{ "id": 2548285, "name": "DIANE CHEVRIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK GRUESEN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Chevrie v. Gruesen", "decision_date": "1991-02-13", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140270", "first_page": "881", "last_page": "887", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 881" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574740 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436829 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" }, { "page": "245-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604927 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5073161 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" }, { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3129495 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5323744 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/99/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2654103 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148298 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609122 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "593-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2787287 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3337956 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496844 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 590, "char_count": 12492, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.113568947089009e-08, "percentile": 0.5064169764337612 }, "sha256": "f265de32eda27420921423537f393e4af36cc56d1d6ea433c8c9eff4b4075b5c", "simhash": "1:38ec9fc2cac464d5", "word_count": 2058 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:42.825942+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DIANE CHEVRIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK GRUESEN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Diane Chevrie, appeals from an order of the trial court granting defendant\u2019s, Frank Gruesen\u2019s, motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand for trial on the merits.\nPlaintiff brought suit against defendant seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained as a result of the collision of her car with several vehicles, including ultimately that of defendant. At the time of the initial collision, plaintiff was traveling east in the curb lane of Butterfield Road in Lombard, Illinois. Butterfield Road is a six-lane highway with three lanes of traffic each going east and west and further divided by a very wide, eight-inch-high median strip. Plaintiff\u2019s car was struck on the rear passenger side by a car exiting a driveway on the south side of Butterfield Road. The driver of that car is not a party to this action. The impact caused plaintiff\u2019s car to spin across the three eastbound lanes of traffic, continue over the median, and enter the westbound lanes. At the time plaintiff\u2019s car entered the westbound lanes it was moving north, perpendicular to traffic, and backwards.\nUpon entering the westbound lanes, plaintiff\u2019s car struck the driver\u2019s side rear of Jeanette Konkol\u2019s (n/k/a Lambrigger) car traveling in the median lane, although Lambrigger had accelerated and swerved to avoid plaintiff\u2019s car. The impact did not stop plaintiff\u2019s car but did cause it to veer slightly east as it continued across the westbound lanes. A car driven by Nancy Larson, immediately behind Lambrigger\u2019s car in the westbound median lane, successfully braked and avoided impact with plaintiff\u2019s car. Defendant was also traveling westbound, behind Lambrigger\u2019s and Larson\u2019s cars. Although conflicting testimony placed defendant\u2019s car in either the curb, middle, or median lane, he collided with plaintiff\u2019s car in the middle westbound lane, with the left front of defendant\u2019s car impacting the driver\u2019s side door of plaintiff\u2019s car.\nPlaintiff alleged that defendant negligently failed to keep a proper lookout and was traveling too fast for conditions. Defendant asserted that the collision between his car and that of plaintiff was unavoidable and, therefore, that his conduct was not the proximate cause of the collision.\nA motion for summary judgment should only be granted if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits demonstrate that there exists no issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005.) Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and should be granted only if the right of the movant to judgment is clear and free from doubt. (Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240; Turner v. Roesner (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 482, 487.) In determining if a question of material fact exists, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and against the moving party. (Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 487; Santschi v. Gorter (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 394, 396; Dakovitz v. Arrow Road Construction Co. (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 56.) Only evidentiary facts and not mere conclusions of law should be considered. (Rutter v. Gemmer (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 586, 591; Bielarczyk v. Happy Press Lounge, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 577, 581.) If the facts are not in dispute, inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts to determine if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 487; Estate of Dompke v. Dompke (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 930, 933), and if fair-minded persons could draw different inferences from those facts then a triable issue exists (Santschi, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 396; Ruby v. Wayman (1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 146).\nAlthough not well articulated by either plaintiff or defendant, two issues are before us on appeal: first, whether the facts presented on defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff\u2019s response thereto raised a material question of fact as to defendant\u2019s breach of his duty to maintain a proper lookout and observe a speed appropriate for conditions and, second, assuming defendant\u2019s breach of duty, did the facts further raise a question of proximate causation?\nThe driver of a vehicle has the duty to maintain a proper lookout for other cars traveling on the road. (Grass v. Hill (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 709, 714-15.) This duty applies even though the other car is traveling on the wrong side of the road. (E.g., Turner v. Roesner (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 482, 488.) So, too, a driver has the duty to reduce the speed of his vehicle to avoid collisions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 601(a); Toney v. Mazariegos (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 399, 403.) Both the question of a proper lookout and of speed appropriate to conditions are generally questions for the jury to decide. Toney, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 403.\nTwo cases have considered the question of evidence of improper lookout that is sufficient to create a factual question requiring the jury\u2019s determination. In Santschi (63 Ill. App. 3d 394), on a two-lane road without a median, the plaintiff swerved into the defendant\u2019s lane to avoid a car in the plaintiff\u2019s lane. The defendant\u2019s deposition testimony was that he only saw the collision at the last moment as he saw himself being struck and that he did not see the automobile blocking the plaintiff\u2019s lane until after the occurrence. (Santschi, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 396.) Thus, the uncontroverted facts created a genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment was inappropriate. Santschi, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 397.\nOn the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial in Sitowski v. Buck Brothers, Inc. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 282, again on a two-lane undivided highway, the defendant struck the plaintiff\u2019s car when it was struck from behind by another car while stopped to make a left turn across the defendant\u2019s lane and was thereby pushed into the lane in front of the defendant\u2019s truck. The defendant\u2019s testimony was that, although he had seen both cars approaching him, the defendant did not see the plaintiff\u2019s car stop nor see the impact between the plaintiff\u2019s car and the car that pushed the plaintiff\u2019s car into his lane. The defendant \u201cdid not see why\u201d the plaintiff had crossed over into his lane. (Sitowski, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 284.) Once again, the evidence presented a substantial factual dispute for the trier of fact. Sitowski, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 288.\nIn this instance, plaintiff crossed at least four lanes and a wide, raised median before coming into defendant\u2019s path in contrast to the much narrower roadways in either Sitowski or Santschi. Thus, the opportunity for defendant to have seen plaintiff\u2019s car was far greater. That inference is further supported by the fact that, prior to the point of impact with defendant\u2019s car, plaintiff\u2019s car was observed by Larson, who avoided impact with plaintiff\u2019s car completely, and by Lambrigger, who escaped with only a minor collision. Defendant admitted that he did not see plaintiff\u2019s car until it impacted with his car. At that time, he saw only a gray object in the left-hand side of his windshield, which he did not identify as a car until after the collision. Thus, from defendant\u2019s own testimony, construed in favor of plaintiff and against defendant as it must on this motion for summary judgment, the uncontroverted facts raise a material question of defendant\u2019s failure to maintain a proper lookout.\nPlaintiff further asserted that defendant was driving too fast for conditions, with the conditions requiring speed below the posted speed limit being the presence of plaintiff\u2019s car in the westbound lanes and preceding collisions between plaintiff\u2019s car and those of the initial driver and that of Lambrigger. Again, defendant\u2019s own deposition testimony was that he had not slowed his car in any way because he did not see plaintiff\u2019s car moving perpendicular across the westbound lanes of traffic. And again, a material question was presented as to whether defendant was driving too fast for conditions.\nTurning to the second issue, defendant asserted the collision was unavoidable and, therefore, there was no issue of proximate cause. A defendant\u2019s failure to maintain a proper lookout or to observe a speed appropriate to conditions, or any other acts or omissions on his part, do not render that defendant negligent if those acts or omissions are not the proximate cause of a plaintiff\u2019s injuries. (Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 490; Rutter, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 593.) Thus, an \u201cunavoidable collision\u201d is without proximate cause, and a defendant\u2019s acts or omissions in breach of a duty are not material. (Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 490; Rutter, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 593.) \u201cUnavoidable collisions\u201d have most often occurred when a defendant is confronted with a sudden swerve into defendant\u2019s right-of-way by an approaching vehicle. (Walling v. Lingelbach (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 244, 248; Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 488-89; Rutter, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 593-94; Wilmere v. Stibolt (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 642, 647.) In such cases, therefore, the defendant had insufficient time to react and take evasive action, or the evasive action taken was ineffective because of the quickness with which the collision occurred.\nIn Turner, on a two-lane highway, the defendant had only two seconds and 120 feet in which to take .measures to avoid the collision after observing the car in which the plaintiff\u2019s decedent was a passenger cross into the defendant\u2019s right-of-way. The defendant further testified that he had removed his foot from the accelerator in that time frame, but did not remember if he had yet applied the brakes. (Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 488-89.) Similarly, in Wilmere, the plaintiff decedent\u2019s car crossed the double center line of a four-lane highway and struck three oncoming cars traveling in close proximity to each other in both oncoming lanes in a matter of seconds. (Wilmere, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 647.) Finally, in Walling, the defendant\u2019s car collided with another vehicle when the other driver crossed the center line into the defendant\u2019s right-of-way in a heavy fog. The defendant both braked and veered away in the 10 feet between the appearance of the other car in her lane and the impact. Walling, 65 Ill. 2d at 245-46.\nIn each of these cases, the collision was almost instantaneous with the action of the plaintiff in veering into the defendant\u2019s right-of-way. In contrast, in the present instance, plaintiff\u2019s car crossed four lanes of traffic and a median, and collided with two other cars before the impact with defendant\u2019s car. Two drivers with less time and distance to either observe plaintiff\u2019s car or react to plaintiff\u2019s sudden appearance in their right-of-way were able to take effective evasive measures. On these uncontroverted facts, there is a clear factual question of whether defendant could have avoided the collision with plaintiff\u2019s car if defendant had maintained a proper lookout and reduced his speed upon observing the unfolding accident scene. Thus, the \u201cunavoidable collision\u201d doctrine does not apply.\nIn reaching this conclusion, we have considered neither the affidavit of Judy Thomas, who was driving eastbound immediately behind plaintiff, nor the opinion of Lambrigger contained in her affidavit, both of which were submitted in support of plaintiff\u2019s opposition to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Rather, defendant\u2019s own admission that he did not see plaintiff\u2019s car before the accident and the fact of Lambrigger\u2019s and Larson\u2019s ability to observe and minimize or avoid collision with plaintiffs car in far shorter time and space are sufficient to create material questions of fact as to both defendant\u2019s breach of duty and proximate cause. Thus, we do not reach plaintiff\u2019s argument.that the trial court improperly struck plaintiff\u2019s documents in support of her opposition to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nThe order of the trial court granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial on the merits.\nReversed and remanded.\nINGLIS and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ken Klimczak, of Michael R. Panter & Associates, and Michael D. Rich-man, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "James F. Best and Sarah E. Chapin, both of Fraterrigo, Best & Beranek, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANE CHEVRIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK GRUESEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140270\nOpinion filed February 13, 1991.\nKen Klimczak, of Michael R. Panter & Associates, and Michael D. Rich-man, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames F. Best and Sarah E. Chapin, both of Fraterrigo, Best & Beranek, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0881-01", "first_page_order": 903, "last_page_order": 909 }