{
  "id": 5374815,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul L. Gibson, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gibson",
  "decision_date": "1974-07-12",
  "docket_number": "Nos. 57373-79 cons.",
  "first_page": "692",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:03.342046+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul L. Gibson, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DRUCKER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the State from the dismissal of criminal charges defendant for violation of the fourth-term rule embodied in section 103\u2014 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(a)). It is contended that a competency examination ordered after a motion filed on behalf of the State requesting such an examination tolled the running of the 120-day rule.\nSeven indictments charged defendant with the crimes of armed robbery, robbery, attempt robbery, theft, and bail jumping. On March 17, 1971, on defendant\u2019s motion, it was ordered that he be examined by the Behavior Clinic. In a letter dated March 31, 1971, Dr. E. J. Kelliher concluded that defendant was not competent to stand trial. However, at a competency hearing conducted on April 5, 1971, a jury found defendant to be competent, and judgment was entered on this finding. On defendant\u2019s motion the case was continued until May 5, 1971.\nThereafter, following three more continuances, none on the motion of defendant, the case was called on July 6, 1971. On that date the State represented to the court that it had been Dr. Kelliher\u2019s opinion that defendant was suffering from \u201ca progressive type of mental disease\u201d and consequently there existed a \u201cbona fide doubt or bona fide question as to Mr. Gibson\u2019s competency.\u201d Defendant immediately pointed out that on April 5 a jury had determined that he was competent to stand trial. The court responded that the finding notwithstanding, it felt \u201cduty bound\u201d to order \u201canother behavior clinic examination.\u201d Defendant, who had been incarcerated for 10 months, then inquired whether the order for an examination would \u201cbreak\u201d his term. The court assured him that it would not since the examination was ordered \u201con the motion of the State.\u201d The court thereupon entered an order for a behavior clinic examination and continued the case until July 19, It stated that:\n\u201c* * * we will set it for subpoenas as to the bail jumping and the State may have, depending on what the results are, a competency hearing if it so desires, but at any rate, we will proceed on one or the other.\u201d\nOn July 19 Dr. Kelliher filed a report concluding that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel stated that he was prepared to go to trial. The State, however, requested a continuance, requesting a mid-August date since it felt \u201cwe have a term, approximately September.\u201d On the State\u2019s motion the case was continued until August 23 with subpoenas on the bail jumping charge only. On August 23, again on the State\u2019s motion, the case was ordered continued until September 9.\nDefendant on September 9, filed his petition for discharge under section 103 \u2014 5. A hearing was held the following day at which it was adduced that the State elected to proceed only on the bond-jumping charge because it was \u201cthe only good case they had.\u201d The trial judge in granting defendant\u2019s motion stated that:\n\u201cThe Court does not believe the Court suspended the trial, the Court does not believe that the Court acted in accordance with section 104 \u2014 2. The Court set this case for trial the next date.\u201d\nRather, on July 6 it granted \u201ca request by the State for a psychiatric examination and a continuance to July 19th for the case in chief.\u201d\nOPINION\nOne hundred twenty-seven days passed from May 5, 1971, the date defendant\u2019s term began to run, until September 9, 1971, the date on which he filed his petition for discharge, thereby invoking the 120-day rule of section 103 \u2014 5. During this period no delay in the proceedings was \u201coccasioned by the defendant.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 103\u2014 5.) It is the State\u2019s contention that despite this fact, defendant\u2019s term was tolled by the July 6 order for a psychiatric examination, and therefore the court below erred in granting his petition for discharge.\nThe Fourth Term Act states that a defendant\u2019s term is tolled by an order for a competency examination ordered pursuant to section 104\u2014 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 104\u2014 2 ). Not all orders for competency examinations meet the prescriptions of this act. For example, it has been held that a petition filed merely for purposes of delay will not toll the running of a defendant\u2019s term. (People v. Hugley, 1 Ill.App.3d 828, 275 N.E.2d 178.) Rather, only where a bona fide doubt as to a defendant\u2019s competency has been raised will an order for a behavior clinic examination meet the requirements of section 104 \u2014 2. (Cf. People v. Lawrence, 132 Ill.App.2d 513, 270 N.E.2d 510.) A bona fide doubt as to a defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial exists where it is unclear whether he understands the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or is unable to assist in his own defense. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 104\u20141.) Thus an individual may be competent to stand trial despite the fact that he is mentally disturbed or defective and requires psychiatric treatment. (Withers v. People, 23 Ill.2d 131, 177 N.E.2d 203.) In determination whether a bona fide doubt exists, courts have taken into consideration such factors as a defendant\u2019s \u201clucidity\u201d and his comprehension of the significance of the proceedings against him. (See People v. Brown, 132 Ill.App.2d 302, 270 N.E.2d 501.) In addition, reliance has been placed upon the fact that a defendant was found competent following an evidentiary hearing shortly before a request for a second mental examination had been made. (Brown.) The determination of a trial court with regard to the issue of whether a bona fide doubt as to competence has been raised will, of course, be given great weight by a court of review. People v. Southwood, 49 Ill.2d 228, 274 N.E.2d 41.\nIn the case at bar the trial judge plainly stated that he did not believe the second behavior clinic examination was ordered pursuant to section 104 \u2014 2. Rather, he indicated that on July 6 he merely granted a request for a psychiatric examination and had no desire that the trial should be long postponed. He noted, moreover, that the order for an examination clearly did not interfere with the State\u2019s preparation for trial. The State, manifesting a desire to go forward only on the bail-jumping charge, appeared to concur with the view of the trial court that the examination was not ordered in accordance with section 104 \u2014 2. On July 13 the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, in requesting an August trial date, indicated that tire prosecution believed that it was confronted with a \u201cSeptember term.\u201d\nFurthermore, in reviewing the record we find that the State on July 6 brought nothing to the attention of the court that would give rise to a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competence to stand trial. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney referred to a behavior clinic report which indicated that defendant might be suffering from a progressive mental disorder. Three months before, however, a jury having presumably considered this report, found him competent. Defendant on July 6 did not behave in a manner which would indicate that his mental state had deteriorated during the intervening 3 months. Indeed, he appeared to be quite lucid and displayed a remarkable understanding of his procedural rights.\nFor the foregoing reasons we find that the court below correctly ruled that the order for a mental examination issued July 6 did not toll defendant\u2019s term and consequently we affirm its discharge of defendant.\nAffirmed.\nBARRETT and LORENZ, JJ., concur.\nIll. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145, provides in pertinent part that:\n\u201c(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for competency ordered pursuant to Section 104 \u2014 2 of this Act e * tt\"\nIll. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 104\u20142, provides in pertinent part that:\n\u201c(a) If before a trial * * * the court has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent the court shall * \u00b0 * impanel a jury to determine the defendant\u2019s competency. * * *\u201d\nIn the most recent amendments to our Criminal Code, section 104 \u2014 2 was repealed and section 5 \u2014 2 \u2014 1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2 \u2014 1(c)) enacted to cover this subject matter. We note that our legislature neglected to amend section 103 \u2014 5 at the time the new provision was enacted and consequently it still refers to examinations \u201cfor competency ordered pursuant to Section 104 \u2014 2 * * See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(a).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DRUCKER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and William K. Hedrick, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.",
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Marc L. Fogelberg and John T. Moran, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul L. Gibson, Defendant-Appellee.\n(Nos. 57373-79 cons.;\nFirst District (5th Division)\nJuly 12, 1974.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and William K. Hedrick, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Marc L. Fogelberg and John T. Moran, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0692-01",
  "first_page_order": 716,
  "last_page_order": 720
}