{ "id": 2541657, "name": "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY et al, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Chief Judge", "decision_date": "1991-01-18", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-3093", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "290", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 283" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "205 N.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5283718 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/55/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 N.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2580159 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/74/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315485 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3373660 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543542 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563972 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471125 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 639, "char_count": 14183, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.145505820819462e-08, "percentile": 0.508085413473913 }, "sha256": "da24b0448f4bb6e91fa2f4ed72f60b41776812775c1731c2317ee3cf5ecb26e2", "simhash": "1:ee334135905a83ee", "word_count": 2220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:55.726214+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY et al, Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employee,., Council 31, AFL-CIO, appeals the decision of respondent, Illinois State Labor Relations Board (State Board) granting the request of the chief judge of the circuit court of Cook County (Employer), to remove a previously certified bargaining unit consisting of approximately 40 employees functioning as juvenile probation officers (PO Ills). On November 25, 1986, the State Board found that PO Ills should not be included in petitioner\u2019s bargaining unit because they functioned as \u201csupervisors\u201d within the meaning of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1601 et seq.).\nOn June 12, 1986, petitioner filed a representation petition with the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board (Local Board) seeking to represent three categories of probation officers (PO I, PO II, and PO Ills) in a bargaining unit. (The only category at issue in this appeal is the status of PO Ills.)\nThe Local Board hearing officer relied upon the supervisory test set forth in section 3(r) of the Act, which provides in relevant part:\n\u201c \u2018Supervisor\u2019 is an employee whose principal work is substantially different from that of his subordinates and who has authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the consistent use of independent judgment. Except with respect to police employment, the term \u2018supervisor\u2019 includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority State supervisors notwithstanding.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1603(r).\nThe Local Board hearing officer found that PO Ills performed principal work which was substantially different from that of their subordinates in directing, rewarding, and disciplining their subordinates and consistently using independent judgment in the direction of their subordinates. With respect to the phrase \u201cpreponderance of employment time,\u201d as set forth in the second sentence of section 3(r), the Local Board hearing officer construed that term to mean \u201cmajority of time\u201d or \u201cmore than 50 percent\u201d in accordance with Local Board standards. This interpretation differed from that of the State Board, which defines \u201cpreponderance\u201d as the \u201clargest single allotment.\u201d City of Burbank, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2008, No. S-RC-45 (ISLRB June 6, 1985).\nThe Local Board hearing officer concluded that PO Ills spent only 30% of their time in supervisory activities, which is less than the \u201cmajority of time\u201d standard adopted by the Local Board. (However, the 30% supervisory activity was sufficient to satisfy the State Board\u2019s definition of \u201cpreponderance.\u201d) Therefore, on May 13, 1987, the Local Board certified petitioner as the exclusive representative of all juvenile probation officers, including the PO Ills.\nOn April 27, 1988, the State Board and Local Board, acting jointly (Joint Board), held that the county and the chief judge were joint employers of adult probation officers. (County of Cook, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2025, No. S \u2014 RC\u201487\u2014113 (ISLRB Apr. 27, 1988).) The Joint Board determined that collective bargaining matters involving the chief judge and the county would be processed by the Joint Boards because the chief judge, a State official, was properly under the State Board\u2019s jurisdiction, while the county fell under the Local Board\u2019s jurisdiction.\nOn April 29, 1988, the Employer filed a petition for unit clarification with both the Local Board and the State Board. In that petition, the Employer sought to exclude PO Ills on two grounds: (1) that due to changes in the evaluation instrument, PO Ills would require additional time engaged in \u201csupervisory\u201d activities; and (2) recent changes in case law. The Employer relied upon the holding in City of Peru v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 284, 521 N.E.2d 108, where this court reversed the Board\u2019s interpretation of the scope of \u201csubstantially different work\u201d and evaluated certain activities as supervisory, and the holding in County of Cook as set forth above.\nIn January 1989, a hearing was held on Employer\u2019s unit clarification petition. The hearing officer limited the factual issue to whether there had been a change in the job duties of PO Ills. The hearing officer did not include the entire transcript of the previous representation case held by the Local Board; rather, she relied upon the Local Board\u2019s final decision.\nAfter the hearing (but prior to the Board\u2019s decision), our supreme court issued its decision in Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 453, 537 N.E.2d 784, holding that the State, and not the county, is the sole employer of judicial employees. In recognition of Orenic, the Joint Boards transferred this matter to the sole jurisdiction of the State Board, as the county is not, according to Orenic, an employer of the PO Ills.\nRelying upon the supreme court\u2019s decision in County of Kane v. Carlson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 186, 507 N.E.2d 482, the State Board hearing officer found that judicial employees were among State employees, and that the exemption in the Act for State employees from the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement included supervisors such as PO Ills. The State Board hearing officer found that the unit clarification petition was properly before the State Board because of recent changes in the law that affected the bargaining rights of employees, and that PO Ills\u2019 duties and responsibilities had not changed since the petitioner was certified. The State Board hearing officer concluded that because the PO Ills functioned as supervisors under the Act, they should be excluded from the bargaining unit.\nOn October 25, 1989, the State Board accepted the recommended decision of the hearing officer and adopted it as its decision.\nOn appeal, petitioner contends that the State Board\u2019s decision concerning the Employer\u2019s unit clarification petition was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; that the Board erroneously construed the supervisory definition found in the Act because it did not include the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test; and that the State Board\u2019s decision was not based on the record and that an adequate record was not developed for review.\nPlaintiff\u2019s initial contention that Employer\u2019s unit clarification petition was barred by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel is without merit. It is well established that a prior determination by an administrative body is not res judicata in subsequent proceedings before it. (Hazelton v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 348, 363 N.E.2d 44, citing Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1953), 1 Ill. 2d 509, 116 N.E.2d 394; Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Knight (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 234, 219 N.E.2d 355; Daley v. License Appeal Comm\u2019n (1965), 55 Ill. App. 2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 269.) An administrative body has the power to deal freely with each situation as it comes before it, regardless of how it may have dealt with a similar or even the same situation in a previous proceeding. Hazelton v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 48 Ill. App. 3d at 352.\nTherefore, we find that in this case the hearing officer correctly set forth the special conditions established by the Board in which it will find that unit clarification petitions are appropriate. One such condition exists where there has been a change in statutory or case law that may affect the bargaining rights of the employees. State of Illinois, Departments of Transportation & Central Management Services, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2011, Nos. S \u2014 RC\u201468, S\u2014 UC-12 (ISLRB June 21, 1985).\nWe conclude that the holding in Orenic constituted a substantial change in case law as required by the Department of Central Management Services analysis to warrant review of Employer\u2019s unit clarification petition. Although the decision in Orenic was filed after the hearing, the hearing officer properly relied upon it to determine that PO Ills, as court employees, are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the State Board. Moreover, it is undisputed that the probation officers are employees of the chief judge, a State official, and are therefore State employees. County of Kane v. Carlson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 186, 507 N.E.2d 482.\nPetitioner contends, however, that the State Board erroneously construed the supervisory test by excluding the \u201cpreponderance\u201d element. The hearing officer found that the sentence in section 3(r) of the Act which stated that \u201c[ejxcept with respect to police employment, the term \u2018supervisor\u2019 includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority State supervisors notwithstanding\u201d (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1603(r)), did not present an interpretation problem, and that the State Board\u2019s prior determination in Illinois Departments of Transportation & of Central Management Services, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2025, Nos. S \u2014 UC\u20144, S \u2014 UC\u201420 (ISLRB Oct. 23, 1985), supported her position that State supervisors are exempt from the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test. In that case, the State Board held that the inclusion of the \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding\u201d language in section 3(r) was ambiguous; therefore, the State Board construed the Act to exempt all State employees from complying with the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test.\nPetitioner disagrees and maintains that the phrase \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding,\u201d an amendatory veto added by Governor James R. Thompson, is intended to subject judicial employees, such as PO Ills, to the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test. As support for its contention, petitioner cites the comments made by the sponsor of the Act, Representative Alan J. Greiman. Introducing the recommended changes, Representative Greiman stated that the Governor\n\u201chas made it specific that *** supervisors in the public sector are different than supervisors in the private sector so that a substantial number of employees in the public sector are given titles to reward them, without giving them any real authority *** over other employees\u2019 wages, hours and working conditions, so that merely the name of that is not enough.\u201d 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November 2, 1983, at 180 (statements of Representative Greiman).\nPetitioner further maintains that the ordinary meaning of the word \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d is unambiguous and clearly does not exempt State supervisors from meeting the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test. We agree with both of petitioner\u2019s arguments.\nWe find that Elinois Department of Central Management Services was incorrectly decided and decline to follow the State Board\u2019s conclusion that PO Ills should be excluded from complying with the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test. We hold that Representative Greiman\u2019s explanation of the amendatory veto provides a sound rationale of the Governor\u2019s intent. Representative Greiman stated that the amendatory language was added in recognition of the differences between supervisors in the private sector versus supervisors in the public sector, and that supervisors in the public sector are often given honorific titles without any real authority over other employees\u2019 wages, hours and working conditions.\nMore importantly, the ordinary meaning of the phrase \u201cnotwithstanding,\u201d is defined as \u201cwithout prevention or obstruction from or by; in spite of.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1981).) Therefore, a literal interpretation of the phrase \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d in the context of section 3(r) could only mean that the term \u201csupervisor\u201d includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority, in spite of their status as State supervisors.\nPetitioner also maintains that there was no complete factual record upon which the State Board hearing officer could base a decision, and requests that we reverse and remand this cause to the State Board with instructions to develop a full record. Specifically, petitioner points out that the State Board hearing officer at the unit clarification limited introduction of the evidence to the change in job duties alleged by the Employer based on the new evaluation instrument, and did not look at all the evidence presented at the earlier representation proceeding.\nWe find that this case should be remanded to the State Board for development of a full record, in light of our determination that PO Ills are not exempt from meeting the \u201cpreponderance\u201d test in section 3(r). After the court\u2019s decision in Orenic, PO Ills, as State employees, are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the State Board. The original representation hearing during which the Local Board hearing officer evaluated the percentage of supervisory activity of the PO Ills was held over four years ago under the Local Board standard, which conflicts with that of the State Board.\nTherefore, we reverse and remand the matter to the State Board for the development of a complete record in accordance with the State Board standards and for such further proceedings as are necessary.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nRAKOWSKI, P.J., and EGAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for petitioner.", "Jacalyn J. Zimmerman, of Illinois State Labor Relations Board, of Chicago, for respondent Illinois State Labor Relations Board.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Karen Michels Caille, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Margaret Kostopulos, of counsel), for respondent Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY et al, Respondents.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1-89-3093\nOpinion filed January 18, 1991.\nCornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for petitioner.\nJacalyn J. Zimmerman, of Illinois State Labor Relations Board, of Chicago, for respondent Illinois State Labor Relations Board.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Karen Michels Caille, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Margaret Kostopulos, of counsel), for respondent Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 312 }