{ "id": 2599299, "name": "LEOCO, S.A., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CARIBE CROWN, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Leoco, S.A. v. Caribe Crown, Inc.", "decision_date": "1991-03-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20142025", "first_page": "640", "last_page": "645", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 640" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "896 F.2d 17", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10526556 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/896/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 F. Supp. 568", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3957971 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/650/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 F. Supp. 1186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577601 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0218-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 631, "char_count": 10531, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3181745344998878 }, "sha256": "92015aab231840a2de8a1449ef386725b33f687de3af53f0537ff9bd940b3335", "simhash": "1:ed80fe956ddb7311", "word_count": 1728 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:59:33.778469+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEOCO, S.A., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CARIBE CROWN, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COCCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Leoco, S.A., Lincoln Diversified Systems, Inc., and A.E. Fegan, Jr., appeal from a circuit order denying their motion for sanctions and fees under section 2 \u2014 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014611). The motion sought to sanction defendants Caribe Crown, Inc., and Gerald M\u00e1rchese, for filing a section 2 \u2014 611 motion without grounds.\nIn 1984, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint alleging tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual interference. On January 28, 1987, the court denied defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. On December 18, 1987, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.\nOn January 19, 1988, defendants filed a section 2 \u2014 611 motion for attorney fees and costs. Defendants\u2019 motion alleged that plaintiffs\u2019 complaint contained untrue allegations of fact; that the intent of the pleading was to harass and penalize defendants; and that plaintiff Fegan contacted potential defense witnesses and threatened them with physical harm, injury and death if they helped the defense.\nA July 1988 evidentiary hearing was held, following which the court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The court stated:\n\u201cThis Court will not be used as a whipping post for a litigant. I find that the 2 \u2014 611 motion that was brought [by defendants] was highly improper to be brought, that you should not have brought this motion.\n* * *\nI find no foundation for this motion whatsoever. It\u2019s denied.\u201d\nThe court ruled that not one of the required points for a section 2\u2014 611 motion had been met.\nOn August 19, 1988, plaintiffs filed their section 2 \u2014 611 motion for attorney fees and costs, which is the motion at issue in this appeal.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 motion alleges that defendants\u2019 section 2 \u2014 611 motion was not well-grounded in fact or law, and was filed for purposes of harassment. The court subsequently denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion. At a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the court stated that it denied the motion on the basis that it did not \u201cknow of any authority for a sanction \u2014 a 2 \u2014 611 on a 2 \u2014 611.\u201d The court declined to go into the specific facts underlying plaintiffs\u2019 motion until a higher court decided whether the law permitted the imposition of sanctions for the groundless filing of a section 2 \u2014 611 motion. \u201cThere was no necessity for me to go any further in your motion to ferret out what was said, who said what, if there was a reasonable basis for it, if it was converted to existing law, et cetera, et cetera. I didn\u2019t do that and I think I made it clear to you last time. I asked that question during oral argument: Is there any basis for 2 \u2014 611 on 2 \u2014 611?\u201d\nOn appeal, plaintiffs contend that, where a party moves for section 2 \u2014 611 sanctions without any basis in law or fact, the court may impose section 2 \u2014 611 sanctions against the moving party. We agree.\nSection 2 \u2014 611 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which was substantially amended effective November 25, 1986, is nearly identical to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2\u2014611, Supplement to Historical & Practice Notes, at 23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc., (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1989), No. 88\u2014C\u20142314.) In the absence of any Illinois cases interpreting this question, therefore, we will consider Federal cases interpreting the issue of imposing sanctions for the opposing party\u2019s improper filing of a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. See Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc. (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1989), No. 88\u2014C\u20142314 (courts should look to Federal precedent for guidance in applying section 2 \u2014 611), citing Frisch Contracting Service Co. v. Personnel Protection, Inc. (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 218, 224, 511 N.E.2d 831, 835-36; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Anderson (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 532 N.E.2d 595 (section 2\u2014611 nearly identical to Rule 11, and therefore court looks to Federal precedent for guidance in application of section 2\u2014611).\nMost significantly, every Federal court which has addressed the issue has held that Rule 11 motions are properly subject to the provisions of Rule 11.\nSee Traina v. United States (5th Cir. 1990), 911 F.2d 1155 (affirming imposition of sanctions for frivolous sanctions motion); Foy v. First National Bank (7th Cir. 1989), 868 F.2d 251 (a frivolous request for sanctions is itself sanctionable); Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (9th Cir. 1988), 857 F.2d 646, 654 (Rule 11 should not itself become a retaliatory device); Lebovitz v. Miller (7th Cir. 1988), 856 F.2d 902, 907 n.6 (court notes magistrate\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s sanctions motion not so thinly based as to warrant sanctions against him); Meeks v. Jewel Cos. (7th Cir. 1988), 845 F.2d 1421 (under Rule 38, Rule ll\u2019s counterpart for appeals, any frivolous motion, pleading or request is subject to sanctions, including a motion or request for sanctions); Local 106, Service Employees International Union v. Homewood Memorial Gardens, Inc. (7th Cir. 1988), 838 F.2d 958, 961 (unwarranted motion for Rule 11 sanctions is itself sanctionable); In re Central Ice Cream Co. (7th Cir. 1987), 836 F.2d 1068, 1073 (noting that district court held that request for sanctions under Rule 11 was itself \u201csanctionably frivolous\u201d); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp. (3d Cir. 1987), 835 F.2d 479, 484-85 (court may impose sanctions when Rule 11 is invoked for improper purpose such as additional tactic of intimidation and harassment); Bergeson v. Dilworth (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 1990), No. 87\u20141579\u2014T (court warns that case is close to \u201cforbidden territories\u201d where Rule 11 motion itself may be basis for sanctions); Ophir v. Goldstein (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 10, 1990), No. 86 Civ. 2963 (magistrate recommends sanctions for a frivolous sanctions motion); Eldon Industries, Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1990), 735 F. Supp. 786, 795 (defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions itself violated Rule 11); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co. (N.D. Ill. 1989), 127 F.R.D. 509 (court imposes sanctions due to repeated, groundless requests for sanctions); Lewandoski v. Two Rivers Public School District (E.D. Wis. 1989), 711 F. Supp. 1486 (Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed on parties and attorneys who make frivolous motions for Rule 11 sanctions); Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc. (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1989), No. 88\u2014C\u20142314 (sanctions request was sanctionable); Quaker Oats Co. v. Uni-Pak Film Systems, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1987), 683 F. Supp. 1186 (court states that if Rule 11 motion is not warranted by existing law and fact, appropriate sanctions may be assessed, warning that \u201ccounsel would do well to choose their Rule 11 battles with more care\u201d); Williams v. Whitmill (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1986), No. 84\u2014C\u20144910 (sanctions motion may be subject to provisions of rule permitting sanctions); Harris v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. (N.D. Ill. 1986), 650 F. Supp. 568 (Rule 11 motion which is not well-grounded in fact or law may result in imposition of sanctions against moving party).\nThis rule is consistent with the underlying purpose of both Rule 11 and section 2 \u2014 611, which is to sanction groundless litigation proceedings. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. (2d Cir. 1990), 896 F.2d 17 (litigant should think twice before tiling sanctions motion as reflex response, since the very purpose of Rule 11 is to eliminate baseless litigation).\nBased on this authority, we conclude that section 2 \u2014 611 motions which are filed with no foundation in fact and are unwarranted by law may result in the imposition of sanctions against the moving party. In determining whether section 2 \u2014 611 sanctions should be imposed for the groundless filing of a section 2 \u2014 611 motion, the' court should use the same standards and factors used in deciding any section 2 \u2014 611 motion. We therefore remand this case to the trial court with directions to consider the merits of plaintiffs\u2019 section 2 \u2014 611 motion. In so holding, we do not intend to indicate in any way whether or not plaintiffs\u2019 motion has any validity.\nDefendants make various arguments before this court, all of which we find unpersuasive. For example, defendants contend the appeal should be dismissed because one transcript is missing from the record and another is uncertified. Apparently no transcript exists for the hearing in question, as no court reporter was present. As to the other transcript, there is in fact a certified copy in the record.\nDefendants point out that plaintiffs did receive partial relief when the trial court granted expenses under Supreme Court Rule 237(b). (134 Ill. 2d R. 237(b).) Under the facts before us here, the record does not show that the Rule 237(b) expenses were considered as part of the section 2 \u2014 611 motion, and that ruling did not affect the trial court\u2019s determination that the section 2 \u2014 611 motion could not be considered on its merits as a matter of law.\nDefendants contend the trial court had no jurisdiction over this matter because defendants\u2019 own section 2 \u2014 611 motion was filed more than 30 days after the order granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for voluntary nonsuit and dismissal. In considering the intervening Sunday and court holiday, however, defendants\u2019 motion was timely filed and thus jurisdiction here was proper. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141203.\nFinally, we are unpersuaded by defendants\u2019 contention that plaintiffs\u2019 motion was untimely because under Supreme Court Rule 182(c) a motion \u201cattacking a pleading other than the complaint must be filed within 21 days after the last day allowed for the filing of the pleading attacked.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 182(c).) We find nothing in the law indicating that Rule 182(c) extends to a request for sanctions which, in effect, always attacks the pleader, not the pleading itself.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the holdings contained herein.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nHARTMAN and DiVITO, JJ., concur.\nWe note that section 2 \u2014 611 was repealed as of August 10,1990.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COCCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul S. Anderson, of Sonnenberg, Anderson, O\u2019Donnell & Rodriguez, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., of Chicago (Aldo E. Botti and Howard R. Wertz, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEOCO, S.A., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CARIBE CROWN, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20142025\nOpinion filed March 26, 1991.\nRehearing denied May 8, 1991.\nPaul S. Anderson, of Sonnenberg, Anderson, O\u2019Donnell & Rodriguez, of Chicago, for appellants.\nBotti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., of Chicago (Aldo E. Botti and Howard R. Wertz, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0640-01", "first_page_order": 662, "last_page_order": 667 }