{ "id": 2548400, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN D. HILL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hill", "decision_date": "1991-02-13", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20140407", "first_page": "887", "last_page": "891", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 887" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "408 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782797 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "2601-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3511539 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2972015 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098345 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5393577 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9136521 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "2012" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156303 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 1083", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5450809 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/1083-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3635747 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0836-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 471, "char_count": 9012, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33295126472624464 }, "sha256": "ab49e606640e926e196f57bc80f805a72fa68cc396c66a44370a62601a13e75e", "simhash": "1:8b620d9af44189ab", "word_count": 1509 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:42.825942+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN D. HILL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DUNN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Steven D. Hill, was convicted of obstructing a peace officer, resisting arrest and aggravated assault. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 31 \u2014 1, 12 \u2014 2(a)(6).) The trial court proceeded with the trial in the absence of the defendant and his attorney. Defendant was sentenced to three 364-day terms of imprisonment to run concurrently. Defendant contends he was denied his right to counsel. We agree, and we reverse.\nOn November 29, 1988, the defendant pleaded not guilty, and the Du Page County public defender was appointed to represent him. At that time, the trial court duly advised the defendant that if he failed to appear on the date of trial, trial would proceed in his absence.\nThe defendant failed to appear on the day of trial. The assistant public defender advised the court that the defendant had failed to attend an interview scheduled with the public defender\u2019s office and that as a result he objected to the trial being held that day. The public defender stated that he would not be prepared to handle the case. The trial judge then dismissed the public defender sua sponte and proceeded with the trial ex parte.\nThe court and the prosecution conducted voir dire. The prosecution gave its opening statement and called two witnesses: Officers Anthony Mineo and Randall Logan. The jury was duly instructed, but during deliberation sent the court a note stating:\n\u201cWhy was there no defense attorney or a chance for the jury to cross-examine the police?\u201d\nThe court responded with a note stating:\n\u201cYou\u2019ve been instructed as to the law and no further instructions will be given.\u201d\nFollowing deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. The court entered judgment on the verdicts and sentenced the defendant. Defendant appeals. The State confesses error.\nIt is well settled that a defendant may be tried in absentia when charged with a misdemeanor or violation of an ordinance. (People v. Hall (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 836, 841.) The decision to proceed in the defendant\u2019s absence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. (People v. Hall, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 841; People v. Joyner (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1088.) In effect, by voluntarily absenting himself from the courtroom, a defendant is deemed to have waived his right to be present throughout the trial, a right which is guaranteed to him by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 145, 157.\nBefore a trial judge may proceed in absentia, section 113\u2014 4(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 113 \u2014 4(e)) requires an admonition be given to the defendant that trial could proceed in his absence. The record in the present case discloses that on November 29, 1988, during the proceeding in which the defendant pleaded not guilty, the judge admonished the defendant pursuant to section 113 \u2014 4(e). In addition, the record discloses that the defendant had missed previous court dates. Accordingly, we hold the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding to proceed to trial in absentia.\nHowever, the trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss the defendant\u2019s attorney sua sponte and proceed to trial in the absence of the defendant must clearly be reversed, and defendant must receive a new trial. In Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972), 407 U.S. 25, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 538, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012, the United States Supreme Court held that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial. (See also People v. Morrissey (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 418, 420.) This constitutional right to counsel must be waived by the defendant. The voluntary absence of the defendant and the dismissal sua sponte of his appointed counsel in this case do not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver. While we understand the trial court\u2019s frustration with the defendant\u2019s behavior in the present case, we cannot sanction such a grievous error.\nA defendant\u2019s right to counsel may be waived, but only after the defendant has been so admonished under Supreme Court Rule 401(a). (134 Ill. 2d 401(a).) The rule provides that any waiver of counsel shall take place in open court and that no waiver will be permitted unless the court admonishes the defendant personally in open court of the nature of the charge, minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, and that he has a right to counsel.\nOur supreme court has held the right to counsel may be waived through the defendant\u2019s conduct once he has been admonished of this right. (People v. Williams (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 109.) In that case, the defendant received admonitions by the court of his right to counsel. Defendant, who was financially able to retain counsel, yet repeatedly failed to have counsel present at his court appearances, had been instructed to retain counsel within a certain and reasonable time. Defendant appeared on that date without counsel. In addition, he did not show reasonable cause for why he had failed to retain counsel. At that time, the court informed the defendant of his trial date and admonished him that if he failed to appear in a timely manner on the date of trial, the court would proceed, whether he or his attorney was present. Only the defendant appeared on the date of trial. The trial court refused to grant another continuance and proceeded to trial. The supreme court upheld the trial court\u2019s action, stating the defendant had waived his right to counsel at trial through his conduct. People v. Williams, 92 Ill. 2d 109.\nThis case is clearly distinguishable. It is well established that waiver of counsel should be carefully scrutinized. (People v. Heral (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 329, 336.) In the present case, the court dismissed the defendant\u2019s attorney on its own motion and proceeded with the trial ex parte. We agree with the supreme court that judicial patience need not be infinite. (People v. Williams, 92 Ill. 2d at 116.) However, under the circumstances, proceeding to trial ex parte in a criminal proceeding at which the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment without assistance of an attorney for defendant was clearly in error.\nAlthough the defendant failed to appear at a scheduled meeting with the public defender\u2019s office to meet with his attorney before trial, this conduct was not sufficient to constitute a waiver of his right to counsel. Unlike Williams, this was not a situation in which the defendant had repeatedly failed to meet with counsel or counsel repeatedly failed to appear in court. In addition, the defendant had not been admonished of the risk of waiver of the right to counsel if he failed to appear. In Williams, the defendant was specifically admonished that trial would proceed with or without his presence or the presence of his attorney.\nSimilarly, the defendant in People v. Klovstad (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 444, had been admonished of the risk of his failure to appear. In that case we affirmed a trial court\u2019s decision to proceed with a probation revocation hearing in absentia and without counsel. However, Klovstad dealt with a probation revocation hearing, not a trial. The United States Supreme Court has held that only \u201cminimal due process\u201d is necessary in probation revocation hearings (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 485, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 496, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601-02), as opposed to the strict due process protections afforded defendants at trial in situations where they may be imprisoned (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006).\nThe circumstances surrounding our holding in Klovstad were unique. The defendant in Klovstad was an attorney himself and the record indicated that although he had retained counsel, he intended to represent himself at the probation revocation hearing. (Klovstad, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 447.) We ruled that after being admonished of the consequences of his failure to appear and absent a reasonable excuse for that failure, defendant\u2019s failure to appear constituted waiver of counsel. Klovstad, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 450.\nUnder the circumstances, we conclude that, while the defendant had waived his right to be present at his trial, his conduct did not constitute a waiver of his right to counsel.\nThe judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nUNVERZAGT and GEIGER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DUNN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Kathleen J. Hamill, and Manuel S. Serritos, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN D. HILL, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140407\nOpinion filed February 13, 1991.\nG. Joseph Weller, Kathleen J. Hamill, and Manuel S. Serritos, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0887-01", "first_page_order": 909, "last_page_order": 913 }