{ "id": 2527237, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICK McGEE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McGee", "decision_date": "1991-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20140905", "first_page": "641", "last_page": "651", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 641" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 1287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461265 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3504575 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 1011", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012326 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2926558 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/11/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565326 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599-600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 1096", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5080985 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1103-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/1096-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 958", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12144667 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0958-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557280 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2430994 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0314-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 917, "char_count": 21467, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.466829779884828e-08, "percentile": 0.4450666814937859 }, "sha256": "5b968f5bb2c9b4ccd02bf048a62826b2510ebd6312a8ae49fe6f6ac4bf55fe25", "simhash": "1:0a7abc067c68e8dc", "word_count": 3474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:56:54.383547+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICK McGEE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Rick McGee, was convicted of possessing more than 30 grams of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)) following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County. Defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 10 years.\nDefendant appeals, contending the trial judge: (1) refused to permit defendant to be represented by retained counsel of defendant\u2019s choice, and also denied defendant\u2019s right to a bench trial; (2) erred in admitting improper rebuttal evidence and other irrelevant evidence; and (3) based the sentence on additional improper testimony.\nWe affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, vacate in part, and remand.\nBackground\nThe record contains the following pertinent facts. On April 24, 1986, Detective Patrick Darcy swore out a search warrant for 831 South Dwyer Avenue, apartment B, in Arlington Heights. At approximately 10 p.m., Darcy and Detectives George Graham, Michael Bobko, and other Chicago and Arlington Heights police officers executed the warrant. When they arrived at the building, they noticed a gray Chevrolet Corvette in the parking lot.\nDetective Darcy and the other officers positioned themselves at the front, back, and patio doors of the apartment. Darcy knocked on the front door and received no response. He knocked a second time. Lucretia Meo asked who was there. Darcy announced his office, stated that he had a search warrant, and directed Meo to open the door. The officers heard Meo run away from the door and shout, \u201cIt\u2019s the police.\u201d\nDarcy forced the door open and the police entered the apartment. They observed defendant, wearing a bathrobe, run out of an office and into a bedroom. Darcy followed defendant and ordered him to halt. The officers asked defendant his name, and he responded \u201cRick.\u201d The officers led defendant and Meo to the living room, where they gave defendant and Meo a copy of the search warrant and advised them of their rights.\nThe police found .10 grams of cocaine in an unfolded paper packet in the bedroom. In the office, they found 8.48 grams of cocaine in an unfolded paper packet lying on a desktop. A further search of the office yielded a plastic container containing 106.53 grams of cocaine. The police also found various drug paraphernalia. Karen Garst, a police laboratory chemist, subsequently performed a field test that identified the substance as cocaine. The cocaine weighed a total of approximately 115 grams and had a street value of approximately $60,000.\nThe officers found cash totalling $810 on top of a bedroom dresser and $594 in a dresser drawer. Meo claimed the $810 and defendant claimed the $594. The police found documents that belonged to Meo and found no documents bearing defendant\u2019s name.\nThe police allowed defendant and Meo to dress prior to leaving the apartment. While defendant was dressing, Darcy searched defendant\u2019s pants and found several keys attached to a key ring. Darcy asked defendant if he owned an automobile. Defendant answered that he had a gray Chevrolet Corvette, the car was parked in the lot, its key was attached to the key ring, and that the officers could search the car. The police did so and did not find any contraband. One of defendant\u2019s keys fit the apartment\u2019s back door lock. When Meo and defendant left the apartment to be taken to the police station, Meo locked the back door with one of her keys.\nAt the police station, defendant told the police that he \u201cwas staying\u201d with Meo, whom he described as his girlfriend. However, he stated that his \u201clegal residence\u201d was at an address on Oconto Avenue in Chicago, where his ex-wife lived. When asked for his telephone number, defendant gave the number listed to Meo at the Dwyer address. Although the arrest report lists as defendant\u2019s residence the Oconto address, another police report lists as his residence both the Dwyer and Oconto addresses separated by a slash mark.\nOn December 31, 1986, defendant and Meo were jointly charged by information with possessing more than 30 grams of a controlled substance, i.e., cocaine, with intent to deliver. Defendant moved for severance because Meo\u2019s defense would be that defendant brought the cocaine into the apartment without her knowledge. Defendant\u2019s motion was granted, and he and Meo were tried separately. A jury acquitted Meo. However, defendant\u2019s trial ended with a hung jury, which the trial judge discharged. Meo was represented by Ralph Meczyk, and defendant was represented by Richard Stopka.\nOn November 16, 1988, Lawrence Hyman moved to substitute as counsel for defendant. At a hearing on the motion, the State expressed concern whether Hyman\u2019s representation of defendant would create a conflict of interest. Hyman assured the trial judge that no such conflict would arise. Although Hyman shared offices with Meczyk, they had no formal business relationship. Hyman even speculated that he and Meczyk could represent defendant as co-counsel. However, the trial judge noted that Meo might testify at defendant\u2019s trial. Thus, the trial judge reasoned, Meo\u2019s appearance would raise a severe conflict of interest in Meczyk\u2019s representation of defendant. Hyman reassured the trial judge that Meczyk would not represent defendant.\nAdditionally, Hyman appeared at Meo\u2019s trial and testified on her behalf as a character witness. However, defendant stated at the hearing that he knew of Hyman\u2019s testimony. In response to the trial judge\u2019s questions, defendant stated that he wanted Hyman to represent him.\nOn November 21, 1988, the trial court held a hearing to review the status of defendant\u2019s upcoming trial. The State reiterated its concern over Hyman representing defendant after testifying as a character witness on behalf of Meo. Again, in response to the trial judge\u2019s questions, defendant stated that he wanted Hyman to represent him. Hyman then asked the court if Meczyk could sit with him and defendant at defense counsel\u2019s table. The trial judge denied the request. He again stated that because Meczyk represented Meo, Meczyk should not be involved in defendant\u2019s trial in any fashion.\nOn November 28, 1988, immediately prior to trial, Hyman presented a motion in limine to prohibit any reference to defendant\u2019s automobile, the Chevrolet Corvette. The court denied the motion. The trial judge deemed it highly probative that defendant gave to police officers a key ring that had attached thereto keys to the car and also a key that fit the apartment\u2019s back door lock. Thus, the court would permit testimony that police officers observed the automobile in the parking lot and that it was registered to defendant. However, the trial judge prohibited the State\u2019s witnesses from testifying that the presence of the automobile indicated that defendant was in the apartment or that the police sought the car.\nHyman again requested the court to allow Meczyk to sit at defense counsel\u2019s table and assist by taking notes. The trial judge allowed Meczyk to take notes, but not at defense counsel\u2019s table and not in any official capacity. Hyman informed the court that defendant signed a waiver of conflict of interest arising from Meczyk\u2019s representation. The trial judge stated that he was not only concerned with defendant\u2019s rights, but with those of Meo as well. Hyman then tendered defendant\u2019s signed waiver of conflict of interest arising from Hyman\u2019s representation of defendant. Defendant was present at this hearing. The trial judge again asked defendant whether he waived any conflict of interest regarding Hyman. Defendant responded that he did.\nAt trial, Detectives Darcy, Bobko, and Graham, and police laboratory chemist Garst testified in the State\u2019s case in chief. In addition to the above-stated pertinent facts, Detective Bobko testified that defendant did not disclose that he lived in an apartment at 2829 West Fullerton Avenue in Chicago. The State rested.\nCatherine McGee, defendant\u2019s ex-wife, testified in pertinent part that their family lived at 3637 North Oconto Avenue. The couple established a trucking business and a property management company. They bought the Fullerton building and other properties prior to their divorce. As part of the divorce, Catherine received the trucking business and the family domicile, while defendant received the management company and other properties. The Oconto address remained defendant\u2019s purported \u201clegal address,\u201d although he rarely occupied it. Also, Catherine continued to work with defendant in the trucking business. It was their custom to carry large amounts of cash in the course of business.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He testified essentially that he lived at the Fullerton Avenue address. He only occasionally occupied the Oconto Avenue address, but considered it his \u201clegal address\u201d; his driver\u2019s license listed the Oconto Avenue address, where he also received his mail. He never lived at, kept clothes at, or possessed a key to Meo\u2019s apartment. He did not possess narcotics with the intent to deliver them.\nDefendant began to date Meo in March 1985. However, by 1986, he dated Meo only one to three times per week. Defendant testified essentially that on April 24, 1986, he drove to Meo\u2019s apartment in his Chevrolet Corvette. Defendant was lying on the bed watching television. Police officers crashed into the apartment unannounced. Defendant jumped up and stood in the bedroom doorway. Police officers aimed guns at him and threatened him. He raised his arms and stood motionless. He did not go into the apartment\u2019s office area that night.\nPolice officers took every item defendant carried in his pants pockets, including cash totalling $594 and his car keys. He gave the officers permission to search his car. At the police station, defendant never told Detective Bobko that he lived with Meo, or gave as his address that of Meo\u2019s apartment. He never saw the cocaine and paraphernalia in Meo\u2019s apartment prior to that night. The defense rested.\nMuriel Otto testified for the State in rebuttal. Otto testified that she was a neighbor of Meo; further, she was acquainted with Meo and came to know defendant. Between January and April 1986, she saw defendant at Meo\u2019s apartment \u201con a daily basis.\u201d She additionally saw defendant enter the building alone through a door that locked automatically upon closing. On cross-examination, however, Otto testified that she did not see defendant everyday. In surrebuttal, defendant testified that he did not visit Meo daily at the time of his arrest.\nThe jury convicted defendant as charged. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion.\nOver defense counsel\u2019s objection, the trial judge heard testimony of defendant\u2019s subsequent arrest for again possessing cocaine. Detective Graham testified that on November 26, 1986, he suspected defendant of possessing illegal drugs based on information from an anonymous source. He went to defendant\u2019s Fullerton Avenue apartment to investigate. In response to Graham\u2019s request and after being advised of his rights, defendant gave Graham permission to search the apartment. Graham did so and did not find any contraband. Graham then asked defendant for permission to search the basement of one of defendant\u2019s buildings, located at 1555 North St. Louis Avenue. After being advised of his rights, defendant gave permission and signed a consent form. They went to the St. Louis Avenue building. Graham forced open the basement and searched it. He found 441 grams of cocaine. Defendant was arrested, tried, and acquitted. Defendant presented two witnesses in mitigation.\nAt the close of the hearing, the trial judge found that the facts of the case, and Graham\u2019s testimony on the subsequent arrest, called for a prison term in excess of the statutory minimum sentence. However, noting defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation and his dependents, the trial judge did not consider a substantial sentence to be necessary. The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 10 years. Defendant appeals.\nOpinion\nI\nDefendant makes two claims pertaining to the pretrial proceedings. He contends the trial judge: (A) refused to permit him to be represented by retained counsel of his choice, and (B) denied his right to a bench trial.\nA\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by not allowing Meczyk, defendant\u2019s retained counsel of choice, to represent him. A criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to assistance of counsel includes the right to be represented by counsel of his choice. However, a defendant may be held to have exercised that right by his acquiescence in appearing counsel\u2019s conduct and statements, as well as the defendant\u2019s express affirmation that the attorney is his chosen counsel. \u201cIn other words, the defendant\u2019s appearance with and treatment of a private attorney as his retained counsel ordinarily is deemed to constitute a ratification of defendant\u2019s employment of that attorney and the exercise of his right to counsel of his choice.\u201d People v. Smalley (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 314, 318, 533 N.E.2d 428, 431 (and cases cited therein).\nApplying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that defendant chose Hyman to be his retained counsel. The record shows that the trial judge questioned defendant on his choice of counsel on three separate occasions prior to trial. Defendant responded each time that he wanted Hyman to represent him. If defendant wanted to retain Meczyk as counsel, he had ample opportunity to notify the trial court. Defendant refers us to his signed waiver of any conflict of interest arising from Meczyk\u2019s representation. However, defendant also signed at the same time a waiver of any conflict of interest arising from Hyman\u2019s representation. Since defendant received Hyman\u2019s representation, we hold that he was not denied his right to retained counsel of his choice.\nB\nDefendant also contends that the trial judge denied his right to a bench trial. Defendant posits that the State \u201capparently\u201d demanded a jury for his first trial, pursuant to section 115\u20141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115\u20141). Defendant further states that at his second trial, he did not waive his right to a jury because it would have been a meaningless act; the statute required a jury if the State so requested. Defendant notes that our supreme court declared section 115\u20141 unconstitutional in People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 209, 533 N.E.2d 873. Thus, defendant contends, he was denied his right to a bench trial.\nWe initially note that defendant misstates the record. At his first trial, it was defendant who demanded a jury and not the State. Further, at his second trial, defendant did not waive his right to a jury and the State did not demand one. These facts notwithstanding, defendant nevertheless argues that \u201cthere is no independent factual account to resolve this question\u201d and \u201csuggests that a remand is required to resolve this issue.\u201d This argument completely lacks merit. The record does not contain a jury demand by the State at either the first or second trial. However, the record does contain defendant\u2019s jury demand for his first trial. These facts are sufficient to resolve the issue.\nII\nDefendant next makes two evidentiary claims. He contends the trial judge erred in admitting: (A) improper rebuttal evidence, and (B) other irrelevant evidence. We note at the outset that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling should not be reversed absent a showing that the court exceeded its discretion. People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56, 463 N.E.2d 696, 702.\nA\nDefendant contends that the trial judge erred by allowing Muriel Otto to testify in rebuttal for the State. Rebuttal evidence is evidence that explains, repels, contradicts, or disproves evidence produced by a defendant. Rebuttal evidence may only be used to contradict the defendant\u2019s testimony as to a material issue and not to a collateral or immaterial issue. People v. Williams (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 958, 964, 422 N.E.2d 199, 204.\nDefendant notes that Otto testified that she saw defendant at Meo\u2019s apartment daily for several months immediately prior to his arrest. Defendant further notes that the State offered Otto\u2019s testimony to rebut defendant\u2019s testimony that he visited Meo only approximately one to three times per week. Defendant argues that Otto\u2019s testimony went to an immaterial issue because defendant admitted visiting Meo at least once per week.\nWe disagree. Otto\u2019s testimony contradicted that of defendant on the frequency of defendant\u2019s visits to Meo\u2019s apartment. Of course, this went to the material issue of defendant\u2019s control over the premises, which is an element of the offense. (See People v. Pintos (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1103-04, 527 N.E.2d 312, 316-17; People v. Burke (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599-600, 483 N.E.2d 674, 679.) The admission of Otto\u2019s rebuttal testimony was well within the discretion of the trial court. See People v. Johnson (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 745, 297 N.E.2d 683.\nB\nDefendant contends that the trial judge erred by admitting into evidence testimony that defendant drove a Chevrolet Corvette. Defendant argues that the evidence is irrelevant because no connection existed between the crime charged and the type of automobile defendant drove.\nThe general test for the admissibility of evidence is its relevance. Evidence is admissible where it fairly tends to prove the particular offense charged. Any circumstances that tend to make the proposition more or less probable may be put into evidence. Evidence is therefore relevant where the fact or circumstance offered tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact or to render the matter at issue more or less probable. Relevance can also be established by means of inference. People v. Jones (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884-85, 439 N.E.2d 1011, 1015-16.\nIn the instant case, the trial judge allowed testimony that police officers observed the automobile in Meo\u2019s parking lot and that it was registered to defendant. The court considered the car\u2019s ownership to be probative because defendant\u2019s key ring had attached thereto keys to the car and a key to the apartment\u2019s back door lot. During oral argument before this court, defense counsel conceded that the car's ownership had probative value. Further, the probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. To prevent undue prejudice, the trial judge prohibited any testimony that the presence of the automobile indicated that defendant was in the apartment or that the police sought the car. We cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting this evidence.\nIll\nDefendant claims that the trial judge erred in allowing Detective Graham to testify in aggravation at the sentencing hearing. Detective Graham described the events leading to a subsequent arrest for drug possession. The record shows that the trial court based the sentence in part on Graham\u2019s testimony. Defendant argues that Graham\u2019s testimony, which we earlier described in detail, was irrelevant and untrustworthy. Defendant asks us to vacate the sentence and remand the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.\nThe State relies on cases such as People v. LaPointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344, in which our supreme court held as follows:\n\u201cWhether a defendant had been prosecuted and convicted for other misconduct, proof of which is offered at a sentencing hearing, is not, in our judgment, controlling as to its admissibility. More important are the questions of relevancy and accuracy of the information submitted. *** While trial judges should be cautious in admitting such proof and sensitive to the possibilities of prejudice to defendant if inaccurate information is considered, we believe that a trial judge may, under circumstances such as those here, properly receive proof of criminal conduct for which no prosecution and conviction ensued.\u201d 88 Ill. 2d at 498-99, 431 N.E.2d at 351-52.\nThis court, however, in People v. Dean (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 344, 509 N.E.2d 618, held that a new sentencing hearing was required where a trial judge, in sentencing a defendant, expressly relied on evidence of a pending charge, of which the defendant was subsequently acquitted. (156 Ill. App. 3d at 355, 509 N.E.2d at 624-25.) The facts in the case at bar fall squarely within our holding in Dean. We acknowledge that the Appellate Court for the Second District has expressly rejected Dean for this point. (People v. Jackson (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 92, 557 N.E.2d 1287.) Based on Dean, we vacate defendant\u2019s sentence and remand the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s conviction of possessing more than 30 grams of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is affirmed, his sentence is vacated, and the cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded.\nJOHNSON and McMORROW, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Ellen Dienes, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Walter P. Hehner, and John Guinn, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICK McGEE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20140905\nOpinion filed March 21, 1991.\nMary Ellen Dienes, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Walter P. Hehner, and John Guinn, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0641-01", "first_page_order": 663, "last_page_order": 673 }