{ "id": 2558708, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL BEASLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Beasley", "decision_date": "1990-11-16", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201486\u20143095", "first_page": "112", "last_page": "121", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 112" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3616551 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615019 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152559 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217778 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121800 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "163-64", "parenthetical": "Clark, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "Goldenhersh, J., dissenting, joined by Simon, J." }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3151982 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "264" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 N.E. 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5092414 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/307/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 U.S. 14", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 633947 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17-18" }, { "page": "20" }, { "page": "1643" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "1643" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "1644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255347 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0066-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 875, "char_count": 21025, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.41364513009464e-08, "percentile": 0.5162837678953484 }, "sha256": "881f2466d6eca43bad418c553c942fc63d0fd41933058c59ace28968b5d55e78", "simhash": "1:c01ab1d65747a7d6", "word_count": 3497 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:01:48.752962+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL BEASLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Terrell Beasley, appeals from his convictions for murder and two counts of attempted murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 8\u20144, 9\u20141(a)(1).) We address the following three issues: (1) whether the trial judge\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement was manifestly erroneous; (2) whether defendant was denied equal protection when he was tried as an adult; and (3) whether the trial judge properly sentenced defendant as an adult. We affirm defendant\u2019s convictions.\nDefendant, who was 16 years old, was arrested in his home on March 3, 1985, for a shooting that occurred in a photography studio on March 2, 1985. One person was killed and two were injured. After his arrest, defendant gave a statement to police, and prior to trial he moved to suppress it based on his warrantless arrest. At the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, the following evidence was presented.\nDuring the investigation of the shooting, police obtained the physical description of one of the men involved and learned his nickname was Porky. Based on information that defendant was Porky, six police officers in plain clothes went to defendant\u2019s house at 2:30 a.m., on March 3, 1985, without an arrest warrant. Four officers went to the front door and the remaining two officers guarded the back door. The four officers who went to the front door testified at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nDetective Bogucki and his partner, Detective Raymond Schalk, testified that defendant\u2019s mother answered the door and allowed the officers to enter the house. The officers stayed in the front room while defendant\u2019s mother woke up defendant. He fit the description of the man they were looking for, and he admitted his nickname was Porky. Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station.\nOfficer William Wagner and his partner, Officer Joe Rodriguez, however, testified that a young woman answered the door and said she would wake up defendant\u2019s mother. The woman allowed the officers to enter the house. Rodriguez testified that the woman told them to wait in the living room while she woke up defendant\u2019s mother. After defendant\u2019s mother spoke with the officers, they followed her to a bedroom where she woke up defendant. Defendant confirmed his nickname was Porky, and the officers took defendant to the police station. Wagner also testified that they did not believe defendant was armed.\nMs. Kimberly Knight, a 19-year-old woman who was a friend of defendant\u2019s family, testified that she answered the door for the police officers. Knight told them to wait at the door while she woke up defendant\u2019s mother but she did not give them permission to enter. After Knight left to wake up defendant\u2019s mother, the officers entered the house. She told them that they could not come in and asked them to wait outside. An officer told her to \u201cshut up\u201d and went to the bedroom. At that time, defendant\u2019s mother came out of another bedroom and told the police to leave. The officers woke up defendant and told him they wanted to take him to the station for questioning.\nMs. Carolyn Figures, a 23-year-old woman who was also a friend of defendant\u2019s family, testified that Knight answered the door. When Knight left to wake up defendant\u2019s mother, Figures went to the door and spoke with the police. Figures testified that she did not give the officers permission to enter; however, when she walked away from the door, the officers entered the house. Defendant\u2019s mother came out of her bedroom and told the officers to get out. The officers took defendant to the police station.\nMrs. Christine Beasley, defendant\u2019s 37-year-old mother, testified that she was sleeping and woke up when she heard Knight scream, \u201c \u2018Stay out.\u2019 \u201d She came out of her bedroom and saw the police officers inside the house. She told them to get out. She denied that she answered the door and allowed the police to enter. She testified that neither Knight nor Figures lived at the house.\nThe trial judge found that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and exigent circumstances justified the officers\u2019 warrant-less entry into defendant\u2019s house. Alternatively, the judge found that Knight, with apparent authority, consented to the officers\u2019 entry He believed Detectives Bogucki and Schalk were mistaken as to the identity of the person who answered the door but each of the police officers\u2019 testimony supported the conclusion that they were given consent to enter. As a result, defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was denied.\nIn a jury trial, the State presented evidence that on March 2, 1985, at approximately 4:15 p.m., a man wearing a ski mask entered a photography studio on North Avenue and fired several shots at a group of people. Another man was behind him. Carlos Romero, a 13-year-old boy, was killed, and Ramon and Jamie Bucio were injured.\nTommy Hernandez testified that in the afternoon of March 2, he was in the alley behind his house and saw defendant, whom he knew as Porky, and another man, whom he knew as Keto, walking toward North Avenue. Both Porky and Keto were members of a gang. Shortly thereafter, he heard gunshots and saw defendant and another person wearing a ski mask running down the alley. The person wearing the ski mask was wearing the same clothes Keto had on earlier.\nOfficer Schalk testified that on March 3 at 5:30 p.m., after defendant was arrested, taken to the police station, and given Miranda warnings, he gave a statement. Defendant told police that his nickname was Porky and he and Keto were members of a gang. On the day of the shooting, Keto said they were going to \u201cburn\u201d some members of a rival gang. They went to the photography studio, and Keto kicked the door open and started shooting. Defendant was behind him. Afterward, defendant and Keto ran away.\nThe State rested its case against defendant.\nDefendant presented one witness, Rosie Valldeperes, who was present at the photography studio at the time of the shooting and testified that she did not see anyone behind the gunman.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied.\nAt the sentencing hearing, defendant presented two witnesses in mitigation, a counsellor and a teacher from his high school. The witnesses testified that defendant was in classes for \u201ceducationable mentally handicapped\u201d students which meant he was functioning at lower than average mental capability. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 30 years for murder and 25 years for each count of attempted murder.\nSubsequently, defendant filed a supplemental motion for new trial and for reconsideration of sentence. Defendant argued he was entitled to a new trial based on new evidence discovered during the sentencing hearing that defendant was an educable, mentally handicapped student. Defendant presented a psychologist, Alan K. Rosenwald, who testified that defendant was \u201cborderline mental defective.\u201d Due to defendant\u2019s limited vocabulary development and inability to recognize the words used, Rosenwald had the opinion that defendant had a minimal understanding of Miranda warnings and he was not able to effectively participate in his defense. Defendant also argued that his sentence was excessive. The trial judge denied the motion and defendant filed a notice of appeal.\nOpinion\nInitially, we consider whether the trial judge\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The trial judge found that although the police did not have a warrant, either exigent circumstances or consent justified their entry into defendant\u2019s home to arrest him. As a result of the ruling, the statement defendant gave at the police station was admitted in evidence at trial. The trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it was clearly erroneous. People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 554 N.E.2d 192.\nAssuming for the purpose of argument that defendant\u2019s warrant-less arrest violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, we must consider the effect of a recent United States Supreme Court opinion on the question of whether defendant\u2019s statement was admissible at trial. In New York v. Harris (1990), 495 U.S. 14, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13, 110 S. Ct. 1640, the Supreme Court held that although the police made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into defendant\u2019s home to arrest him, his statement made outside the home was admissible because the police had probable cause to arrest.\nIn Harris, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for murder. Although they did not have a warrant and were not given consent, they entered defendant\u2019s home and arrested him. After he was taken to the police station and read his Miranda rights, defendant signed a written statement which he subsequently moved to suppress. The trial judge denied the motion, and the statement was admitted in evidence at trial. On appeal from his conviction, defendant in Harris argued that the statement should have been suppressed because under the fourth amendment the police were prohibited from entering his home to arrest him if they did not have a warrant or consent to enter, as held in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639,100 S. Ct. 1371.\nThe United States Supreme Court in Harris found that although defendant\u2019s arrest violated Payton, his statement at the police station was admissible. The court in Harris stated:\n\u201c[W]e decline to apply the exclusionary rule in this context because the rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects *** protection for statements made outside their premises where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a crime. * * *\nNothing in the reasoning of [Payton] suggests that an arrest in a home without a warrant but with probable cause somehow renders unlawful continued custody of the suspect once he is removed from the house.\u201d (Harris, 495 U.S. at 17-18, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 20, 110 S. Ct. at 1643.)\nHowever, a violation of Payton will justify suppressing evidence or statements obtained inside the home. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13, 110 S. Ct. 1640.\nThe Court distinguished Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254, where defendant\u2019s statements were suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree because they had a \u201csufficiently close relationship\u201d to an arrest without probable cause. (Harris, 495 U.S. at 19, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 1643; see Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407.) Conversely, in Harris, defendant was in lawful custody at the time he made the statement because the police had probable cause to arrest. Therefore, his statement given at the police station was not \u201can exploitation\u201d of the police officers\u2019 illegal entry into his home and was admissible at trial. Harris, 495 U.S. at 19, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 1644.\nIn the present case, defendant does not challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling that the police had probable cause to arrest him when they entered his home. Defendant argued that neither exigent circumstances nor consent justified the police officers' entry and, therefore, his statement should have been suppressed. Under Harris, these questions are irrelevant as the statement defendant sought to suppress was not obtained inside his home. Rather, defendant sought to suppress his statement which he gave at the police station after his arrest. Such a statement is admissible under Harris despite a violation of Payton. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was not manifestly erroneous.\nDefendant accepts that Harris disposes of his argument that the statement was inadmissible because the police, violated the fourth amendment. Alternatively, defendant urges this court to disregard Harris and grant greater protection under article I, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76) which, similar to the fourth amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.\nDefendant argues that the Illinois Supreme Court applied an exclusionary rule in People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728, before the Federal exclusionary rule was applied to the States in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684. In Brocamp, the court held that evidence obtained in an illegal search of defendant\u2019s home should not have been admitted at trial. Brocamp is consistent with Harris, which stated that an illegal entry into defendant\u2019s home will justify the suppression of evidence obtained in the home. In the present case, however, defendant sought to suppress the statement he gave at the police station.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has acknowledged that in the past it has elected to adopt the United States Supreme Court\u2019s construction of the fourth amendment when construing section 6 of article I of the State Constitution, although it is not required to do so. (People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147.) The court in Tisler stated:\n\u201cAfter having accepted the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in deciding fourth amendment cases as the appropriate construction of the search and seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution for so many years, we should not suddenly change course and go our separate way simply to accommodate the desire of the defendant to circumvent what he perceives as a narrowing of his fourth amendment rights ***. Any variance between the Supreme Court\u2019s construction of the provisions of the fourth amendment in the Federal Constitution and similar provisions in the Illinois Constitution must be based on more substantial grounds. We must find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned.\u201d (Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 245, 469 N.E.2d at 157.)\nThe court noted that the constitutional convention intended to extend the protection of the fourth amendment to include new protections against invasions of privacy and eavesdropping in section 6 of article I. (See also Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. I, \u00a76, Constitutional Commentary, at 317 (Smith-Hurd 1971) (the section expanded upon the individual rights of the previous version of the section and the guarantees of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments).) However, the convention did not intend to \u201cexpand the nature of the protection afforded by the fourth amendment.\u201d (Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 242, 469 N.E.2d at 155.) As a result, the court in Tisler followed the Supreme Court\u2019s construction of the fourth amendment in construing article I, section 6, of the State Constitution.\nA special concurrence and a dissent criticized the majority\u2019s approach. (Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Clark, J., specially concurring; Goldenhersh, J., dissenting, joined by Simon, J.).) Justice Clark noted in his special concurrence:\n\u201c[T]he majority\u2019s stance on this issue is dangerous because it limits our power to interpret our own State Constitution in the future. ***\nUnder the majority\u2019s analysis, this court would be precluded from protecting the civil liberties of Illinois citizens should the United States Supreme Court decide to consistently favor police efficiency over the rights of the accused. Although the majority\u2019s reasoning may seem harmless today, it would preclude this court from protecting the individual liberties of Illinois citizens should such protection become essential in the future.\u201d (Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 259, 469 N.E.2d at 163-64 (Clark, J., specially concurring).)\nSimilarly, Justice Goldenhersh noted that the court was not required to \u201c \u2018blindly follow\u2019 \u201d the United States Supreme Court. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 264, 469 N.E.2d at 166 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting, joined by Simon, J.), quoting People v. Exline (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 150, 157, 456 N.E.2d 112 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).\nIn resolving the issue of whether we should adopt the reasoning of Harris in construing section 6 of article I of the State Constitution, we must be guided by the majority opinion in Tisler. The court acknowledged that it had the power to break from the Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of the fourth amendment but declined to \u201csuddenly change course\u201d from its previous decisions which paralleled the Supreme Court without \u201csubstantial grounds\u201d to do so. (Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 245, 469 N.E.2d at 157.) Accordingly, we believe Harris is applicable to the present case and, as a result, we must reject defendant\u2019s argument that the trial judge erroneously denied his motion to suppress.\nDefendant also argues that his equal protection rights were violated when he was tried as an adult under section 2 \u2014 7(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702 \u2014 7(6)(a) (current version at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 805 \u2014 4(6)(a))). As an exception to juvenile court jurisdiction, section 2 \u2014 7(6)(a) provides that a minor would be tried as an adult if he was at least 15 years old at the time of the crime and was charged with murder or certain other Class X felonies. In this case, defendant was tried as an adult because he was 16 years old at the time of the crime and he was charged with murder. He contends that he was denied equal protection because he was prosecuted under an accountability theory and because he was \u201cmentally defective.\u201d\nThis argument was not raised in the trial court. In his motion for new trial, defendant argued that the Juvenile Court Act was only intended to apply to principals but he did not contend that the act violated equal protection. The failure to raise an issue in the trial court can result in a waiver of that issue on appeal (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124); however, plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal although they were not raised in the trial court (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). We do not believe that plain error occurred in this case because the supreme court has field that the section does not violate equal protection. People v. M.A. (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 135, 529 N.E.2d 492; People v. J.S. (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 395, 469 N.E.2d 1090.\nLastly, defendant argues that the trial judge erred in sentencing him as an adult. At the time defendant was sentenced on May 22, 1986, section 2\u20147(6)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702\u2014 7(6)(c) (current version at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 805 \u2014 4(6)(c))) provided that if a minor was tried as an adult and convicted of an offense listed in section 2 \u2014 7(6)(a), the trial judge had the option to sentence defendant as an adult under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20141\u20141 et seq.) or as a juvenile under Article 5 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 705\u20141 et seq.). Defendant argues his sentence should be vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the judge did not consider the option to sentence defendant as a juvenile.\nAt the sentencing hearing, defendant\u2019s attorney did not request the trial judge to sentence defendant as a juvenile and instead requested a prison term of 20 years, which was the minimum sentence for murder under section 5\u20148\u20141(a)(1)(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(1)(a)). The judge sentenced defendant as an adult to prison terms of 30 years for murder and 25 years for each count of attempted murder, to run concurrently. Although defendant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, he failed to raise this issue.\nIt cannot be presumed that the trial judge was unaware of the option to sentence defendant as a juvenile. (People v. White (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 536 N.E.2d 812.) Where defendant\u2019s attorney invited the trial judge to sentence defendant as an adult, defendant cannot claim on appeal that the judge abused his discretion in sentencing him as an adult. (People v. Berryman (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 548, 526 N.E.2d 180.) Accordingly, there is no basis to vacate defendant\u2019s sentence.\nAffirmed.\nMURRAY and GORDON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Martin Carlson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and McCollough, Campbell & Lane, both of Chicago (David E. Schroeder, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Paul Gliatta, and Karlene Behringer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRELL BEASLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201486\u20143095\nOpinion filed November 16, 1990.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Martin Carlson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and McCollough, Campbell & Lane, both of Chicago (David E. Schroeder, of counsel), for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Paul Gliatta, and Karlene Behringer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0112-01", "first_page_order": 134, "last_page_order": 143 }