{ "id": 2528015, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LIBORIO CRISANTOS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Crisantos", "decision_date": "1991-03-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20142418", "first_page": "870", "last_page": "876", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 870" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142311 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3502808 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075987 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075393 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589640 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148980 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105923 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 640, "char_count": 13192, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.524155635027854e-08, "percentile": 0.40067142910648457 }, "sha256": "54878d62d368ece90b26d155f39fa57ce86d7136e4ec70b8754726fe8b743534", "simhash": "1:28597cb63a4634fb", "word_count": 2141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:56:54.383547+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LIBORIO CRISANTOS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial defendant, Liborio Crisantos, was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1402.) Defendant was sentenced to a term of six years to be served in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nDefendant appeals, seeking reversal of his conviction or, in the alternative, reversal of his conviction and remand of the cause for a new trial. Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the State proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether he was denied a fair trial when certain of the State\u2019s witnesses allegedly made negative insinuations regarding Hispanic persons; and (3) whether the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction on both actual and constructive possession of a controlled substance.\nWe affirm.\nAt trial, the evidence established that on October 5, 1987, at approximately 2:30 p.m., four members of the Chicago police force\u2019s organized crime division, narcotics section, were performing a surveillance of the Latin Lounge. The lounge is located at 2528 Lincoln Avenue in Chicago. The surveillance was conducted from an undercover van which was located 150 feet to 200 feet south of the lounge. Chicago police officers Ricardo Abreu and Frank Goff testified that they observed the owner of the lounge, Vitine Santiago, come out of the lounge on at least two occasions and look along Lincoln Avenue in a northerly direction.\nAt approximately 2:45 p.m., the officers observed a man, identified as defendant, walking in a southerly direction along Lincoln Avenue. Officer Goff testified that he did not \u201cfocus\u201d on defendant until he walked into the lounge. Officer Abreu also testified that he saw defendant walking southbound on Lincoln Avenue. Both Officers Abreu and Goff testified that they observed defendant carrying a box. Shortly after the officers observed defendant enter the lounge, they executed a search warrant.\nOfficers Abreu, Goff, O\u2019Connor, and Thomas then proceeded directly to the lounge and knocked on the door. The purpose of their presence was first announced in English and then Officer Abreu repeated the same information in Spanish. The officers observed defendant, through a glass door, rapidly walk toward the rear of the lounge.\nSantiago, who was standing at the entrance, did not immediately open the door. It was only after the officers started to use force to gain entry into the premises that Santiago opened the door. Once inside the lounge, Officers Abreu and O'Connor walked toward the rear of the lounge. As the officers were walking, they observed defendant coming out of the rest room. Officer Abreu then seized defendant. Officer O\u2019Connor went into the rest room, where he discovered the box that the officers had previously observed being carried by defendant. Three plastic bags containing 800 grams of cocaine were retrieved from the box.\nDefendant was then arrested. In searching the rest of the lounge, the officers discovered a gun and $300 in cash. A triple beam scale, which is commonly used in weighing cocaine, was also found on the premises.\nDefendant testified that he was employed by Santiago to do general maintenance work at the lounge. Defendant\u2019s regular working hours were from noon until 7 p.m., when the lounge opens for business. He had been employed by Santiago for approximately three years.\nAccording to defendant, on October 5, when the police arrived, he and Santiago were the only two people on the premises. The lounge was closed, and defendant was in the process of \u201cmoving\u201d glasses from the back of the lounge to the front of the lounge. Santiago had previously told defendant not to open the door until he instructed him to do so. Defendant also testified that he was not in possession of the cocaine that had been confiscated by the police nor had he ever seen cocaine on the premises.\nAfter hearing all of the evidence, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. It is from this decision that defendant appeals.\nThe first issue defendant raises is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he had either actual or constructive possession of the seized cocaine. Defendant argues that the State\u2019s case was based upon the testimony of Officers Abreu and Goff, which was of \u201cdubious trustworthiness\u201d and insufficient to show that he was in actual possession of the cocaine.\nDefendant contends that the officers\u2019 vantage point in the van would not have allowed them to positively identify him as the person who entered the lounge carrying the box and that Officer Goff did not \u201cfocus\u201d on the person carrying the box in question. Moreover, defendant argues, on the day in question, he did not leave the lounge prior to the officers\u2019 arrival.\nInitially, we note that the police officers\u2019 testimony regarding defendant\u2019s activities on October 5 differs from defendant\u2019s version of the events. As the jury found defendant guilty, it is evident that the officers\u2019 testimony proved to be more credible. Credibility determinations are exclusively within the province of the jury. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261-62.) A court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact where the evidence is conflicting; \u201c[i]t [is] the jury\u2019s responsibility to resolve contradictory evidence and factual disputes and weigh the credibility of the witnesses.\u201d (People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437, 468.) We, therefore, defer to the findings of the trier of fact with respect to the weight given to defendant\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant\u2019s claim that the undercover van was parked too far away from the lounge to allow the officers to positively identify him is without merit. The van was equipped with special surveillance equipment to view street activities within radius of the lounge. The fact that Officer Goff testified that he did not \u201cfocus\u201d on defendant as he was walking down Lincoln Avenue is not fatal to the State\u2019s case, as Officer Abreu did observe defendant walking down the street with the box. Moreover, as the State contends, Officer Goff\u2019s observation of defendant's clothing and physical characteristics enabled him to identify defendant as the person he saw carrying the box.\nWe find defendant\u2019s contention that the State had not proved that he was in actual or constructive possession of the cocaine to be without merit. Defendant reasons that he was merely an employee on the premises when the police arrived and that the State did not present evidence that he possessed the contraband or even knew that cocaine was in the lounge.\nIn order to support a conviction for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and that the substance was in his immediate and exclusive control. (People v. Ortiz (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 466, 470.) The elements of possession or knowledge are both questions of fact which must be determined by the jury (Ortiz, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 471), and are rarely susceptible to direct proof (People v. Embry (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 331, 334). This is because drug trafficking is conducted with the \u201cutmost secrecy and care.\u201d People v. Nettles (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 306, 308.\nIn the instant case, we find that the State proved that defendant had actual possession of the drugs as both Officers Abreu and Goff identified defendant as the person carrying the box which contained the 800 grams of cocaine.\nConstructive possession may be proved where the accused \u201cknows of the presence of the substance and has the intent and capability to maintain control and possession of it. [Citations.] Thus, defendant must be shown to have exclusive control of the area where the controlled substance was located.\u201d People v. Roundtree (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1080.\nIn the instant case, defendant had exclusive control over the rest room, the area in which the cocaine was found, at the time the contraband was seized. Defendant was the last person seen in the rest room before the officers discovered the cocaine, and defendant admitted that only he and Santiago were in the lounge when the officers arrived. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the State had adequately proved defendant\u2019s guilt under a theory of constructive possession.\nNext defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by certain statements made by the State\u2019s witnesses. Specifically, defendant cites to Officer Abreu\u2019s testimony concerning how cocaine is \u201cusually packaged\u201d and how a search warrant is \u201cusually obtained.\u201d Defendant argues that these statements, coupled with Officer Goff\u2019s testimony that he has heard officers announce their office in Spanish \u201con several hundred search warrants,\u201d constitute reversible error. Defendant reasons that the import of these statements is that all Spanish-speaking persons are drug dealers. He submits that his guilt was not based upon the evidence presented against him but, rather, was due to the fact that he is Hispanic.\nHowever, these objections were not raised during trial or in defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. To preserve a question for review there must be both an objection to the evidence at trial and a written post-trial motion raising the question of the objected to evidence. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176.) We, therefore, find that for all intents and purposes this issue has been waived.\nEven assuming, arguendo, that this issue had not been waived, we find no merit to defendant\u2019s claim. Defendant is correct in his assertion that insinuations made by the State having no basis in fact constitute \u201cpotentially reversible error.\u201d (People v. Connor (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 900, 906.) However, after carefully reviewing the transcript, we find no recorded testimony from Officer Abreu as to how cocaine is \u201cusually packaged\u201d or how a search warrant is \u201cusually obtained.\u201d We do not know from which portion of the transcript defendant is quoting. The testimony which defendant refers to was elicited for the purpose of explaining how the narcotics section operates. There was no improper insinuation having no basis in fact made during Officer Abreu\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant also takes Officer Goff\u2019s testimony completely out of context. Officer Goff was giving a narrative as to the events of October 5 when he was asked whether he recalled the words used by Officer O\u2019Connor in executing the search warrant. Officer Goff stated that Officer O'Connor announced their presence and purpose and then told Santiago to open the door. Officer Goff then testified that this same announcement was repeated in Spanish by Officer Abreu \u201cwhich [Officer Abreu] always does when dealing with Spanish people. *** I don\u2019t speak Spanish, but I understand the phrase because [Officer Abreu has] repeated it on several hundred search warrants.\u201d\nWe find that this testimony was not elicited for the purpose of insinuating that Hispanic persons are drug dealers. This testimony illustrates how Officer Abreu ensures that the announcement is understood by Spanish-speaking persons. While the announcement of authority and purpose may not be necessary to the execution of a search warrant (People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 525, 531), it may protect the police officers and result in the avoidance of a confrontation (People v. Ouellette (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 511, 520). We cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, interpret Officer Goff\u2019s statements as insinuating that Hispanic people are drug dealers. Defendant\u2019s contention fails with respect to this issue.\nThe final issue defendant raises is whether the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury on both actual and constructive possession of a controlled substance was erroneous where the only evidence, allegedly, presented was that of actual possession.\nHowever, we previously held that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under both actual possession and constructive possession theories. The evidence presented at trial supported both of these theories. Where evidence is presented at trial supporting both an actual possession theory and a constructive possession theory, both theories may be given to the jury. People v. McCrimmon (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 112, 117.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed. As part of our judgment, we grant the State\u2019s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for defending this appeal pursuant to People v. Nicholls (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 166. We deny the State\u2019s request that this court also award it an additional $25 as fees pursuant to People v. Agnew (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 275, as oral argument before this court was waived by defendant.\nAffirmed.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and McMORROW, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael A. Unger, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and William D. Carroll, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LIBORIO CRISANTOS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20142418\nOpinion filed March 28, 1991.\nMichael A. Unger, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and William D. Carroll, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0870-01", "first_page_order": 892, "last_page_order": 898 }