{ "id": 2540817, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHASTER SMITH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "1991-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 2-88-1197", "first_page": "795", "last_page": "804", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 795" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "319 U.S. 463", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 366829 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "1524" }, { "page": "1245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/319/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532023 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "2229" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "2229" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "2229-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045347 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418-19" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2628435 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3518986 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 893", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587914 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0893-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3109012 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5434877 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3264742 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460284 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/399/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2431961 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111039 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340319 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "1134" }, { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/225/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Colum. L. Rev. 571", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Colum. L. Rev.", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.E. 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.Y. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 1981250 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/246/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3077002 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641783 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163414 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "435" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S. Ct. 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 L. Ed. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 U.S. 942", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3650465, 3655494, 3661257, 3660597, 3654839, 3661630 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/358/0942-05", "/us/358/0942-04", "/us/358/0942-02", "/us/358/0942-06", "/us/358/0942-01", "/us/358/0942-03" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2770405 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0406-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 960, "char_count": 22085, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3465238706967086 }, "sha256": "4bc741b94cde36a842a9461522abf5cc4b874d18855b09edfe3deeaf5c619338", "simhash": "1:833d736f7999d6e7", "word_count": 3662 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:55.726214+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHASTER SMITH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, Shaster Smith, was convicted of armed robbery, attempt (armed robbery), unlawful use of weapons by a felon, and aggravated assault. He appeals only the attempt (armed robbery) and unlawful use of weapons by a felon convictions, arguing that the evidence as to each charge was legally insufficient. We reverse both the attempt (armed robbery) conviction and the unlawful use of weapons by a felon conviction.\nThe evidence, generally not in dispute, shows that on July 18, 1988, defendant paid train fare from Chicago to Waukegan. However, he left the train at the Highland Park Metra station, where, at about 12:30 p.m., he entered the taxi cab of Roman Suminski (cab driver). At defendant\u2019s direction, the cab driver drove to Genesee Street in Waukegan. In response to the cab driver\u2019s inquiry, defendant said that he was looking for a jewelry store. The cab driver noticed a jewelry store and pointed it out, but defendant told the cab driver that it was \u201cnot the one.\u201d Defendant then directed the cab driver to go to the Waukegan Metra station. On the way there, the cab driver noticed a police car and suggested defendant ask directions, but defendant declined. When the cab driver parked at the train station and asked for the fare, defendant drew a gun, demanded money, and ordered the cab driver out of the cab. After defendant drove the cab away, the cab driver called the police and reported the robbery.\nA Waukegan police officer responded to the cab driver\u2019s call. Police detectives heard the dispatch about the robbery and located the abandoned cab about a block and a half northwest of the Metra station. While surveying the area, the detectives saw defendant walking. When defendant saw the police car, he started to run. One of the detectives ordered defendant to stop. Defendant dropped his gun, some money, and a pillow case, as he ran and jumped a fence. Defendant hid in a trailer where he was discovered and apprehended by police.\nAfter being arrested for armed robbery, defendant consented to an interview at the Waukegan police station. Defendant admitted to detectives that he had intended to rob an unidentified jewelry store on Gene-see Street and to use the stolen cab as a getaway vehicle. Defendant told the detectives that he did not know the name of the building where the jewelry store was located but knew what the jewelry store looked like. In other respects, defendant\u2019s admissions corroborated the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses at the trial.\nThe defense put on no witnesses at the trial. After putting on all of its testimony, the prosecution, as part of its proof on the unlawful use of weapons charge, filed a certified statement of conviction from the circuit court of Cook County indicating that on November 1, 1983, \u201cShaster Smith\u201d pleaded guilty to and was sentenced on a charge of burglary. The copy of conviction did not identify the person convicted in any way other than by name. Defense counsel, in moving for a directed verdict, argued that the unlawful use of weapons by a felon charge could not be sustained because the copy of conviction was legally insufficient to establish that defendant was the person convicted of the 1983 burglary charge. Defendant rested without presenting any witnesses. The trial judge found defendant guilty of all four charges. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of 21 years\u2019 imprisonment for armed robbery of the cab driver, 15 years\u2019 imprisonment for attempted armed robbery of the jewelry store, five years for unlawful use of weapons by a felon, and one year for aggravated assault.\nDefendant argues first that he could not properly be found guilty of attempted armed robbery of the jewelry store because there is no evidence that he ever found or came within any particular distance of the store. He argues that because the prosecution failed to show that he ever came within \u201cdangerous proximity to success\u201d of his objective, his conviction must be reversed.\nDefendant also argues that the court, in adjudging the sufficiency of the evidence, must limit itself to those facts set out in the indictment, to wit, that, \u201cWhile armed with a *** gun, [defendant] went to a street in Waukegan and inquired of a cab driver as to the location of a jewelry store he wanted to rob.\u201d However, defendant at no time objected to any variance between pleading and proof or to the trial judge\u2019s consideration of facts beyond those specified in the indictment. In passing on the sufficiency of the evidence of attempt (armed robbery), we therefore examine the totality of the evidence' presented at trial. People v. Flowers (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 406, 415-17, cert. denied (1959), 358 U.S. 942, 3 L. Ed. 2d 349, 79 S. Ct. 349.\nThe Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a person commits an attempt \u201cwhen, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4(a).) Defendant concedes that he intended to rob a jewelry store, but argues that at most his actions amounted to preparation rather than attempt. The State maintains, and defendant denies, that under People v. Terrell (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 427, defendant, by arming himself, traveling to Waukegan, searching for the jewelry store, and driving a stolen cab that he intended to use as a getaway car, committed a substantial step toward his objective of robbing the store.\nIn Terrell, the defendant was convicted of attempted armed robbery. The Terrell defendant was discovered hiding in weeds about 25 to 30 feet behind a service station and carrying a loaded revolver and a stocking mask. In a split decision, the supreme court held the evidence sufficient to prove both intent and a substantial step toward the armed robbery of the service station. The majority stated the general rule that although it is not necessary that a defendant commit the last proximate act to be convicted of attempt, mere preparation is not a substantial step. The determination of whether the line between preparation and perpetration has been crossed must therefore be decided on the facts of each case. (99 Ill. 2d at 433.) The court noted earlier findings of a \u201csubstantial step\u201d in People v. Burleson (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 629, where the defendant, armed with a shotgun, a suitcase, and disguises, was prevented from entering a bank only by the quick action of a man inside the bank, and in People v. Reyes (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 820, where the defendant\u2019s conviction of attempted armed robbery was upheld even though he never entered the drugstore whose patrons he intended to rob. The Terrell court held the defendant, like those in Burleson and Reyes, was in possession of the materials necessary to carry out an armed robbery at or near the place contemplated for its commission and, therefore, had done enough to support a finding of a \u201csubstantial step.\u201d\nThe Terrell majority held further that the defendant\u2019s actions fit within certain provisions of the Model Penal Code, providing that a \u201csubstantial step\u201d may consist of:\n\u201c(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances.\u201d Terrell, 99 Ill. 2d at 436, citing Model Penal Code \u00a75.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1963).\nThe three Terrell court dissenters denied intent had been shown beyond a reasonable doubt and further maintained that, as the defendant\u2019s actions were preliminary activities consistent with a variety of possible outcomes and as the defendant had never been observed moving toward any target or making any demands on anyone, the defendant\u2019s activities did not bring him within \u201cdangerous proximity to success.\u201d The Terrell dissent asserted that the majority misapplied the standards of the Model Penal Code because the record did not initially establish the defendant\u2019s intent to rob the gas station, and without the establishment of specific intent it was impossible to test whether the conduct involved was strongly corroborative of the defendant\u2019s criminal purpose.\nIn applying Terrell, we note first defendant correctly points out a major difference between his case and the facts of Terrell, Burleson, and Reyes', in each of those cases, the defendant had already found his target and either was waiting close by, intending to pounce momentarily, or had already started toward the building. In each case, the defendant\u2019s physical proximity to an identified, settled target enabled the fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had gone beyond preparation and achieved dangerous proximity to success. Here defendant never located his target, although he did drive along the street where he expected to find it. The facts of this case do not fit within the rule of Terrell that a substantial step has been taken when the defendant possesses the necessary materials for the crime at or near the placo contemplated for its commission. (Terrell, 99 Ill. 2d at 435.) We have found no case in our jurisdiction analogous to this one. However, in People v. Rizzo (1927), 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction of attempted robbery where the evidence showed only that the defendant and his confederates rode around town looking for their intended victim but were arrested before they could find him. The court explained:\n\u201cIn a word, these defendants had planned to commit a crime, and were looking around the city for an opportunity to commit it, but the opportunity fortunately never came. Men would not be guilty of an attempt at burglary if they had planned to break into a building and were arrested while they were hunting about the streets for the building not knowing where it was.\u201d 246 N.Y. at 338-39,158 N.E. at 889.\nHowever, the Terrell court held that a \u201csubstantial step\u201d may be also found according to the standards of the Model Penal Code based on a defendant\u2019s \u201c(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances.\u201d Terrell, 99 Ill. 2d at 436, citing Model Penal Code \u00a75.01(2)(e) (Proposed Official Draft 1963).\nBy shifting the emphasis from what remains to be done to what the actor has already done, the Model Penal Code standards enable a trier of fact to find a \u201csubstantial step\u201d even where the commission of the crime still requires several major steps to be taken. The standards thus broaden the scope of criminal liability beyond that under the \u201cdangerous proximity\u201d test. (Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 593 (1961).) This expanded reading of the \u201csubstantial step\u201d language of the attempt statute is supported not only by the fact that the statutory language is taken from the Model Penal Code, but also by the committee comments to section 8 \u2014 4(a) that \u201c[wjhether we describe the required act as a substantial step toward commission, or as in dangerous proximity to the principal offense, the courts must still make the determination based on the facts of each case.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4, Committee Comments, at 499 (Smith-Hurd 1989).\nThe Model Penal Code criteria were consciously patterned after a Louisiana statute that was expressly directed at preventing the type of result in People v. Rizzo. Thus, searching or lying in wait for a victim who never materializes may still amount to criminal attempt. Wechsler et al, 61 Colum. L. Rev. at 595-96.\nHowever, even the expanded scope of a \u201csubstantial step\u201d provided by the Model Penal Code provisions does not allow mere preparation to rise to the level necessary to find an attempt. Both of the cited Model Penal Code provisions contain a requirement of specificity that is lacking in this instance.\n\u201c[T]he contemplated victim of the crime\u201d was never identified here. (See Model Penal Code \u00a75.01(2Xa) (1985).) Although defendant admitted an intent to rob a jewelry store, defendant, as well as the State, was unable to give the name, address or description of the store that was \u201cthe contemplated victim.\u201d Rather, the evidence reveals that defendant had only general, vague notions of the location and the appearance of a jewelry store. Defendant\u2019s lack of specific information belies the existence of a specific contemplated victim as required by the Model Penal Code.\nNor were the materials carried by defendant \u201cspecially designed\u201d for the unlawful purpose of robbing a jewelry store. (See Model Penal Code \u00a75.01(2Xe) (1985).) A gun and a pillowcase simply do not rise to the level of \u201cspecifically designed\u201d materials.\nThe Terrell majority\u2019s adoption of the expanded scope of \u201csubstantial step\u201d as provided by the Model Penal Code did not abrogate the general rule that mere preparation does not bring a defendant in \u201cdangerous proximity to success.\u201d (Terrell, 99 Ill. 2d at 434, citing Hyde v. United States (1912), 225 U.S. 347, 388, 56 L. Ed. 1114, 1134, 32 S. Ct. 793, 810 (Holmes, J., dissenting).) Rather, only clearly specific conduct which can only be directed at the specific identified victim or crime if \u201cstrongly corroborative of the actor\u2019s criminal purpose\u201d may be held a \u201csubstantial step.\u201d See Model Penal Code \u00a75.01(2) (1985).\nWe, therefore, hold that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempt (armed robbery) and reverse his conviction of and sentence for this charge.\nWe hold further that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict defendant of unlawful use of weapons by a felon. The sole evidence at trial of defendant\u2019s prior felony conviction, an essential element of the charge, was a certified copy of a conviction from the circuit court of Cook County indicating that on November 1, 1983, \u201cShaster Smith\u201d was sentenced on a guilty plea to a term of three years for burglary. The State argues that under People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, and People v. Bond (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 959, the identity of names between defendant and the defendant in the copy of conviction creates a rebut-table presumption of identity of person, which, in the absence of any contest by defendant, shows his prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree, however, that these cases enable us to affirm the trial court where the previous conviction is an element of the offense to be proved at trial and the copy of conviction is uncorroborated.\nPrior to Davis, our courts consistently held that the presumption of identity of person from identity of names, though legally sufficient in a civil context, was inadequate to establish identity under the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, proof of defendant\u2019s prior conviction required more than the record of conviction of someone with the same name. (People v. Casey (1948), 399 Ill. 374, 378; People v. Langdon (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 881.) However, the supreme court upheld the application of judicial notice in the criminal context in People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, a case in which the defendant coincidentally had the same name as that in the decision now urged by the State. Nonetheless, in People v. Martin (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 704, we held that Casey and Langdon were still good law, noting that the earlier Davis decision involved both a trial judge with direct personal knowledge of the prior conviction and a preponderance, rather than reasonable doubt, standard of proof.\nThe State, however, contends that under People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, the rebuttable presumption of identity held inadequate in Casey, Langdon and Martin must now be considered sufficient to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard, at least where, as here, defendant does not directly deny that he is the person named in the prior conviction. Because Davis has generated much confusion, we examine both its holding and subsequent application in detail.\nIn Davis, the defendant argued that the State had not, in a death penalty hearing on aggravating factors, adequately proved his prior convictions. The State introduced certified copies of defendant\u2019s two prior indictments and convictions for murder. An employee of the court clerk\u2019s office testified that these were the convictions of the same Girvies L. Davis presently being sentenced. The witness did not, however, identify the defendant, and the defendant\u2019s counsel did not cross-examine the witness or object to this lack of identification. The supreme court held that the defendant, who did not deny his prior convictions or assert that he was not the Girvies L. Davis named in the document, was not prejudiced by the State\u2019s proof of identity. The court announced its adoption of a rebuttable presumption of identity of person based on identity of name and found that the evidence satisfied the State\u2019s burden to prove the defendant\u2019s prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The State urges us to interpret this decision as holding that an unrebutted presumption of identity, without more, satisfies the State\u2019s burden of proving a prior conviction as an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law.\nOnly the Appellate Court for the Fourth District (fourth district) has adopted the expansive reading of Davis urged in this instance by the State. In People v. Bond (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 959, and more recently in People v. House (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 893, the fourth district applied the presumption of identity to an element of the crime charged without corroboration. However, the fourth district has also limited the presumption of identity to the context of a sentencing hearing (People v. Stanley (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 532, 537-38 (Miller, J., specially concurring)) and expressly held that outside of a sentencing hearing at a trial in absentia, the presumption of identity is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt without corroboration. (People v. Newbern (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 995; see also People v. Broyld (1989), 146 Ill. App. 3d 693.) Nor are appellate court decisions from the Appellate Court for the First and Fifth Districts dispositive of the question as both have applied the presumption of identity only in the context of sentencing hearings, and only when corroborated. People v. Stewart (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 833, 836-37; People v. Gill (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1057; People v. Hall (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 873, 878.\nWith such unsettled appellate precedent, we return to Davis itself for guidance. The court cited its earlier Davis opinion that \u201can inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of proof of identity *** [is] incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency\u201d (Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31, citing People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164) and adopted the \u201cgeneral rule that identity of name gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of identity of person.\u201d Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31.\nPresumptions and inferences are substitutes for evidentiary facts. (People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415, 418.) As such, presumptions present serious due process concerns when applied in criminal contexts. (Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 418-19.) Mandatory presumptions are distinguished from permissive presumptions. (Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 420.) A mandatory presumption must flow beyond a reasonable doubt from the established fact. (Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 420, citing County Court v. Allen (1979), 442 U.S. 140, 166, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777, 797, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2229.) In contrast, a permissive presumption must have a \u201crational connection\u201d (Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 420, citing Tot v. United States (1943), 319 U.S. 463, 467, 87 L. Ed. 1519, 1524, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 1245), and is \u201c \u2018more likely than not to flow from\u2019 \u201d the proven fact (Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 421, quoting County Court, 442 U.S. at 165, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 797, 99 S. Ct. at 2229).When the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, a permissive presumption must further be corroborated. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 421, citing County Court, 442 U.S. at 167, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 798, 99 S. Ct. at 2229-30.\nIn Davis, the court did not identify the presumption of identity as a permissive presumption. However, the presumption was corroborated by testimony of a witness that the defendant was in fact the person named in the certified copies of conviction. Thus, we interpret that decision to create a permissive presumption, which alone is adequate to satisfy a preponderance of the evidence \u201cmore likely than not\u201d standard, but which must be corroborated when the burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\nBecause in this instance defendant\u2019s prior conviction was an element of the crime charged, and it was the State\u2019s burden to prove defendant\u2019s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that the State failed to meet its burden as to this element of the charged offenses. Accordingly, we reverse both defendant\u2019s conviction of unlawful use of weapons by a felon as well as his conviction of attempt (armed robbery). Those portions of defendant\u2019s convictions of aggravated assault and armed robbery that were not appealed are affirmed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nBOWMAN and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and Stephen R. Frank, of Johnson, Frank, Frederick & Walsh, of Urbana (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHASTER SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-88-1197\nOpinion filed March 29, 1991.\nG. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and Stephen R. Frank, of Johnson, Frank, Frederick & Walsh, of Urbana (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0795-01", "first_page_order": 817, "last_page_order": 826 }