{ "id": 2554086, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES T. BLACK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Black", "decision_date": "1991-01-07", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-89-0416, 3-90-0286 cons.", "first_page": "304", "last_page": "310", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 304" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88, 694" }, { "page": "693, 698" }, { "page": "2064, 2068" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "2067-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6197970 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3129823 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661978 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205331 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538892 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174831 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 978", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531965 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0937-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 707, "char_count": 12754, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.909279637321106e-08, "percentile": 0.3693578274254599 }, "sha256": "f8d62246bb3ede9cc88aa99003251de79708ca789b50b8fac4cbcc6e5410c216", "simhash": "1:aaa21e0672350f26", "word_count": 2149 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:09.339704+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES T. BLACK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant, James Black, was convicted of the charge of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(1)) and sentenced to a term of seven years\u2019 imprisonment. He appealed. While his appeal was pending, he filed a post-conviction petition. A hearing was held on the petition. We delayed determination of the direct appeal until the conclusion of the post-conviction proceeding. Subsequently, the trial court denied his prayer for relief. He also appeals that order. We have consolidated these appeals for disposition. We affirm.\nOn April 7, 1989, the defendant appeared in court with his attorney, Deborah Dunn, and waived his right to a jury trial. At that time, the defendant\u2019s trial was reconsolidated with that of a codefendant, Jeffrey Parcher, despite a prior severance order. Parcher was found guilty of criminal sexual assault in a bench trial. He also appealed his conviction, and we affirmed the trial court in People v. Parcher (3d Dist. 1990), No. 3 \u2014 89\u20140432 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nAt trial, the victim testified she was at home on the evening of August 18, 1988, when she received a phone call from Parcher asking if she would like to go riding around in his truck. She agreed to go and, shortly thereafter, joined Parcher, the defendant, and a third male subject in Parcher\u2019s track. The victim indicated she had known Parcher for about a month prior to the phone call but that she had never been out alone with him or ever on a date with him. At the time, she considered Parcher a friend, but not a boyfriend. She further testified she knew the defendant for approximately three or four years; she used to baby-sit the defendant\u2019s children. The four proceeded to drive around for awhile and eventually dropped off the third male.\nThe defendant, the victim, and Parcher then drove to the Streator Country Club. There, the defendant and Parcher wanted to go swimming. The defendant climbed a fence and sneaked into the pool area. Parcher and the victim followed suit. The defendant and Parcher then proceeded to jump into the pool and take their clothes off. The nude men then swam to where the victim was standing outside the pool. Parcher grabbed her ankles and she fell into the pool.\nAfter falling into the pool, Parcher held the victim as the defendant tried to unzip her pants. After straggling with the victim, the defendant pulled her pants down, pulled her tampon out and threw it to the side of the pool, pried her legs apart, and placed his penis into her vagina. The defendant then stated it was Parcher\u2019s turn whereby Parcher proceeded to place his penis into her vagina. The victim immediately left the pool area and went to her sister\u2019s house.\nTara Dimming, the victim\u2019s sister, testified the victim came to her home on August 19, crying, upset, and wet. She stated the victim told her that she was raped.\nAfter reporting the alleged rape, the victim was taken to the hospital where a rape kit was prepared. The Joliet lab concluded seminal material taken from the victim could have come from Parcher and the defendant or just the defendant. Also included in the rape kit was a brief medical history of the victim which included statements she made about the assault to the examining physician. The State did not use these statements at trial. The defendant, meanwhile, failed to request this information from the State and failed to subpoena the hospital for the records.\nThe report showed the victim stated that one of the guys involved in the assault she has \u201cgone with a couple of times.\u201d She also stated both men were drunk. At trial, the victim stated she did not date Parcher. She also did not testify to both men being drunk.\nParcher testified he met the victim at a party in May of 1988. On that occasion, they went for a ride in his truck and engaged in sexual intercourse. They subsequently saw each other about every other week and continued to engage in sexual intercourse.\nRegarding the incident at the pool, Parcher stated that he, the victim, and the defendant stopped at the pool to go swimming. He and the defendant proceeded to get undressed. Laughingly, they pulled the victim into the pool, whereupon she and Parcher began kissing. The defendant then approached the two and joked about removing the victim\u2019s clothes. She permitted the defendant to do so but became angry when he removed her tampon. Parcher then swam off but could see the defendant feeling the victim\u2019s breasts and hear him calling her names. The defendant then gave up and sent the victim over to Parcher. The victim was crying, so he started kissing her but stopped when she asked him to. She then left but came back to get her purse and a ride to her sister\u2019s house.\nIn addition, a defense witness, Brian Crouch, testified he previously dated the victim and that she admitted sleeping with Parcher. This charge was vehemently denied by the victim in rebuttal.\nThe defendant first argues he is entitled to a new trial due to a discovery violation committed by the State. He specifically contends the State\u2019s failure to produce a medical report containing statements made by the victim violated his right to due process. He alleges the statements could have been used to impeach the victim and as such were necessary to him in his defense. He therefore concludes the State\u2019s failure to produce the document resulted in his being prejudiced.\nThe trial court, after the defendant presented these arguments at his post-conviction petition hearing, denied his prayer for relief. The trial court found no constitutional violation and found the evidence would not have changed the outcome of the trial.\nA prosecutor\u2019s failure to disclose evidence which the defense might have used to impeach a witness is error. (People v. King (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 937, 486 N.E.2d 978.) However, such suppression of evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. (United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392.) Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579, citing United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375.) The undisclosed evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record to determine if it creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. People v. King (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 937, 486 N.E.2d 978.\nThe defendant suggests the trier of fact, in this case the trial court, was deprived of the opportunity to assess the degree of the impeachment of the victim\u2019s credibility. We disagree. The defendant, by coupling the testimony of Brian Crouch with Parcher\u2019s testimony, sufficiently presented this boyfriend/girlfriend impeachment angle to the trial court without success.\nWe find no reasonable probability that this evidence would have changed the outcome of the defendant\u2019s trial, since the evidence overwhelmingly supported the decision of the trier of fact and the minor inconsistencies contained within the report cast very little doubt upon the credibility of the victim. Apparently, the defendant\u2019s use of the victim\u2019s statements would be to show that she described her relationship with Parcher at trial somewhat differently than what she said at the hospital and to the investigator following the incident. The testimony of Crouch, however, allows for a similar impeachable inference to be made, and the failure to produce the other statements is not prejudicial error.\nThe defendant next asserts his waiver of a jury trial was not voluntarily made due to the improper advice of his trial counsel. The trial court found the defendant\u2019s jury trial waiver to be knowingly and understandingly made and was a matter of sound trial strategy.\nThe record shows at the hearing on his post-conviction petition the defendant testified he was advised by Dunn to not proceed to a jury trial in order to prevent the State from informing the jury of his prior convictions. He was also advised that if he proceeded to a bench trial, he would not have to testify and the State would then be unable to divulge the prior convictions. The defendant alleges he was not told he could proceed to a jury trial and still not testify. The defendant also testified he was told that if he proceeded to a jury trial and was found guilty, he would be given the maximum sentence of 15 years. The defendant essentially maintains Dunn, an attorney with no prior jury trial experience, made gross misrepresentations to the defendant thereby coercing him into waiving his right to a jury trial.\nDunn testified she could not recall the specifics of the conversation between herself and the defendant regarding the decision to waive a jury trial. In addition, she stated she had no personal knowledge of the trial court\u2019s sentencing practices.\nDunn also explained the reasoning behind the decision to waive the jury trial. She noted at the time the defendant waived the jury trial, codefendant Parcher had a jury demand on file. Since Parcher was not waiving a jury trial, the two jury trials were going to be severed. Dunn, due to certain factors, found it advantageous to have Parcher\u2019s testimony at the defendant\u2019s trial. She therefore believed to ensure the availability of Parcher\u2019s testimony the defendant should waive a jury trial.\nFurthermore, she questioned the defendant\u2019s credibility in a jury trial setting. She related she would have a difficult time explaining why the defendant, a married man, would leave his wife and children at home in the middle of the night to go carousing with three teenagers (one being his children\u2019s babysitter), the fact that the defendant pulled down the victim\u2019s pants and pulled out her tampon, and that he had thought about having sex with her. Dunn believed the best available defense was to accept Parcher\u2019s testimony relating to the events on the night in question and to use the testimony in an attempt to exonerate the defendant.\nFor a jury waiver to be valid, it must be knowingly and understandingly made. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 6.) However, there is no precise formula for determining whether a jury waiver is knowingly and understandingly made because the decision to do so necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. People v. Crespo (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 815, 455 N.E.2d 854.\nHere, the defendant asserts he was prejudiced by the advice of trial counsel. He argues trial counsel never told him that he could request a jury trial and still not have to testify, thereby precluding the State from introducing his prior convictions. The defendant, citing People v. Correa (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307, argues the appropriate standard in reviewing trial counsel\u2019s conduct is whether the advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.\nHowever, the United States Supreme Court in Hill v. Lock-hart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366, found the two-part Strickland test to be the appropriate standard measure in determining the effectiveness of counsel in guilty plea settings as well as trial proceedings. Under Strickland, the defendant is required to prove: (1) that his counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068.) In essence, prejudice must be proved. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2067-68.\nIn the instant case, the defendant suggests Dunn failed to satisfy the Strickland test by allegedly failing to tell him that he could proceed to a jury trial without having to testify. The record discloses, however, the decision to waive a jury trial was based on sound trial strategy and satisfied the Strickland test.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed. .\nAffirmed.\nBARRY and McCUSKEY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Swengel & Swartz, of Henry (Eric S. Swartz, of counsel), for appellant.", "Joseph Navarro, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES T. BLACK, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201489\u20140416, 3\u201490\u20140286 cons.\nOpinion filed January 7, 1991.\nSwengel & Swartz, of Henry (Eric S. Swartz, of counsel), for appellant.\nJoseph Navarro, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0304-01", "first_page_order": 326, "last_page_order": 332 }