exemption for the parcel. The Illinois Department of Revenue filed this appeal.\nThe Department\u2019s sole contention is that the circuit court\u2019s decision is void and should be vacated because the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. Although prior to this appeal the Department did not object to the circuit court\u2019s authority to hear the case, objections to jurisdiction may be raised for the first time, on appeal. (Carillo v. Jam Productions, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 371, 376, 454 N.E.2d 649, 652.) We will, therefore, address the issue raised by the Department.\nWe begin our analysis of this question by asking whether the findings of the administrative law judge, acting on behalf of the Department, were final administrative decisions. Only a final administrative decision is subject to administrative review in our courts. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 102; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 357, 326 N.E.2d 737, 741.) Determinations of finality, and thus of the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter, are specifically challenged here. See City of Wood Dale v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885, 520 N.E.2d 1097, 1099.\nSection 3 \u2014 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines \u201cadministrative decision\u201d or \u201cdecision\u201d as \u201cany decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101.) Bi-State submits that the administrative law judge\u2019s decision regarding the agreement between Bi-State and Trost adversely affected the legal rights and duties of Bi-State\u2019s interest in the agreement. This, reasons Bi-State, clearly shows that the administrative law judge\u2019s decision was not a mere recommendation, but a final administrative order subject to judicial review. We disagree.\nSection 14 \u2014 1408 of the Illinois Income Tax Act expressly provides that the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 1001 et seq.) applies to all administrative rules and procedures of the Department of Revenue under the Illinois Income Tax Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 120, par. 14 \u2014 1408.) Administrative proceedings may be conducted by hearing officers who refer the case for final determination to a board which has not \u201cheard\u201d the evidence in person. (Homefinders, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 115, 128-29, 357 N.E.2d 785, 791.) Due process requirements are fulfilled where the hearing officer conveys his findings, conclusions and impressions of conflicting testimony, by either oral or written report, to the decision-making body. 1 Ill. L. & Prac. Administrative Law & Procedure \u00a734 (1988); Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 66, 80, 303 N.E.2d 606, 616, aff\u2019d (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 204, 326 N.E.2d 406.\nThe record includes two documents which were submitted on behalf of the Department after the conclusion of the administrative hearing. The first is a one-page document with the Illinois Department of Revenue logo at the top, entitled \u201cHearing Disposition Property Tax Exemption.\u201d Bi-State Development Agency is named as the applicant, and the following is shown:\n\u201c_ Approved for_ % of year\n_Approved for_ % of property\n_ \u2014 _ Approved\n_ Disapproved\u201d\nAt the bottom of the page is the signature of the administrative law judge George Nafziger. Also included at the bottom of the page is a signature in the space designated \u201cDirector,\u201d preceded by the word \u201cApproved.\u201d The document concludes with the admonition, \u201cThis hearing disposition may be appealed to the circuit court of the county where the property is located, within 35 days from the date a copy of this hearing disposition was mailed.\u201d\nAttached to this single-page document is a four-page document entitled \u201cRecommended Disposition.\u201d Although not signed or dated, the document appears to have been prepared by the administrative law judge. In fact, the Department contends that this document is the recommended disposition of the administrative law judge, and Bi-State does not dispute that the document was prepared by the administrative law judge. After reciting what the administrative law judge believed to be the issues and findings of fact, the document concludes:\n\u201cI therefore recommend that the fee interest in St. Clair County parcel No. 01 \u2014 36\u20140\u2014300\u2014021, owned by Applicant, be exempt from real estate tax for 1986, and that the value of the leasehold interest of Mr. Trost in said parcel be assessed to him for 1986.\u201d\nWe find that the recommendation as to Trost\u2019s tax liability included in the \u201cRecommended Disposition\u201d was only a recommendation, and not a final administrative decision.\n\u201cThe Administrative Review Law itself contemplates some sort of adversarial process involving the parties affected, where a hearing on controverted facts is held, and ultimately a disposition is rendered by an impartial officer.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Taylor v. State Universities Retirement System (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 372, 376, 512 N.E.2d 399, 402.) Trost was not a party to the administrative hearing, and the administrative law judge\u2019s finding could not serve as anything more than an informational recommendation to the Department. Since the administrative law judge\u2019s recommendation as to Trost\u2019s tax liability was not a final administrative decision, the circuit \u25a0 court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 3 \u2014 102, 3 \u2014 104; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 357, 326 N.E.2d 737, 741.\nWe also disagree with Bi-State\u2019s position that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the case because Bi-State was adversely affected by the Department\u2019s determination. A party seeking reversal has the burden of establishing prejudice. (Cole v. Guy (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 768, 777, 539 N.E.2d 436, 443; Atkins v. Thapedi (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 471, 477, 519 N.E.2d 1073, 1077; 3 Ill. L. & Prac. Appeal & Error \u00a7802 (1953).) As noted above, the \u201cfinding\u201d as to Trost\u2019s tax liability was only a recommended disposition and not a final administrative determination. The Department\u2019s finding as to Bi-State\u2019s exempt tax liability status was a final decision. This decision was in Bi-State\u2019s favor; therefore, we are convinced that Bi-State was not prejudiced by the Department\u2019s hearing disposition.\nIn light of the foregoing, we vacate the decision of the circuit court.\nVacated.\nRARICK and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "David H. Bone, of Kassly, Bone, Becker, Dix, Reagan & Young, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201489\u20140230\nOpinion filed November 20, 1990.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nDavid H. Bone, of Kassly, Bone, Becker, Dix, Reagan & Young, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0668-01", "first_page_order": 690, "last_page_order": 694 }