{
  "id": 2600240,
  "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF NORMAN E. JENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, and MARY A. JENSEN, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Jensen",
  "decision_date": "1991-04-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201490\u20140561",
  "first_page": "60",
  "last_page": "62",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 60"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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    {
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      "cite": "533 N.E.2d 1125",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 928",
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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        2433162
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:59:33.778469+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re MARRIAGE OF NORMAN E. JENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, and MARY A. JENSEN, Respondent-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, Norman E. Jensen, appeals the denial of his petition to terminate his obligation to pay maintenance to the respondent, Mary A. Jensen.\nThe record shows that the parties were divorced in 1987. The settlement agreement incorporated in the order of dissolution stated that Norman was to pay \u201cpermanent maintenance\u201d of $45 per week. After Mary remarried five months later, Norman filed a petition to terminate maintenance. The petition was based on section 510(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.), which states:\n\u201cUnless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judgment ***, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon *** the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 510(c).\nThe trial court denied the petition, finding that the words \u201cpermanent maintenance\u201d meant that the parties had agreed that in the event of Mary\u2019s remarriage, maintenance would not be terminated under section 510(c).\nOn appeal, Norman argues that the trial court erred. He contends that the settlement agreement did not establish that the parties intended that maintenance payments would continue upon Mary\u2019s remarriage.\nWe agree with Norman\u2019s argument. If the parties to a settlement agreement intend to limit the automatic termination of certain terms, they must do so in clear language. (See In re Marriage of Sutton (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 928, 533 N.E.2d 1125.) Here, the agreement did not specificaUy state that the termination provision of section 510(c) would not apply in the event of Mary\u2019s remarriage. Although the agreement characterized the maintenance as \u201cpermanent,\u201d this term may also be used simply to distinguish permanent maintenance from temporary maintenance awarded during the pendency of a dissolution action. (Schoenhard v. Schoenhard (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 296, 392 N.E.2d 764.) As such, we find that the agreement was too vague to establish that the parties intended to contravene the general policy of Illinois and provide for continuing maintenance payments after Mary\u2019s remarriage. We therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of the petition and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nGORMAN and SLATER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John R. Heying, of Keying & Watts, of Naperville, for appellant.",
      "Lee H. Russell, of Russell & Doheny, of Northlake, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF NORMAN E. JENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, and MARY A. JENSEN, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201490\u20140561\nOpinion filed April 9, 1991.\nJohn R. Heying, of Keying & Watts, of Naperville, for appellant.\nLee H. Russell, of Russell & Doheny, of Northlake, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0060-01",
  "first_page_order": 82,
  "last_page_order": 84
}