{ "id": 2533929, "name": "MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON, Indiv. and as the Special Adm'r of the Estate of Sheryl Colburn Harrington, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE'S HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Harrington v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hospital", "decision_date": "1990-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-1254", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "189", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 183" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 1217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012811 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 626, "char_count": 12439, "ocr_confidence": 0.691, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.094312139892907e-08, "percentile": 0.46740987601979883 }, "sha256": "c20e644141c8da77f38e1d0965779e2268195a9bddf96d8ae0b57f8f918a1597", "simhash": "1:71684d86b4c439c5", "word_count": 1978 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:57.765044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON, Indiv. and as the Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Sheryl Colburn Harrington, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE\u2019S HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Hospital (Rush) brings this appeal seeking reversal of a jury verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff Michael Harrington. Harrington\u2019s medical malpractice action alleges that Rush was negligent in the care and treatment of Sheryl Harrington, Michael\u2019s wife, and that such negligence proximately resulted in Sheryl\u2019s death. After a full trial on the merits of Harrington\u2019s claims, the jury returned a verdict in Harrington\u2019s favor and against Rush.\nRush now brings this appeal, claiming: (1) the trial court erred in not granting Rush\u2019s motion for a directed verdict and/or Rush\u2019s motion for judgment n.o.v.; and (2) erroneous evidentiary rulings, improper jury instructions and plaintiff\u2019s prejudicial closing argument entitle Rush to a new trial.\nFor the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nBackground\nSheryl and Michael Harrington were married in 1975. Shortly before their marriage, Sheryl was involved in a serious automobile accident that resulted in the amputation of her right leg below the knee. In 1976, Sheryl and Michael had a son, Ryan.\nThe leg amputation left Sheryl with chronic pain in her right leg stump and serious mental depression. Sheryl was under the treatment of several physicians for problems relating to the leg amputation. Sheryl was prescribed Darvocet, a mild pain killer. Sheryl thereafter became dependent on Darvocet.\nIn 1977, Sheryl and Michael decided to have another child. Before attempting to do so, Sheryl wanted to terminate her dependency on Darvocet. Sheryl\u2019s physician advised her to undergo in-patient treatment to relieve her of any dependency on Darvocet. Sheryl\u2019s physician indicated that the in-patient detoxification program would last approximately three weeks. Sheryl decided to voluntarily admit herself into Rush for the purpose of undergoing an in-patient detoxification program.\nSheryl was admitted to Rush on October 24, 1977. On October 25 and 26, Sheryl\u2019s visitors noticed that she appeared to be groggy. On October 28, her condition improved and she became more alert. Sheryl\u2019s poor condition was attributed to the detoxification program.\nOn October 29, 1977, Sheryl\u2019s condition appeared to worsen. She was constantly falling asleep and could not carry on a conversation. On October 30, 1977, Sheryl suffered from severe headaches and appeared to be totally incoherent.\nOn October 31, 1977, Sheryl remained groggy. The last time a member of Sheryl\u2019s family saw her alive was at approximately 9 p.m. on October 31, 1977. Sheryl was pronounced dead on November 1, 1977.\nThe autopsy report indicated that Sheryl had died from \u201ccombined drug toxicity\u201d as a result of her system being overloaded with various drugs, most notably, Darvocet.\nMichael thereafter commenced this action against Rush claiming that Rush\u2019s failure to monitor and care for Sheryl had proximately caused Sheryl\u2019s death.\nThe case against Rush was premised on Rush\u2019s failure to properly monitor Sheryl during the night of October 31, 1977, and the morning of November 1, 1977.\nNear 11 p.m. on October 31, 1977, Sheryl passed out on the bathroom floor. The nurses returned Sheryl to her bed but did not contact a physician regarding Sheryl\u2019s episode. There were no progress notes of Sheryl\u2019s condition from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. and no mention was made in Sheryl\u2019s records of her collapse. In addition, the record reveals that following Sheryl\u2019s collapse, Rush\u2019s nurses failed to check on Sheryl\u2019s condition for the remainder of the evening of October 31-No-vember 1, 1977. The evidence also showed that Rush\u2019s nursing staff failed to give Sheryl her medicine at 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. Sheryl\u2019s autopsy indicated that she had died some four to six hours before 7 a.m. on November 1,1977.\nThe evidence at trial showed that Narcon is an antidote for Darvocet. It immediately reverses the effects of Darvocet. There was expert testimony presented that if Narcon had been given to Sheryl, she would be alive.\nBoth Rush and the plaintiff presented expert testimony regarding the standard of care owed by a hospital\u2019s nursing staff. The plaintiff\u2019s experts testified that Rush\u2019s failure to give Sheryl her medicine at the prescribed intervals as well as Rush\u2019s failure to check Sheryl on a regular basis constituted a breach of the standard of care. In addition, the plaintiff\u2019s expert testified that Sheryl\u2019s life could have been saved had Rush\u2019s nurses identified her condition and provided her with Narcon. The plaintiff\u2019s experts interpreted the absence of entries on Sheryl\u2019s medical charts as indicating that nothing had been done for Sheryl during the night.\nRush\u2019s experts, on the other hand, opined that the mere absence of entries did not reflect that regular checks on Sheryl had not been made. Rush\u2019s experts also asserted that Sheryl\u2019s drug toxicity level was so high that she could not have been saved even if her condition had been discovered by Rush\u2019s nurses. According to Rush\u2019s experts, therefore, no breach of the standard of care occurred.\nFollowing a trial of several weeks, and the presentation of many exhibits, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against Rush in the amount of $4 million. That amount was subsequently reduced by prior settlements that other defendants had made with the plaintiff.\nRush\u2019s post-trial motions were denied, prompting Rush to bring this appeal.\nOpinion\nRush asserts two principle arguments in seeking reversal of the jury\u2019s verdict.\nFirst, Rush claims that it was entitled to a directed verdict or, in the alternative, a judgment n.o.v. Rush asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove a breach of the standard of care by Rush\u2019s nurses and that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing that any additional monitoring by Rush\u2019s nurses would have prevented Sheryl\u2019s death.\nThe standard governing directed verdicts and judgment n.o.v. was set forth by the supreme court in Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504. The celebrated \u201cPedrick standard\u201d provides:\n\u201c[V]erdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.\u201d 37 Ill. 2d at 510, 229 N.E.2d at 513-14.\nApplying that standard to the case at bar, we believe the trial court correctly denied Rush\u2019s motion for a directed verdict as well as its motion for judgment n.o.v. There is no dispute that Rush had a duty to monitor Sheryl\u2019s vital signs, to observe Sheryl\u2019s breathing patterns on a periodic basis during the night, and to advise Sheryl\u2019s physician of any significant changes. Rather, the dispute centered around whether Rush had in fact performed its monitoring obligations.\nThe plaintiff presented medical evidence that showed Rush had not checked on Sheryl\u2019s condition for at least six or seven hours. The plaintiff\u2019s expert testified that rigor mortis had set in between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. and that any type of inspection by Rush\u2019s nurses would have revealed Sheryl\u2019s condition. Also, there was no dispute that Rush\u2019s nurses failed to give Sheryl her medicine at 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. on the morning in question.\nFurthermore, the evidence shows that Sheryl collapsed at approximately 11 p.m. and was helped back into bed by Rush\u2019s nurses. However, the nurses failed to notify Sheryl\u2019s physician of that episode.\nThe plaintiff thus presented evidence from which a jury could find that Rush breached the standard of care by failing to monitor Sheryl\u2019s condition and by failing to inform Sheryl\u2019s physician of her collapse. This evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, is clearly sufficient to withstand scrutiny under the Pedrick standard.\nRush also claims that, even if its nurses failed to monitor Sheryl, nevertheless, Rush\u2019s failure was not the proximate cause of Sheryl\u2019s death because there was nothing that could be done to save Sheryl\u2019s life.\nThis was a hotly contested issue at trial. Each side\u2019s expert witnesses opined regarding whether \u201cprompt intervention\u201d could have saved Sheryl\u2019s life. Needless to say, the plaintiff\u2019s experts contended that Sheryl\u2019s life could have been spared and Rush\u2019s experts testified that no help would have been sufficient.\nThere is no dispute, however, that Narcon was an antidote that could have been utilized to counter the effects of Sheryl\u2019s toxicity. The plaintiff\u2019s expert specifically testified that, to a degree of medical and scientific certainty, Sheryl\u2019s life could have been saved if the Narcon had been administered at 11 p.m. following her collapse. Although Rush\u2019s expert testified that Sheryl\u2019s death was \u201csudden\u201d and that no amount of monitoring could have saved her, this difference of opinion between experts was clearly a credibility issue that the jury resolved in the plaintiff\u2019s favor.\nThe plaintiff thus presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Sheryl\u2019s death was proximately caused by Rush\u2019s negligence. Under these circumstances, we cannot overturn the jury\u2019s verdict pursuant to the Pedrick standards.\nIn sum, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were matters that were properly left for the jury to decide. We cannot say that the evidence \u201cso overwhelmingly favors [Rush] that no contrary verdict\u201d could ever stand. (Pedrick, 37 Ill. 2d at 510, 220 N.E.2d at 513-14.) We therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s orders denying Rush\u2019s motion for a directed verdict and its motion for a judgment n.o.v.\nRush\u2019s second basis for reversal attacks procedural rather than evidentiary matters. Rush asserts that the trial court erred in permitting one of the plaintiff\u2019s expert witnesses to render certain testimony, that Rush was denied a fair trial because of improper jury instructions, and that plaintiff\u2019s closing argument was unfairly prejudicial.\nInitially, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the plaintiff\u2019s nursing expert to render testimony regarding the effects of certain medicines. The trial court inquired as to the expert\u2019s qualifications, and the trial court could have found, within its discretion, that the nursing expert\u2019s experience and background were adequate to permit her to render her opinion. See Broussard v. Huffman Manufacturing Co. (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 356, 438 N.E.2d 1217.\nRush also asserts that the trial court erred in giving both the \u201cordinary negligence\u201d instructions and the \u201cmedical malpractice\u201d jury instructions. We agree with Rush that both instructions should not be given in a medical malpractice case. However, Rush failed to submit a modified set of jury instructions and, therefore, waived any complaint regarding the instructions tendered by the trial court.\nFinally, Rush complains about plaintiff\u2019s closing argument. Interestingly, the focus of this dispute relates to the failure to call the nurses who were on duty on the evening of October 31-November 1, 1977, to testify. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel asserted that he did not call the nurses because he believed Rush\u2019s counsel was going to do so. Rush\u2019s attorney, on the other hand, also did not call the nurses to testify. For some reason, therefore, neither side called the very persons whose conduct, it appears, was at issue in this trial.\nWhatever the reason for this strategy, we have closely reviewed the record and reject Rush\u2019s contention that it was denied a fair trial because of comments made by plaintiff\u2019s counsel during closing arguments. The comments directed to the testimony or nontestimony of the nurses were certainly a disputed issue and one that could not possibly have interfered with Rush receiving a fair trial.\nAccordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, we affirm the jury\u2019s verdict.\nAffirmed.\nMcMORROW, P.J., and JIGANTI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (William C. Anderson, Harold L. Jacobson, and Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel), for appellant.", "Hayes & Power, of Chicago (Joseph A. Power, Jr., and David A. Novoselsky, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL D. HARRINGTON, Indiv. and as the Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Sheryl Colburn Harrington, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE\u2019S HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 89\u20141254\nOpinion filed December 20, 1990.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied April 2,1991.\nLord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (William C. Anderson, Harold L. Jacobson, and Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel), for appellant.\nHayes & Power, of Chicago (Joseph A. Power, Jr., and David A. Novoselsky, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 205, "last_page_order": 211 }