{ "id": 2535165, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN W. WEHDE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wehde", "decision_date": "1991-03-05", "docket_number": "No. 2-90-0173", "first_page": "56", "last_page": "64", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 56" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "378 U.S. 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165107 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "1514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491123 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255347 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 N.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179289 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340969 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "3420" }, { "page": "923" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "3421" }, { "page": "921" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "3419" }, { "page": "914" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "3416" }, { "page": "923" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "3421" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "3417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0897-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 687, "char_count": 16461, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.2976341477823611 }, "sha256": "1b3b7ca9f52df82cf041d670283da7fc3eea5873ebbf6573c1ec1a22aa2760a8", "simhash": "1:6a809104e7ce8c71", "word_count": 2665 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:57.765044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN W. WEHDE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged by complaint filed in the circuit court of Du Page County with the unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle in violation of section 1 of \"An Act to regulate the possession, delivery, sale or exchange of hypodermic syringes, hypodermic needles, and similar instruments\u201d (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 22 \u2014 50). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress items seized in his home during the execution of a search warrant. The State filed a certificate of impairment and now appeals from the order suppressing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nOn appeal, the State apparently concedes that the warrant at issue was defective. However, the State contends that the facts of the instant case fall within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405.\nWe note that the record presented to this court contains neither the search warrant at issue nor the affidavit supporting the warrant. However, the trial court\u2019s statements when rendering its decision on the motion to reconsider its denial of the original motion to suppress specify the pertinent contents of the warrant and affidavit at issue, and the court\u2019s statements are consistent with the characterization of the facts made by defendant in the record of the proceedings below. Accordingly, while we caution the State that the preferred procedure in such circumstances is to supplement the record with all relevant material, we believe the record is sufficient to infer the contents of the affidavit and allow review of the question presented here.\nThe search warrant in question was issued on the basis of statements made to the issuing judge by Lieutenant K. Dwyer of the Naperville police department. In the affidavit seeking a warrant, Lieutenant Dwyer stated that, during the course of a telephone conversation with defendant, he heard a beeping noise on the telephone. Defendant then informed Lieutenant Dwyer that he was recording the conversation. The officer stated to the issuing judge that defendant\u2019s conduct constituted the criminal offense of eavesdropping (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 14 \u2014 2). Based on this information, the judge issued a search warrant on June 26, 1989, authorizing the police to search defendant\u2019s residence for evidence of \u201ceavesdropping, in violation of Illinois Revised Statute[s], Chapter 38, Section 14 \u2014 2 and seize[:] recording tapes, recording device, condenser microphones, and proof of residency.\u201d\nLieutenant Dwyer and two other Naperville police officers then executed the search warrant and, in the process of doing so, discovered a hypodermic syringe or needle in defendant\u2019s residence. Lieutenant Dwyer then swore out a complaint against defendant for a violation of the Act based on this evidence. Defendant was never charged with eavesdropping.\nDefendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, stating that the police exceeded the scope of the warrant. The motion was denied. Defendant then filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this ruling on a different basis. Defendant argued that, pursuant to the supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Beardsley (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 47, 503 N.E.2d 346, of which the trial court \u201cwas not fully informed\u201d when it first ruled on defendant\u2019s motion, defendant\u2019s conduct did not constitute criminal eavesdropping. Beardsley held that there is no violation of the eavesdropping statute where there is no surreptitious interception of a communication or where the communication was not intended to be private. (Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d at 55, 503 N.E.2d at 350.) Defendant argued that, under Beardsley, his conduct did not constitute an offense and that, therefore, no warrant should have been issued.\nDefendant further argued that the good-faith exception to the requirement of a valid warrant did not apply in this case because the police officers\u2019 reliance on the validity of the warrant was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant contended that a \u201cpolice officer cannot objectively reasonably rely on a warrant which is insufficient due to his reckless statement of the law which results in an error by the magistrate and which makes the warrant objectively unreasonable.\u201d Defendant also argued that the issuing judge \u201cwholly abandoned his judicial role\u201d and that the good-faith exception did not apply here because the warrant was \u201cfacially deficient.\u201d\nThe trial court apparently accepted that, under Beardsley, defendant\u2019s conduct as described in Lieutenant Dwyer\u2019s affidavit did not constitute criminal eavesdropping and that, therefore, no warrant should have been issued to search for evidence of such an offense. The court then determined that the good-faith exception of Leon did not apply in the instant case:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** Now, applying the reasoning of the Leon decision to the facts in this case, it is my conclusion that the warrant itself is facially invalid, and the fact that it was issued by a judge does not authorize the search.\n* # *\nThus, on the face of the warrant itself, it appears the warrant is defective because at issue, then, [are] facts which do not constitute a crime according to the Supreme Court in the Beardsley opinion.\nIt is somewhat of a troublesome case in my mind because I do not believe the officers did anything wrong, and I think they did operate in a way where they were relying on the warrant, but nevertheless, they are the ones who went to the Judge and made the allegation that this was a crime.\nAnd I cannot see from the warrant itself the Judge made a determination himself independently of the facts that it was a crime, basically concurred in the findings of the officer and on that basis issued the warrant.\nSo although the whole purpose of a warrant is to [have] the Judge make an independent objective impartial determination whether there is probable cause so that a policeman can then rely on that, here, I think, the officer knew or reasonably should have known himself because of what the Supreme Court has said in Beardsley that these facts did not constitute a crime. Thus, there was no probable cause.\u201d\nThe court then granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant.\nOn appeal, the State concedes that the warrant issued was not valid because the facts supporting it do not constitute an offense under Beardsley, and so our review of the issue presented is premised on this concession. The State\u2019s main contention on appeal is that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in Leon applies here. The State argues that it is unreasonable for the trial court to have expected Lieutenant Dwyer to be cognizant of the Beardsley opinion and to second-guess the determination of probable cause made by the judge who issued the search warrant.\nDefendant has not filed a response brief in this court, so we examine this appeal pursuant to the standards set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493. Although a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence will generally not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous, where, as here, neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is in dispute, the question is a legal one subject to de novo consideration on review. People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76, 554 N.E.2d 192; People v. Graves (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 273, 276, 553 N.E.2d 810.\nIn Leon, the Supreme Court first recognized the good-faith exception to the general rule that evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant may not be used against an accused. Under Leon\u2019s good-faith exception, evidence seized by a police officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate is not excluded. (Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 3420.) However, the court articulated four instances where an officer\u2019s reliance on a warrant issued by a magistrate would not be objectively reasonable: (1) where the magistrate was misled by information supplied in an affidavit which the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) where the judicial magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role; (3) where the affidavit upon which the warrant is issued is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that an official belief in its existence is unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably expect it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 699,104 S. Ct. at 3421.\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded that the officers executing the search warrant could not have reasonably relied on the warrant, but the court blurred the distinction between the four aspects of objectively reasonable reliance discussed in Leon. We now examine each of these four areas to determine whether, under these circumstances, the police officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable.\nFirst, Lieutenant Dwyer did not supply false factual information to the judge who issued the warrant. While Dwyer may have stated that defendant\u2019s conduct constituted an offense, this is only an incorrect assessment of the legal consequence resulting from the facts asserted, and there is nothing in the record to show his misapprehension of law was intentional or in reckless disregard of the truth. The trial court noted that it did \u201cnot believe the officers did anything wrong.\u201d\nSecond, there is no indication that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant. The record demonstrates, at most, that the issuing judge merely made an incorrect assessment that the conduct described by Lieutenant Dwyer constituted a criminal offense. However, the court in Leon stated that \u201c[penalizing the officer for the magistrate\u2019s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.\u201d Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 3419.\nFurthermore, it cannot be assumed from this record that the issuing judge acted as a mere \u201crubber stamp for the police\u201d in concurring with Lieutenant Dwyer\u2019s suggestion that defendant\u2019s conduct constituted criminal eavesdropping. (See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 3416.) The judge was presented with underlying circumstances supporting the officer\u2019s belief that the defendant had committed a crime. (See Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514.) The record does not indicate that defendant sought to elicit testimony from the officer to establish whether the judge entirely failed to examine the affidavit before issuing the warrant, although such testimony would have been proper under Leon. (1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a71.3(f), at 65 (2d ed. 1987).) Since, as the trial court itself noted, \u201c[t]here is no record or other indication in the warrant what determination was made by the judge,\u201d there is simply no basis in the record from which to conclude that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role.\nThird, the affidavit supporting the search warrant is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in its existence would be unreasonable. Typically, a court reviewing this issue will examine whether the affidavit supplies sufficient factual indicia of probable cause so that an official belief in its existence would be objectively reasonable. Here, while the affidavit provides sufficient facts from which to find probable cause that defendant engaged in the conduct described, the defect in probable cause stems from a misinterpretation of the law. Under these particular circumstances of evolving case law, as evidenced by the Beardsley decision, and frequent changes in the eavesdropping statute (see Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 108A \u2014 1 et seq.\\ ch. 38, par. 108B \u2014 1 et seq., Historical & Statutory Notes, at 45-66 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990)), it would be unreasonable to expect a police officer to second-guess the legal basis of the issuing judge\u2019s finding of probable cause. While the issuing judge should have been familiar with the supreme court\u2019s decision in Beardsley, in this circumstance, we conclude that Dwyer\u2019s reliance on the judge\u2019s legal determination was not objectively unreasonable.\nFourth, we do not agree with the trial court\u2019s characterization of the warrant as \u201cfacially invalid\u201d based on the Beardsley decision. As discussed in Leon, facial invalidity generally refers to obvious factual deficiencies or omissions on the face of the warrant, such as failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized, which make it impossible for the officer reasonably to presume the warrant is valid. (Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 3421.) We do not interpret Leon to include within the notion of facial invalidity an underlying legal deficiency in the judge\u2019s finding of probable cause. See generally 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a71.3(f), at 66-71 (2d ed. 1987).\nWe conclude that the police officers\u2019 reliance on the search warrant issued by a judge was objectively reasonable under these circumstances. The officers acted reasonably in presenting information to obtain the search warrant and thereafter relying on the warrant. The deficiency stems from the issuing judge\u2019s failure to assess the supreme court\u2019s decision in Beardsley. However, \u201cthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.\u201d (Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 3417.) We believe that there is no police misconduct here and that Leon\u2019s good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply. Therefore, the evidence should not have been suppressed.\nAccordingly, the trial court's order suppressing the evidence seized during the execution of the subsequently invalidated warrant is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nBOWMAN J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN,\nspecially concurring:\nI file this special concurrence because I reach the same result but by a different path regarding the third aspect of the \u201cLeon\u201d test.\nAs stated in the majority opinion, \u201c[tjypically, a court reviewing this issue will examine whether the affidavit [my emphasis] supplies sufficient factual indicia of probable cause so that an official belief in its existence would be objectively reasonable.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (210 Ill. App. 3d at 63.) The affidavit is not of record. The majority cites other factors also not in the record: evolving case law and frequent changes in the eavesdropping statute. These appear to be factors of which the majority takes judicial notice in determining Dwyer\u2019s reliance was not objectively unreasonable. I therefore believe the majority is making a de novo determination of fact without a sufficient record to do so. The statement made by the majority appears to be a legal pronouncement that high-ranking police officers are not required to become aware of evolving case law and frequent changes in the eavesdropping statute. I am not aware of any authority supporting such a position.\nRather than impose this court\u2019s de novo findings, I would reverse on the basis that the trial court\u2019s finding \u201cthe officer did not do anything wrong\u201d was not manifestly erroneous. I interpret the trial court\u2019s finding \u201cthat the officer did not do anything wrong\u201d to mean that the officer\u2019s reliance on the judge\u2019s legal determination was not objectively unreasonable. I, therefore, see no need for the majority\u2019s hypothesis based on an affidavit and other matters not contained in the record.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the people.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN W. WEHDE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 90\u20140173\nOpinion filed March 5, 1991.\nMcLAREN, J., specially concurring.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the people.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0056-01", "first_page_order": 78, "last_page_order": 86 }