{ "id": 2542806, "name": "SHARON RUBLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Rubly v. Edgar", "decision_date": "1991-01-17", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-0334", "first_page": "396", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 396" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3613154 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 932", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2612833 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3450216 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 966", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577483 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506692 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152711 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567088 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 11708, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0466751196281493e-07, "percentile": 0.7548870609830921 }, "sha256": "521021a4312c6bce20f11d652b531725d364c946641b3efeb02a12dc641f3ad5", "simhash": "1:9ba016df7e530f64", "word_count": 1933 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:55.726214+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SHARON RUBLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, the Secretary of State, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County that reversed defendant\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s request for a restricted driving permit (RDP). The circuit court ordered the defendant to issue plaintiff a renewal of her RDP and refused to stay the order pending appeal. The defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on a motion to modify a judgment made more than 30 days after a final order had been entered and (2) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to file a complaint in administrative review based upon the November 15,1988, hearing.\nWe affirm.\nOn March 6, 1987, plaintiff was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Consequently, the defendant suspended plaintiff\u2019s driver\u2019s license for one year. On June 1, 1987, plaintiff petitioned the defendant for reinstatement of full driving privileges or, alternatively, issuance of a RDP. A hearing on the petition was held on July 16, 1987. On September 23, 1987, the hearing officer denied plaintiff\u2019s request for restoration of driving privileges and, alternatively, for a restricted driving permit. The defendant adopted the hearing officer\u2019s findings and recommendations.\nOn October 9, 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review (No. 87 \u2014 CH\u201410119) of the defendant\u2019s decision denying plaintiff\u2019s petition for reinstatement of her driver\u2019s license or, alternatively, a RDP. On January 13, 1988, the circuit court reversed the decision and ordered the defendant to issue plaintiff a RDP. The circuit court held that the defendant had abused his discretion in denying plaintiff the issuance of a RDP and that the decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court also refused to stay the order pending appeal. The defendant filed a notice of appeal which he voluntarily dismissed several months later. On July 1, 1988, the defendant granted plaintiff a RDP valid for three months. The RDP was issued on September 12, 1988, and expired on December 12, 1988.\nPlaintiff sought to renew the RDP prior to its expiration through an informal hearing procedure. The defendant denied plaintiff\u2019s request because she had obtained her RDP as the result of a court order, and not a decision by the defendant\u2019s office. Plaintiff was then required to undergo another formal hearing which was conducted on November 15, 1988. On January 4, 1989, plaintiff\u2019s request for renewal of a RDP was denied. The hearing officer entered virtually the same findings of fact that had been previously entered on September 23, 1987.\nOn January 17, 1989, plaintiff filed a petition for relief from violation of the court\u2019s order (No. 87 \u2014 CH\u201410119) that had been entered on January 13, 1988. On January 19, 1989, the circuit court reversed the defendant\u2019s decision of January 4, 1989, and ordered the defendant to issue a RDP to plaintiff forthwith. On January 20, 1989, the defendant filed a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. On January 25, 1989, plaintiff filed a motion to reverse the defendant\u2019s order denying her a RDP in a complaint for administrative review (No. 89 \u2014 CH\u2014459) that she had filed based upon the November 15, 1988, hearing. On January 25, 1989, the cases were consolidated. On January 27, 1989, the circuit court refused to stay the order pending appeal and denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to reverse the defendant\u2019s order in No. 89 \u2014 CH\u2014459 without prejudice.\nInitially, we note plaintiff did not file a brief. However, the record is sufficient for us to decide the issues without the plaintiff\u2019s assistance. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nThe defendant has broad authority to administer the State\u2019s laws governing the conduct of drivers on the roads and is statutorily directed to observe, administer and enforce the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code. (People v. Pine (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 88, 542 N.E.2d 711; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 2 \u2014 101, 2 \u2014 104.) The defendant has authority to revoke and reinstate the driving privileges of persons convicted of DUI. (People v. Pine, 129 Ill. 2d 88, 542 N.E.2d 711; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6 \u2014 205, 6 \u2014 208.) The defendant has exclusive authority to hold hearings and grant hardship relief or reinstatement of license privileges after a suspension or revocation imposed pursuant to his authority over non-first-time DUI offenders. People v. Pine, 129 Ill. 2d 88, 542 N.E.2d 711; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6-205, 6-208.\nUpon review, the findings and conclusions of an administrative agency are considered prima facie true and correct. (Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 469 N.E.2d 1085; Britt v. Edgar (1989),\n192 Ill. App. 3d 469, 548 N.E.2d 826; Fitzpatrick v. Edgar (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 966, 512 N.E.2d 56.) Courts may not interfere with an agency\u2019s discretionary authority unless that power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious fashion or the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Britt v. Edgar, 192 Ill. App. 3d 469, 548 N.E.2d 826; Murdy v. Edgar, 103 Ill. 2d 384, 469 N.E.2d 1085; Fitzpatrick v. Edgar, 158 Ill. App. 3d 966, 512 N.E.2d 56.) The defendant\u2019s decision will be found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only when the reviewing court can find, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the agency, that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency. Britt v. Edgar, 192 Ill. App. 3d 469, 548 N.E.2d 826; Agans v. Edgar (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 492 N.E.2d 929.\nThe relevant factors in determining whether to issue a RDP are the degree of hardship which deprivation of driving privileges imposes upon the applicant, whether alternative means of transportation are available, and whether issuance of the permit would prove a danger to public safety and welfare. (Britt v. Edgar, 192 Ill. App. 3d 469, 548 N.E.2d 826; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6-206(c)(3).) The relevant inquiry in restricted driving permit cases is the danger to public safety and welfare. Britt v. Edgar, 192 Ill. App. 3d 469, 548 N.E.2d 826; Murdy v. Edgar, 103 Ill. 2d 384, 469 N.E.2d 1085.\nThe hearing officer at the November 15, 1988, hearing held that plaintiff was not entitled to a RDP, and entered, inter alia, these findings of facts: (1) plaintiff had been arrested for DUI twice in SVz years; (2) plaintiff had attended and completed an alcohol/drug remedial education course; and (3) plaintiff had been classified as a Level I nonproblematic user of alcohol in an alcohol/drug evaluation. The hearing officer stated that plaintiff\u2019s alcohol history was indicative of a \u201cproblematic, use,\u201d however, and that she had never obtained any treatment for her alcohol problem. The officer also noted that plaintiff displayed an \u201cevasive\u201d demeanor at the hearing and that her testimony lacked credibility. The hearing officer concluded that plaintiff remained unable to recognize the seriousness of her alcohol problem and would continue to be a danger to the public safety and welfare if driving relief was to be granted to her.\nWhen the parties returned to court on January 19, 1989, the plaintiff sought to enforce, not modify, the judgment that had been entered by the circuit court on January 13, 1988. The circuit court believed that it had retained jurisdiction in the matter because: (1) the findings of fact entered from the November 15, 1988, hearing mirrored those of the findings of fact entered from the July 16, 1987, hearing; (2) plaintiff had not been arrested for a DUI during the intervening period; (3) the defendant\u2019s compliance with the January 13, 1988, order was so negligible as to show that the defendant was continuing to exercise his power in an arbitrary and capricious fashion; and (4) the defendant\u2019s decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence introduced by plaintiff at both hearings was unrebutted. We agree.\nGenerally, a circuit court retains jurisdiction over cases pending before it until such time as a final judgment is entered in the case and the litigation is effectively terminated between the parties in the trial court. That court does, however, have a 30-day period after the entry of a final judgment within which it may hear post-trial motions or other motions, and at the end of this 30-day period, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, rehear, retry, vacate, or grant other relief of a similar nature from the final judgment order. (Brigando v. Republic Steel Corp. (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 536 N.E.2d 778.) A trial court may, at times, retain jurisdiction to enforce its order after the lapse of the 30-day period where the judgment contemplates or orders future performance by the parties. Brigando v. Republic Steel Corp., 180 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 536 N.E.2d 778; Village of Gilberts v. Holiday Park Corp. (1986), 150 Ill. App. 932, 502 N.E.2d 378.\nAlthough the circuit court ordered the defendant to issue a RDP to plaintiff on January 13, 1988, the defendant did not comply by granting a RDP to plaintiff until July 1, 1988. Further, the RDP was not even issued until September 12, 1988, and it was valid only for three months. When the plaintiff sought a renewal of the RDP prior to its expiration, plaintiff was required to undergo another formal hearing, although she had not had any other DUI arrests. The defendant then refused to grant plaintiff a renewal of her RDP on January 17, 1989, for virtually the same reasons as on September 23, 1987. We believe that the circuit court retained jurisdiction in the present case to enforce its order of January 13, 1988, regardless of the lapse of the 30-day period. The January 13, 1988, judgment ordered the defendant to issue a RDP to plaintiff. Although the circuit court did not specify a time period for compliance, we conclude that the circuit court\u2019s actions of January 19, 1989, were proper because the defendant had continued to exercise his power in an arbitrary and capricious fashion by continuing to create unnecessary and burdensome obstacles for the plaintiff. Further, we believe that it is unnecessary to require plaintiff to file a complaint in administrative review for No. 89 \u2014 CH\u2014459 since both cases involve the same factual situation.\nWe believe that Ball v. Edgar (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 349, 519 N.E.2d 35, is inapplicable in the present case. In Bell v. Edgar, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of a judgment in the circuit court, asking for an extension of his three-month RDP, without initially seeking a renewal of the RDP with the defendant. The appellate court held that the trial court\u2019s modified order was void for lack of jurisdiction because it was entered more than 30 days after entry of the final order for issuance of a RDP. Further, the circuit court\u2019s decision encroached on the defendant\u2019s discretion and duties, who had neither denied the extension nor presented evidence on the issue. This case does not present a similar factual situation.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHARON RUBLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1-89-0334\nOpinion filed January 17, 1991.\nRehearing denied March 7, 1991.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0396-01", "first_page_order": 418, "last_page_order": 423 }