{ "id": 2555860, "name": "BEECHER MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARD J. TURNOCK, Director, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Beecher Medical Center, Inc. v. Turnock", "decision_date": "1990-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-88-3724", "first_page": "751", "last_page": "756", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 751" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614989 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426007 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112244 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 1045", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3646906 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1059" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/1045-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 969", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3441994 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0969-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 611, "char_count": 11500, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1322728588539572e-07, "percentile": 0.5761220055686644 }, "sha256": "72788ed1fd48b2c935df63b863a5a86158903600aafd310d567c354b9ce80c78", "simhash": "1:4df63d989aa39cd3", "word_count": 1825 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:09.339704+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BEECHER MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARD J. TURNOCK, Director, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendants, the Director of Public Health and the Illinois Department of Public Health (Director and Department, respectively), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County on administrative review that reversed the Director\u2019s \u201cFinal Order and Decision,\u201d finding the plaintiff, Beecher Medical Center, Inc. (Beecher), a long-term nursing care facility, in violation of the Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979 (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. IIIV2, par. 4151 \u2014 101 et seq.). The reversal of the circuit court was predicated on the procedural ground that the attorney appointed by the Director to serve as a hearing officer was not lawfully appointed as required by section 3 \u2014 704(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. III\u00bd, par. 4153 \u2014 704(a)), and therefore the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to conduct the administrative hearing below. For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nIn April of 1986, the Department received a complaint against Beecher alleging that Beecher had negligently cared for one of its residents who, while under the care of the staff at Beecher, had sustained bone fractures in both of her legs. According to the nursing records, the attending nurse had observed bruises on the resident\u2019s legs, but had failed to notify her physician of her condition.\nAfter investigating that complaint, the Department concluded that Beecher had violated Rule 300.1010(h) of the Minimum Standards, Rules and Regulations for the Classification and Licensure of Skilled Nursing Facilities and Intermediate Care Facilities (77 Ill. Admin. Code, \u00a7300.1010(h) (1980)) by its failure to notify the resident\u2019s physician of the bruises observed by the resident\u2019s attending nurse. Beecher thereupon requested an administrative hearing to review the Department\u2019s determination. Subsequently, in August of 1986, evidentiary hearings were held and conducted by a private attorney who was appointed by the Director as a hearing officer pursuant to a contractual agreement with the Department. After hearing testimony, the hearing officer recommended that the Department\u2019s finding that Beecher violated Rule 300.1010(h) be affirmed. The Director adopted the hearing officer\u2019s recommendation in the final order, thus citing Beecher with a \u201cType B\u201d violation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. HV-lz, par. 4151-130.\nBeecher filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. In its complaint, Beecher alleged that: (1) the Director\u2019s decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Department failed to follow its own published rules in adopting and issuing the decision; and (3) the Department\u2019s actions denied Beecher due process of law because the hearing officer was not lawfully appointed pursuant to section 3 \u2014 704(a) of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. IIIV2, par. 4153 \u2014 704(a).) The circuit court ruled that although there was sufficient evidence to sustain the Director\u2019s decision that Beecher had committed a \u201cType B\u201d violation and that the Department did adhere to its own rules, the court reversed the Director\u2019s decision solely on the ground that the hearing officer was not lawfully appointed and therefore the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to conduct the hearing.\nAt issue here is whether the attorney appointed by the Director qualified as a hearing officer under section 3 \u2014 704(a) of the Act, which at the relevant times herein provided: \u201cUpon the receipt of a request in writing for a hearing, the Director or a duly qualified employee of the Department designated in writing by the Director as a hearing officer shall conduct a hearing to review the decision.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 4153 \u2014 704(a).) The term \u201cDirector\u201d is defined in an earlier provision of the Act to mean \u201cthe Director of Public Health or his designee.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 4151 \u2014 110.) In August of 1988, the legislature amended section 3 \u2014 704(a) of the Act by omitting the term \u201cduly qualified employee\u201d and inserting the word \u201cperson\u201d (Pub. Act 85 \u2014 1183, eff. August 13, 1988 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 704(a)), thereby explicitly providing that any person designated in writing by the Director would have the authority to serve as a hearing officer. Both parties agree, however, that this case is controlled by the statute as it existed prior to amendment. Because neither party argues on appeal that the hearing officer in this case was an \u201cemployee\u201d of the Department, we proceed under the implicit concession that the attorney\u2019s status was that of an independent contractor, and not that of a \u201cduly qualified employee.\u201d\nThe Department contends that the proper construction of section 3 \u2014 704(a) requires that the term \u201cDirector\u201d be accorded its full latitude as defined permitting either the Director or his designee, whether the designee is an independent contractor or an employee, to serve as a hearing officer. The Department points out that this construction is mandated by the provision in the Act which states that \u201c[flor the purposes of this Act, *** the terms defined in this Article have the meanings ascribed to them herein,\u201d unless the context otherwise requires. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. IIIV2, par. 4151 \u2014 102.) The Department, therefore, urges that even though he was not a Department employee, the hearing officer was lawfully appointed pursuant to the Director\u2019s designation as evidenced by his contract, which states that he would \u201cserve as a hearing officer on behalf of the Director of Public Health for the administrative proceedings for which [he] is appointed by the Director.\u201d\nBeecher responds that if the term \u201cDirector\u201d in section 3 \u2014 704(a) is construed according to its definition, the term \u201cduly qualified employee\u201d becomes redundant and meaningless because anyone can be the Director\u2019s \u201cdesignee.\u201d It further argues that the 1988 legislative amendment supports its contention because there would have been no need for a legislative amendment.\nOn balance we find that the Department\u2019s position is more cogent and more consistent with basic principles of statutory construction. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when an act defines its own terms, those terms must be construed according to the definitions given to them in the act. (Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. Harris (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 969, 478 N.E.2d 526.) Those definitions furnish \u201cofficial and authoritative evidence of legislative intent and meaning and should be given controlling effect.\u201d (Laborer\u2019s International Union of North America, Local 1280 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1059, 507 N.E.2d 1200, 1209, citing 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, \u00a727.02 (Sands 4th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1983).) Under this principle, the full statutory definition of the term \u201cDirector\u201d should be implemented to include any designee of the Director even though a nonemployee.\nMoreover, judicial deference should be given to administrative interpretation particularly where such interpretation involves resolution of jurisdictional questions. (Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 142, 447 N.E.2d 295; see generally 2 Davis, Administrative Law \u00a7\u00a77:11 through 7:13 (2d ed. 1979).) Additionally, our supreme court has recognized that the interpretations of statutes by administrative agencies \u201cexpress an informed source for ascertaining the legislative intent\u201d (Adams v. Jewel Cos. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 336, 344-45, 348 N.E.2d 161, 165), especially where such interpretations \u201chave been consistently adhered to for a long period of time. [Citations.]\u201d (Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 153, 447 N.E.2d at 300.) Under this policy, deference must be paid to the interpretation of the Department because it has consistently interpreted section 3 \u2014 704(a) of the Act to mean that the Department may engage hearing officers who are not employees of the Department to conduct its hearings.\nThe issue concerning the authority of a nonemployee designated by the Director to serve as a hearing officer recently was addressed in Moon Lake Convalescent Center v. Margolis (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 245, 435 N.E.2d 956. The hearing officer in that case was hired by the Department through a contractual agreement similar to the appointed attorney in the instant case. The Moon Lake court agreed with the Department that the term \u201cDirector\u201d in section 3\u2014 704(a) of the Act is to be construed consistent with its definition as provided in section 1 \u2014 110. (Moon Lake, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 535 N.E.2d at 962.) In so doing, the Moon Lake court noted that the legislature had specifically defined \u201cDirector\u201d to include \u201chis designee,\u201d which aptly \u201crecognizes that the Director of an agency cannot possibly perform all of the functions of the agency.\u201d (180 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 535 N.E.2d at 962.) The court, therefore, determined that the hearing officer in that case was the Director\u2019s \u201cdesignee\u201d and thus satisfied the statutory requirements of the Act. Additionally, the court, aware of the 1988 amendment, concluded, contrary to the appellee\u2019s contention that was likewise argued here, that the amendment did not \u201cdemonstrate^ a change in attitude, but reflects the legislature\u2019s original intent in this matter.\u201d (180 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 535 N.E.2d at 962.) We agree with that conclusion. Moreover, it should be noted that although the only apparent reference to the amendment\u2019s purpose in the legislative debates was a single sentence by one senator, he did state without adverse comment that the amendment \u201ccodifies the existing practice of hiring contractual hearing officers.\u201d (85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 22, 1988, at 175 (statement of Senator Donahue).) This comment is consistent with the conclusion reached in Moon Lake.\nBeecher suggests that the decision in Moon Lake should be afforded little deference because the court\u2019s analysis regarding the status of the hearing officer is contained in \u201cabout two and half pages of a 22 page opinion.\u201d Additionally, Beecher maintains that we should not be persuaded by Moon Lake and therefore should not reverse the circuit court\u2019s finding because in Moon Lake the underlying offense was far more flagrant than the offense in this case, thus suggesting that a reversal is only warranted where the offense leads to the death of a nursing home resident. (See Moon Lake, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 249, 535 N.E.2d at 959.) These arguments on their face are without merit.\nBecause we hold that the appointed attorney satisfied statutory requirements pursuant to section 3 \u2014 704 as a \u201cdesignee\u201d of the Director, we need not address the Department\u2019s second argument that the hearing officer was a de facto officer whose acts were valid.\nFor the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nReversed.\nCOCCIA and MURRAY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Valerie J. Peiler, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.", "Ronald Scott Mangum, of Chicago (Terrence J. Benshoff, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BEECHER MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARD J. TURNOCK, Director, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20143724\nOpinion filed December 21, 1990.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Valerie J. Peiler, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.\nRonald Scott Mangum, of Chicago (Terrence J. Benshoff, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0751-01", "first_page_order": 773, "last_page_order": 778 }