{ "id": 2566763, "name": "ILLINOIS ARMORED CAR CORPORATION, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John Spizzinoco, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Armored Car Corp. v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1990-11-02", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-3375WC", "first_page": "993", "last_page": "1000", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 993" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082762 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 N.E.2d 725", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2471760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2476015 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3251047 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/276/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 1289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 854", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575871 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0854-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 1025", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3601536 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567504 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167547 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 N.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3493651 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5662133 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531815 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 1120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2947298 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833530 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474327 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083206 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114178 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164164 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 1167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3498244 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2908430 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442395 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0299-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 731, "char_count": 15206, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6470635001198804e-07, "percentile": 0.8899040059864494 }, "sha256": "6cfbfa307616cfdf37ae5dfb69442889e6696436302fce500a2b598ef27279d5", "simhash": "1:1255ba073d727d86", "word_count": 2466 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:36.258665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS ARMORED CAR CORPORATION, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John Spizzinoco, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, John Spizzinoco sought workers\u2019 compensation benefits for injuries sustained while working for Illinois Armored Car Corporation. The arbitrator awarded him $341.19 per week for 262/v weeks as temporary total disability. The arbitrator also awarded $97.52 per week as a wage differential, which represents two-thirds of the difference between the average amount he would have earned if engaged in his former occupation and the average amount earned in the job he is capable of performing after the accident. The Industrial Commission (Commission) affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision on February 23, 1989.\nThe employer appealed to the circuit court of Cook County. On March 20, 1989, the employer filed a request for the issuance of summons, a petition to commence proceeding to review order of the Commission and the certificate of mailing. On the same day, the employer\u2019s attorney executed a bond as its principal. A representative of the employer\u2019s insurance company signed the bond as surety. On April 19, 1989, claimant filed a special and limited appearance and a motion to quash the summons, contending that the bond was defective because it was executed by the attorney as principal, rather than by an agent of the employer. On May 3, 1989, the employer filed the affidavit of Christopher Alexander, its president, which stated that the attorney was authorized to execute the bond as principal on behalf of the respondent on March 20, 1989.\nThe trial court denied claimant\u2019s motion to quash summons and motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The court, however, ultimately confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision that the claimant\u2019s condition was causally related to his October 24, 1985, work injury and that he was entitled to both the temporary total disability benefits and the wage differential.\nThe employer now appeals, contending that the Commission\u2019s decision as to the wage differential was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, it argues that the Commission erred in finding that claimant was unable to perform his previous job and that his earning capacity was diminished. Further, it maintains that the bond executed by its attorney was proper and complied with section 19(f)(2) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.19(f)(2)) and thus the trial court properly found that subject-matter jurisdiction existed.\nThe claimant-appellee argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the bond filed by the employer was defective. Because we believe that the jurisdictional issue disposes of the appeal, it is not necessary to review the evidence relating to the claimant\u2019s injury.\nSection 19(f) of the Act sets forth the requirements for the filing of an appeal from the Commission to the circuit court. Section 19(f)(2) provides in pertinent part: \u201cNo such summons shall issue unless the one against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall upon the filing of his written request for such summons file with the clerk of the court a bond conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the review, he will pay the award and the costs of the proceedings in the courts.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.19(f)(2).\nIn this case, the Commission issued a written decision awarding benefits on February 23, 1989. The employer timely petitioned for review in the circuit court. It also timely filed a bond. However, the bond was not executed by \u201cthe one against whom the award was made,\u201d as the statute requires. Rather, the employer\u2019s attorney executed the bond. Further there was no indication that the attorney had authority to sign the bond until after the statutory period had expired. As such, no subject-matter jurisdiction existed for the appeal, and the trial court improperly denied the claimant\u2019s motion to quash summons.\nThe circuit court exercises special statutory jurisdiction when it hears cases on certiorari to the Industrial Commission. (Perusky v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 299, 381 N.E.2d 270; Peter H. Clark Lodge No. 483 v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 64, 268 N.E.2d 382; Malone v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 116, 489 N.E.2d 1167.) Therefore, statutory requirements for the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction to review Commission cases require strict compliance. (Daugherty v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 1, 457 N.E.2d 381; Arrington v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 505, 451 N.E.2d 866.) In the absence of proof in the record, jurisdiction does not exist. Wabash Area Development, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 392, 430 N.E.2d 1002.\nThe trial court relied on Lee v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 496, 413 N.E.2d 425, to find that jurisdiction existed. In Lee, the Commission awarded benefits against the respondents, Eugene Lee and Jack Onofrey, who were partners doing business as LeJac\u2019s. When the respondents filed an appeal to the circuit court, one partner signed the bond as principal and the other signed as surety. The trial court granted claimant\u2019s motion to dismiss because the bond was not in proper form. The trial court subsequently refused to accept respondents\u2019 tender of a new bond which both partners executed as principals. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, finding that the trial court should have allowed the respondents\u2019 motion to vacate the order quashing the writ and should have determined the sufficiency of the subsequently tendered bond. The court focused on the fact that one of the two respondents did, in fact, execute the original bond. The court concluded that although the bond was irregular in form, the fact that at least one of the respondents signed the bond was sufficient to allow the trial court to find that jurisdiction was proper.\nThe Lee court\u2019s reasoning will not sustain a finding of jurisdiction in this case. Unlike the bond in Lee, the bond here was not executed by the employer against whom the award was made. Although the attorney was hired to represent the employer in this matter, the attorney cannot be considered \u201cthe one against whom the award was made\u201d for purposes of this statute. The award was against the corporation, not the attorney. Further, no agent or officer of the corporation signed the bond. Thus, Lee is distinguishable.\nThe supreme court\u2019s decision in Coultas v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 527, 202 N.E.2d 485, demonstrates the necessity for strict compliance with the section 19(f)(2) bond requirement to confer jurisdiction for review of Commission cases. In Coultas, the Commission awarded benefits to the claimant against L. Coultas doing business as Scott Grain and Land Company. Although the award was made against L. Coultas, the company executed the bond. The court stated: \u201cL. Coultas was the person against whom the Commission entered the award for money and it is she who must file her bond at the time she requests judicial review before such review may be had.\u201d (Coultas, 31 Ill. 2d at 528, 202 N.E.2d at 486.) The supreme court thus concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.\nThe employer argues, however, that under basic agency law, its attorney was authorized to execute the bond on its behalf. Specifically, the employer suggests two bases of authority: actual authority and ratified authority. Under either theory, however, the employer\u2019s argument fails.\nGenerally, the ordinary agency rules apply to the attorney-client relationship. (Flight Kitchen, Inc. v. Chicago Seven-Up Bottling Co. (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 558, 317 N.E.2d 663; Doyle v. Shlensky (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 807, 458 N.E.2d 1120.) However, a court may not presume the agent\u2019s authority to bind the principal. (Hofner v. Glenn Ingram & Co. (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311.) Instead, the person alleging authority must show the source of his authority unless the principal ratified the act. Hofner v. Glenn Ingram & Co. (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311; Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 431, 454 N.E.2d 754.\nThe employer contends that it ratified the attorney\u2019s authority by tendering its president\u2019s own affidavit. Where an act is performed by one person without authority for the benefit of another, or by an authorized agent in excess of his authority, the person for whose benefit the act was done may ratify the act. (Copley v. Pekin Insurance Co. (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 299, 474 N.E.2d 57, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 76, 488 N.E.2d 1004; Effingham State Bank v. Blades (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 259, 487 N.E.2d 431.) Ratification of an unauthorized act is the equivalent of an original authorization and confirms that which was originally unauthorized. Hofner v. Glenn Ingram & Co. (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311; Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Concordia Mutual Life Association (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481 N.E.2d 1025.\nHowever, even assuming that the sworn affidavit here ratified the attorney\u2019s unauthorized execution of the bond, the attorney\u2019s authority did not appear in the record within the statutory period. The failure to demonstrate this authority until after the statutory period expired does not meet the strict compliance standard required for circuit court review of Industrial Commission cases. Arrington v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 505, 451 N.E.2d 866.\nThe employer also contends that the attorney possessed actual authority to execute the bond. Authority of an agent may be either actual or apparent; actual authority may be either express or implied. (Hofner v. Glenn Ingram & Co. (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311.) The record shows no evidence that an agent of the employer expressly authorized the attorney to file the bond prior to the expiration of the statutory period.\nImplied authority is defined as actual authority proved circumstantially and is implied from facts and circumstances. (Mateyka v. Schroeder (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 854, 504 N.E.2d 1289.) Aside from the belated affidavit, there are no facts or circumstances in the record which demonstrate the attorney\u2019s authority to execute the bond. The employer hired the attorney to represent it in this worker\u2019s compensation case. As such, we may presume that she had the authority to take certain actions to defend the employer in this case. However, we cannot presume that the attorney had authority on March 20, 1989, to obligate her client to pay an $8,300 bond. (Hofner v. Glenn Ingram & Co. (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311.) The only evidence in the record which even suggests the attorney\u2019s authority appears in the affidavit which was filed after the statutory period ended.\nThe scope of an agent\u2019s implied authority may be ascertained by determining what reasonably prudent persons, who are familiar with pertinent business practices, might rightfully believe the agent possesses based on the principal\u2019s conduct. (Mateyka v. Schroeder (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 854, 504 N.E.2d 1289.) It is un likely that a reasonable person would assume that retaining an attorney to defend a corporation against a worker\u2019s compensation claim would necessarily give the attorney authority to obligate the corporation financially. Nor is this the customary practice. Decisions relating to a corporation\u2019s financial obligations are typically reserved for corporate officers and directors, not for attorneys representing the corporation. The purpose of an appeal bond is to protect the employee. (Cooke v. Groveland Coal Mining Co. (1934), 276 Ill. App. 521.) The bond here failed to protect the claimant in the same way as one executed by a corporate officer.\nIn our opinion, employer\u2019s bond does not substantially comply with the material provisions of section 19(f)(2). While we recognize the merits of honoring substance over form and simplifying appeal procedures, we believe that the substance of the statutory bond requirement was not fulfilled in this case.\nAlthough it is sometimes proper to correct a mistake on appeal, it is not proper to belatedly supply a jurisdiction element. (Peasley v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 460, 555 N.E.2d 1172.) In Beasley, the claimant failed to exhibit a receipt showing payment to the clerk of the court within the statutory period, as required by section 19(f)(1). After the statutory period expired, claimant filed the requisite receipt. The court held that claimant could not attempt to cure a jurisdictional flaw after the statutory period expired, and, thus, no jurisdiction was conferred.\nBeasley is apposite to the present case. Although a bond was filed within the 20-day period, it was not executed by the party against whom the award was made, as the statute requires. Further, the attorney\u2019s authority to sign the bond was not apparent within the 20-day statutory period. As in Beasley, the defect in the jurisdictional requirement was not cured until after the statutory period had expired, when the employer\u2019s agent tendered an affidavit which ratified the attorney\u2019s execution. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 439, 273 N.E.2d 725 (employer filed for review after 20-day period had expired; later affidavit stating that counsel misplaced the Commission\u2019s decision cannot cure defect; no jurisdiction).\nNotwithstanding our holding that no jurisdiction existed for review of the Commission\u2019s original order, we should note that even if there were jurisdiction, the Commission\u2019s decision to award benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, that decision would not be disturbed by this court. See Odie v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1982), 88 Ill. 2d 514, 431 N.E.2d 374.\nThe Commission found that claimant was entitled to a wage differential under section 8(d)(1) of the Act because he was no longer able to perform his usual employment and was now earning less money due to his work-related injury. The medical evidence on this issue was in dispute. Drs. Kale, Brash and Bias all opined that claimant was unable to perform his usual duties as coin roller and truck driver, while Dr. Shafer believed that claimant was fully capable of returning to his usual duties. It is, of course, for the Commission to decide which of the conflicting medical opinions is to be accepted, and we would not disturb that determination.\nWe hold that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits since the employer against whom the award of money was made did not file its bond. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed, with directions to quash the writ of certiorari.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.\nBARRY, P.J., and WOODWARD, McCULLOUGH and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Jobin & Flynn, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Law Offices of Cohn, Lambert, Ryan, Schneider & Harman, Ltd., of Chicago (David M. Parish, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS ARMORED CAR CORPORATION, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John Spizzinoco, Appellee).\nFirst District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20143375WC\nOpinion filed November 2, 1990.\nLaw Offices of Jobin & Flynn, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLaw Offices of Cohn, Lambert, Ryan, Schneider & Harman, Ltd., of Chicago (David M. Parish, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0993-01", "first_page_order": 1015, "last_page_order": 1022 }