{ "id": 2529121, "name": "JOHN HOPKINS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS MASONIC MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee (Sid John Shafer et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Hopkins v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center", "decision_date": "1991-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20143213", "first_page": "652", "last_page": "656", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 652" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3548117 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5068686 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 1155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1157" }, { "page": "1159", "parenthetical": "Barry, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5085620 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499650 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325-26" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465630 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465630 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0692-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 455, "char_count": 8299, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2514423364493507e-07, "percentile": 0.6102338398879625 }, "sha256": "540010d2f1f13236713b9cda2a86ea2f9df6a79e500c9dda14e6bd37290c6235", "simhash": "1:02c331cf2f6885dc", "word_count": 1353 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:56:54.383547+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHN HOPKINS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS MASONIC MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee (Sid John Shafer et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, John and Eunice Hopkins, brought a medical malpractice action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, Illinois Masonic Medical Center (Illinois Masonic); Sid Shafer, M.D.; William Meltzer, M.D.; Michael Lewis, M.D.; and Ira Kornblatt, M.D. The trial court dismissed Illinois Masonic from the action.\nApproximately three years later, plaintiffs petitioned the trial court to vacate the dismissal of Illinois Masonic and thereby reinstate it in the lawsuit, which is still pending in the trial court. The trial court denied the petition, and plaintiffs assign error to the denial.\nWe reverse the order of the trial court and remand.\nBackground\nThe record contains the following pertinent facts. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on February 14, 1986. They named as defendants Drs. Shafer, Meltzer, Lewis, and Kornblatt; L.L. Braun, M.D.; Illinois Masonic; Johnson and Johnson, Inc.; and Chas. F. Thackray USA, Inc.\nIn the multicount complaint, John brought medical malpractice actions against the individual physicians and Illinois Masonic. He alleged that those defendants negligently treated a broken artificial hip; further, their negligence proximately resulted in additional surgery and permanent injury. John also brought product liability actions against defendants Thackray USA and Johnson and Johnson. Eunice Hopkins sought damages from all defendants for loss of consortium.\nOn June 16, 1986, Hlinois Masonic filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel was absent from the hearing on the motion. However, counsel for plaintiffs and Illinois Masonic agreed to a briefing schedule on the motion, which culminated in a final hearing on August 19, 1986. On that date, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel again failed to appear. At the close of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Illinois Masonic from the lawsuit. Counsel for Illinois Masonic drafted the dismissal order, which stated in pertinent part:\n\u201cIT IS HEREBY ORDERED:\n1. Defendant, ILLINOIS MASONIC MEDICAL CENTER\u2019S Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted.\n2. This order of dismissal is Final and Appealable as to Illinois Masonic Medical Center only.\u201d\nOn January 18, 1989, plaintiffs petitioned the trial court to vacate the dismissal of Illinois Masonic pursuant to section 2\u20141401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141401). At the close of a hearing on October 24, 1989, the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal.\nOpinion\nPlaintiffs initially claim that the August 19, 1986, order, which dismissed Illinois Masonic from the lawsuit, was not enforceable and appealable. They contend the order thus was, and remains, subject to revision at any time. Plaintiffs argue that, consequently, a section 2\u20141401 petition for relief from judgment was not the appropriate standard to apply to the August 19, 1986, dismissal order.\nWe agree. The dismissal order, which Illinois Masonic drafted, did not include the language that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) requires. (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).) The rule provides that in a case having multiple parties or multiple claims for relief, no appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims, unless the trial court makes an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. \u201cIn the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).\nThis court has held that the requirements of Rule 304(a) are mandatory. (Hamer v. Lentz (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 692, 694-95, 508 N.E.2d 324, 325-26.) In Hamer, the trial court stated that its order was \u201ca final and appealable order.\u201d (155 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 508 N.E.2d at 325.) We held that Rule 304(a) requires \u201can express written finding of both enforceability and appealability,\u201d and that it is the two-pronged finding that renders a final judgment enforceable and a final judgment appealable. (155 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 508 N.E.2d at 326, citing Rauscher v. Albert (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803, 485 N.E.2d 1362, 1365.) We reasoned that the word \u201cfinal\u201d did not even address the concept of enforceability. We further reasoned that we would defeat the purpose of the rule, to prevent piecemeal appeals, if we held that the mere inclusion of the word \u201cfinal\u201d in an order rendered the order final. We concluded, therefore, that the order appealed from was unenforceable and unappealable. Hamer, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 508 N.E.2d at 326.\nThe dismissal order in the case at bar is indistinguishable from the order in Hamer. During oral argument, Illinois Masonic conceded that Hamer would control the outcome of this case if we applied it. However, Illinois Masonic urged us not to follow Hamer. Illinois Masonic argued that the Appellate Court for the Third District expressed the better view in Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Kneller (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 210, 525 N.E.2d 1155. The court in that case held that an order could \u201cconstructively\u201d fulfill \u201cthe technical language requirement\u201d of Rule 304(a). 172 Ill. App. 3d at 213, 525 N.E.2d at 1157.\nWe adhere to Hamer, which expresses the purpose and policy behind Rule 304(a). We note that the Appellate Court for the Second District has also approved of and followed the Hamer approach. (Lurz v. Panek (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1110.) Additionally, we agree with Justice Tobias Barry, who dissented in Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. He observed as follows:\n\u201cThe language of Rule 304(a) is mandatory and precise, not directory or generic \u2014 its purpose, salutary, not cavalier. The rule is not unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the rule should be, and until today has been, applied strictly.\u201d Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., 172 Ill. App. 3d at 217, 525 N.E.2d at 1159 (Barry, J., dissenting).\nBased on Hamer, we hold that the August 19, 1986, order, which dismissed Illinois Masonic from the lawsuit, was not enforceable or appealable. Since this lawsuit is still pending in the trial court, the order was and remains subject to revision at any time. (See First National Bank v. Lewis (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 160, 516 N.E.2d 552.) Consequently, we reverse the order of the trial court that denied plaintiffs\u2019 section 2 \u2014 1401 petition for relief from judgment. We remand the cause with directions that the trial court consider plaintiffs\u2019 motion to vacate the dismissal order in light of the nonenforceable and nonappealable nature of the order.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJOHNSON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI,\ndissenting:\nUnder scrutiny is the legally necessary language making a final order appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(a). (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).) The wording of the rule itself is indirect and understated. It states an order is appealable if the court finds there is \u201cno just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.\u201d In contrast, the wording of the trial court\u2019s order in the instant case is clear, assertive and direct. It grants the motion to dismiss and states that the order \u201cis final and appealable.\u201d The finding of appealability is patent. Neither the majority opinion nor the opinion in Hamer v. Lentz (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 692, 508 N.E.2d 324, provides a rationale for mandating that to be appealable a final order must precisely track the wording of Rule 304(a). I would affirm the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Philip F. Maher, of counsel), for appellants.", "Connelly, Mustes & Schroeder, of Chicago (John J. Mustes and John R. Ostojic, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN HOPKINS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS MASONIC MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee (Sid John Shafer et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20143213\nOpinion filed March 21, 1991.\nJIGANTI, P.J., dissenting.\nMichael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Philip F. Maher, of counsel), for appellants.\nConnelly, Mustes & Schroeder, of Chicago (John J. Mustes and John R. Ostojic, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0652-01", "first_page_order": 674, "last_page_order": 678 }