{ "id": 2547289, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY FUDGE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Fudge", "decision_date": "1990-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20140807", "first_page": "611", "last_page": "612", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 611" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3229022 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 996", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614822 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0996-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 243, "char_count": 3530, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08203103733074786 }, "sha256": "fa999cb83cf06db6cc9e5e2ec2aca2d6d75f6fe566b25ff6b817b2414863aeb1", "simhash": "1:8aa95e9f54c27eb3", "word_count": 560 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:42.825942+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY FUDGE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial defendant Jeffrey Fudge was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and sentenced to serve five years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction must be vacated because the possession of stolen motor vehicle statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 103(a)(1)) violates due process and the guarantee of proportionate penalties. We affirm.\nDefendant was charged by indictment with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (PSMV). Defendant argued at trial that the PSMV statute was unconstitutional and cited People v. Bryant (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 996, 520 N.E.2d 890, in support of his position. The trial court ruled that Bryant was not controlling and subsequently denied defendant\u2019s motion in arrest of judgment. This appeal followed.\nOn appeal defendant argues that the PSMV statute is unconstitutional because it does not use a reasonable method to further or protect the State interest for which it was enacted. Defendant further contends that the offense of PSMV is a lesser included offense of theft and, therefore, imposition of a greater penalty violates the Illinois Constitutional requirement of proportionate penalties.\nSection 4 \u2014 103 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides in part:\n\u201cOffenses relating to motor vehicles and other vehicles\u2014 Felonies, (a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:\n(1) A person not entitled to the possession of a vehicle or essential part of a vehicle to receive, possess, conceal, sell, dispose, or transfer it, knowing it to have been stolen or converted; ***\n* * *\n(b) Sentence. A person convicted of a violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 4 \u2014 103.\nIn People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448, 539 N.E.2d 1225, the supreme court reversed the appellate court and held that section 4 \u2014 103 of the motor vehicle code does not violate the due process and proportionate penalty clauses of the Illinois Constitution. The court found that section 4 \u2014 103 applies to all persons, including organized motor vehicle thieves. The supreme court therefore concluded that the appellate court erred in determining that possessors of stolen motor vehicles are punished more severely than organized motor vehicle thieves. The court reached this conclusion because all persons who possess a stolen motor vehicle, including organized motor vehicle thieves, are punishable under section 4 \u2014 103(b) of the Vehicle Code. (Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 456.) The court also concluded that the steady increase in the penalty provision for possession of a stolen motor vehicle was indicative of the legislature\u2019s intent to make possession of a stolen motor vehicle a separate, more serious offense than theft, rather than a lesser included offense of theft. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 457.\nSince the supreme court has upheld the constitutionality of section 4 \u2014 103 of the Vehicle Code, we reject defendant\u2019s argument and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nCERDA, P.J., and WHITE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Robert D. Glick, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund and Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY FUDGE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20140807\nOpinion filed December 31, 1990.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Robert D. Glick, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund and Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0611-01", "first_page_order": 633, "last_page_order": 634 }