{ "id": 2598772, "name": "BARBARA LEGGETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VIJAY S. KUMAR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Leggett v. Kumar", "decision_date": "1991-04-24", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140734", "first_page": "255", "last_page": "281", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 255" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3631614 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 N.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 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VIJAY S. KUMAR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Barbara Leggett, brought the instant medical malpractice action in the circuit court of Kane County against defendant, Dr. Vijay S. Kumar, alleging various acts of negligence arising out of defendant\u2019s performance of a bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy on plaintiff on June 23, 1981. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff\u2019s favor for $675,000, and defendant now appeals.\nThe following issues are presented on appeal: (1) whether the trial court improperly reversed a pretrial order entered previously in the case by another judge; (2) whether defendant was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the admission of improper evidence; (3) whether plaintiff\u2019s expert witness was improperly allowed to testify regarding previously undisclosed medical books and articles; (4) whether plaintiff\u2019s attorney engaged in improper final argument; (5) whether the trial court acted as an advocate for plaintiff in suggesting foundational questions; and (6) whether the jury\u2019s verdict was excessive and the result of passion or prejudice.\nIn May 1978, plaintiff began seeing Dr. John Landes, a general surgeon at the Dreyer Clinic, regarding cysts which had developed in her breasts in the late 1970s. Dr. Landes diagnosed plaintiff as having fibrocystic disease, which is a nonmalignant abnormality in the breast resulting in the formation of fluid-filled cysts. Eventually, on May 11, 1981, Dr. Landes, who was concerned that the disease could mask malignancies, recommended that plaintiff see defendant regarding a subcutaneous mastectomy with a prosthetic implant to address plaintiff\u2019s fibrocystic disease.\nPlaintiff first became a patient of defendant\u2019s on May 21, 1981. On June 23, 1981, defendant performed a bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy and a silastic gel implantation on plaintiff\u2019s breasts with Dr. Landes assisting. In performing a subcutaneous mastectomy, a surgeon makes a hairline cut through the skin, tissue and muscle to remove breast tissue, which is then replaced by a prosthetic implant. A small portion of breast tissue remains, and the outer skin, including the nipple, also remains.\nImmediately after the surgery, plaintiff\u2019s breasts were connected to tubes to allow drainage of blood. Plaintiff was released from the hospital on June 28, 1981. On July 3, 1981, plaintiff noticed that her right breast was engorged. She was admitted to the hospital that evening and defendant again operated on both breasts. Defendant removed, cleaned and then reinserted both breast implants.\nOn July 13, 1981, plaintiff noticed the prosthetic insert coming out of the wound in the left breast. She went to defendant\u2019s office, where he removed the implant and bandaged the open wound. Plaintiff then visited defendant daily to have the wound checked. On July 16, 1981, defendant noticed that tissue in the left breast was necrotic (dying from lack of blood), so he surgically removed the necrotic tissue from around the sutures. The remaining sutures were removed from the left breast the next day. On July 27, 1981, defendant noticed that plaintiff\u2019s right nipple was separating from the breast. He advised plaintiff that the nipple would fall off but that a new one could be constructed out of tissue from plaintiff\u2019s groin.\nOn September 8, 1981, defendant closed the incision in plaintiff\u2019s left breast, which had been emitting some discharge up to that point. Plaintiff then returned to work for about 25 hours per week. Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital on October 8, 1981, for two days to have scar tissue removed from the left breast. On December 12, 1981, defendant surgically closed a small opening in plaintiff\u2019s left breast. The sutures were removed in defendant\u2019s office on December 22. Minor surgery was again performed on March 3, 1982, in defendant\u2019s office, at which time tissue was cleaned and a stitch placed in plaintiff\u2019s wound. The stitch was removed on April 6,1982.\nPlaintiff was again admitted to the hospital on June 18, 1982, for surgical reinsertion of the prosthetic implant in her left breast. Plaintiff was released from the hospital on June 22, 1982. A few days later, however, plaintiff again noticed the prosthesis coming out of the wound in her breast. Plaintiff saw defendant again on August 27, 1982, and discussed various surgical alternatives. Plaintiff next saw defendant on November 5, 1982, when he removed a small nodule from her left breast. Plaintiff subsequently sought treatment from a different doctor, Dr. Richard Schultz, on the advice of her attorney.\nPlaintiff filed her first action against defendant and Dr. Landes in 1984 (No. 84 \u2014 L\u2014571) and voluntarily dismissed that action on September 25,1986.\nThe instant action was filed on September 25, 1987, naming Dr. Kumar as the sole defendant. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged that the silastic implant became infected and the breast became diseased, necessitating subsequent surgeries. Plaintiff alleged that defendant breached his duty to exercise ordinary care commensurate with the standard of care for plastic surgeons in the Chicago metropolitan area. Among plaintiff\u2019s specific allegations were that defendant advised the insertion of the implant when this procedure was contraindicated; failed to properly insert the implant; failed to advise plaintiff that a bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy was not essential and carried risks; and failed to advise plaintiff of treatment alternatives. With regard to post-surgical care, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to care properly for the incision and the drains in the incision and attempted to surgically repair the incision when it was necrotic, inflamed and diseased.\nOn January 11, 1988, the trial court entered an order requiring that nonexpert discovery be completed by March 30, 1988, and that all depositions of expert witnesses be completed by July 30, 1988. A pretrial status hearing was set for April 4, 1988, and a pretrial conference pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 218 (134 Ill. 2d R. 218) was set for August 12, 1988. Trial was set to begin August 26, 1988. The deadline for discovery was later extended to November 15, 1988, and trial set for December 16,1988.\nOn November 30, 1988, defendant filed a motion seeking to bar Dr. Richard Schultz from testifying as an expert for plaintiff. Defendant\u2019s motion noted that plaintiff\u2019s October 26, 1988, response to defendant\u2019s supplemental interrogatories regarding the identity of expert witnesses provided the first indication that plaintiff intended to utilize Dr. Schultz as an expert witness. According to defendant, plaintiff had still not responded to interrogatories regarding the substance and scope of Dr. Schultz\u2019s expert testimony. Noting that trial was less than 60 days away, defendant sought to exclude Dr. Schultz\u2019s expert testimony pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d R. 220).\nDefendant also filed a separate motion regarding the payment of Dr. Schultz\u2019s anticipated deposition fee. The motion recited that Dr. Schultz had requested that he be paid a fee of $2,500 for the first hour of his deposition time and $2,000 for each hour thereafter. Defendant argued that such a fee request was patently unreasonable and designed to frustrate discovery. Defendant argued that, if Dr. Schultz were allowed to testify as an expert witness, then plaintiff should bear the cost of his fee pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d R. 220). Alternatively, defendant argued that, if Dr. Schultz were to testify as a treating physician only, then the court should order Dr. Schultz to submit to a discovery deposition for a reasonable fee pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 201(c) and 204 (134 Ill. 2d Rules 201(c), 204).\nOn November 10, 1988, Judge Patrick J. Dixon ruled on defendant\u2019s motion to exclude Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony. The court\u2019s order stated, in pertinent part:\n\u201cPlaintiff shall be allowed to utilize Dr. Schultz as a witness/ treating physician but not as an expert on the issue of the alleged negligence of defendant Dr. Kumar.\u201d\nDefendant was also \u201cgranted leave to subpoena the discovery deposition of Richard Schultz, M.D.\u201d No ruling was made regarding Dr. Schultz\u2019s deposition fee. The record contains no report of proceedings corresponding to the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn November 16, 1988, plaintiff was granted leave to file her first amended complaint, which was filed of record on November 17. Among the additional allegations of negligence in the first amended complaint were that defendant failed to recognize or diagnose the condition of infection within the surgical site following surgery and failed to treat the infection properly.\nOn January 12, 1989, plaintiff filed a motion to reschedule the trial date, which had been set for April 7, 1989. On this date plaintiff also filed a disclosure of expert witnesses, naming, inter alia, Dr. Joseph Bocchino, Dr. Roger Hatcher, and Dr. Schultz as potential expert witnesses.\nOn January 25, 1989, defendant filed a motion to limit plaintiff\u2019s use of expert witnesses. The motion sought to exclude plaintiff\u2019s use of Dr. Bocchino and Dr. Hatcher because they had not been disclosed until January 11, 1989. Defendant further sought to limit Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony to that of a treating physician only and not an expert in conformity with Judge Dixon\u2019s earlier order of November 10, 1988.\nOn February 16, 1989, Judge Michael J. Colwell, to whom the case was now assigned, issued the following order:\n\u201cThis cause coming on for hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to bar plaintiff\u2019s experts: Dr. Bochino [sic], Dr. Hatcher, and Dr. Schultz, the court being advised that plaintiff has withdrawn Dr. Bochino [sic] and Dr. Hatcher as expert witnesses;\nIt is hereby ordered [that] defendant is granted leave to subpoena the deposition of plaintiff\u2019s treating physician, Dr. Richard Schultz.\u201d\nAfter several continuances, trial was set for March 9, 1990, and the trial court heard a number of pretrial motions on that date. First, plaintiff was granted leave to file her second amended complaint, which alleged, in addition to the prior allegations of negligence, that defendant improperly reinserted the implant in an infected surgical site and repeatedly attempted to achieve secondary closure of the skin flaps despite the presence of inflamed, necfotic tissue.\nNext, defendant presented three motions in limine. The first motion is not pertinent here. Defendant\u2019s second motion in limine sought to limit the testimony of Dr. Schultz. Defendant noted that the order entered on November 10, 1988, by Judge Dixon stated that Dr. Schultz would be allowed to testify \u201cas a witness/treating physician but not as an expert on the alleged negligence of defendant.\u201d Defendant indicated that he did not depose Dr. Schultz as a treating physician because Dr. Schultz requested that he be paid more than $2,000 per hour for his time. Defendant indicated, however, that he believed that plaintiff intended to utilize Dr. Schultz as an expert witness. Attached to defendant\u2019s motion was a letter from plaintiff\u2019s attorney dated February 28, 1990, regarding articles upon which Dr. Schultz would rely in his testimony.\nDefendant asked that, in conformity with Judge Dixon\u2019s prior order, Dr. Schultz should not be allowed to give expert testimony regarding defendant\u2019s alleged professional negligence. Defendant argued that it would be unfair to allow plaintiff to utilize her treating physician as an expert regarding the quality of care given by plaintiff\u2019s prior doctor without disclosing his opinions and without paying the cost of deposing the witness. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney responded by noting that, at the time of Judge Dixon\u2019s November 10, 1988, order, trial was set for the next month. Plaintiff argued that Dr. Schultz subsequently was timely disclosed as an expert on January 12, 1989, and that:\n\u201cDefense counsel then came in on a motion to bar any experts or expert testimony, which you then ruled upon on February 16, 1989, allowing us the use of Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony as a treating physician with absolutely no limitation whatsoever. And advising counsel for defendant that if he wanted to know what Doctor Schultz had to say, that he could subpoena him for deposition at that point in time.\u201d\nDefense counsel did not take issue with this characterization of the February 16,1989, ruling.\nAcknowledging that the issue was \u201ca difficult area,\u201d Judge Col-well ruled that Dr. Schultz could testify as an expert, including testimony based on plaintiff\u2019s prior medical treatment and on various medical books and articles.\nDefendant\u2019s third motion in limine sought to limit the testimony of Dr. David Befeler, plaintiff\u2019s expert witness. The court delayed consideration of the motion.\nAttorneys for the parties gave their opening statements on March 12, 1990. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel began by explaining the nature of the subcutaneous mastectomy. When the attorney described plaintiff\u2019s various post-operative complications, including the allegation that defendant placed the prosthesis into an infected area, defense counsel objected. At a sidebar, defense counsel contended that the statements were objectionable because plaintiff had no expert testimony pertaining to post-operative negligence. Plaintiff indicated that Dr. Schultz would provide such testimony. The court overruled the objection, and opening arguments proceeded.\nBefore moving to the presentation of evidence, the court heard several of defendant\u2019s objections to the evidence deposition of Dr. David Befeler, some of which were also the subject of defendant\u2019s prior motion in limine. Of interest here is defendant\u2019s request to exclude Dr. Befeler\u2019s reference to specific medical texts in support of his expert testimony. Defendant argued that these texts were not disclosed pursuant to his discovery requests and should therefore not be included in Dr. Befeler\u2019s testimony. The court delayed its consideration of this issue.\nPlaintiff first called defendant as an adverse witness. During a break in defendant\u2019s testimony, defendant\u2019s attorney asked the court for a recess of less than an hour to allow him to conduct a discovery deposition of Dr. Schultz before he testified the next day. The court stated that it had already ruled on this issue and asked why the matter was being raised again. Defendant\u2019s attorney stated that, until the preceding Friday, he had relied on Judge Dixon\u2019s November 10, 1988, order limiting Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony. The court expressed concern about the point in the proceedings at which the issue was presented and stated that it would take the matter under advisement.\nDefendant testified that he discussed several surgical options with plaintiff and also informed her of the risks associated with the subcutaneous mastectomy, such as injection, bleeding and rejection of the prosthesis. During defendant\u2019s testimony, plaintiff\u2019s counsel asked him about infection, antibiotics, and the cleanliness of the implant. Defendant answered affirmatively when asked whether it was important to keep an office clean, but the court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection when plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked who cleaned defendant\u2019s office. Defendant acknowledged that, when he removed the implant from plaintiff in his office, he was not wearing surgical gloves. Defendant was also asked a number of times about the type of sutures he used.\nDefendant testified that, at some point in plaintiff\u2019s post-operative treatment, he consulted with Dr. Chandra, a cancer specialist and blood-disorder physician. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked whether Dr. Chandra was consulted because plaintiff\u2019s wound was not healing and because of an infection problem, and defendant responded, \u201c[t]he wound was not healing, yes.\u201d On redirect examination, plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked defendant whether Dr. Chandra was an infectious disease expert, and defendant\u2019s attorney objected. At a sidebar, defense counsel explained that he objected to the question because plaintiff would not present any expert testimony that defendant breached his duty of care by failing to consult with an infectious disease expert. The court agreed, and plaintiff\u2019s attorney withdrew the question. Defendant then moved for a mistrial, arguing that the damage had already been done. The court refused to grant a mistrial on the basis of plaintiff\u2019s improper question, but stated that it would do so \u201cif there\u2019s any more.\u201d The court then instructed the jury to disregard the question, and defendant completed his testimony.\nPlaintiff testified that defendant never physically examined her before the surgery and that he never informed her of the risks of, or alternatives to, surgery. Plaintiff testified that defendant did not tell her that the left breast would be operated on in the July 3, 1981, follow-up surgery. After this operation, plaintiff stated, defendant told her that there was hematoma in her right breast and that the left breast was infected. Plaintiff also testified that, when she first saw defendant in his office regarding the implant emerging from her wound, he indicated to her that it was infected. He removed it with his bare hands and bandaged her wound.\nPlaintiff described how defendant, dressed in his street clothes, would clean her wound on visits to his office. Defense counsel then requested a sidebar wherein he asked the court to exclude testimony regarding the cleanliness of defendant\u2019s office because plaintiff would not be presenting any evidence to show that there was any infection caused by unsterile conditions at defendant\u2019s office. The court directed plaintiff\u2019s attorney to \u201cstay away from the question of the cleanliness unless you\u2019re able to tie it up later with your experts.\u201d\nPlaintiff testified that, when she was admitted to the hospital in June 1982 for reimplantation of the prosthesis in her left breast, defendant did not explain the risks and complications attendant to the surgery. Immediately after her surgery, plaintiff\u2019s left breast felt like a \u201clittle knot\u201d compared to the size of her right breast. Plaintiff testified that, after she again discovered the implant emerging from her wound on Friday, she visited defendant at his office the following Monday. At that time, she refused to allow defendant to again remove the implant in his office. Plaintiff testified that defendant never told her that cysts could recur after the mastectomy was performed. On plaintiff\u2019s last visit to defendant\u2019s office, he began to discuss future options, but she jumped down from the examining table and told him, \u201c[y]ou will never cut me again.\u201d\nPlaintiff testified that, in 1983, she underwent a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Schultz which involved relocating a flap of plaintiff\u2019s skin to the breast area. Plaintiff was asked whether she had undergone any further surgical procedures by Dr. Schultz:\n\u201cA. No, I have not.\nQ. And why is that, Barbara?\nMR. STRELECKY [defense counsel]: I\u2019m going to object, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: I think she can answer.\nA. I just haven\u2019t had the money to have it done.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s testimony continued for a few moments, and then a sidebar was held on an unrelated issue. At the sidebar, defense counsel also revisited the subject of his prior objection. Defense counsel contended that plaintiff\u2019s statement about her inability to afford further surgery should be stricken to avoid any exploration of plaintiff\u2019s otherwise irrelevant financial condition. The trial court refused to strike the testimony.\nDuring plaintiff\u2019s testimony, her medical bills totalling more than $40,000 were introduced into evidence, and plaintiff estimated her lost income at $1,800. The trial was recessed following plaintiff\u2019s testimony.\nThe proceedings resumed the next day with discussion of defendant\u2019s motion in limine to limit the scope of the evidence deposition of plaintiff\u2019s expert Dr. David Befeler. Defendant\u2019s motion in limine recited that, in response to defendant\u2019s interrogatories seeking disclosure of the opinions Dr. Befeler would give, plaintiff indicated that the information would \u201cbe determined from deposition testimony.\u201d Defendant\u2019s motion noted that, at the October 11, 1988, discovery deposition, Dr. Befeler indicated that he did not know of any specific articles appearing in the medical literature which would support his opinions. However, defendant claimed that, at Dr. Befeler\u2019s evidence deposition, the doctor did, in fact, make reference to medical journal articles. Defendant asked the court to strike the use of medical authority on direct and redirect examination of Dr. Befeler.\nThe trial court ruled that Dr. Befeler \u201cdid mention the use of journals,\u201d so the reference to medical journals was not stricken. The court allowed the use of another article conditioned upon his review, and he struck one reference to another article.\nMoving to the subject of Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony, defense counsel then noted that the court had never ruled on defendant\u2019s request to take Dr. Schultz\u2019s deposition. Defense counsel indicated that a subpoena had been issued to Dr. Schultz, but no deposition had yet been taken. The court stated, \u201c[y]ou can take your deposition, but I don\u2019t know when you\u2019re going to do it.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s attorney objected, noting that the court granted defendant leave to subpoena Dr. Schultz\u2019s deposition on February 16, 1989, more than a year before. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney argued that, although defendant could have obtained a ruling from the court on the reasonableness of Dr. Schultz\u2019s deposition fee request, he failed to do so. The court then stated:\n\u201cTHE COURT: I guess I had forgotten about the subpoena problem. And you *** never did it because you didn\u2019t want to pay the money, and didn\u2019t want to come into court and seek any relief from me.\nMR. STRELECKY [defense counsel]: Your Honor, the reason we didn\u2019t want to pay the money is because we relied on the prior Court\u2019s orders which stated that this doctor\u2014\nTHE COURT: Wait a minute. You have been mentioning this prior Court\u2019s order a lot. Let me tell you something very fundamental.\nThat is, a Trial Judge is not bound by some other Judge\u2019s order in a case.\nNow, as far as I\u2019m concerned, if we\u2019ve got an order that is after that, that covers this problem, as far as I\u2019m concerned, that\u2019s a dead horse and you ought to let it be buried, because the law\u2019s clear that I\u2019m not bound by any order that was entered by some other Judge prior to trial.\nSo, let\u2019s bury that horse right now.\u201d\nThe court ruled that Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony would proceed without allowing for a deposition.\nThe proceedings before the jury resumed with the reading of Dr. Befeler\u2019s evidence deposition. Dr. Befeler, a general surgeon practicing in the New Jersey area, described two approaches to the subcutaneous mastectomy: the submammary approach, where the incision is made underneath the breast, and the transverse approach, in which an incision is made transversely across the middle of the breast and around the areolar nipple complex. Dr. Befeler testified that the transverse approach is the \u201cprocedure of choice\u201d and that the sub-mammary approach is not preferred \u201cbecause it is associated with too high a degree of complications and too high a degree of retained breast tissue.\u201d Dr. Befeler explained that, although the submammary approach was once preferred because the incision was hidden, in the 1960s and 1970s it was recognized that the approach left too much tissue behind. This made it possible for cysts and cancerous growths to recur.\nWhen asked what medical articles had been published on this subject matter, Dr. Befeler identified two books and indicated that various medical journals also occasionally carry articles dealing with mastectomy. Dr. Befeler testified that the standard of care for a surgeon in the Chicagoland area is the same as the standard of care in the rest of the nation. Dr. Befeler stated that, before a surgeon recommends a subcutaneous mastectomy for a patient with fibrocystic disease, he should recommend a conservative course of treatment, including caffeine avoidance and vitamin therapy. The subcutaneous mastectomy is indicated for extremely rare patients with fibrocystic disease.\nDr. Befeler\u2019s expert medical opinion was that plaintiff\u2019s symptoms were not sufficient to indicate bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy as the procedure of choice, regardless of the approach utilized. Further, Dr. Befeler opined that it would be a breach of a surgeon\u2019s duty of care not to inform a patient of the risks associated with such a procedure (infection, bleeding, scarring around the prosthesis or rejection of the prosthesis, loss of the nipple, and recurrent disease in the breast) and alternative treatments. Dr. Befeler testified that there were no deviations from the standard of care in defendant\u2019s actual performance of plaintiff\u2019s subcutaneous mastectomy. Based on viewing post-surgical photographs of plaintiff, Dr. Befeler was of the opinion that plaintiff suffered mental and physical pain as a result of her experience and that her appearance was so unsightly as to possibly require reconstructive surgery. Dr. Befeler believed that plaintiff\u2019s condition was the result of the \u201cill-advised, unindicated *** unnecessary surgery\u201d performed by defendant \u201cthrough an incorrect approach [which] led to a catastrophe.\u201d\nBefore Dr. Schultz testified for plaintiff, defendant renewed his motion in limine to limit Dr. Schultz\u2019s opinion testimony. The court responded that it would stand by its prior order.\nDr. Schultz testified that he engages in the general practice of plastic surgery, of which about 15% to 20% involves breast surgery. He estimated that he had treated approximately 25 patients with fibrocystic disease in his career. Defendant twice successfully objected to the lack of foundation for questions posed by plaintiff\u2019s attorney regarding conservative treatment of fibrocystic disease. When plaintiff asked a third question in this regard, defendant\u2019s attorney again objected, and the court directed the parties to proceed to his chambers.\nIn chambers, the court stated:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The objection is as to foundation. You haven\u2019t asked any foundation questions. Now you\u2019re asking some kind of a hypothetical, which we don\u2019t want.\nIf you\u2019re going to use a hypothetical I\u2019ve got to see it in advance, okay?\nSo, ask him some questions about what he notices about fibrocystic disease, and has he encountered it in his practice, then we can deal with it. But I think the objection is well-founded. Okay.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney then asked, without objection, questions conforming to the foundational deficiency specified by the trial court. Soon thereafter, plaintiff\u2019s counsel elicited, over defendant\u2019s objection, Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony regarding his criteria for proper treatment of fibrocystic disease, including the use of conservative therapy rather than mastectomy. Dr. Schultz was of the opinion that a reasonable practitioner would examine a patient before undertaking a surgical procedure such as a bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy.\nAs for his own treatment of plaintiff, Dr. Schultz testified that, when he examined plaintiff in 1982, her left breast exhibited scarring and an absence of profile, and her right breast exhibited a reconstruction with an implant which looked \u201cquite good.\u201d Over defendant\u2019s objection, Dr. Schultz opined that plaintiff\u2019s physical condition and upset emotional state were related to the surgery performed by defendant. Dr. Schultz was also of the opinion that plaintiff\u2019s condition could result in permanent disfigurement and disability and that she suffers pain which he suspected was the result of her surgery. In Dr. Schultz\u2019s opinion, plaintiff would continue to suffer pain in the future.\nPlaintiff\u2019s counsel asked Dr. Schultz whether, if infection were noticed following a subcutaneous mastectomy, it would be \u201cgood judgment\u201d to wait six months before reimplanting a prosthesis once it had been removed. Defense counsel\u2019s objection to the question\u2019s vagueness and lack of foundation was sustained. Dr. Schultz stated that infection is one of the risks associated with subcutaneous mastectomy and, over defendant\u2019s objection, testified that he avoids implantation of a foreign body into the infected tissues of his patients. When plaintiff\u2019s counsel asked Dr. Schultz if reimplantation of a prosthesis into infected tissue would constitute a deviation from the standard of care, defense counsel objected. The court sustained the objection and asked to see counsel in chambers.\nIn chambers, the court indicated that plaintiff\u2019s counsel could not ask questions unrelated to Dr. Schultz\u2019s own treatment of plaintiff without establishing that Dr. Schultz had reviewed the medical records pertaining to such treatment. The court told plaintiff\u2019s attorney:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** \u201c[Yjou\u2019ve got to establish this doctor knows something about that which you\u2019re asking him. I can\u2019t just pull it out of the sky from nowhere and say, you know: based on your treatment of your patient.\nHe\u2019s here talking about his patient now. If he reviewed all of these records in the course of his treatment, he knows about the infection, and then you want to ask him about it, that\u2019s fine.\u201d\nThe court sustained defendant\u2019s objection, and the judge and the attorneys returned to the courtroom.\nAfter Dr. Schultz testified that he reviewed plaintiff\u2019s hospital records which indicated the presence of an infection, plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked him whether it would be improper to place a prosthesis in the site of such an infection. Defense counsel objected, and the court stated:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Well, we\u2019re close. We need just a little bit more. So I\u2019ll sustain it with that admonition.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney then asked several questions going toward foundation, but defense counsel\u2019s objections were sustained. The court again called the attorneys into his chambers, but the substance of what transpired there is not contained in the report of proceedings.\nDr. Schultz testified that he recommended a three-stage course of reconstructive surgery for plaintiff which would last about a year and cost approximately $21,500.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Schultz testified that he had performed subcutaneous mastectomies on some of his own patients who then experienced complications such as the loss of a nipple or the loss or wrinkling of skin. Dr. Schultz agreed that such complications can arise even where the physician does not deviate from the expected standard of care.\nPlaintiff\u2019s two daughters also testified. They described the manner in which plaintiff\u2019s emotional state declined following her surgery. During her testimony, plaintiff\u2019s daughter Lora said of her mother:\n\u201cShe was real upset. We lived off our two paychecks, so we lost our house.\u201d\nDefense counsel objected, and the court instructed the jury to disregard the remark.\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney rested but then asked the court to allow a life expectancy table to be read to the jury. Defense counsel objected based on the lack of evidence as to the permanence of plaintiff\u2019s injury. The trial court indicated that plaintiff could have the life expectancy table read to the jury.\nDefense counsel then asked the court to declare a mistrial. He argued that plaintiff\u2019s evidence had raised several prejudicial inferences not linked to expert testimony indicating that these incidents constituted a breach of defendant\u2019s duty of care, including: placing the prosthesis into infected tissue; defendant\u2019s removal of the implant with his bare hands in his office rather than in a hospital; the type of sutures used; the use of drains; the failure to consult with an infectious disease specialist; failure to explain various risks; and the comment of plaintiff\u2019s daughter that they had lost their house. Finding that the evidence complained of related either to deviations from the standard of care or to plaintiff\u2019s damages, the court denied the motion for a mistrial. The court also refused defendant\u2019s request that the jury be admonished to disregard some of the evidence. The court then denied defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nPursuant to the court\u2019s prior determination, plaintiff\u2019s attorney was allowed to read from a life expectancy table that the average life expectancy for a white female at age 44, plaintiff\u2019s age at the time of the surgery, is 36.3 years. The life expectancy for a white female at age 52, plaintiff\u2019s age at trial, is 29.1 years. .\nDr. John Landes then testified for defendant. Landes had treated plaintiff since the mid-1970s. Dr. Landes testified that, in 1981, plaintiff was suffering from moderately severe fibrocystic disease. Dr. Landes advised plaintiff that she had the option to have the breast tissue removed and replaced by a prosthesis. According to Dr. Landes, plaintiff initially elected not to undergo the surgery. After cysts in plaintiff\u2019s breasts were aspirated, Dr. Landes recommended that plaintiff consult with defendant regarding a possible subcutaneous mastectomy. Dr. Landes testified that he would not recommend such surgery unless it was necessary.\nTestifying in his own behalf, defendant stated that, as a surgeon, he deals with surgical options for dealing with fibrocystic disease but does not actually treat the disease. That role is served by the general physician rather than the surgeon. Defendant stated that, although there was no clinical evidence of acute infection, he prescribed antibiotics for plaintiff as a prophylactic measure to guard against possible infection.\nDr. Raymond Warpeha, a plastic surgeon and an instructor of surgery and anatomy at Loyola Medical Center, testified as an expert for defendant. Dr. Warpeha had an opportunity to review plaintiff\u2019s medical records to help him form his opinions regarding the adequacy of care provided by defendant. Dr. Warpeha testified that it was the responsibility of plaintiff\u2019s general doctor to recommend a conservative course of treatment. He testified that such treatments reduce the patient\u2019s pain somewhat but are rarely generally successful in the treatment of the disease itself. In Dr. Warpeha\u2019s opinion, it would constitute a breach of the duty of care for a doctor to perform surgery without fully explaining the risks.\nDr. Warpeha testified that the standard incision used in a subcutaneous mastectomy is inframammary. He further testified that plaintiff\u2019s complications were not unusual for patients who have undergone a subcutaneous mastectomy and could occur in the absence of negligence by the physician. Plaintiff\u2019s complications, Dr. WarPeha opined, could have been the result of poor circulation which, in turn, would be aggravated by plaintiff\u2019s smoking. Dr. Warpeha was of the opinion that defendant did not deviate from accepted practice in his treatment of plaintiff. He further stated that it was appropriate for defendant to remove plaintiff\u2019s prosthesis in his office when it began to emerge from the wound. On cross-examination, Dr. Warpeha stated that it would be a deviation from the standard of care for a surgeon to perform a subcutaneous mastectomy without first examining the patient. He stated that approximately 10% of such patients experience complications.\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney began his closing argument by stating that he had experienced \u201ca real hard time *** keeping [his] emotions under control\u201d and that he \u201ccouldn\u2019t hardly handle [his] emotions with reference to\u201d plaintiff. When he later stated that \u201cit would be real hard for a man to put themselves [sic] in\u201d plaintiff\u2019s shoes, defense counsel\u2019s objection was sustained. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney stated that, \u201c[n]o-body not one of us, would ever trade any amount of money to change our lives the way Barbara\u2019s has been changed.\u201d Later, he stated the following:\n\u201cThere is [sic] some professionals that make $300,000 in a given year, professional \u2022 football players, look what they\u2019re making. Yeah, we don\u2019t make that kind of money. Look what a house is making. Would any of us go through those experiences that [plaintiff has] gone through and trade them for a house?\u201d\nDefense counsel\u2019s objection was sustained. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney later argued:\n\u201cYou have heard her testimony as to the daughters, the kind of house that they have had before this happened, a loving happy house; lots of activities that they did together.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s attorney did not object to this statement.\nLater, plaintiff\u2019s attorney again asked the jury to place itself in plaintiff\u2019s shoes, and defendant\u2019s objection was sustained. At the conclusion of plaintiff\u2019s argument, defendant complained about such statements outside the jury\u2019s presence:\n\u201cMR. STRELECKY [defense counsel]: *** I don\u2019t want to move for a mistrial, but I don\u2019t know how we overcome that kind of error.\nTHE COURT: Well, I guess the answer is just simply to admonish the jurors that it is not proper for them to place themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff. That\u2019s what I\u2019ll do when they come back.\nMR. STRELECKY: Fine.\u201d\nWhen the jury returned, the court stated:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** It would not be proper for your [sic] to consider the personal opinions of Mr. Gooding or the request that you place yourselves in the shoes of the plaintiff.\nThe rest of his argument was entirely proper, but on those items it would not be proper for you to consider that.\u201d\nDefendant did not object to the court\u2019s statement.\nThe jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff for $675,000, and defendant now appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that Judge Colwell improperly reversed the prior order entered by Judge Dixon on November 10, 1988, allowing plaintiff to utilize Dr. Schultz as a \u201cwitness/ treating physician but not as an expert on the issue of the alleged negligence of defendant.\u201d Judge Dixon\u2019s ruling was apparently based on Supreme Court Rule 220(b), which requires the disclosure of expert witnesses at least 60 days before trial. 134 Ill. 2d R. 220(b).\nA court is not bound by an order previously entered by a different judge in the same case and has the power to correct orders which it considers erroneous. A previous order committed to a judge\u2019s discretion is unlikely to be erroneous, but there are circumstances when it can be overturned. (McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 278, 287, 520 N.E.2d 368.) Prior interlocutory orders should be vacated or amended by a successor judge only after careful consideration, especially if there is evidence of judge shopping. (Towns v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 113, 121, 382 N.E.2d 1217.) In the context of discovery, it is particularly appropriate for a judge before whom a motion for reconsideration is pending to exercise considerable restraint in reversing or modifying previous rulings. A successor judge should revise or modify previous discovery rulings only if there is a change of circumstances or additional facts which would warrant such action. Balciunas v. Duff (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 176, 188, 446 N.E.2d 242.\nThe parties are not in agreement as to when Judge Colwell actually reversed the November 10, 1988, order. Defendant takes the position that the order was reversed on March 9, 1990, at the beginning of trial. Plaintiff, on the other hand, suggests that Judge Col-well\u2019s order of February 16, 1989, which was issued in response to defendant\u2019s motion to limit plaintiff\u2019s use of Dr. Schultz as an expert, constitutes the point at which Judge Dixon\u2019s prior order was reversed. The February 16, 1989, order merely granted defendant \u201cleave to subpoena the deposition of plaintiff\u2019s treating physician, Dr. Richard Schultz.\u201d\nThe record provides support for plaintiff\u2019s position. Defendant\u2019s motion asked the court to prevent Dr. Schultz from testifying as an expert, but the order entered by Judge Colwell on February 16 did not express such a limitation. There is no report of proceedings corresponding to a hearing on the motion. The record reveals simply that plaintiff disclosed Dr. Schultz as an expert and that defendant asked to exclude such expert testimony, but the court\u2019s order does not contain such a limitation. Moreover, during trial Judge Colwell said of Judge Dixon\u2019s prior order, \u201cif we\u2019ve got an order which is after that, that covers this problem,\u201d indicating that the February 16 order changed the substance of Judge Dixon\u2019s order. Resolving any doubts raised by the incompleteness in the record against the appellant (Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392, 459 N.E.2d 958), we conclude that Judge Colwell reversed Judge Dixon\u2019s order on February 16,1989, not in March 1990.\nBased on this conclusion, we believe that defendant has not demonstrated any error in Judge Colwell\u2019s reversal of Judge Dixon\u2019s prior order. Although such a reversal would have been appropriate only if there had been a change of circumstances or additional facts (Balciunas, 94 Ill. 2d at 188, 446 N.E.2d at 247), where, as here, there is not a complete record of the proceedings at trial, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92, 459 N.E.2d at 959.\nAdditionally, the record does demonstrate a change in circumstance in two respects. First, Judge Colwell\u2019s ruling, unlike Judge Dixon\u2019s, was made at a time when trial was more than 60 days away. Second, developing case law, of which Judge Dixon was apparently unaware when he made his ruling, suggests that a treating physician is not considered an expert under Rule 220.\nIn Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 226, 237, 529 N.E.2d 525, the supreme court held that treating physicians are not expert witnesses within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 220. The court reasoned that, while treating physicians may give opinions at trial, these opinions are developed in the course of treating the patient and are completely apart from any litigation. Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234, 529 N.E.2d at 529-30.\nIn Wilson v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 171, 176, 533 N.E.2d 894, the supreme court restated that Rule 220\u2019s disclosure and discovery provisions do not apply to treating physicians. The court stated that parties must guard against surprise in a treating physician\u2019s testimony through adequate trial preparation, not by reliance on the protections of Rule 220. Wilson, 126 Ill. 2d at 176, 533 N.E.2d at 897.\nMost recently, the court held that a defendant-physician may give testimony at trial, including testimony as to the standard of care, even though he has not been disclosed as an expert witness. The nature of his opinion testimony is subject to the discovery process applicable to ordinary witnesses. Fawcett v. Reinertsen (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 380, 384-85, 546 N.E.2d 558.\nDefendant suggests that a treating physician must be considered a Rule 220 expert when his testimony is based on facts not learned in the course of treatment. The supreme court has not directly addressed this issue, although it had unequivocally stated that Rule 220 does not apply to treating physicians. (Wilson, 126 Ill. 2d at 176, 533 N.E.2d at 897.) A recent appellate court opinion held that a defendant cannot complain of surprise when a disclosed treating physician gives expert testimony based on facts not learned in his treatment. (Cochran v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 935, 941, 561 N.E.2d 229.) Thus, although the issue is not squarely presented here, we conclude that Judge Colwell\u2019s order was in conformity with the law which developed after Judge Dixon\u2019s .order was issued.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erroneously denied him the opportunity to depose Dr. Schultz when he requested the opportunity to do so during trial. However, defendant had been given the opportunity to depose Dr. Schultz earlier and elected not to do so only because of the potential cost. As the trial court noted, defendant could have pressed for a resolution to this problem but chose not to. Defendant\u2019s argument that his decision in this regard was made in reliance on Judge Dixon\u2019s order is unpersuasive given our determination that this order was reversed more than a year before trial.\nDefendant\u2019s next argument focuses on the cumulative effect of improper and irrelevant evidence. During oral argument, defendant clarified that the alleged error in this evidence is not always relevance per se but the fact that the evidence was never tied up with expert testimony showing a breach of the duty of care. Because the evidence complained of can be grouped into five different categories, we examine each separately.\nFirst, defendant contends that testimony regarding the type and number of sutures used and the use of drains was irrelevant. In determining relevancy, the trial court must consider the evidence in light of the factual issues raised by the pleadings. (Schneiderman v. Kakalnik (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 629, 635-36, 558 N.E.2d 334.) Here, the type of sutures appears to be irrelevant to any acts of negligence alleged in the pleadings, but testimony as to the number of sutures used and the use of drains would, arguably be relevant to show plaintiff\u2019s post-operative condition. In any event, defendant never objected to this testimony. A court is not required to exclude objectionable evidence absent an objection. (Casson v. Nash (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 164, 171, 384 N.E.2d 365.) Defendant has, therefore, waived any objection to this evidence.\nSecond, defendant contends that testimony regarding the method of subcutaneous, mastectomy utilized, by defendant should not have been allowed absent expert testimony showing that the choice of methodology constituted a breach of defendant\u2019s duty of care. We note that defendant did not object to this testimony when it was given, and he did not raise this issue in his second motion for a mistrial. Moreover, we believe that Dr. Befeler\u2019s testimony regarding the greater risks associated with the submammary approach to the subcutaneous mastectomy was pertinent to the issue of defendant\u2019s failure to adequately inform plaintiff of the risks associated with her surgery.\nThird, defendant argues that testimony pertaining to defendant\u2019s failure to inform plaintiff of the risks associated with her followup surgeries should not have been allowed because, once again, there was never any expert testimony that linked defendant\u2019s conduct to a breach of his duty of care. We agree. However, defendant never objected to this testimony when it was given. Additionally, plaintiff\u2019s closing argument did not dwell on or in any way mention this isolated remark. We therefore find that any error in the admission of this testimony did not prejudice defendant.\nFourth, defendant argues that plaintiff was improperly allowed to present testimony regarding defendant\u2019s cleanliness and the reimplantation of the prosthesis into infected tissue without corresponding expert testimony that this conduct violated defendant\u2019s duty of care. However, defendant successfully objected to the testimony regarding cleanliness. This is generally sufficient to correct the error. See People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 163, 178, 514 N.E.2d 970.\nAlthough there was evidence of infection in plaintiff\u2019s left breast, defendant is correct in his contention that plaintiff never presented expert testimony showing that reimplantation of the prosthesis into the infected tissue violated defendant\u2019s duty of care.\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney indicated at a sidebar that Dr. Schultz would provide such testimony, and Dr. Schultz testified that infection is a risk of the subcutaneous mastectomy and that he avoids implantation of a prosthesis into infected tissue. Plaintiff appeared to have laid the proper foundation for Dr. Schultz to testify as to a breach of the standard of care by establishing that he had spoken with plaintiff about her condition and had reviewed her medical records. (See Melecosky v. McCarthy Brothers Co. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 209, 216, 503 N.E.2d 355 (expert medical testimony may be given on the basis of statements made to the expert by the patient).) However, when plaintiff\u2019s counsel asked Dr. Schultz whether reimplantation of the prosthesis into infected tissue would constitute a breach of the standard of care, defendant\u2019s objection was sustained by the trial court.\nUnder these circumstances, where plaintiff\u2019s failure to elicit Dr. Schultz\u2019s expert opinion in the proper form was due to the improper sustaining of defendant\u2019s foundational objection by the trial court, we do not believe it would be appropriate to fault plaintiff for the absence of this testimony. Although it could constitute reversible error if the failure to tie up the evidence was the result of bad faith (see Karsten v. McCray (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9-10, 509 N.E.2d 1376), where, as here, plaintiff\u2019s attorney failed in his attempt to tie up the evidence because of the court\u2019s incorrect sustaining of defendant\u2019s objection, we cannot assume defendant was prejudiced (see Gowler v. Ferrell-Ross Co. (1990), 206 Ill. App. 3d 194, 205, 563 N.E.2d 773). Viewing the issue in all of its relevant aspects, we do not believe defendant was prejudiced in any way by the absence of Dr. Schultz\u2019s testimony phrased in the precise manner normally utilized for expert opinions.\nFinally, defendant contends that testimony relating to plaintiff\u2019s financial condition was improperly allowed into evidence. When only compensatory damages are at issue, the parties\u2019 financial conditions are irrelevant and often prejudicial. If undue emphasis is placed on such irrelevant evidence, or if the jury\u2019s verdict is affected by it, then reversal is required. Pagel v. Yates (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902, 471 N.E.2d 946.\nDefendant notes that, on two occasions, testimony was allowed which suggested the impecunious nature of plaintiff\u2019s financial condition. The first was when plaintiff testified, over defendant\u2019s objection, that she did not have further reconstructive surgery because she could not afford it. It is difficult to conclude that this isolated reference, which was not referred to subsequently in argument, affected the jury\u2019s verdict. We conclude that any error in the admission of this testimony is not a ground for reversal.\nThe second incident was when plaintiff\u2019s daughter testified, \u201c[w]e lived off our two paychecks, so we lost our house.\u201d Defendant\u2019s objection to this statement was sustained, and the court instructed the jury to disregard it. Defendant argues that plaintiff\u2019s attorney compounded the effect of this statement in closing argument by stating, \u201cLook what a house is making. Would any of us go through those experiences *** and trade them for a house?\u201d Defendant\u2019s objection to this nonsensical remark was also sustained, and the link to the statement made by plaintiff\u2019s daughter is so weak that it is impossible to conclude defendant could have been prejudiced by this remark.\nDefendant also refers to the statement in plaintiff\u2019s closing argument regarding \u201cthe kind of house [plaintiff\u2019s family] had before this happened, a happy, loving house.\u201d However, defendant did not object to this statement which, once again, is of the most obscure relationship to plaintiff\u2019s financial condition. In the absence of an objection, which would have given the trial court the opportunity to ameliorate any prejudice by a curative instruction, it must be assumed that the jury had the ability to separate inflammatory and emotional rhetoric from the relevant facts in the case. Marotta v. General Motors Corp. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 168,179, 483 N.E.2d 503.\nIn conclusion, we believe that the majority of the evidence and argument complained of was either not objected to, or successfully objected to, by defendant. Much of the remaining evidence is relevant to the question of plaintiff\u2019s damages, because evidence of an injured person\u2019s general health and physical condition following the injury may be admissible to show the nature, extent and probable effect of the injury (O\u2019Brien v. Thomas Steel Corp. (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 901, 905, 538 N.E.2d 1162). Although some evidence was improperly admitted over defendant\u2019s objection, a party is not entitled to reversal and a new trial based on evidentiary rulings unless the error was prejudicial or affected the outcome of the trial. (J.L. Simmons Co. ex rel. Hartford Insurance Group v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 106, 115, 483 N.E.2d 273.) The burden is on the party seeking reversal to establish prejudice. (Cairns v. Hansen (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 505, 511, 524 N.E.2d 939.) We find that, after reviewing the entire record, defendant has failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice from improper evidence.\nDefendant\u2019s next contention is that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Befeler to refer to previously undisclosed medical publications in his evidence deposition. In his discovery deposition of October 11, 1988, Dr. Befeler testified that, although he had read the medical literature on the subcutaneous mastectomy, he could not identify any specific article or treatise. Plaintiff\u2019s answers to defendant\u2019s supplemental interrogatories as to what medical texts would be relied on stated only, \u201cto be determined.\u201d However, in his February 7, 1990, evidence deposition, Dr. Befeler referred to certain books and articles. Defendant argues that Supreme Court Rule 220(c)(3) (134 Ill. 2d R. 220(c)(3)) required plaintiff to seasonably supplement disclosure to alert defendant that these articles would be relied on by Dr. Befeler in his testimony.\nAdmission at trial of evidence which should have been disclosed through discovery is not reversible error absent proof that it resulted in prejudice. (Wilson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 79, 85, 440 N.E.2d 238.) While Dr. Befeler was improperly allowed to refer to certain undisclosed medical books and articles, we believe that his statements with regard to these articles were not prejudicial to defendant. The trial court did, in fact, preclude reference to certain other articles, and the remaining references referred to only the general nature of these texts. Such references neither supported specific portions of Dr. Befeler\u2019s testimony nor altered the opinion voiced in his discovery deposition. In essence, the limited testimony relating to the medical texts established only that the authorities cited deal with the subject of complications from a subcutaneous mastectomy, but, aside from this, no specifics from the texts were testified to by Dr. Befeler. Accordingly, we find no prejudice.\nDefendant next argues that plaintiff\u2019s attorney engaged in improper final argument which necessitates a new trial. Defendant correctly notes that it was improper for plaintiff\u2019s attorney to ask the jury to put itself into plaintiff\u2019s position. (Chakos v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1029, 524 N.E.2d 615.) However, defendant\u2019s prompt objections to these remarks were sustained by the trial court, and, with defense counsel\u2019s agreement, the jury was instructed to disregard such improper statements. This is sufficient to have cured any prejudice arising from the improper argument. (Webb v. Angell (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 848, 852, 508 N.E.2d 508.) Defendant\u2019s suggestion that the trial court\u2019s curative comments were vitiated by his statement that \u201cthe rest of [plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s] argument was entirely proper\u201d is speculative and does not detract from the curative effect of the court\u2019s comments.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court improperly acted as an advocate for plaintiff. Defendant notes that, on three occasions, the trial court called the attorneys into his chambers and suggested ways in which plaintiff\u2019s attorney could overcome defendant\u2019s foundational objections in the questioning of Dr. Schultz to elicit his expert opinion.\nWe note that defendant never objected to the trial court\u2019s conduct in this regard, so the question has not been properly preserved for review. (See Hargrove v. Gerill Corp. (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 924, 929, 464 N.E.2d 1226.) Moreover, it is not clear that there is merit to defendant\u2019s argument. A trial court may properly give its reasons for ruling upon evidence and must be accorded a reasonable degree of latitude in so doing. (County of Cook v. Colonial Oil Corp. (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 67, 70, 153 N.E.2d 844.) The trial court\u2019s explanation of the deficiencies in the foundational questions asked by plaintiff\u2019s counsel can be viewed as merely explanatory and is not uncommon in civil trials. All such comments were made outside the presence of the jury, and the judge never truly acted as an advocate for plaintiff.\nFinally, defendant contends that the $675,000 verdict returned in favor of plaintiff was so excessive that it could only have been the result of the improper evidence and argument to which the jury had been exposed. The amount of a verdict is generally within the discretion of the jury (Paulan v. Jett (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 497, 500, 545 N.E.2d 1377), and the jury\u2019s verdict will stand unless it is so large as to indicate it is the result of passion or prejudice (Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10 (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 415, 437, 412 N.E.2d 447).\nHere, defendant assails the amount of the jury\u2019s award on two bases. First, defendant notes that plaintiff\u2019s lost income, medical expenses and the cost of future surgery would total approximately $64,300. However, the award also covered other damages such as pain and suffering and disfigurement. We cannot conclude that the award of damages here is the result of passion or prejudice.\nSecond, defendant contends that, despite the fact that the life expectancy table was read to the jury, there was no evidence that plaintiff\u2019s injury was permanent. Even where an injury results in recurring pain, the life expectancy of the sufferer is a factor only when the injury is permanent. (Savka v. Smith (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 12, 17-18, 373 N.E.2d 1051.) Here, however, Dr. Schultz testified that plaintiff\u2019s condition could result in permanent disfigurement and disability, and Dr. Befeler\u2019s testimony clearly linked her condition to the surgery performed by defendant. This is sufficient evidence of the permanence of plaintiff\u2019s injury. See Melford v. Gaus & Brown Construction Co. (1958), 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 505-06, 151 N.E.2d 128.\nAlthough defendant has exhaustively brought to our attention a number of errors precipitated by plaintiff\u2019s counsel throughout the lengthy trial, we are satisfied from our review of the entire record that these errors did not affect the outcome below. While we wish that every trial could be free from error (J.L. Simmons, 108 Ill. 2d at 115, 483 N.E.2d at 277), the reality is that a perfect, error-free trial is seldom the case. Litigants are entitled to a fair trial, not one which is error free. (Oko v. Rogers (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724, 466 N.E.2d 658.) All the reviewing court can do is to assess whether the error was prejudicial or affected the outcome. In this case, we do not find it so.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOODWARD and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "David J. Cahill, of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Wheaton, and Ruth E. VanDemark and Mary Elisabeth Ruether, both of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (Robert A. Strelecky, of counsel), for appellant.", "R. Gary Gooding, of Gooding & Goblet, and Wilson Burnell, both of Aurora (Meg E. Goblet, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BARBARA LEGGETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VIJAY S. KUMAR, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140734\nOpinion filed April 24, 1991.\nDavid J. Cahill, of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Wheaton, and Ruth E. VanDemark and Mary Elisabeth Ruether, both of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (Robert A. Strelecky, of counsel), for appellant.\nR. Gary Gooding, of Gooding & Goblet, and Wilson Burnell, both of Aurora (Meg E. Goblet, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0255-01", "first_page_order": 277, "last_page_order": 303 }