{ "id": 2527031, "name": "GEORGE PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MYRTIS MINOR, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Palmer v. Minor", "decision_date": "1991-03-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20142319", "first_page": "1083", "last_page": "1087", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 1083" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2718666 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2845655 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2694179 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0936-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503465 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0971-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 8693, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.603802238420272e-08, "percentile": 0.4900509643612427 }, "sha256": "36a6fb2e800ebe0c29f86b44f4a352c161cd5fc96d8f5a8a8196082b45585741", "simhash": "1:a63a116f7ea51ca3", "word_count": 1455 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:56:54.383547+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MYRTIS MINOR, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, George Palmer, appeals from an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and barring his witness, Reba Shavers, from testifying as a sanction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c)). The trial court also found that Shavers was a person \u201cdirectly interested in the action\u201d under the Dead Man\u2019s Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8\u2014201), and thus barred her as a witness under that act.\nOn April 20, 1988, plaintiff filed this complaint against Myrtis Minor, as executrix of the estate of Quincy Boles, deceased, seeking $15,000 in damages arising out of an intersectional automobile accident that occurred in Chicago. Plaintiff was the driver of one automobile while the deceased drove the other vehicle. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint denying all allegations of negligence.\nIn answer to defendant\u2019s first set of interrogatories filed on June 5, 1989, plaintiff identified Sadie Haywood and Michael Pamphlet as occurrence witnesses, in addition to the parties. On January 24, 1990, defendant served supplemental interrogatories which remained unanswered at the time trial was to begin on April 3, 1990. These interrogatories also asked for the names of occurrence witnesses. On April 3, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to bar the testimony of the previously disclosed occurrence witnesses, Haywood and Pamphlet, and plaintiff does not dispute the propriety of that order. (Nor does plaintiff challenge the fact that under the Dead Man\u2019s Act he may not testify at trial.)\nAt the hearing on April 3, plaintiff\u2019s counsel for the first time orally disclosed the name of Reba Shavers as an occurrence witness. Plaintiff had not identified her as a witness either in his answers to interrogatories or at his discovery deposition. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel subsequently filed an affidavit stating that on March 28, 1990, plaintiff came to his office to sign his answers to the supplemental interrogatories. At that time, counsel first became aware of Shavers as an occurrence witness. Counsel\u2019s affidavit further recited that he drafted answers to the supplemental interrogatories naming Shavers as a witness, but due to a clerical error the answers were not typed and thus were not filed with the court or mailed to opposing counsel. Over defendant\u2019s objection, Judge Ian Levin ordered the deposition of Shavers to take place and continued the trial to May 31,1990.\nAt Shavers\u2019 deposition, it was disclosed that she and plaintiff lived together and that while they were not married, she was the mother of his child. Shavers also testified as follows:\n\u201cQ. How is it that you became aware that a lawsuit was pending because of this accident?\nA. Well, George asked if I had, you know, saw [sic] the accident and you know, at that time of the accident when he was getting his witnesses together he asked if I\u2019d be available in case, you know, something \u2014 the other two weren\u2019t, you know, just in case.\nQ. When was that?\nA. When was it?\nQ. Yes.\nA. When I spoke to him?\nQ. When he asked if you\u2019d be available?\nA. That was after the accident.\nQ. How long after the accident?\nA. Well, this was like when everyone was leaving.\nQ. At the time?\nA. At the scene when it was clearing up.\u201d\nOn May 31, 1990, the case was continued until the following day. On June 1, defendant asked the present trial judge to bar the testimony of Shavers as a Rule 219(c) violation. After several continuances during which time both sides filed pleadings concerning the issue, on July 18, 1990, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to bar Shavers as a witness. On July 19, 1990, the trial judge stated that he granted the motion for the following reasons:\n\u201cFailure to disclose Reba Shavers as a witness constitutes a gross violation of Supreme Court Rule 219(c), due to the close relationship of the plaintiff to the witness, the court finds the plaintiff has failed to exercise good faith for the following reasons:\n* * *\nThe witness is known to the plaintiff; the witness is the mother of the plaintiff\u2019s child; the witness was present at the scene of the accident at the time of the occurrence; the plaintiff failed to mention Reba Shavers as a witness at the time of his discovery deposition, although he was asked.\u201d\nThe trial court also barred Shavers\u2019 testimony on the grounds of the Dead Man\u2019s Act. Since Shavers was the only witness who could testify, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nPlaintiff initially contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in barring Shavers from testifying as a Rule 219(c) sanction. We do not agree.\nSupreme Court Rule 219(c) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(c) Failure to Comply with Order or Rules. If a party, or any person at the instance of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably refuses to comply with any provision of part E of article II of the rules of this court (Discovery, Requests for Admission, and Pretrial Procedure) or fails to comply with any order entered under these rules, the court, on motion, may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders as are just, including, among others, the following:\n* * *\n(iv) that a witness be barred from testifying concerning that issue.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).\nImposition of any Rule 219(c) sanction is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Anderson v. City of Chicago (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 971, 331 N.E.2d 243; Trippel v. Lott (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 936, 312 N.E.2d 369; Carlson v. General Motors Corp. (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 606, 289 N.E.2d 439.\nWe recognize that in barring Shavers from testifying, the court barred plaintiff\u2019s only testifying witness. However, in view of plaintiff\u2019s gross violation of the rule, the record fully supports that disposition. Plaintiff maintains that under the holding of Blakely v. Johnson (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 112, 345 N.E.2d 814, the trial court must look to several factors to determine whether and which sanction should be imposed: (1) surprise of the testimony to the opposing party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the testimony; (3) the diligence of the opposing party in seeking discovery; (4) timely objection to the testimony; and (5) good faith of the party calling the witness. Yet, in our view, the presence or absence of the above factors either separately or together fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in this case.\nPlaintiff had a close relationship with Shavers. They lived together; she was the mother of his child; she was present at the scene of the accident; plaintiff knew that Shavers was a witness; and indeed they had discussed her role as a witness. Yet despite all these facts, plaintiff deliberately and repeatedly withheld the identity of Shavers as a witness. Plaintiff failed to disclose her name in his sworn answers to interrogatories. At his discovery deposition, plaintiff insisted that there were only two witnesses, persons whom he did not know prior to the accident. It was only on the day scheduled for the commencement of trial, after the judge barred the use of the two witnesses he had disclosed, that plaintiff revealed the name of Shavers as a witness. And to compound all the foregoing concealment, it is undisputed that plaintiff informed Shavers she would be a \u201cspare\u201d witness, apparently only to be used in an emergency. It is difficult to imagine how there could be a more gross violation of the rule than that perpetrated by plaintiff here.\nWe acknowledge that barring a witness from testifying is a drastic sanction and should be exercised sparingly. That is particularly true when the witness barred is a party\u2019s only witness. Nevertheless, we find that under the circumstances before us, the trial judge exercised an appropriate sanction.\nIn view of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider the propriety of the court\u2019s ruling that Shavers should be barred from testifying as a \u201cparty directly interested in the action\u201d under the Dead Man\u2019s Act.\nSince Reba Shavers was the only witness available to plaintiff, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nEGAN and LaPORTA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Benjamin & Shapiro, Ltd., of Chicago (Fred I. Benjamin and Laurence M. Landsman, of counsel), for appellant.", "Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael Resis and Linda L. Stinauer, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MYRTIS MINOR, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20142319\nOpinion filed March 28, 1991.\nBenjamin & Shapiro, Ltd., of Chicago (Fred I. Benjamin and Laurence M. Landsman, of counsel), for appellant.\nQuerrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael Resis and Linda L. Stinauer, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1083-01", "first_page_order": 1105, "last_page_order": 1109 }