{ "id": 2542650, "name": "DENNIS J. DOBRYDNIA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INDIANA GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Dobrydnia v. Indiana Group, Inc.", "decision_date": "1991-03-12", "docket_number": "No. 3-90-0445", "first_page": "1038", "last_page": "1042", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 1038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "137 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5321421 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4916652 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/284/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2887789 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3630064 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985-86" }, { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2758643 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114553 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0479-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 561, "char_count": 10954, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0739584829732352e-07, "percentile": 0.560473602901173 }, "sha256": "a6b1914aa8edbcfc1b19a504603505fee3854831fc22f279f9c350293a745c26", "simhash": "1:33c206d406c4e7ec", "word_count": 1768 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:55.726214+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DENNIS J. DOBRYDNIA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INDIANA GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Dennis J. Dobrydnia and Linda M. Dobrydnia, appeal a determination by the trial court granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiff Linda M. Dobrydnia\u2019s loss of consortium claim because her recovery is barred by section 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)). We affirm.\nSince this appeal was taken at the pleading stage of this case, the facts and circumstances surrounding plaintiff Dennis J. Dobrydnia\u2019s accident are allegations of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint rather than demonstrated evidentiary facts. Plaintiff Dennis J. Dobrydnia was injured during the course of his employment at Princeton Elementary School District 115. Plaintiff Dennis M. Dobrydnia brought an action to recover damages occasioned by the alleged negligence of defendants in their failure to adequately inspect a certain boiler, its appurtenances and accompanying equipment. Indiana Insurance Company (hereinafter defendant) is the insurer for the school district. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint requested damages for personal injuries, and count V, the subject of this appeal, sought damages for loss of consortium.\nDefendant filed a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619) stating, inter alia, that the loss of consortium claim of Linda M. Dobrydnia (hereinafter plaintiff) was prohibited by section 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The trial court held section 5(a) barred the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action for loss of consortium.\nSection 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)) states the following:\n\u201cNo common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer *** for injury *** sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her loss of consortium claim was improper. She contends her cause of action is not an injured worker\u2019s claim for bodily injuries but an entirely separate assertion based on loss of consortium of her husband. Plaintiff states that an existing common law right, such as loss of consortium, is not eradicated by statute unless it is explicitly enacted by the legislature. Plaintiff posits that under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, there is no direct enactment barring a spouse\u2019s right for loss of consortium. Plaintiff further contends the legislature did not intend to bar a spouse\u2019s loss of consortium claim.\nPlaintiff\u2019s position, however, is not supported by statute or case law. The statute clearly reads that the immunity afforded by section 5(a) prohibits suits, not only by the injured employee but also by \u201cany one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).) It is obviously the intent of this section to bar any and all claims that arise out of the injury to the employee. While the spouse\u2019s loss of consortium claim may be an independent claim for damages, it arises out of the employee\u2019s injury.\nIt is plaintiff\u2019s position that she is not a person \u201cwholly or partially dependent\u201d upon her spouse. Plaintiff states the essence of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is a \u201cquid pro quo\u201d in which immunity from tort is granted to an employer in exchange for a no-fault proof on the part of the employee to obtain recovery. Plaintiff contends the spouse of the injured employee receives no \u201cquid pro quo\u201d for loss of her independent common law right to recover for loss of consortium.\nPlaintiff\u2019s argument sounds plausible in theory, but not in its application. A spouse, whether or not dependent, receives benefits directly or indirectly under the Act. For example, if an employee is killed during the course of his employment, a surviving spouse would be entitled to survivor\u2019s benefits under section 7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.7) of the Act. If the injury does not result in death, the employee receives the compensation and the spouse indirectly receives a benefit by the employer\u2019s reimbursement of the family expenses and employee\u2019s injuries. Likewise, the spouse may well receive a direct benefit by reason of having medical bills paid which might otherwise be his or her responsibility.\nFinally and foremost, section 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court, prohibits recovery for a loss of consortium claim against an employer. This very issue was decided in the case of Fregeau v. Gillespie (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 479, 451 N.E.2d 870, wherein the plaintiff-wife sought damages for loss of consortium under the Act. The court denied plaintiff\u2019s claim. In construing the language of section 5(a) to prohibit loss of consortium claims, the court commented as follows:\n\u201cToo, we observe that the exclusivity provision in section 5(a) operates not only to prohibit an action by the employee, but also by \u2018any one wholly or partially dependent upon him *** or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.\u2019 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5.) With near unanimity courts interpreting exclusivity provisions with this or comparable language have held that the provisions preclude actions by a spouse of the employee for loss of consortium. 2A A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation sec. 66.20 (1982).\u201d 96 Ill. 2d at 486, 451 N.E.2d at 873.\nThe issue of the applicability of section 5(a) to a loss of consortium claim against an employer had been previously decided in Bloemer v. Square D Co. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 371, 290 N.E.2d 699. In ruling that section 5(a) barred loss of consortium claims, the court stated:\n\u201cThe Illinois Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act was intended to provide a complete scheme for recovery from an employer for industrial injuries only and therefore, the trial court was correct in sustaining the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (8 Ill. App. 3d at 373, 290 N.E.2d at 700.)\nThe appellate court accordingly affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the loss of consortium claim.\nIn the present case, plaintiff contends the provisions of section 5(a) are unconstitutional as they act to extinguish the common law and statutory rights of third parties who otherwise might be entitled to recover damages against an employer for an employee\u2019s injuries. Plaintiff states that to bar her consortium claim under section 5(a) would violate her rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of both the State and Federal constitutions.\nThese constitutional arguments were discussed at great length in Block v. Pielet Brothers Scrap & Metal, Inc. (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 983, 457 N.E.2d 509, wherein the court explained the case law history which clearly supports the constitutionality of section 5(a).\n\u201cIn Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373, a woman was fatally injured in the course of her employment upon being struck by a forklift truck. Her husband, in his capacity as administrator of his wife\u2019s estate, brought a wrongful death action against the defendant employer.\nOur supreme court affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of this action. The plaintiff, as his wife\u2019s sole surviving beneficiary, had previously proceeded against the defendant before the Industrial Commission, resulting in a $500 burial expense compensation award. The supreme court held that the plaintiff was barred by section 5(a) from any further relief under the Act.\nThe court further held that the prohibition of additional actions is consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute in that \u2018 \u201c[t]he act was designed as a substitute for previous rights of action of employees against employers and to cover the whole ground of the liabilities of the master ***.\u201d \u2019 44 Ill. 2d 15, 18, 253 N.E.2d 373.\nFurthermore, the court concluded that while the Act fixes limits upon the amounts to be recovered, it is sustained as a legitimate exercise of the legislature\u2019s police power for the general welfare in that it takes away existing rights of action of the employee while extending the liabilities of the employer. 44 Ill. 2d 15, 18, 253 N.E.2d 373. See also Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board (1918), 284 Ill. 378, 382-83, 120 N.E.249.\u201d (119 Ill. App. 3d at 985-86.)\nThe Block court then examined the constitutionality of section 5(a):\n\u201cIn considering the question of whether section 5(a) violated either the Constitution of the United States or the Illinois Constitution, the Duley court cited Moushon v. National Garages, Inc. (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842, as previously determining this issue when it considered the constitutionality of section 5(a) where no remedy for permanent injury was provided in the Act. \u2018By the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, the legislature required the employer to give up certain defenses and required the employee to give up certain recoverable elements of damage of a common-law negligence action; and this we have held many times is a reasonable exercise of the legislature\u2019s police power for the promotion of the general welfare. [Citations.] This court has never considered one to have such a vested right in the common-law rules governing negligence actions as to preclude the legislature from substituting a statutory remedy of this type for the common-law remedy.\u2019 (9 Ill. 2d 407, 412, 137 N.E.2d 842.)\u201d (119 Ill. App. 3d at 986.)\nThe Block court held that section 5(a) of the workers\u2019 compensation statute, which bars a spouse\u2019s loss of consortium claim, is not violative of due process or equal protection of the laws.\nWe find the aforementioned reasoning determining the constitutionality of section 5(a) to be dispositive of the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiff. The substitution of the workers\u2019 compensation scheme for preexisting common-law remedies for injuries directly or indirectly resulting from injury to an employee do not violate due process or equal protection safeguards. The workers\u2019 compensation statute involves not an eradication, but a substitution of remedies that is considered by the legislature to be in the public interest. We agree.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru (Louis E. Olivero, of counsel), for appellants.", "Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, of Peoria (Daniel L. Johns, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DENNIS J. DOBRYDNIA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INDIANA GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3-90-0445\nOpinion filed March 12, 1991.\nLouis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru (Louis E. Olivero, of counsel), for appellants.\nWestervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, of Peoria (Daniel L. Johns, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1038-01", "first_page_order": 1060, "last_page_order": 1064 }