{ "id": 2532836, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMY GORDON FLOYD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Floyd", "decision_date": "1991-03-15", "docket_number": "No. 5-89-0512", "first_page": "840", "last_page": "843", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 840" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491969 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3462426 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3366255 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557342 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S. Ct. 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494528, 1494689, 1493336, 1495075, 1495335, 1494407, 1495273, 1495021, 1494256, 1493233, 1495539, 1493492, 1494360, 1493851, 1493791 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0837-06", "/us/488/0837-13", "/us/488/0837-02", "/us/488/0837-14", "/us/488/0837-12", "/us/488/0837-09", "/us/488/0837-04", "/us/488/0837-07", "/us/488/0837-11", "/us/488/0837-05", "/us/488/0837-01", "/us/488/0837-03", "/us/488/0837-15", "/us/488/0837-10", "/us/488/0837-08" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549473 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 1378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649161 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0080-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 390, "char_count": 6155, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.33924545407859685 }, "sha256": "150af6af2f6a6a9cbf3ec1e9194eddd8475f64ead165f08a243fe76988cb24c2", "simhash": "1:ba0a30377ef9ba77", "word_count": 1047 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:57.765044+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMY GORDON FLOYD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Tommy Gordon Floyd, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of White County which summarily dismissed his pro se post-conviction petition. As grounds for his appeal, defendant contends that the dismissal is void and must be set aside because the circuit court violated section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 2.1) when it failed to render its dismissal order within 30 days of when defendant mailed his petition to the clerk of the circuit court. For the reasons which follow, we hold that the 30-day statutory period did not, in fact, commence at the time the petition was allegedly mailed. We therefore affirm.\nDefendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. On direct appeal to this court we affirmed. (People v. Floyd (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 80, 512 N.E.2d 1378.) Thereafter, defendant initiated this action for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 et seq.). The certificate of service attached to defendant\u2019s petition indicates that it was mailed to the State\u2019s Attorney for White County on June 13, 1989. There is no evidence as to when it was sent to the clerk of the court. We know, however, that the clerk received the petition two days later, on June 15, 1989. The clerk file-stamped the petition with that date and made an entry in the record sheet for the case which provided, \u201cPetition for Post-Conviction [Relief] received [and] docketed for consideration by the Court pursuant to Section 122 \u2014 2.1. Petition for Post-Conviction promptly brought to attention of Court.\u201d\nSection 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 2.1) states, in part:\n\u201c(a) Within 30 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. * * *\n(2) If *** the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.\u201d\nOur supreme court has made clear that the 30-day rule set forth in this statute is mandatory, not directory. Accordingly, a trial court\u2019s noncompliance with the rule will render any summary dismissal of a petition void. People v. Porter (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 64, 86, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1167, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 837, 102 L. Ed. 2d 77, 109 S. Ct. 102.\nIn this case, the circuit court did summarily dismiss defendant\u2019s petition in a written order dated July 17, 1989. There is no dispute that this order was timely if June 15, 1989, is regarded as the date of \u201cfiling and docketing\u201d under the statute. This is so because July 15, the thirtieth day after June 15, fell on a Saturday, and the time in which the trial court was required to act was therefore automatically extended to the following Monday, which was July 17. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1, par. 1012.) Defendant, however, argues that the actual date of \u201cfiling\u201d here was the date when the petition was mailed, June 13, 1989. Because more than 30 days had elapsed between this date and the date of dismissal, defendant reasons that the order of dismissal was void and must now be set aside.\nA threshold problem with defendant\u2019s argument is that the record before us shows only that the petition was mailed to the White County State\u2019s Attorney on June 13. It does not indicate when or even how the petition was transmitted to the clerk of the circuit court. As a result, there is no evidentiary basis for the proposed earlier \u201cfiling\u201d date urged by defendant.\nEven if defendant had established that his petition was in fact mailed to the clerk on June 13, his position would still be untenable. For certain purposes, documents are deemed to be filed with the clerk of the circuit court on the day they are mailed to the clerk\u2019s office. (See Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 326, 533 N.E.2d 1072 (notices of appeal).) However, where, as here, a petition commences a new action and is not merely a continuation of some prior proceeding (People v. Morris (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 732, 735, 365 N.E.2d 424, 426-27), the petition is not deemed to have been filed until it passes into the actual physical possession of the clerk. The date of mailing is not controlling. Wilkins v. Dellenback (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 549, 500 N.E.2d 692.\nIn any case, defendant\u2019s analysis overlooks that the mandatory 30-day period which is at the heart of this dispute commences not simply when a petition is filed, but when it is filed and docketed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 2.1(a).) For a petition to be \u201cdocketed\u201d does not mean that it must be placed on the trial court\u2019s call. However, the reference to \u201cdocketing\u201d in the statute does presuppose some ministerial action performed by the clerk upon the receipt of the petition. (People v. Byers (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509, 554 N.E.2d 317, 321.) Obviously, such action cannot occur while a petition is still in the mail. Accordingly, even if a petition were deemed to be filed at the time it is mailed, it cannot possibly be regarded as having been \u201cdocketed\u201d at that time. Thus, the 30-day period cannot begin to run upon mailing of the petition alone.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of White County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nRARICK, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Janet L. Gandy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Mark Stanley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carmi (Kenneth R. Boyle and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMY GORDON FLOYD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 89\u20140512\nOpinion filed March 15, 1991.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Janet L. Gandy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nMark Stanley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carmi (Kenneth R. Boyle and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0840-01", "first_page_order": 862, "last_page_order": 865 }