{ "id": 2529461, "name": "CENTRAL TERRACE CO-OPERATIVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Central Terrace Co-Operative v. Martin", "decision_date": "1991-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140856", "first_page": "130", "last_page": "134", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 130" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898682 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/90/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5483669 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498429 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590387 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3583478 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0680-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 9805, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.139730011794099e-08, "percentile": 0.47428653176304875 }, "sha256": "c485ab9c660bc495796d424ed690eb899c287cd52aa0a3c5cb2c960b5f7fa9df", "simhash": "1:19f904930b8844fb", "word_count": 1567 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:56:54.383547+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CENTRAL TERRACE CO-OPERATIVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, David Martin, appeals from an order of the trial court granting plaintiff, Central Terrace Co-Operative (CTC), the relief it sought in its complaint for forcible entry and detainer. Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the forcible entry and detainer statute applies to this case; (2) whether the co-op\u2019s board of directors followed proper procedures in bringing its complaint and terminating defendant\u2019s contractual rights; and (3) whether the trial court used the proper standard in determining the merits of plaintiff\u2019s complaint. We reverse.\nOn March 1, 1965, Martin and CTC executed an agreement entitled, \u201cMutual Ownership Contract.\u201d Pursuant to this agreement, Martin was entitled to perpetual use of 1212 Cypress Terrace in exchange for payment of $3,640. Martin has completely paid the purchase price. Martin initially occupied his unit with his wife. Martin\u2019s wife died in 1984.\nIn 1989, Martin sent a letter to CTC\u2019s board stating that his daughter was moving out of the unit and his niece was moving in to act as his cook and housekeeper. The board responded by asking Martin to have his niece fill out a \u201csublease application\u201d for a period not to exceed six months. Apparently, Martin did not reply to this request.\nOn June 9, 1990, the board voted to \u201cfollow through with a 5 Day Notice, then a Forcible Entry.\u201d Thereafter, Martin received a \u201cNotice of Termination and Intention to Institute Forcible Entry and Detainer.\u201d The notice alleged Martin had failed to occupy his unit and had sublet the unit without approval. Martin was given until March 3 to either personally occupy the premises or obtain approval to sublet.\nOn March 2, one day before the deadline given to Martin, CTC filed a complaint for forcible detainer. On May 1, after the complaint had been filed, CTC\u2019s board met pursuant to a request by Martin. The board\u2019s president and three other people gave their opinion that Martin did not reside at 1212 Cypress Terrace. The board voted to terminate Martin\u2019s membership in the co-op.\nOn May 11, a bench trial was conducted by the court. The trial court\u2019s order was filed on July 17, 1990. The court found \u201cthis cause was properly brought under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute in that a landlord tenant relationship was created by the Cooperative lease agreement.\u201d The court also stated \u201cthe standard of review for the court is one of determining reasonableness and not conducting a trial de novo.\u201d Additionally, the court found \u201cThat the Board of Directors followed proper procedures in bringing the Complaint against the defendant and in terminating the contract. The plaintiff has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Board\u2019s decision that the defendant was not occupying the dwelling was a reasonable and non-arbitrary finding.\u201d\nThe court ordered possession of the premises be restored to CTC.\nDefendant first contends the forcible entry and detainer statute is not applicable to the case at bar. The trial court found the statute applied because \u201ca landlord tenant relationship was created by the Cooperative lease agreement.\u201d\nThe forcible entry and detainer statute (statute) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 9\u2014101 et seq.) is in derogation of common law, and recovery under the statute is confined to cases clearly within its provisions. (Heritage Pullman Bank v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 680, 686.) However, if a case falls within the parameters of the statute, the court should liberally construe its provisions to effectuate the remedy it provides. (Heritage, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 686:) The statute sets forth eight circumstances in which an action may be maintained for forcible entry and detainer. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 9\u2014102(a).) A situation concerning a leasehold is specifically provided for in the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 9\u2014102(a)(4)). Additionally, it is clear that condominiums and common interest communities fall within the parameters of the statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 9\u2014102(a)(7), (a)(8).) However, it is also clear that cooperatives are expressly excluded from the definition of common interest communities. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 9\u2014102(c).\nIn its letter opinion, the trial court cited this court\u2019s decision in Sinnissippi Apartments, Inc. v. Hubbard (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 151, in support of its finding that a leasehold arrangement was established by the \u201cCooperative lease agreement.\u201d In Sinnissippi, the plaintiff was a corporation organized to operate a cooperative apartment complex. The defendant was a shareholder of the corporation and also a lessee pursuant to a lease agreement with the plaintiff/corporation. The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking monies allegedly due and owing for increased maintenance charges. In discussing the relationship of the parties in a co-op, this court quoted the following language set forth in 1 American Law of Property, \u00a73.10, at 199-200 (1952):\n\u201c \u2018Shares of stock *** are sold to persons who will occupy the housing units, the number of shares *** depending on the value of the particular apartment or unit. \u201cProprietary\u201d leases are issued by the corporation to the shareholders. These leases contain provisions common to other leases. *** Rent, which is sub-\nject to being increased or decreased, is based upon estimates of amounts necessary to pay operational costs and interest and installments of principal on any capital indebtedness. Other provisions include covenants against assignment without the consent of the board of directors of the corporation, that the tenant will make inside repairs but no structural changes, and that the corporation may forfeit the lease for breach of various of the covenants or violation of the rules of conduct established by the corporation.\n* * *\nIt would seem clear that the lease in the usual cooperative apartment organization creates the relation of landlord and tenant between the corporation and the shareholder-occupant. Of course, the purpose of the organization is to approach individual home ownership as nearly as is possible in a situation where the only practical solution is common operation and management of many features, and the number of the occupant\u2019s shares are determined by the value of the apartment he occupies. But in legal theory the corporation is.distinct from its shareholders, no one of whom has a right to receive legal title to any specific property of the corporation under the better-drawn plans, and it is necessary that this distinction be observed in order to carry out the purposes of the cooperative. The courts have recognized that the relation is that of landlord and tenant in allowing the corporation the usual remedies of a landlord against a tenant.\u2019 \u201d {Sinnissippi, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 156.)\nWe also noted that the relationship between the tenant/shareholder and the owner/corporation is determined by reviewing, in totality, the certificate of incorporation, stock offering perspectives, stock subscription agreement and the proprietary lease. Sinnissippi, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 157.\nThe case at bar is distinguishable from Sinnissippi in that this situation does not appear to be the \u201cusual\u201d cooperative organization. The court called the agreement executed by the parties a \u201cCooperative lease agreement\u201d while the parties titled it a \u201cMutual Ownership Contract.\u201d Defendant did not sign a lease. The only document executed was entitled \u201cMutual Ownership Contract.\u201d In the agreement, defendant was referred to as a \u201cmember\u201d not a lessee. The agreement further provided that \u201cperpetual use of each particular dwelling shall be delivered by the corporation to the member in the form of a membership certificate.\u201d Additionally, the bylaws of CTC state the corporation was \u201cformed for the purpose of owning residential property on a cooperative basis.\u201d The stated purpose did not include leasing property. Contra Moss v. Elofsson (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 256.\nWe determine that, after a review of the documents presented to the trial court, the trial court\u2019s finding that a landlord/ tenant relationship existed was against the manifest weight of the evidence. CTC elected to give possessory rights to members based upon ownership interests not lease agreements.\nWe also note that, in the case at bar, the trial court found the contract was properly terminated. In so doing, the court was not only adjudicating defendant\u2019s possessory rights but also defendant\u2019s ownership rights. A forcible entry and detainer action is summary in nature, and the litigation is limited to the issue of who is entitled to possession of the property. (Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilson (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 357, 360.) The question of title cannot be litigated. Kitzer v. Rice (1967), 90 Ill. App. 2d 72, 77.\nSince there was no landlord/tenant relationship created in this case, no other provision of the statute would bring this particular cooperative within the parameters of the statute, and CTC\u2019s suit sought to terminate ownership rights, the trial court erred by finding this case was properly brought under the forcible entry and detainer statute.\nDue to our resolution of the above issue, the remaining issues need not be addressed.\nFor the above stated reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed.\nReversed.\nBOWMAN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "David F. Black, of UAW-Chrysler Legal Services Plan, of Belvidere, for appellant.", "Nancy Hyzer, of Hyzer Law Firm, of Rockford, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CENTRAL TERRACE CO-OPERATIVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140856\nOpinion filed March 21, 1991.\nRehearing denied April 29, 1991.\nDavid F. Black, of UAW-Chrysler Legal Services Plan, of Belvidere, for appellant.\nNancy Hyzer, of Hyzer Law Firm, of Rockford, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0130-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 156 }