{ "id": 2534660, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RON D. TYLER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tyler", "decision_date": "1991-03-14", "docket_number": "No. 5-89-0616", "first_page": "833", "last_page": "840", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 833" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564578 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1071" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/1068-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474907 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 58", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168959 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "789-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176124 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "2482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/433/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 770, "char_count": 15024, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.112991951469139e-08, "percentile": 0.3208984384803902 }, "sha256": "e90268996d4832b228578b359e945a59a55ed6d2ba7a4b78265af88192126ffe", "simhash": "1:a002a194b7e5a0f7", "word_count": 2542 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:57.765044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RON D. TYLER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ron Tyler, was charged with the offense of possession of less than 200 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. This appeal is from the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.\nAt a preliminary hearing on April 11, 1989, the State presented the testimony of State Trooper David Crackel. Trooper Crackel testified that at approximately 4 p.m. on September 11, 1988, he was directed to the scene of a single-car accident on Funkhouser Road. Defendant, the driver of the vehicle, was unconscious when he was removed from the car by the emergency medical technicians. After defendant was taken by ambulance to the hospital, Trooper Crackel proceeded to examine the vehicle for the purpose of preparing an accident report and inventory. Peering inside the vehicle, Trooper Crackel discovered on the floorboard a \u201csandwich baggy\u201d with a green leafy substance, which he believed to be cannabis, in it.\nTrooper Crackel then proceeded to the hospital to determine the driver\u2019s identity. He observed hospital personnel working with the defendant. Defendant\u2019s jeans had been cut off and were in a basket beneath the defendant\u2019s gurney. Crackel proceeded to examine \u201cthe pockets of Tyler\u2019s jeans to look for a drivers [sic] license.\u201d Crackel reached into each of the pockets, and in one of the pockets he found a small vial, which was later determined to contain methamphetamine. Crackel testified that when he arrived at the hospital neither Tyler\u2019s mother nor his wife was there. Crackel did not know whether any of Tyler\u2019s other relatives were there before he started examining Tyler\u2019s jeans.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, Crackel testified that when he examined Tyler\u2019s jeans, the only clothing Tyler had on was a hospital gown. Crackel had removed the vial from Tyler\u2019s jeans before Tyler\u2019s mother, Peggy Knight, arrived at the hospital.\nTyler\u2019s mother, Peggy Knight, testified that when she was informed that her son was at the emergency room, she telephoned the emergency room to learn her son\u2019s condition. Knight testified that she advised the emergency room nurse that she was Tyler\u2019s mother and asked what his condition was. The nurse advised Knight that she needed to get to the hospital as quickly as possible. When she arrived at the hospital, Tyler\u2019s wife and sister were already there. Knight testified that an officer, who was in the hall, asked her for whom she was looking and when she told him \u201cRonnie Tyler,\u201d he pointed to the defendant\u2019s treatment room. Knight entered the treatment room and noticed that Tyler was wearing his trousers. Approximately 10 minutes after Knight was asked to leave the treatment room, Tyler was taken to surgery.\nFollowing the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court entered an order granting defendant\u2019s motion, finding:\n\u201c(a) The search was not incident to an arrest.\n(b) The search was not pursuant to consent.\n(c) The seizure was not of evidence in plain view.\n(d) The search was of an article in which the defendant had a substantial expectancy of privacy.\n(e) The search was made without a warrant.\n(f) The removal of a vial from a pants pocket and the opening of the vial to examine the contents were not necessary as part of a search for a driver\u2019s license.\u201d\nThe State argues that the search was justified because of (1) Trooper Crackel\u2019s need to ascertain Tyler\u2019s identity, (2) the lack of Tyler\u2019s privacy interest in his clothing, and (3) the existence of probable cause to believe the jeans contained contraband.\nThe fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees the individual the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In considering fourth amendment issues, our fundamental inquiry is whether or not the search or seizure was reasonable under all of the circumstances. (United States v. Chadwick (1977), 433 U.S. 1, 9, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 547, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482; Cooper v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 58, 59, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 732, 87 S. Ct. 788, 789-90; People v. Bayles (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346.) Generally, unless the trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is manifestly erroneous, it will not be disturbed. People v. Industrial Salvage, Inc. (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1071, 484 N.E.2d 322, 323.\nIn support of the argument that the search was justified, the State argues that Trooper Crackel acted reasonably in searching for the defendant\u2019s wallet in order to determine his identity. The State cites People v. Smith (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 82, 254 N.E.2d 492, in support of its argument. In that case, a police officer examined a wallet which he had taken from a semiconscious shooting victim and discovered an incriminating note. In upholding the admission of the note, the Smith court observed that the conduct of the officer in securing the wallet was a reasonable and appropriate police measure. (Smith, 44 Ill. 2d at 87, 254 N.E.2d at 495.) The State draws our attention, in particular, to the Smith court\u2019s unwillingness to find that the officer unreasonably seized the wallet, even though the court found that it was \u201capparently not necessary to use the wallet to identify the appellant.\u201d (Smith, 44 Ill. 2d at 87, 254 N.E.2d at 495.) The State contends that although it is arguable whether it was necessary for Trooper Crackel to conduct the search in order to ascertain Tyler\u2019s identity, the holding in Smith conclusively establishes that the officer\u2019s search was nonetheless reasonable. An examination of the facts in Smith demonstrates that the State\u2019s position is untenable.\nSmith is distinguished from the instant case in that there the wallet was removed from the defendant at the scene of the offense, whereas here the trooper conducted the search at the hospital over an hour after the accident. In Smith, ascertaining the victim\u2019s identity by seizing his wallet was justified in that at the time of the search: the victim was still at the scene of the incident; the victim was semi-conscious; a wallet typically contains cards identifying its owner in the event of illness or accident; and a wallet might provide information of value in the handling of the wounded man, e.g., information concerning his blood type, a possible diabetic condition, an inability to tolerate certain medications or anaesthetics, or a religious affiliation. (See Smith, 44 Ill. 2d at 87-88, 254 N.E.2d at 495-96.) The officer in the instant case did not have the same need to ascertain the defendant\u2019s identity or to determine any of the other information.\nHere, Trooper Crackel testified that he did not arrive at the hospital until approximately one hour after the accident. When Crackel arrived hospital personnel were already attending to Tyler. In addition, there is a conflict in the testimony presented below as to whether Trooper Crackel already knew the identity of Tyler prior to his search of Tyler\u2019s clothing. Although the trial court made no specific finding as to whose testimony was more credible, it did find all issues and controverted facts in favor of the defendant. Courts generally defer to the trial court on questions of testimonial credibility and will draw from the evidence all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. See People v. Lagle (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 948, 954, 558 N.E.2d 514, 519.\nWe further note that in Smith the court held that, \u201c[t]hough the identification of the appellant was not apparently a problem, the securing of his wallet to safeguard it was not unreasonable under the circumstances.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Smith, 44 Ill. 2d at 87, 254 N.E.2d at 496.) In the instant case, by the time Trooper Crackel arrived at the hospital, Tyler had been admitted, and there was testimony that his relatives were also there. There is no question that safeguarding of Tyler\u2019s property by the police was unnecessary.\nIn addition to the foregoing, we find Trooper Crackel\u2019s own testimony persuasive on the proposition that the search was beyond the scope of the officer\u2019s stated reason for conducting the search:\n\u201cQ. And your reason for going through the jeans was what?\nA. To find his drivers [sic] license.\nQ. Okay. And did you find his drivers [sic] license?\nA. I don\u2019t remember if they were in his jfeans or not. I don\u2019t think they were, but I couldn\u2019t say for sure one way or other, now.\nQ. So, did you feel the outside of the pants, or did you just reach directly into the pocket?\nA. I felt \u2014 reached into the pockets. They were all cut up. I reached into his pockets.\nQ. And when you felt a vial, did it feel like a drivers [sic] license or not?\nA. No, sir, it did not.\nQ. But you went ahead and pulled it out of the pant pocket?\nA. Yes, sir, just to see what it was.\u201d\nBased on the foregoing, we cannot accept the State\u2019s contention that the evidence was seized as a result of a justified search in order to ascertain Tyler\u2019s identity.\nThe State also contends, relying on People v. Sutherland (1980), 92 Ill. App. 3d 338, 415 N.E.2d 1267, that the search was reasonable because Tyler did not have a privacy interest in his clothing which had been removed. In Sutherland, the defendant, a robbery suspect, was taken to the hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound. The defendant\u2019s clothes were removed, and a policeman obtained them from a security guard. The court affirmed the denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. In so holding, the court found that the defendant did not ask or indicate that when his clothing was removed at the hospital it was not to be given to anyone else, nor did the defendant otherwise demonstrate an actual intent to preserve the privacy of his apparel.\nIn Sutherland, there was testimony that it was common practice for police to inventory the clothing of gunshot-wound victims. The hospital security guard testified that in the past he had given the clothing of such victims to the police. The court found that under the circumstances, \u201cany subjective expectation of privacy was not of the type \u2018that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) (Sutherland, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 343, 415 N.E.2d at 1271, quoting Smith v. Maryland (1979), 442 U.S. 735, 740, 6 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226-27, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580.) The instant case does not involve a gunshot-wound victim, and Trooper Crackel was not conducting the search in furtherance of an inventory. Furthermore, there has been no showing that it was common practice for the police to conduct an inventory under facts such as in this case, nor has there been a showing that it was hospital policy to relinquish personal effects to the police.\nIn order to determine whether the challenged police conduct offends the fourth amendment, we must decide whether defendant had a \u201creasonable expectation of privacy\u201d with regard to his clothes. (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 9, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 899, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873; Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 361, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 587-88, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516.) Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Tyler was physically capable of asking or signalling that he did not want anyone other than hospital personnel or his family to be given his clothing. The State concedes in its brief that Tyler could not have expressed a privacy interest in his pants which had been removed because of his unconscious condition. Although he was injured in the accident, Tyler kept the vial of methamphetamine on his person when he was taken to the hospital. Even though his clothing was removed, it was placed in a basket under Tyler\u2019s gurney and, in accordance with hospital policy, was given to Tyler\u2019s relatives. Under the facts presented, there exists no justification for the intrusion into Tyler\u2019s clothing.\nWe also reject the State\u2019s contention that the officer\u2019s conduct was permissible under the doctrine of plain view. That doctrine provides that when an officer in the performance of his duty lawfully discovers evidence within his view, the taking of such evidence does not constitute an unreasonable seizure. (People v. Bombacino (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 17, 280 N.E.2d 697; People v. Berg (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 65, 364 N.E.2d 880.) As determined above, the officer\u2019s search was not justified for the purpose of conducting an inventory, or for ascertaining Tyler\u2019s identity. Trooper Crackel, therefore, was not legally authorized to have his hand inside the pockets of Tyler\u2019s pants. Trooper Crackel could only discover the evidence after reaching into the pocket. Based on the facts, we do not agree that the plain view doctrine is applicable to this case.\nFinally, the State alleges that the search was proper even if Trooper Crackel\u2019s sole purpose was to discover evidence of an additional offense. Defendant acknowledges that a warrantless search, as was conducted here, may have been effected by the officer if the search was incident to a lawful arrest. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 108 \u2014 1.) Defendant argues, however, that in order to uphold a search made pursuant to section 108 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of Procedure of 1963, there must first be a valid arrest of the individual.\nThe State concedes that Trooper Crackel did not arrest Tyler prior to conducting the search but contends that, since Trooper Crackel had probable cause to arrest Tyler at the time of the search, the search was lawful. There are instances where probable cause exists for arrest, and where a search and arrest are practically simultaneous, it may be immaterial that the search preceded the arrest. (See People v. Hall (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 414 N.E.2d 201; People v. Jones (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 414, 371 N.E.2d 1093.) However, in order for a search made incident to a lawful arrest, and which precedes an arrest, to be valid, the search must be made immediately prior to the arrest. (Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 448 U.S. 98, 111. 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645-46, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564; Jones, 56 Ill. App. 3d 414, 371 N.E.2d 1093.) While the record is unclear when Tyler was actually arrested for the instant offense, it is clear that he was not arrested on September 11, 1988. As the search made prior to the arrest cannot be viewed as the type of single transaction evident in Rawlings, Hall, and Jones, we cannot view the search in the instant case as a lawful search incident to arrest. See People v. Vollrath (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 866, 870, 420 N.E.2d 760, 763.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAffirmed.\nHOWERTON and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul Phillips, State\u2019s Attorney, of Effingham (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Raymond E Buckley, Jr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel M. Kirwan and Janet L. Gandy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RON D. TYLER, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 89\u20140616\nOpinion filed March 14, 1991.\nPaul Phillips, State\u2019s Attorney, of Effingham (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Raymond E Buckley, Jr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Janet L. Gandy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0833-01", "first_page_order": 855, "last_page_order": 862 }