{ "id": 2527397, "name": "WILLIAM JAGIELNIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Jagielnik v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund", "decision_date": "1991-04-04", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140819", "first_page": "26", "last_page": "36", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 26" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676089 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 1132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5537946 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1136" }, { "page": "1133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/1132-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498804 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2576510 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468479 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554869 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656387 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2640621 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "\"Once the three certificates were submitted, the pension board was empowered to admit and weigh additional evidence relative to either granting or denying the disability pension request\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2565433 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610672 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5537778 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3403188 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2495115 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0654-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 923, "char_count": 22564, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4400928093441944e-07, "percentile": 0.6529676054472674 }, "sha256": "29c665562d2b44b73f9b5ff944d9ff1aacad513f7193d8940496ac3688633867", "simhash": "1:1ec6e52d2472f44f", "word_count": 3682 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:56:54.383547+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM JAGIELNIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, William Jagielnik, appeals the dismissal of his complaint for administrative review. The defendants (referred to collectively hereafter as the Board) moved for dismissal of the complaint under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Civil Practice Law, alleging the circuit court of Lake County did not have jurisdiction of the cause because Jagielnik\u2019s complaint was not taken from an \u201cadministrative decision\u201d as defined in section 3 \u2014 101 of the Administrative Review Law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 2\u2014619, 3 \u2014 101.) We affirm the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint.\nJagielnik applied to the Board for a 50% not-on-duty disability pension as provided for in section 3\u2014114.2 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code) (III. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014114.2). That section provides for a disability pension of 50% of the officer\u2019s salary at the time of his or her suspension of duty or retirement if the officer has become physically or mentally disabled \u201cas a result of any cause other than the performance of an act of duty.\u201d At the time he petitioned, Jagielnik had charges of misconduct pending against him before the Mundelein Board of Fire and Police Commissioners and criminal charges pending against him in the circuit court of Lake County, Illinois.\nThe charges before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners alleged that Jagielnik, while in uniform and on duty, committed various offenses against a young woman, J.M., in February, March, and April 1989. Allegedly, Jagielnik grabbed J.M.\u2019s breasts on one occasion and made lewd and suggestive remarks to her on several occasions. Also, allegedly, Jagielnik ordered J.M. to meet him at a specific time and place and be friendly with him or he would cause her problems with the Village of Mundelein and cause traffic citations to be issued against her. The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners did not hear the matter because Jagielnik resigned as a police officer on June 2, 1989.\nThe charges pending before the circuit court of Lake County, Illinois, involved the same conduct as the charges before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the State\u2019s Attorney nol-prossed two felony counts, and the court found Jagielnik guilty of the remaining count, a misdemeanor battery. The court imposed a $500 fine and a one-year term of probation conditioned upon psychiatric counseling. The factual basis for the plea was stipulated to be as follows:\n\u201cIf the matter came to trial, [J.M.] would testify that she was an employee of the White Hen Pantry in Mundelein, Lake County, Illinois; and in mid-March 1989, [Jagielnik] came into the Pantry and after some comments which she construed as having sexual undertones, he asked to use the phone, at which time she gave him permission; and he, in passing in close proximity to her, did touch her breasts in a manner which she found insulting and provoking; he did make actual physical contact with her breasts, and this all happened in Lake County, Illinois.\u201d\nAlong with his petition to the Board for a disability pension, Jagielnik submitted a written report dated May 27, 1989, from Dr. Marlene E. Casiano, a psychiatrist, who stated that Jagielnik was suffering from severe symptoms of depression and that \u201cthe precipitant for his severe depressive reaction was his being accused of making sexual advances to a woman at a grocery store.\u201d\nAt the request of the Pension Board, three other psychiatrists examined Jagielnik. All three were of the opinion that Jagielnik was mentally disabled for service as a police officer and that his disability was the consequence of being accused of making sexual advances to a woman at a grocery store and the events which followed. The three psychiatrists also stated that Jagielnik had no history of a prior mental illness nor was there any evidence that he might have had a prior mental illness.\nThe Board determined that there was no issue with respect to Jagielnik\u2019s being mentally disabled. However, since all of the psychiatrists reported that Jagielnik\u2019s mental disability was the result of accusations of sexual conduct toward J.M., it felt this raised a question whether such accusations were true or false. If the accusations were true, then Jagielnik\u2019s mental disability \u201ccould be the result of his own intentionally committed wrongful act.\u201d\nThe Board set the matter for a public hearing on September 14, 1989, at which time the Village and Jagielnik would be permitted to present evidence relative to the issues the Board felt were presented. Inter alia, those issues were: whether section 3 \u2014 114.2 of the Code incorporates the public policy which precludes a wrongdoer from profiting from his intentionally committed wrongful act; whether Jagielnik, in fact, committed one or more wrongful acts; whether, if he did commit one or more wrongful acts, his present mental disability resulted from such wrongful act or acts and the events which followed; and whether, if he did not commit any wrongful act or acts, his mental disability resulted from the performance of an act of duty.\nFollowing a continuance, the Board convened, and Jagielnik moved, first, for another continuance and, second, to bar the hearing altogether based on certain legal grounds contained in a memorandum filed with the motion. The supporting affidavit of Dr. Marlene Casiano which was appended to Jagielnik\u2019s continuance motion was described in the Board\u2019s interim ruling. Dr. Casiano stated in her affidavit that Jagielnik would be unable to participate as a witness in the proceeding without risk of aggravating his stress-related disorder and, in Dr. Casiano\u2019s opinion, his present condition would not enable him to testify for at least three months.\nThe crux of Jagielnik\u2019s motion to bar the hearing, also described in the Board\u2019s interim ruling, was that section 3 \u2014 114.2 of the Code (not-on-duty disability pension) does not incorporate the public policy precluding an intentional wrongdoer from profiting from his wrongful act. He relied on section 3 \u2014 147 of the Code (providing that no benefits will be paid to any person convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a police officer) in support of his argument that he can lose his disability pension benefits only if he is convicted of a service-related felony.\nThe Board granted Jagielnik\u2019s request for a further continuance, subject to an examination by psychiatrist Dr. Alan N. Miller to evaluate Jagielnik\u2019s ability to testify at the hearing on the matter. It also established a briefing schedule on Jagielnik\u2019s motion to bar a hearing.\nDr. Miller\u2019s report to the Board was that Jagielnik had improved considerably since the doctor last saw him and Jagielnik had, in fact, found a new job. Dr. Miller further reported that Jagielnik was at risk of relapse should he be forced to testify at a public hearing, but that, in the doctor\u2019s opinion, Jagielnik was fully capable of preparing written statements on the matter.\nThe attorneys for both parties advised that they did not wish to make oral argument on the motion to bar a hearing and would stand on their briefs. They also agreed that the Board should take the motion to bar the hearing under advisement and issue a ruling by mail.\nThe Board denied Jagielnik\u2019s motion to bar a hearing in its interim ruling dated December 12, 1989, determining, inter alia, that the language of section 3 \u2014 147 of the Code did not thereby exclude reasons other than a felony conviction for a police officer\u2019s losing his or her disability pension benefits. Expressing its belief that the Village and Jagielnik should have an opportunity to present evidence on the matter of the charges against Jagielnik, and, in light of Dr. Miller\u2019s opinion of Jagielnik\u2019s fragile emotional state and Jagielnik\u2019s probable ability to prepare a written statement, the Board continued the cause to February 8 and requested the parties to submit within 30 days \u201c(1) any authorities on whether or not [the] Board may conduct a hearing closed to the public and (2) any authorities on whether or not [the] Board may accept Mr. Jagielnik\u2019s testimony given at a deposition or accept an affidavit *** in lieu of his testimony at a hearing\u201d or any other suggestions the parties might have as to how to resolve the problem.\nOn January 16, 1990, Jagielnik filed his complaint for administrative review of the Board\u2019s December 12 interim ruling. Following the submission of memoranda of law and argument by the parties, the trial court concluded the Board\u2019s interim ruling contemplated further proceedings and, as such, Jagielnik\u2019s complaint for administrative review was not an appeal from a ruling which terminated the proceedings before the administrative agency. Jagielnik then brought the instant appeal, contending (1) the Board\u2019s order was a final order subject to administrative review and (2) a mental disability resulting from the commission of a misdemeanor battery does not bar the awarding of a not-on-duty pension.\nIn determining the propriety of the dismissal of a complaint, the reviewing court is concerned only with the questions of law presented by the pleadings (Dick v. Peoples Mid-Illinois Corp. (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658; People ex rel. Lee v. Kenroy, Inc. (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 688, 690-91) and will affirm if the court\u2019s decision is correct regardless of the reasons assigned by the court for the dismissal (Lasswell v. Ehrlich (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 935, 936). Under section 3\u2014148 of the Code, all final administrative decisions of the Pension Board are judicially reviewable under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, and an \u201cadministrative decision\u201d is as defined therein. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014148.) \u201c \u2018Administrative decision\u2019 or \u2018decision\u2019 means any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014101.\nJudicial review can only be undertaken where there is a final agency determination. (Taylor v. State Universities Retirement System (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 372, 374.) Such a determination is made following \u201csome sort of adversarial process involving the parties affected, where a hearing on controverted facts is held, and ultimately a disposition is rendered by an impartial [fact finder].\u201d (Taylor, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 376.) In the absence of such a final administrative decision, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014102; Bi-State Development Agency v. Department of Revenue (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672.\nAs we perceive it, Jagielnik\u2019s complaint for administrative review presents only a challenge to the Board\u2019s denial of his motion to bar the hearing and its decision to proceed to take evidence on the matter. His complaint characterizes the interim ruling as \u201cdenying [him] his petition for a 50% disability *** not oil duty pension, when the interim order has denied [his] motion to bar a hearing, thereby resulting in such a denial.\u201d\nOn its face, the Board\u2019s interim ruling is merely a procedural step in the process of arriving at its \u201cadministrative decision.\u201d Jagielnik argues, however, the Board\u2019s designation of its ruling as an \u201cinterim\u201d one is not controlling and posits the ruling is a final administrative decision subject to judicial review in that it fixed the rights and liabilities of both himself and the Board. That is, all the prerequisites to his receiving a not-on-duty disability pension were met: (1) based on the evaluations of the three psychiatrists selected by it, the Board found that, as a result of a cause not arising out of an act of duty, he was mentally disabled to such a degree that he could no longer serve as a police officer; (2) his application for the disability pension was timely; (3) he was not discharged from the police force; and (4) he has not been \u201cconvicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his *** service as a police officer\u201d which precludes the payment of benefits provided under section 3\u2014147 of the Code. Moreover, the hearing scheduled by the Board is not for the limited authorized purpose of receiving \u201cother evidence of disability\u201d as provided in section 3\u2014115 of the Code. Thus, Jagielnik argues, the ruling should be viewed effectively as having terminated the proceedings.\nThe Board argues its interim ruling should be regarded as an interlocutory order only since it contemplates an evidentiary hearing prior to the rendering of a final decision on Jagielnik\u2019s application for a mental disability pension. Authority to hold such a hearing, it argues, is derived from its power under section 3 \u2014 136 of the Code to compel witnesses to attend and testify before it \u201cupon all matters connected with the administration of this Article.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014136.) In light of the further proceedings contemplated, the Board posits there was not yet an \u201cadministrative decision\u201d subject to administrative review and the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the cause should be affirmed. We agree.\nJagielnik\u2019s contention that the statement in the Board\u2019s ruling that it determined \u201cthere was no issue with respect to [his] being mentally disabled\u201d is conclusive on the issue of his disability is without merit. A case cited by Jagielnik himself refutes the contention. In Caauwe v. Police Pension Board (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 482, the trial court\u2019s order affirming the pension board\u2019s denial of a police officer\u2019s application for disability pension due to back injuries was reversed and the cause remanded so that the board could receive certifications of the three doctors as to the police officer\u2019s disability or lack thereof. (Caauwe, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 486.) The police officer there was denied a disability pension after an evidentiary hearing at which the board received reports from its three selected doctors in the form of uncertified, unsworn, unverified, written medical reports. Based on the evidence of these reports, the Board found \u201cthese three doctors do not all certify Detective Caauwe\u2019s disability.\u201d 184 Ill. App. 3d at 484.\nOn appeal, the officer argued that because the doctors failed to certify his disability, or lack of disability, in their medical reports, there was insufficient evidence before the pension board on which to predicate any finding of disability or lack thereof. The court agreed, noting section 3 \u2014 115 of the Code mandates that the three selected physicians are required to furnish the pension board with subscribed and sworn-to certificates of the applicant\u2019s disability. Because the pension board did not require the certificates to be furnished nor did the physicians submit such certificates, the trial court\u2019s affirmance of the board\u2019s denial of the disability pension was reversed and the cause remanded.\nIn the case at bar, and contrary to Jagielnik\u2019s assertion during oral argument, the manner in which the three doctors \u201creported\u201d their findings is not evident, and we find no certificates or references to same in the record before us. Based on this record, the Board\u2019s statement here that it determined that \u201cthere was no issue with respect to Mr. Jagielnik\u2019s being mentally disabled\u201d cannot be deemed an administrative decision which \u201cterminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d We note moreover that the Board\u2019s interim ruling specifically contemplates that one of the issues to be determined is whether \u201c[Jagielnik\u2019s] mental disability resulted from the performance of an act of duty.\u201d It is clear, therefore, that no determination has been made as to whether Jagielnik is or is not entitled to a disability pension in the first place, and, secondly, whether the disability is on-duty or not-on-duty related. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, pars. 3\u2014114.1, 3\u2014114.2.\nJagielnik\u2019s additional argument that the Board is limited by section 3\u2014115 to receiving only \u201cother evidence of disability\u201d in further proceedings before it is unsupported by any authority. On its face, section 3\u2014115 shows the Board is not limited to receiving certificates of the police officer\u2019s disability only, but that it \u201cmay require other evidence of disability.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014115; see Batka v. Board of Trustees of the Village of Orland Park Police Pension Fund (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 715, 723 n.2.) Other evidence concerning whether the Board will grant or deny the officer\u2019s application for disability pension is not limited by section 3\u2014115 to only \u201cevidence of disability.\u201d (Cf. Caauwe, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 485 (\u201cOnce the three certificates were submitted, the pension board was empowered to admit and weigh additional evidence relative to either granting or denying the disability pension request\u201d (emphasis added)).) Further, as pointed out by the Board, it has the power under section 3\u2014136 of the Code to compel witnesses to attend and testify \u201cupon all matters\u201d concerning its administration of the pension fund. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014136.) Acceptance of Jagielnik\u2019s narrow construction of section 3 \u2014 115 would nullify the broad language of section 3\u2014136 and contravene the well-settled -.principle that a statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless. People v. Parvin (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 519, 525; People v. Knop (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 944, 951.\nWe find Jagielnik\u2019s citations to Stec v. Oak Park Police Pension Board (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 556, and Hahn v. Police Pension Fund (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 206, are irrelevant to the issue of whether the Board\u2019s interim ruling here is an administrative decision which may be judicially reviewed. We also find that Board of Education of Valley View Community Unit School District No. 365U v. File (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 1132, is distinguishable. Jagielnik relies on File to support his contention that the instant interim ruling terminated the proceedings despite the fact it did not contain \u201cfindings.\u201d\nIn File, a tenured teacher was dismissed by the Board of Education effective June 30, 1976, and, pending a hearing pursuant to the school code, was suspended without pay. A lengthy 13-day hearing over the course of a nine-month period was held and the filing of post-hearing briefs was completed by July 11, 1977. It was not until May 30, 1978, however, that the hearing officer ruled (1) that File\u2019s dismissal was not for just cause; (2) that she was to be reinstated and, preferably, transferred to a position with new supervisors; and (3) that she was to receive one year\u2019s back pay. The hearing officer explained by letter that his ruling was being made \u201cwithout explanation\u201d at that time due to his serious health problems and pending heart surgery but that the explanation would follow as soon as he was able to return to work.\nOn administrative review sought by both parties, the circuit court found the lack of written findings precluded judicial review of the hearing officer\u2019s order, declaring same to be null and void and remanding for a hearing de novo. The circuit court was reversed on appeal; however, the court finding that the hearing officer\u2019s failure to submit written findings in conjunction with his order did not make that order any less a final order. \u201cFor all practical purposes, [the hearing officerj\u2019s order *** terminated the proceedings before him, and fixed the rights and liabilities of both the Board and Mrs. File.\u201d 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1136.\nAlthough the court found the order thus was final and subject to judicial review under the administrative review law, it nonetheless found the order not reviewable because the officer\u2019s \u201cbare decision\u201d that File\u2019s dismissal was not for just cause provided no basis upon which a reviewing court might find the decision contrary to, or supported by, the manifest weight of the evidence. (Cf. Fagiano v. Police Pension Board (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 963, 982-83 (unlike the order in File, city personnel board\u2019s discharge of city employee provided adequate ground for review where hearing officer\u2019s findings adopted by board were sufficient to satisfy questions of jurisdiction, procedural due process, and sufficiency of evidence, coupled with clear and complete record of hearing fully capable of review).) It disagreed that remandment for a hearing de novo was the proper disposition, however, since the order was defective only in that it lacked findings. Accordingly, the cause was remanded to the hearing officer for the purpose of obtaining his written findings, which could then be judicially reviewed.\nFile is distinguishable from the instant cause in that the order in File at least was dispositive, albeit not reviewable without the hearing officer\u2019s findings. File\u2019s dismissal was found to be \u201cnot for just cause.\u201d (File, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1133.) Here, nothing dispositive of Jagielnik\u2019s right to a disability pension has yet occurred. The Board has neither granted nor denied him a disability pension; it simply seeks to receive more evidence on the question. Undoubtedly because there has been no disposition, Jagielnik has not shown here that he has been prejudiced by an administrative decision of the Board. It is axiomatic that \u201c[a] party seeking reversal has the burden of establishing prejudice.\u201d Bi-State Development Agency v. Department of Revenue (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672.\nBecause we conclude the Board\u2019s interim ruling is not an administrative decision subject to judicial review under the administrative review law and that the cause properly was dismissed, we have no authority to render what would amount to an advisory opinion on the merits of the issue of whether a mental disability resulting from the commission of a misdemeanor battery bars the award of a non-on-duty disability pension. Consequently, we do not address that issue.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for administrative review is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDUNN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant.", "Charles E Marino, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM JAGIELNIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140819\nOpinion filed April 4, 1991.\nStanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant.\nCharles E Marino, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0026-01", "first_page_order": 48, "last_page_order": 58 }