{ "id": 2555226, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOE L. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Young", "decision_date": "1990-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 4-90-0219", "first_page": "130", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 130" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615171 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656305 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" }, { "page": "1041", "parenthetical": "awaiting money from home" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3388916 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607-08" }, { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3620829 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" }, { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3311742 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" }, { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2803931 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" }, { "page": "589-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212318 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238302 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2846753 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0555-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 636, "char_count": 10675, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0555080549609794e-07, "percentile": 0.5552487809134818 }, "sha256": "82255e5248f16328040424ffb115e2368e9d31c9480e2744f39a456a7a28f141", "simhash": "1:bb24f4cc6fa62ec6", "word_count": 1788 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:09.339704+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOE L. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Joe L. Young, was convicted of armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 33A\u2014 2), attempt (armed robbery) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4(a), 18 \u2014 2), and aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4), and was sentenced to 11 years, 10 years, and 5 years in prison, respectively. On appeal, defendant claims, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded him from replacing his court-appointed counsel with a private attorney of his own choice. We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand for a new trial.\nI. Facts\nDefendant and Gary Bolden were arrested and charged with attempt (armed robbery) and armed violence on July 24, 1989, and the Vermilion County public defender was appointed as counsel for both defendants. On September 8, 1989, both defendants were arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and jury trial was set for October 23, 1989. However, on October 23, Vermilion County public defender Robert Melntire, who represented both defendants, filed a motion for separate trials or, in the alternative, separate counsel for each defendant. The court denied the motion for severance but granted the motion for substitution of counsel. The court appointed attorney Theodore Pasierb to represent Bolden. Pasierb immediately requested a continuance, and that request was granted. The court set October 30, 1989, as the trial date for both defendants.\nOn the morning of October 30, prior to jury selection, Melntire informed the court that defendant wished to replace him with an attorney of defendant\u2019s own choice. Melntire explained that defendant had apparently received bail money (in excess of $1,500) four days earlier and intended to use it to hire his own lawyer. The court summarily denied the motion, stating that \u201cbecause of the late time and the Jury trial is set this date, the Defendant is incarcerated, the motion for a continuance to seek another counsel is denied.\u201d\nAfter a luncheon recess, attorney John McFetridge appeared in open court and stated that defendant had contacted him for the purpose of representation. McFetridge explained his situation as follows:\n\u201cMR. McFETRIDGE: Your Honor, if I might, I have been contacted very recently by Mr. Young who has expressed a desire to retain me. I had spoken to him some time ago. Apparently his ability to do so is of extremely recent genesis. Miss Simpson [the assistant State\u2019s Attorney] has advised me that she would be resisting any such appearance for the reason that the matter is set for trial right away. I\u2019m not sure what the Court\u2019s position [is] nor, in fact, what that of other Counsel is in this.\u201d\nPasierb told the court that he would not object to McFetridge\u2019s entry as long as the trial would not be delayed by a continuance. The State objected to McFetridge\u2019s entry, claiming it was \u201cmore than likely a ruse to move the case from your Honor\u2019s court call\u201d because McFetridge was employed by the judge\u2019s former law firm, and \"would also prevent us from starting the trial this afternoon.\u201d In support of Mc-Fetridge\u2019s entry of appearance for defendant, the public defender, Melntire, argued that defendant had only recently become financially able to retain private counsel who was now \u201cavailable and willing\u201d to enter his appearance and that the only previous continuance in the case had been primarily for the benefit of the codefendant. After hearing arguments, the entire ruling and explanation of the trial court was as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay, the motion to enter substitution of Counsel is denied as being untimely. We\u2019ll proceed to trial on this case. Bring in 30 prospective Jurors. Is there anything else we need before we start?\nMR. MeINTIRE: The only other matter is I\u2019m not quite sure of the state of the record with respect to Mr. McFetridge\u2019s willingness to enter an appearance. I understand that Mr. Mc-Fetridge\u2014\nMR. McFETRIDGE: Judge, I\u2019m reluctant to address the Court on any substantive issues in this matter for a lot of good reasons, simple good manners being one and prohibition of my practicing before your Honor. I believe Mr. Mclntire has adequately articulated Mr. Young\u2019s position in this matter, and I note that everything is being transcribed by a Court Reporter.\nTHE COURT: Okay. The motion is still denied. I think it\u2019s untimely. Mr. Young has had from 7/24[/89, the day of his initial appearance]. I realize that there may have been a question of monetary needs. We continued this case last week to this morning. We continued it this morning after hearing it. There are a hundred Jurors out there. There\u2019s a co-Defendant that wishes to have a trial, and based on all those I don\u2019t believe it would be appropriate to allow an entry of appearance or substitution of Counsel. Bring 30 people in, and we\u2019ll start picking a Jury.\u201d\nII. Analysis\nA defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78), which \u201cincludes the right to be represented by counsel of one\u2019s own choice.\u201d (People v. Green (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 555, 557, 248 N.E.2d 116, 117; see also People v. Holmes (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 204, 217 (\u201cThis constitutional guaranty [of the right to assistance of counsel] encompasses both the right to effective representation by competent counsel [citation] and the right to select and be represented by one\u2019s preferred attorney (Wheat v. United States (1988), 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 D-DO The right to choice of counsel is an absolute right, limited only when abused, such as attempts to thwart, delay, or embarrass the effective administration of justice (Green, 42 Ill. 2d at 557, 248 N.E.2d at 117; People v. Solomon (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 586, 590, 182 N.E.2d 736, 739; People v. Spurlark (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 186, 196, 384 N.E.2d 767, 774 (referring to the right to be represented by a particular counsel as \u201cfundamental\u201d)) or when a conflict of interest might arise (Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 226-27).\nIf a defendant moves to change counsel, it is within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion to grant or deny a continuance for the substitution of counsel. (Solomon, 24 Ill. 2d at 589-90, 182 N.E.2d at 738.) \u201cAt what point a defendant\u2019s right to select counsel unreasonably interferes with the orderly process of judicial administration, necessarily depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case and is a matter which lies within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Spurlark, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 197, 384 N.E.2d at 774; see also People v. Terry (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 185, 190, 532 N.E.2d 568, 572.) Therefore, we must determine whether the court\u2019s action in this case amounts to an abuse of discretion.\nIn People v. Koss (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 605, 367 N.E.2d 1040, this court concluded \u201cthat if new counsel, specifically identified, stands ready, willing[,] and able to make an unconditional entry of appearance instanter, a motion for continuance should be allowed. If any one of these requirements be lacking, the decisions indicate that a denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion.\u201d Koss, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 607-08, 367 N.E.2d at 1041.\nFrom the record before this court, attorney McFetridge apparently stood willing and able to make an entry; the only reason we do not know if he was ready to do so unconditionally is because the court never asked. Thus, McFetridge never discussed how prepared he was for trial, if he would need a continuance, and how lengthy that might have to be. The Illinois Supreme Court in Green, speaking through Justice Schaefer, discussed the late entry of appearance of new counsel, as follows:\n\u201c[T]he right of an accused to be represented by counsel of his choice cannot be permitted to bring about an \u2018indefinite thwarting of the administration of justice.\u2019 But no such danger was threatened in this case, and we are of the opinion that the defendant\u2019s constitutional right was violated when the court, without any inquiry into the truth of the circumstances described by the defendant, summarily denied his request for a continuance and insisted that he go to trial that day, represented by an assistant public defender who had no opportunity to investigate the case.\u201d (Green, 42 Ill. 2d at 557, 248 N.E.2d at 117.)\nWe note that the public defender in the present case was fully prepared to proceed, as opposed to the circumstances in Green, but Green still provides guidance as to what inquiries the court should make. Unless the court specifically finds that defendant is utilizing his right to counsel to thwart the administration of justice, defendant\u2019s right to counsel of his choice ought to be respected. All that is shown in this case is the potential for an inconvenience to the administration of justice; such an inconvenience cannot be deemed an unreasonable interference with the orderly process of judicial administration.\nThe present case differs from others in which a defendant merely expressed a desire to obtain private counsel (Terry, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 191, 532 N.E.2d at 572) or \u201cexpected\u201d private counsel to make an entry of appearance (People v. Capers (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370, 542 N.E.2d 528, 530). This case also differs from those in which the defendant\u2019s financial ability to hire an attorney is unclear (People v. Lewis (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103, 518 N.E.2d 741, 745 (awaiting loan approval); Koss, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 367 N.E.2d at 1041 (awaiting money from home)).\nBased on this record, we conclude that the court\u2019s decision to deny defendant the counsel of his choice was an abuse of discretion. We therefore reverse and remand. To avoid double jeopardy problems on remand, we find that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant\u2019s convictions. This ruling in no way implies a finding as to defendant\u2019s guilt that would be binding on retrial, but merely allows the State to proceed again against defendant. See People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10, 391 N.E.2d 366, 375.\nReversed and remanded.\nGREEN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Theodore A. Gottfried and Patrick J. Hughes, Jr., both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Craig H. DeArmond, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Beth McGann, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOE L. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 90\u20140219\nOpinion filed December 31, 1990.\nTheodore A. Gottfried and Patrick J. Hughes, Jr., both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCraig H. DeArmond, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Beth McGann, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0130-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 157 }