{ "id": 2561314, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lawrence", "decision_date": "1990-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201489\u20140256", "first_page": "622", "last_page": "625", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 622" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2576679 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138191 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5476875 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522919 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" }, { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" }, { "page": "832-33" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563871 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "182-83" }, { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0174-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 423, "char_count": 6425, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1042491682310593e-07, "percentile": 0.7622548650519779 }, "sha256": "127aafaffb389078073d65fe4cb566a4052e72488aef4bd0d58b6e25fd3b0ea1", "simhash": "1:59ea340f77c4f4c7", "word_count": 1048 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:01:48.752962+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE RARICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Richard Lawrence, appeals from the judgment entered by the circuit court of Wayne County revoking his probation and ordering him to pay restitution. We reverse in part and affirm in part.\nIn October of 1987, defendant pleaded guilty to two separate counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to one year of periodic imprisonment and 30 months\u2019 probation and ordered to pay $405 as restitution to the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). Pursuant to section 6 \u2014 205(b)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 205(b)(2)), defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license also was revoked as a result of his conviction.\nAfter completing his sentence of periodic imprisonment, defendant was arrested for driving while license revoked. A petition was filed two days later requesting the revocation of defendant\u2019s probation. Defendant\u2019s probation subsequently was revoked. This time, defendant was sentenced to 30 months\u2019 probation without credit for prior time served and to two weekends of periodic imprisonment along with being ordered to pay all outstanding fines and court costs.\nDefendant first argues on appeal in reliance upon People v. Lindner (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 174, 535 N.E.2d 829, that his license to drive was not properly revoked and, therefore, the revocation of his probation was improper and should be reversed. In Lindner, our supreme court struck down section 6 \u2014 205(b)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 205(b)(2)), the statute under which defendant\u2019s license was revoked, as a violation of the due process clauses of the Illinois and United States constitutions. (127 Ill. 2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 834.) The trial court here, however, believed the holding only applied to convictions for specified sex offenses and accordingly agreed to the revocation of defendant\u2019s probation. It is true the convictions involved in Lindner are sex offense-related, but this does not mean the court\u2019s holding is so narrowly limited. The supreme court reviewed in detail section 6\u2014 205(b)(2) and the Illinois Vehicle Code in general. Upon determining the legislative purpose in enacting the Code was to protect the public interest of safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles, the court concluded section 6 \u2014 205(b)(2) constituted an unreasonable means of furthering this public interest. To prohibit persons from driving merely because they have committed an offense which did not even involve the use of a motor vehicle is not a reasonable way to ensure that motor vehicles will be owned and operated safely and legally. (127 Ill. 2d at 182-83, 535 N.E.2d at 832-33.) The court further stated the inclusion of the enumerated offenses and no others was an arbitrary decision of the legislature. (127 Ill. 2d at 183, 535 N.E.2d at 833.) We therefore believe the trial court erred in distinguishing Lindner solely on the basis of which offense defendant was convicted of. Lindner overruled section 6 \u2014 205(b)(2) in its entirety without regard for the specific offense as an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of State powers.\nThe State counters that revocation of driving privileges for delivery of a controlled substance can be reasonably related to the purpose of repressing the commission of such crimes. The same argument can be made for numerous other crimes committed without the use of a motor vehicle. The choice of this offense and no others remains an arbitrary decision of the legislature. We therefore conclude defendant\u2019s license was never properly revoked. Consequently, the decision to revoke defendant\u2019s probation based upon his arrest for driving while license revoked must be reversed.\nDefendant also argues on appeal the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $405 restitution to DCI because DCI is not a victim.\nWe initially note that the State\u2019s contentions that defendant has waived this issue for appeal are erroneous. A void order may be attacked at any time. People v. Evans (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 733, 740, 461 N.E.2d 634, 639; People v. Daugherty (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 89, 92, 432 N.E.2d 391, 394.\n\u2022 4, 5 Turning to the merits of the issue, admittedly, when public monies have been expended to purchase drugs by undercover agents, the governmental agency that funded the purchase is not a victim within the intendments of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20146(b)). (See Evans, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 740, 461 N.E.2d at 639.) Here, however, we are not dealing with a restitution order imposed after a jury verdict. Rather, we are faced with a restitution order comprising an essential term of defendant\u2019s plea agreement. Under such circumstances, if legal consideration is present and both parties have in fact entered into an agreement, then both parties will be bound by such agreement. (People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441, 448-49, 478 N.E.2d 350, 353-54.) In this instance, the State\u2019s legal consideration consisted of giving up the right to seek the maximum sentence allowed for defendant\u2019s conviction while defendant\u2019s legal consideration was giving up his right to a trial by jury. Defendant clearly received the benefit of his bargain and is, therefore, bound by the terms of his agreement. In light of this, we can vacate defendant\u2019s restitution order only if the record indicates the plea agreement was involuntary or uninformed. We find no indication such was the case. We, therefore, affirm the trial court\u2019s order of restitution to DCI. See People v. Brumas (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 542, 548.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the order entered by the circuit court of Wayne County revoking defendant\u2019s probation is reversed while the order of restitution to DCI is affirmed.\nReversed in part; affirmed in part.\nWELCH and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE RARICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Erwin J. Anderson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Barry Vaughn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Fairfield (Kenneth R. Boyle and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201489\u20140256\nOpinion filed December 31, 1990.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Erwin J. Anderson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nBarry Vaughn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Fairfield (Kenneth R. Boyle and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0622-01", "first_page_order": 644, "last_page_order": 647 }