{ "id": 2548193, "name": "In re J.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois; Petitioner-Appellee, v. Frances Richko, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Richko", "decision_date": "1990-12-31", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201489\u20140570, 1\u201489\u20142802 cons.", "first_page": "602", "last_page": "610", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 602" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621676 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5810521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578937 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5069255 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2647513 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3508662 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1005" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/1001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 732, "char_count": 19935, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0820511157214185 }, "sha256": "3d3c77d6189ca05cc959e6661a9e4de96b79d48ca250864458028a66f70170ef", "simhash": "1:4fa10ae70347727e", "word_count": 3326 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:42.825942+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re J.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois; Petitioner-Appellee, v. Frances Richko, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Frances Richko (Frances) appeals from several orders which effectively ended her and her husband\u2019s, Vincent Richko\u2019s (Vincent) (collectively Richkos), custody of J.S., a minor, and which eventually granted custody, under the protective supervision of the Cook County Probation Department (Probation Department), to Lee and Christine S. (Lee and Christine), her parents. Frances, J.S.\u2019s maternal aunt, claims that she was a \u201cresponsible relative\u201d of the child under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 1 et seq.) (the Act) and was thus entitled to the rights of a party to the proceedings that resulted in the orders from which she appeals.\nChristine has a history of mental illness and was hospitalized in a mental health facility when J.S. was born to her on May 24, 1986. Christine gave Frances custody of J.S. after the girl\u2019s birth.\nWhen Lee and Christine later requested custody of J.S. from the Richkos, they refused. On June 18, 1987, Frances filed a \u201cPetition for Adjudication of Wardship\u201d under section 2 \u2014 13 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 13), claiming that J.S. was a neglected and dependent minor and asking that J.S. be adjudged a ward of the court.\nThe circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem for J.S. and ordered that temporary custody be given to the Richkos. Following investigations by social service agencies, the court vacated the Richkos\u2019 temporary custody of J.S. and granted temporary custody to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The court ordered, however, that J.S. was to continue living with the Richkos pending a further investigation, with which the Richkos were ordered to cooperate. Frances does not appeal from these orders.\nOn August 10, 1988, a juvenile warrant was issued for J.S. at the request of the Probation Department, which charged that she was \u201cdependent and neglected,\u201d under sections 2 \u2014 3(1) and 2 \u2014 4(1) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 3(1), 802 \u2014 4(1)). During a hearing on August 19, 1988, in which the Richkos were not invited to participate, the Probation Department requested that the warrant be quashed and recalled. An officer of that department testified that although the warrant had been issued because the Richkos had moved from where they had been living without notifying DCFS or the Probation Department, J.S. was no longer living with the Richkos and probably would not be living -with them in the future. The court therefore ordered the warrant quashed and continued the case to a later date. Frances appeals from this order, claiming that the court thereby approved J.S.\u2019s removal from the physical custody of the Richkos.\nFrances filed an \u201cEmergency Petition for Temporary Custody\u201d on August 25, 1988, asking for temporary custody of J.S. during the pendency of the proceedings. At the hearing on that petition on August 30, 1988, Frances claimed that she had filed it in order to obtain review of the DCFS\u2019s decision to end J.S.\u2019s placement with the Richkos.\nDebbie Palmer (Palmer) of DCFS testified that the Department had planned since February 1988 to eventually reunite J.S. with her parents. The Richkos, according to the testimony, had attempted to sabotage this plan by failing to cooperate in the scheduling of visits between J.S. and her parents and by referring to J.S. as \u201cMichelle,\u201d rather than by her own name. Additionally, the juvenile court\u2019s department of clinical services had recommended removing J.S. from the Richkos\u2019 home on the ground that continued placement with that couple was not in J.S.\u2019s best interests.\nPalmer further testified that she was unable to locate the Richkos between August 10 and 17, 1988, at the address listed for them. In light of DCFS\u2019s belief that J.S.\u2019s interests would be better served by her placement in a new foster home, its failure to locate the Richkos prompted DCFS to attempt to remove J.S. from the Richkos\u2019 physical custody. Vincent Richko called DCFS on August 17, 1988, and was instructed by Palmer to return J.S. to DCFS. Palmer testified that when she was returned to DCFS, J.S. was wearing shoes that were too small and clothing that was dirty and unwearable and did not fit properly.\nFrances testified that Christine gave her custody of J.S. after the girl\u2019s birth, explained the reasons for calling the girl \u201cMichelle,\u201d claimed that she had complied with the court\u2019s request to no longer do so, and claimed that DCFS, not the Richkos, was responsible for DCFS\u2019s inability to locate the Richkos prior to removing J.S. from their custody. She also testified that Lee and Christine were responsible for any difficulties in arranging visits between J.S. and her parents. Frances further stated that for more than two years since J.S.\u2019s birth, she had lived with the Richkos, and that they could provide better care for her than an emergency foster home, at least until a later hearing could determine Christine\u2019s rights to custody of J.S.\nUpon a motion filed by Lee and Christine, by J.S.\u2019s guardian ad litem, and by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, all of whom agreed that DCFS\u2019s removal of Jennifer from the Richkos\u2019 home was justified, the court, while noting a preference for placing J.S. with relatives, held that J.S\u2019s best interests were served by continuing her care in the new foster home. The court denied Frances\u2019 petition, but granted the Richkos supervised visitation after September 30, 1988, at DCFS\u2019s discretion.\nFrances\u2019 \u201cNotice of Interlocutory Appeal\u201d states that she appeals from an order of August 25, 1988. Because that order, however, granted Frances leave to file her \u201cEmergency Petition for Temporary Custody,\u201d we assume, given the argument in her brief, that she is appealing from the circuit court\u2019s August 30, 1988, denial of her emergency petition.\nFollowing this decision, Frances attempted to depose Lee and Christine, J.S.\u2019s guardian ad litem, and Palmer. She also requested discovery of medical, psychological, investigative and other records concerning J.S., Lee and Christine, and the custody matter in general. After an October 12, 1988, hearing on motions by the deposed parties to quash the notices to take depositions and for other discovery, the circuit court granted the motions.\nThe court held that while the Richkos were legally \u201cresponsible relatives\u201d during the time they had temporary custody of J.S., the vacation of that temporary custody and its placement with DCFS transformed the Richkos\u2019 status to that of \u201cfoster parents.\u201d When DCFS terminated that relationship and placed J.S. in another foster home, the Richkos became \u201cformer foster parents.\u201d The court held that the Act gave the Richkos the right to be heard in proceedings regarding J.S.\u2019s disposition and also the right to representation by an attorney, but gave them no right to discovery. Frances appeals from this order.\nDuring the November 2, 1988, hearing on DCFS\u2019s petition charging that J.S. was a dependent and neglected child, the State dropped the charge of neglect. Christine admitted the allegations of the petition that J.S. was dependent and without proper parental care. The court so found, ordered a supplemental investigation and set a date for a dispositional hearing.\nDuring the November 2 hearing, the Richkos asked the court to undertake an independent review of an alleged \u201cdeal\u201d between the State\u2019s Attorney and DCFS that had been allegedly arranged without consultation with the Richkos. The court refused. Frances appeals from this decision.\nFollowing further investigations by social service agencies, J.S.\u2019s dispositional hearing was held on February 1, 1989. Frances moved for temporary or permanent custody of J.S., claiming that the child had been wrongfully removed from the Richkos\u2019 home and that granting permanent custody of J.S. to DCFS with placement in a foster home would be harmful to the child.\n. The court granted the State\u2019s oral motion to strike Frances\u2019 request, holding that while, as former foster parents, the Richkos had a right to be heard, the court had already resolved the issue of their custody of J.S. After obtaining Christine\u2019s consent, the court found that J.S.\u2019s parents were unable to care for her, that her best interests lay in making her a ward of the court and in granting permanent custody of J.S., with the right to place for adoption, to DCFS. Frances also appeals from this decision.\nFrances filed her appeal of the above matters on March 1, 1989. During the months following the grant of permanent custody to DCFS, various progress reports were filed by social service agencies involved in the attempt to reunite Jennifer with her parents. The reports indicate that Lee and Christine participated in counseling, that they improved their relationship with each other and with J.S., and that J.S.\u2019s overnight visits with Lee and Christine were successful. Despite Frances\u2019 claims to the contrary in oral argument before this court, the reports disclose evidence that Christine was successfully being treated for her mental illness and was considered by her doctor to be capable of caring for J.S.\nLee and Christine filed a \u201cSupplemental Petition for Return\u201d on September 6, 1989, requesting vacation of DCFS\u2019s guardianship of J.S. and the grant of permanent custody to themselves, under the initial supervision of DCFS and Catholic Charities. Catholic Charities, which had been involved in the investigation of the relationship between J.S. and her parents, supported the petition, as did the family counseling service which had cooperated with DCFS in counseling the child and her parents.\nFrances contends that Lee and Christine improperly moved on July 31, 1989, to exclude the Richkos from any further proceedings involving J.S. She then moved to strike that motion and for a grant of attorney fees incurred in responding to it. The record discloses a \u201cNotice of Motion\u201d but indicates neither the content of nor the basis therefor.\nA hearing on Lee and Christine\u2019s petition for custody was held on September 21, 1989. During this hearing, Lee and Christine withdrew their \u201cmotion *** to exclude the foster parents from the proceedings\u201d on the ground that it had become moot. The court denied Frances\u2019 request for attorney fees.\nFrances then objected to Lee and Christine\u2019s \u201cPetition for Return,\u201d arguing that a full hearing should be held to determine whether J.S. should be returned to her natural mother. Frances pointed out to the court that Christine had stated earlier in the year that she was unable to care for J.S. and that she was being treated for manic depression and schizophrenia. Frances also claimed that there was no evidence that Christine\u2019s condition had changed or that she was capable of caring for J.S.\nThe court, however, after finding that the guardian ad litem, DCFS and the State agreed that Lee and Christine\u2019s petition should be granted, denied Frances\u2019 request. The court held that as \u201cfoster parents,\u201d the Richkos had a right to be heard, and that they had been heard, but that they had no right to an evidentiary hearing.\nThe court then held that J.S.\u2019s best interests were served by vacating DCFS\u2019s guardianship, that Lee and Christine were able to adequately care for J.S. and that she would therefore be placed in the custody of her parents under a supervisory order lasting at least 12 months. The order required Lee and Christine to provide all necessary care for J.S., to cooperate with DCFS, to continue in individual and in family counseling, to enroll J.S. in an appropriate care program and to make J.S. accessible to the court and to the guardian ad litem. The court also ordered Christine to continue her medical treatment. Frances appeals from this decision as well.\nThe State contends that this court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of August 19, 1988, August 30, 1988, October 12, 1988, and November 2, 1988, because Frances did not file an appeal within 30 days from the time each of those orders were issued. Frances filed her appeal on March 1,1989.\nFrances originally claimed that this court\u2019s jurisdiction to review the above orders was based either upon Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) or Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1), but in response to the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the appeal from those orders, Frances maintains that this court\u2019s jurisdiction is based upon Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(6). (See 134 Ill. 2d Rules 307(a)(1), (b)(1), (a)(6).) That rule allows an appeal from an interlocutory court order \u201cterminating parental rights.\u201d That rule, however, also requires that any \u201cappeal must be perfected within 30 days from the entry of the interlocutory order by filing a notice of appeal.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(6).) As held in Stoller v. Village of Northbrook (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1005, \u201cJurisdiction only exists where a party files his notice of interlocutory appeal within the 30-day limitation.\u201d See also Design Studio International, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 797, 808.\nFrances asserts that her appeal from the above orders need not have been filed within the 30-day deadline because \u201c[pjiecemeal appeals are not favored *** in Illinois.\u201d (Voss v. Lincoln Mall Management Co. (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 442, 451.) Voss, however, decided whether to allow a permissive interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308. The lack of favor with piecemeal appeals may justify a court\u2019s decision not to allow appeal of interlocutory orders until the rights of the parties have been finally determined, in cases where the court has the discretion whether or not to hear the appeal. (Voss, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 451-52.) Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(6), however, allows appeals from interlocutory orders as of right. It is irrelevant for the purposes of an appeal under Rule 307(a)(6) whether piecemeal appeals result, as the rule itself is an exception to the policy stated in Voss.\nFurther, Voss does not imply that a party could avoid the effect of the deadlines set forth in Rule 308 for filing appeals from interlocutory orders. Rather, Voss assumes that a permissive appeal has been properly filed, but that it might not be heard because it would result in piecemeal litigation.\nTherefore, because this court does not have jurisdiction to review the circuit court orders of August 19, 1988, August 30, 1988, October 12, 1988, and November 2, 1988, the appeals from those orders are dismissed.\nAs to Frances\u2019 appeals from the orders of February 1, 1989, denying her request for temporary or permanent custody of J.S. and granting permanent custody of J.S. to DCFS, she avers that as a \u201cresponsible relative\u201d of J.S. under the Act, she was a party to the proceeding, pursuant to section 1 \u2014 5(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(1)), and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her petition for custody of J.S.\nThe circuit court held on November 2, 1988, however, that while the Richkos were \u201cresponsible relatives\u201d during the time they had temporary custody of J.S., the vacation of that temporary custody and its grant to DCFS terminated the Richkos\u2019 status as responsible relatives, and the Richkos became \u201cfoster parents.\u201d When DCFS removed J.S. from the Richkos\u2019 home, they became \u201cformer foster parents,\u201d having a right to be heard, but no longer parties to the proceeding.\nFrances\u2019 failure to properly appeal from this judgment, which determined her status as a nonparty and thus determined her accordant rights, renders that judgment final. \u201cIn general a party\u2019s failure to timely appeal an order appealable under Rule 307(a) renders that order the law of the case and that part of the resulting judgment res judicata.\u201d (Wolfe v. Mini Federal Savings & Loan Association (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 321, 324.) Therefore, when the February 1, 1989, and September 21, 1989, orders were entered, Frances had the same, but no greater, rights than any other former foster parent.\nAs a \u201cpreviously appointed foster parent\u201d at the time of the February 1, 1989, order, Frances had the \u201cright to be heard by the court, but [did] not thereby become a party to the proceeding.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(2). See In re Jennings (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 125, 130.) She was not, therefore, entitled to an \u201cevidentiary hearing,\u201d and the circuit court\u2019s order of February 1, 1989, is accordingly affirmed.\nLikewise, Frances\u2019 appeal from the order of September 21, 1989, granting to Lee and Christine custody of J.S. under the protective supervision of the Probation Department, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 24 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 24), must also fail. As a former foster parent and nonparty to the proceeding, Frances had no right to discovery of or to controvert the contents of \u201cthe reports prepared for the use of the court and considered by it.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 22(2).) She had only the right to be heard, a right which she does not contend was denied.\nFrances\u2019 claim that the court erred in not holding a hearing to determine the fitness of Lee and Christine to care for J.S. is also without warrant. Frances relies on section 2 \u2014 23(l)(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 23(l)(a)), which prohibits the restoration to any parent found by the court to have caused a child to be neglected or abused under section 2 \u2014 3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 3) without a hearing to determine that parent\u2019s fitness to care for the child. J.S., however, was not found to be neglected or abused, and the section of the Act relied upon is therefore inapplicable to this case.\nThe assistant State\u2019s Attorney, DCFS and J.S.\u2019s guardian ad litem all stipulated that J.S.\u2019s best interests would be served by a grant of custody to Lee and Christine under the protective supervision of the Probation Department, and the court had several reports before it, all indicating agreement with such a disposition. Accordingly, we find no reason to disturb the circuit court\u2019s grant of custody to Lee and Christine under the condition it imposed on such custody, and its decision is therefore affirmed.\nFinally, Frances appeals from the denial by the circuit court of her request for attorney fees resulting from the allegedly improper petition brought by Lee and Christine to exclude her from the September 21, 1989, dispositional hearing. The record, while indicating that a motion to exclude Frances was made, contains neither a copy of the motion nor any of the bases upon which it was advanced.\nThe appellant is obliged to present a complete record on appeal, \u201cso the reviewing court will be fully informed regarding the issues in the case. A reviewing court will not consider anything which is not contained in the record.\u201d (International Amphitheatre Co. v. Vanguard Underwriters Insurance Co. (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 555, 564.) Without sufficient evidence that an improper petition warranting a grant of attorney fees to the Richkos was filed, this court has no alternative but to affirm the circuit court\u2019s denial of Frances\u2019 request.\nThe appeals from the orders of August 19, 1988, August 30, 1988, October 12, 1988, and November 2, 1988, are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The orders of February 1, 1989, and September 21, 1989, are affirmed.\nAppeal dismissed in part; affirmed in part.\nHARTMAN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.\nJudge Bilandic participated in the decision of this case prior to taking office as a supreme court judge.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald S. Fishman, of Fishman & Fishman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Susan Tone Pierce, Anita Weinberg, and Michael G. Dsida, of counsel), for appellee J.S." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re J.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois; Petitioner-Appellee, v. Frances Richko, Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 1\u201489\u20140570, 1\u201489\u20142802 cons.\nOpinion filed December 31, 1990.\nRonald S. Fishman, of Fishman & Fishman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Susan Tone Pierce, Anita Weinberg, and Michael G. Dsida, of counsel), for appellee J.S." }, "file_name": "0602-01", "first_page_order": 624, "last_page_order": 632 }