{
  "id": 2533242,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANNY R. CORNETT, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cornett",
  "decision_date": "1991-03-07",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANNY R. CORNETT, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from an order of the circuit court which dismissed an information charging the defendant, Danny Cornett, with the offense of driving while his license was revoked (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d)). The State raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in determining that section 6 \u2014 303(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d)) did not permit the State to use the violation of a local ordinance prohibiting driving while one\u2019s license is revoked to enhance a violation of section 6 \u2014 303(c) to a Class 4 felony under section 6 \u2014 303(d) of the Vehicle Code. We will summarize those facts necessary to resolve the issue raised in this appeal.\nThe defendant was charged in the circuit court of Ogle County with the violation of section 6 \u2014 303(d) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95x/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d)), because he was seen driving a vehicle on December 16, 1989, while his license was revoked. At the preliminary hearing, the State maintained that the defendant could be convicted under section 6 \u2014 303(d) because he had a previous conviction of a local ordinance violation of driving while his license was revoked. The court took judicial notice of case No. 87 \u2014 TR\u20145530, a prosecution filed by the City of Rochelle charging the defendant -with the offense of driving while his license was revoked, in violation of the Rochelle Municipal Code (municipal code). The defendant was convicted of that offense on January 15,1988.\nThe court found that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant was driving while his license was revoked. The defendant then made an oral motion to dismiss the section 6 \u2014 303(d) charge on the ground that he did not have a prior conviction under section 6\u2014 303(c) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95 V2, par. 6\u2014 303(c)). The court construed section 6 \u2014 303(d) as excluding local ordinance violations from enhancing an offense under section 6 \u2014 303(c) to a felony. The court concluded that the legislature could have specifically included local ordinance violations in section 6 \u2014 303(d), but chose not to do so. Thus, the court found that there was no probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony, and it granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the section 6 \u2014 303(d) charge.\nThe State filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal. The State asserted that the local ordinance violation conviction did constitute a prior conviction for purposes of section 6 \u2014 303(d) because the City of Rochelle incorporated the Vehicle Code into the municipal code, and, therefore, conviction of the local ordinance charge was the same as conviction of a State offense under section 6 \u2014 303(c). The State attached to the motion a certificate from the Secretary of State which certified that an order of revocation was entered against the defendant on January 29, 1987, which was in effect on December 16, 1989. The defendant had been issued a restricted driving permit on July 31, 1989. The State also included a copy of the order of revocation, a copy of the restricted driving permit, a copy of the Rochelle complaint and the court record. In addition, the State attached a copy of the defendant\u2019s driving abstract, which showed that, on January 12, 1987, the defendant was convicted of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501), and his license was revoked on January 29, 1987. The abstract further showed that on January 1, 1988, defendant was convicted of violating section 6 \u2014 303.\nFinally, the State attached a copy of the Rochelle ordinance, which provided that in March 1983 Rochelle \u201cadopted cerain [sic] provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code by reference, and this ordinance is codified as Section 10.08.010 of the Rochelle Municipal Code.\u201d The ordinance further stated that since the Vehicle Code had been amended since 1983, the city council amended section 10.08.010 of the municipal code as follows:\n\u201cThe Illinois Vehicle Code, Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act, and Child Passenger Protection Act codified as Section 95%; [sic] of the Illinois Revised Statutes, is hereby incorporated by this reference, as though full [sic] set forth herein.\u201d (Rochelle, Ill., Municipal Code \u00a710.08.010 (1986).)\nSection 10.08.020 of the municipal code was amended to provide:\n\u201cAny person violating the provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code, Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act, and Child Passenger Protection Act, adopted by Section 10.08.010 shall, upon conviction, be punished as follows:\na. For the offense of Driving while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof, 11 \u2014 501; Every person convicted of violating this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor with a sentence of a fine of up to $1,000 and up to 1 year imprisonment, *** for any second or subsequent conviction of violating this Section committed within 5 years of a previous violation of this Section shall be mandatorily sentenced to a minimum of 48 consecutive hours of imprisonment or assigned to a minimum of 10 days community service as may be determined by the Court. ***\nb. If the Illinois Vehicle Code, Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act, and Child Passenger Protection Act has [sic] incorporated a mandatory penalty provision into a particular section then that penalty provision shall apply.\nc. If the mandatory penalty provisions of (a) and (b) above do not apply, then the punishment provisions of Section 10.12.050 shall apply.\u201d (Rochelle, Ill., Municipal Code \u00a710.08.020 (1986).)\nThe ordinance was published on August 19,1986.\nAfter a hearing, the court denied the State\u2019s motion to reconsider. The State timely filed its appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)).\nThe State contends that the trial court erred in granting the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on the determination that section 6 \u2014 303(d) did not permit the State to use the violation of a local ordinance prohibiting one from driving with a revoked license to enhance a violation of section 6 \u2014 303(c) to a Class 4 felony under section 6\u2014 303(d). Section 6 \u2014 303(d) provides in relevant part:\n\u201cAny person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the original revocation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11 \u2014 401 or 11 \u2014 501 of this Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).)\nThe State argues that if the municipal code incorporates the Vehicle Code and encompasses provisions identical to section 11 \u2014 501 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501), then the defendant had a prior revocation based on a \u201csimilar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d\nThe defendant responds that the State\u2019s focus is on the wrong part of section 6 \u2014 303(d). According to the defendant, the language referring to \u201ca similar provision of a local ordinance\u201d is applicable only to the underlying basis of the original revocation. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6-303(d).\nThe issue in this case turns on the interpretation of a statute. The proper interpretation of a statute must reflect the intent of the legislature. (People v. Parker (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 204, 209.) This intent may be discerned from the statutory language itself and the purpose of the legislation. (People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271.) Where the intent of the legislature is clear from the unambiguous language used in the statute, it must be given effect as written, without resorting to any aids of construction. People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448, 455.\nThe State argues that the language of section 6 \u2014 303(d) is not ambiguous and that it clearly allows a local ordinance conviction to suffice for purposes of enhancing a violation under section 6 \u2014 303(c) to a felony. We agree with the State that the language of section 6 \u2014 303(d) is unambiguous. We do not agree, however, with the State\u2019s interpretation of that language.\nSection 6 \u2014 303 of the Vehicle Code provides for enhancement to a Class 4 felony when a person has been \u201cconvicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).) It does not state that a violation of the section also can be enhanced by a prior violation of a similar local ordinance. Thus, the plain language of the statute supports the trial court\u2019s conclusion that a local ordinance violation cannot be the basis of enhancement under section 6 \u2014 303(d).\nEven looking beyond the language of subsection (d) and considering section 6 \u2014 303 as a whole, we conclude that the State\u2019s position is without merit. A statute should be interpreted as a whole (People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 206), so that no part of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous (People v. Singleton (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345). An examination of section 6 \u2014 303 reveals that the legislature specifically mentioned local ordinance violations by providing that when the local ordinance is similar to sections 11 \u2014 401 or 11 \u2014 501 of the Vehicle Code, the resulting suspension or revocation of an offender\u2019s license is sufficient to support a section 6 \u2014 303(c) conviction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95^2, pars. 6 \u2014 303(c)(1), (c)(2).) Section 6 \u2014 303(d) also specifically refers to local ordinances, but in the context of the underlying basis for the revocation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).) The State\u2019s interpretation would render superfluous the phrase \u201cor a similar provision of a local ordinance\u201d as used in subsections (c)(1), (c)(2) and (d) of section 6 \u2014 303. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95^2, pars. 6\u2014 303(c)(1), (c)(2), (d).\nThe State argues that interpreting the statute to mean what it says would nullify the purpose and objectives of section 6 \u2014 303(d). While the judiciary has the authority to read language into a statute which has been omitted through legislative oversight, this authority must be used cautiously in criminal cases where statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. (People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 253-54.) We do not believe it is appropriate to add words to section 6 \u2014 303(d) because the legislature considered local ordinances when it drafted subsection (d) and could have chosen to include the phrase \u201cor similar local ordinance\u201d when it determined that the potential punishment should be increased for a person who has repeatedly violated section 6 \u2014 303(c). (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).) This does not appear to be a situation where the phrase was omitted through legislative oversight, since the legislature did use the phrase \u201cor similar local ordinance\u201d in subsections (c) and (d) to permit a conviction based on a revocation which was the result of the violation of local ordinances similar to sections 11 \u2014 401 and 11 \u2014 501 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 11 \u2014 401, 11 \u2014 501). (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 6 \u2014 303(c), (d).) Thus, we conclude that the defendant\u2019s conviction of violating a local ordinance prohibiting driving with a revoked license is not sufficient to enhance a section 6 \u2014 303(c) charge to a Class 4 felony under section 6 \u2014 303(d) of the Vehicle Code. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the 6 \u2014 303(d) charge.\nThe judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and McLAREN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Dennis Schumacher, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Daniel P. Merriman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Stephen C. Pemberton and Milo W. Miller, both of Williams & McCarthy, P.C., of Oregon, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANNY R. CORNETT, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 90\u20140450\nOpinion filed March 7, 1991.\nDennis Schumacher, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Daniel P. Merriman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nStephen C. Pemberton and Milo W. Miller, both of Williams & McCarthy, P.C., of Oregon, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0110-01",
  "first_page_order": 132,
  "last_page_order": 137
}