{ "id": 2600136, "name": "ARTHUR LETOURNEAU et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION AND EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Letourneau v. Department of Registration & Education", "decision_date": "1991-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20143823", "first_page": "717", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 717" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3508910 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" }, { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614961 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3132383 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391803 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3262644 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1116" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5538157 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2864424 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3328219 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" }, { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3272783 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "715-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5354687 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" }, { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0376-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1197, "char_count": 32470, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0186210298897682e-07, "percentile": 0.5441436933195719 }, "sha256": "196a2eef93a06e37a8e8598e8d7bc11db6b7128d262684f36b13ffb864eb6e95", "simhash": "1:6ab744dcaa432581", "word_count": 5151 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:59:33.778469+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ARTHUR LETOURNEAU et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION AND EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WHITE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants appeal from a judgment entered by the circuit court of Cook County that reversed the revocation of plaintiffs\u2019 licenses to practice. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nDefendants are the Department of Registration and Education (the Department), now known as the Department of Professional Regulation; Gary L. Clayton (the Director), who was Director of Registration and Education .at the pertinent times; the Illinois Private Detective, Private Alarm, and Private Security Board (the Board); and the Board\u2019s chairman, and five other members.\nOne plaintiff is Arthur Letourneau, to whom the record sometimes refers as Arthur LeTourneau. The other plaintiffs are the detective division, the security division, and the alarm division, of Investigations International (the company). Of the four licenses and certificates revoked, two licenses (as a private detective and a private security contractor) were issued in Letourneau\u2019s name, and two certificates (as a private detective agency and as a private security contractor agency) were issued to Letourneau in the names of the company\u2019s detective division and security division, respectively. For convenience when referring collectively in this opinion to plaintiffs\u2019 licenses and certificates, the general term \u201clicenses\u201d is used.\nA certificate as a private alarm contractor agency, issued in the name of the company\u2019s alarm division, and a license as a private alarm contractor, issued in Letourneau\u2019s name, were neither revoked nor involved in the disciplinary proceedings, but as licensees the holders thereof have joined as plaintiffs.\nThe central issue is whether revocation of plaintiffs\u2019 licenses was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and unreasonable.\nI. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nUnder the Private Detective, Private Alarm, and Private Security Act of 1983 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2651 et seq.) (the Act or the present Act), a licensee is subject to disciplinary sanctions for enumerated violations. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2672(a).) A range of sanctions, including license revocation, is provided. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2675.\nIn this cause, the Department filed formal charges seeking disciplinary action against Letourneau and the company as respondents. The charges named Letoumeau and the company\u2019s detective and security divisions as holders of the licenses in question. The charges alleged three substantive acts or omissions, said to constitute violations of the Act or of its precursor statute (the 1933 Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, par. 2601 et seq.) (repealed eff. Jan. 5, 1984) and therefore to constitute grounds for license revocation or suspension under section 22 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2672). The alleged violations were:\n(a) Failure by the company since 1979 to register its employees with the department, in violation of section 10b(4) of the 1933 Act and section 15(c) of the present Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, par. 2622(4); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2665(c)).\n(b) Practice by the company as \u201ca detective\u201d while its \u201clicense\u201d was nonrenewed from 1977 to October 1983, said to be in violation of section 3 of the 1933 Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, par. 2603).\n(c) Practice by Ernest Rizzo since 1979 as a detective for the company despite a 1978 revocation of his detective license, in violation of sections 16(b) and (f) of the 1933 Act and sections 22(a)(3), (a)(14), (a)(15), and (a)(19) of the present Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, pars. 2628(b), (f); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2672(a)(3), (a)(14), (a)(15), (a)(19)).\nUnder the version of the Act applicable to this cause, it was a continuing requirement for agency certification such as here that the agencies each have a full-time Illinois-licensed private detective or private security contractor in charge and that each such person reside in Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2664(d), (f).) \u201cResidency\u201d meant having established an actual domicile in Illinois for at least one year. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2652(m).) The 1933 Act contained similar requirements for detective agencies. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, pars. 2601, 2621.) The present Act has now been amended to repeal the requirement that a licensee in charge reside in Illinois. See Pub. Act 85 \u2014 981, art. Ill, \u00a75, eff. Jan. 1, 1988 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2664(d) through (f)).\nDuring several sessions between January and July 1986, a hearing officer received testimony from 11 witnesses and admitted 75 exhibits into evidence. Attending from time to time and sometimes participating in the proceedings were several members of the Board. On January 22, 1987, the Board made and submitted its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the licenses at issue be revoked. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2674(d).\nThe Board\u2019s factual findings were:\nLetourneau had been a Florida resident since at least 1980 and, while holding the licenses at issue, had falsely reported to the Department since 1980 that he was an Illinois resident.\nLetourneau and the company had practiced as a detective and detective agency from October 1977 to October 13, 1983, and from January 4, 1984, to January 7, 1985, without a license and without registering employees.\nLetourneau and the company had since at least 1980 allowed Ernest Rizzo to practice as a detective without a license or supervision.\nLetourneau and the company had practiced as a security contractor and security contractor agency from January 4, 1984, to January 7,1985, without registering employees.\nThe Board\u2019s legal conclusion was that Letourneau had violated the sections of the present Act and of the 1933 Act that he and the company were charged with violating.\nLetourneau filed a motion for rehearing, but the Director denied it. Adopting the Board\u2019s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, he then ordered that the licenses at issue be revoked.\nOn April 28, 1987, Letourneau filed his complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County, seeking to have the Director\u2019s revocation orders vacated. After briefing and argument, the court entered an order on August 10, 1988, reversing the Department\u2019s revocation decision.\nThe trial judge stated that he was reversing the revocation orders because the findings of fact were without substantial foundation in the evidence. Specifically, the judge found that there was no evidence to support the Director\u2019s finding that Letourneau had been a Florida resident since 1980 and that there was evidence that Letourneau had been an Illinois resident at the times in question. The judge also found that there was no evidence to support the Director\u2019s finding that Letourneau had allowed Rizzo to practice as an unlicensed private detective and that the Department\u2019s evidence in general was not strong enough to support the result of revocation. At a hearing on defendants\u2019 motion for reconsideration, the judge again stated that there was insufficient evidence to support the Director\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, he denied the motion for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.\nThis opinion will refer to matters of evidence as required for discussion of the issues.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. STANDARD FOR REVIEWING FINDINGS OF FACT\nIn reviewing the factual determinations made by the Director, this court is limited to ascertaining whether his decision accorded with the manifest weight of the evidence and was supported by substantial evidence. Massa v. Department of Registration & Education (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 376, 385, 507 N.E.2d 814, 818; Bruce v. Department of Registration & Education (1963), 26 Ill. 2d 612, 622, 187 N.E.2d 711, 717; Irving\u2019s Pharmacy v. Department of Registration & Education (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 652, 658, 394 N.E.2d 627, 632.\nThe findings and conclusions of an administrative agency regarding questions of fact are to be considered prima facie true and correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014110; Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 391, 469 N.E.2d 1085, 1088.) However, this does not mean that a court should automatically approve an agency decision merely because the agency heard witnesses and made findings. Viera v. Illinois Racing Board (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 94, 99, 382 N.E.2d 462, 466.\nB. LETOURNEAU\u2019S RESIDENCY\nDefendants appear to regard Letourneau\u2019s residency as being relevant for two reasons, either of which might support disciplinary action.\nFirst, as the sole individual to whom the company\u2019s agency licenses were issued, Letourneau (or some person employed by him) was required to be in charge of agency operations as a full-time, individually licensed Illinois resident, and failure to comply would violate the law. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2664(d), (f); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, par. 2621.) Letourneau employed no such person; the question is whether Letourneau himself met the requirement.\nSecond, Letourneau was required to avoid fraud or material deception in connection with licensure and to report his correct address and practice location to the Department (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2671(a), 2672(a)(1); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, pars. 2616, 2628(a)); according to defendants, failure to report a Florida residence would violate the law.\nHowever, though the Department\u2019s briefs discuss such residency questions at length, its formal charges never clearly specified violation of either of these residency-related requirements. The only formal charge that even arguably might be read as pertaining to one or both of them was the charge that Rizzo had unlawfully practiced as a detective for the company.\nDespite any deficiencies in the formal charges, one of the Director\u2019s findings of fact was that Letoumeau had been a Florida resident who falsely reported Illinois residency \u2014 thereby presumably violating the requirements that he report his correct address and avoid fraud or material deception (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2671(a), 2672(a)(1)). And one of the Director\u2019s conclusions of law was that Letoumeau had permitted his license to be used by an unlicensed person in order to operate without Letoumeau\u2019s supervision or control (see ILl. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2672(a)(15)) \u2014 which comes close to saying that Letoumeau violated the requirement that he keep a full-time Illinois-licensed individual who resides in Illinois in charge of his agencies (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, pars. 2664(d), (f)).\nThe implication of defendants\u2019 treatment of the residency question is that Letourneau\u2019s nonresidency, failure to report a correct address, failure to keep a full-time licensed resident in charge, and facilitation of Rizzo\u2019s unlicensed practice are actually all of a piece in common sense, and all unlawful under one statutory section or another. For the additional reason that plaintiffs make no issue of any incongruity in formal charges, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, Letourneau\u2019s alleged nonresidency is treated in this opinion as if it had been duly framed as a violation from the outset.\nDefendants point to testimony by Letoumeau\u2019s business partner and two alleged former employees (who testified under grants of immunity) that they never saw Letoumeau in Illinois during the period in question. Defendants also point to evidence that departmental investigators were never able to find Letoumeau at his Illinois addresses, that the company maintained a Florida office, and that Florida had issued detective licenses to an Arthur Letoumeau. From this, defendants argue that they were entitled to use their expertise regarding normal conduct of a licensee in order to infer that Letourneau was not an Illinois resident.\nThough Ernest Rizzo (whom, according to the formal charges, Letoumeau had helped to engage in unlicensed practice) testified that he had known Letoumeau for 20 years and that Letoumeau was an Illinois resident, defendants argue that they were entitled to judge Rizzo\u2019s credibility adversely because of his failure to explain adequately a number of past actions and statements suggestive of unlicensed practice. In addition, defendants point to the testimony of one witness, a longtime Letoumeau acquaintance, that he had dined with Letourneau in Florida in 1983 and that Letoumeau, in the witness\u2019 words, had then \u201cindicated\u201d that he was a Florida resident.\nDocumentary evidence in the form of mail and utility bills shows Illinois addresses for Letoumeau, but defendants argue that the addresses were actually Rizzo\u2019s. As a fact from which an adverse inference can be drawn, defendants point to Letourneau\u2019s refusal to answer questions at the administrative hearing on grounds of potential self-incrimination after the Department\u2019s counsel had referred to the possibility of criminal charges. Accordingly, defendants contend that the finding of Letoumeau\u2019s nonresidency in Illinois was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn reply, besides referring to evidence already noted, plaintiffs point to other evidence that Letoumeau was an Hlinois resident. The Department\u2019s investigator testified that he saw a license on the wall at an address previously stated by Letoumeau to be his own. The Department\u2019s investigators testified that mailboxes bearing Letoumeau\u2019s name and containing mail addressed to him existed at addresses given by Letoumeau. Responses in Letoumeau\u2019s name were received by the Department, after it had sent mail to Letoumeau at his Hlinois address, though defendants contend that the responses either did not bear Letourneau\u2019s personal signature at all or bore discrepant personal signatures. Letoumeau also appeared before Hlinois notaries public.\nIn the circuit court, the trial judge referred to the need for \u201cfacts established by evidence, *** evidence that is understood in law as being evidence.\u201d He continued:\n\u201cThis is not a case which turns on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, quite frankly.\nThis is a case which must be reversed I believe because the findings are without substantial foundation in the evidence. A case by the state cannot be made from inferences, from presumptions, or from suspicions, or from indirect evidence. They have to be made by evidence that\u2019s credible, and sufficiently strong to warrant the result that is reached. There is no strong evidence here to support the result of revocation of Letourneau\u2019s license.\u201d\nAfter referring to the Department\u2019s grant of immunity to its witnesses, the trial judge remarked:\n\u201cThe only basis for the conclusion that Mr. Letourneau resides in Florida is that one witness had dinner with Mr. Letourneau once in Florida in 1983 I believe, and yet the charge is that he lived there since 1980. That same witness said I hadn\u2019t seen him around, and I had dinner with him in \u201983. The fact that that witness had not seen Letourneau in Illinois does not mean that Letourneau resided in Florida during all of that hiatus.\u201d\nThe trial judge acknowledged the evidence of Florida detective licenses in the name of an Arthur Letourneau but stated:\n\u201cI am not sure that this Mr. Letourneau is the only Arthur Le-to[ur]neau in the USA, and there was no attempt to demonstrate the Arthur Letourneau in Florida is the Arthur Letourneau that we are talking about here in Illinois.\nSo there clearly is no evidence to support the finding *** that Letourneau has lived in Florida since 1980.\u201d\nThe judge then referred to evidence that Letourneau had received mail in his Illinois mailbox, was paying utility bills in Illinois, had registered his automobile in Illinois, and had responded to department notices mailed to Illinois. The judge also cited Rizzo\u2019s testimony that Letourneau lived in Illinois:\n\u201cClearly the department is free to ignore Mr. Rizzo\u2019s testimony, but I find it incredible that they would ignore that testimony and accept testimony from someone who said he had dinner with Mr. Letourneau in Florida and give greater weight to the latter while giving no weight to the former.\u201d\nDefendants were entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. (Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 512, 517, 229 N.E.2d 673, 676.) In an administrative proceeding, defendants could also, in conjunction with other evidence, draw an inference adverse to Letourneau from his refusal to testify on grounds of potential self-incrimination. (Giampa v. Illinois Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 606, 613-14, 411 N.E.2d 1110, 1116.) If the issue is merely one of conflicting testimony and a witness\u2019 credibility, the administrative agency\u2019s determination should be sustained. (Keen v. Police Board (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 65, 70-71, 391 N.E.2d 190, 195.) An administrative agency may properly base its decision on circumstantial evidence. Ritenour v. Police Board (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 877, 882-83, 369 N.E.2d 135, 139.\nIn finding \u201cno\u201d evidence of Letourneau\u2019s nonresidency, the trial judge overlooked testimony that, in what may have been admissions against interest (see Cox v. Daley (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 593, 596-97, 417 N.E.2d 745, 748), Letourneau had said in about 1979 that he planned to move to Florida and had \u201cindicated\u201d in 1983 that he was now a Florida resident. In any event, the Department presented what it contends was circumstantial evidence of Letourneau\u2019s Florida residency: the Florida licenses, inability to find him in Illinois, accumulation of several weeks\u2019 worth of mail in a mailbox, identity between Letourneau\u2019s claimed Illinois addresses and Rizzo\u2019s addresses, irregularities in Letourneau\u2019s purported signature on answers to mail sent to him at Illinois addresses, and the adverse inference from Letourneau\u2019s refusal to testify on the question of his residency.\nAlthough the trial judge erred in concluding that there was no evidence that Letourneau had lived in Florida since 1980, the question remains whether the evidence offered by the Department sufficiently supported the Director\u2019s decision so that the decision can be said not to have been against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDefendants have not cited and we have not found any requirement that one must be a Florida resident in order to be licensed as a detective in that State, so the mere fact of Florida licensure would carry relatively little weight even if plaintiff were shown to have been the Florida licensee.\nThe Act did not expressly require the person in charge of a private detective agency always to remain within Illinois; all it required was that the person in charge be a resident of this State and be a \u201cfull-time Illinois licensed private detective.\u201d (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2664(d).) Assuming that Letourneau did spend some time in Florida, such a fact is not substantial evidence that he thereby gave up Hlinois residency, that while he was in Florida his Illinois agency operations actively continued without him, or that he was thereby prevented from being as much a \u201cfull-time Illinois licensed\u201d individual as any other licensee who took vacations or went on trips out of State. The fact that departmental investigators failed to find Letourneau but found his mail in the mailbox is evidence that he was absent; it falls short of being substantial evidence that he was nonresident.\nAssuming that any connection between Rizzo and Letourneau was lawful, a coincidence between Letourneau\u2019s Illinois addresses and Rizzo\u2019s is of little probative value. Any relationship between Letourneau and Rizzo in the nature of business association, friendship, or employment (unless of a type prohibited by the Act) is substantial evidence neither of Letourneau\u2019s nonresidency nor of his facilitation of unlicensed practice by Rizzo.\nLetourneau would ordinarily have had a right to appoint someone his agent for signing documents; thus, purported irregularities in his signature are not substantial evidence of nonresidency. Because Letoumeau\u2019s refusal to testify can lead to an adverse inference only in conjunction with other evidence (Giampa, 89 Ill. App. 3d 606, 411 N.E.2d 1110), the lack of other substantial evidence impairs the probative value of his refusal. And, given the other evidentiary shortcomings, a naked assertion of departmental expertise in judging licensees\u2019 conduct amounts to ipse dixit.\nIf the Department had produced substantial evidence on the residency issue and it were simply a matter of weighing that evidence against Letoumeau\u2019s or of judging the credibility of witnesses, the presumption of correctness in the Director\u2019s findings would prevail over mere disagreements by plaintiffs or even by this court. However, as did the circuit court, we believe that no substantial evidence supported the Director\u2019s finding of Letoumeau\u2019s Florida residency and false statements of Illinois residency.\nStill, the matter does not end here. The parties agree that the most serious charge against Letoumeau was that he permitted the use of his agency certificates by Rizzo in order for Rizzo to engage in unlicensed practice. Thus, we must address the sufficiency of the Director\u2019s findings on that issue.\nC. RIZZO\u2019S ACTIVITIES\nDefendants point to considerable evidence as proving that Letourneau permitted Rizzo to use Letoumeau\u2019s licenses and thus to operate without being licensed himself.\nRepeated coincidences were demonstrated between Rizzo\u2019s address and those of Letoumeau and the company. Letourneau, accompanied by Rizzo, had once attempted to obtain an agency certificate in the name of Ernest D. Rizzo, Ltd. In addition, Rizzo had contacted the Department in behalf of Letourneau to discuss an agency name change and what kind of work Rizzo (whose license had been revoked) could now permissibly do for the company. Insurance procured by Letourneau was carried in Rizzo\u2019s name until corrected after departmental rejection. Checks payable to Rizzo had been deposited to the company\u2019s account. Rizzo signed purchase papers as owner of cars purchased by the company.\nRaymond Rocke, testifying under a grant of immunity, said he had performed security work for the company under Rizzo as \u201cboss.\u201d Though Rizzo testified that the witness was working without authority and was discharged by Letourneau, the testimony was impeached by Letourneau\u2019s certification to the Department that the witness had been an employee after the \u201cdischarge.\u201d Rizzo also attempted to explain such matters as his deposition testimony that he was employed by the company, a magazine account of investigations he supposedly was conducting as a company subcontractor without being licensed, and a telephone director advertisement for the company that carried Rizzo\u2019s name. Defendants argue that the credibility of Rizzo\u2019s explanations was simply judged adversely.\nIn addition, Letourneau refused to answer questions about Ed Rossi, whom he had listed as an employee and whose name the department contended was an alias for Rizzo. Rizzo matched the age and physical description of Rossi, and his social security number was a slightly transposed version of Rossi\u2019s. Rizzo acknowledged having used the name Ed Ross.\nBut plaintiffs respond that no witness, not even Rocke, testified to personal knowledge that since 1980 Rizzo had actually engaged in activities legally constituting practice as a private detective. One witness testified to Rizzo\u2019s having told him that Rizzo planned to be an employee but not a principal of a company to be formed by Letourneau. Rizzo himself denied having practiced as a detective in Hlinois since 1978 or 1979.\nDefendants contend that, despite Rizzo\u2019s denial of practicing as a detective, he admitted that he had investigated Rocke, ascertained the address and business of another person, conducted electronic sweeps to discover surveillance devices, and conducted \u201cinvestigations for pay\u201d on cases for Letourneau\u2019s attorney. However, these contentions by defendants lack force, because none of the described activity, unless it is part of a paid investigation, legally constituted practice as a private detective \u2014 except possibly, of course, for the very conduct of \u201cinvestigations for pay.\u201d (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2652(h).) As for the latter conduct, the most to which Rizzo\u2019s testimony admitted was serving a subpoena and checking for wiretaps at the attorney\u2019s request, apparently for pay in both cases. Neither serving a subpoena nor checking for a wiretap, even for pay, was itself necessarily practice as a private detective; it would only have been so if part of a paid investigation made to obtain information regarding several subjects specified by statute. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2652(h).) There was no testimony that Rizzo\u2019s admitted activity was part of any such statutorily specified investigation, much less that it was performed by use of Letourneau\u2019s licenses.\nThe Director was entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and to draw inferences from the evidence. However, the evidence offered to prove Rizzo\u2019s unlicensed practice did not constitute the substantial evidence required by law on what was admittedly the most serious charge against Letourneau. Thus, the circuit court correctly rejected the Director\u2019s finding that Letourneau had permitted Rizzo to practice without a license by using Letourneau\u2019s licenses.\nD. OTHER DISPUTED FACTUAL POINTS\nDefendants extensively discuss their contention that the Director\u2019s findings regarding practice on inactive licenses and regarding nonregistration of employees should not have been reversed by the circuit court. Plaintiffs reply at length. Yet, the circuit court never \u201creversed\u201d the Director\u2019s findings on these issues.\nThe circuit court\u2019s order as drafted by plaintiffs\u2019 counsel did read that \u201cthe Court, having found no evidence to support the findings entered by the Department, orders that the Decision of the Department revoking the licenses of Arthur Letourneau be and is hereby reversed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) However, the transcript reveals that the court focused entirely on the lack of substantial evidence for the findings on residency and on allowing Rizzo\u2019s unlicensed practice. Because of that lack, the court declared that \u201cthe decision by the department therefore is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of the department\u2019s discretion. For all of these reasons the decision is reversed.\u201d\nIt is evident that the circuit court based reversal on the residency and Rizzo issues and on no other. We need not consider the Director\u2019s findings and conclusions on other issues if his reversible findings on the residency and Rizzo issues were so central as to render his revocation decision an abuse of discretion.\nE. LICENSE REVOCATION\nAn agency\u2019s exercise of discretion may be set aside if it was arbitrary or unreasonable or clearly violated the rule of law. (Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1988), 180 Ill. App. 3d 899, 907, 536 N.E.2d 724, 729.) The courts will not reweigh the evidence but will determine whether the final administrative decision is just and reasonable in light of the evidence presented. Davern v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 469, 471, 269 N.E.2d 713, 714; Sircher v. Police Board (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 19, 20-21, 382 N.E.2d 325, 327.\nThe applicable rule, as phrased by many authorities, is that courts may not interfere with an administrative agency\u2019s discretionary authority unless it is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or unless the administrative decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (E.g., Massa v. Department of Registration & Education (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 376, 388, 507 N.E.2d 814, 819; Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 391, 469 N.E.2d 1085, 1088; People ex rel. Stephens v. Collins (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 499, 501, 221 N.E.2d 254, 255.) In terms of that formulation of the rule, it has been said that, when determining whether an administrative decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, a court should consider the severity of the sanction imposed. Cartwright v. Illinois Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 787, 793, 400 N.E.2d 581, 586; Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Howlett (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 14, 17, 380 N.E.2d 999, 1002. Contra Epstein v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 81, 84, 361 N.E.2d 782, 785.\nAn alternative formulation of the rule is that, when judging whether an agency sanction is arbitrary or unreasonable, manifest weight of the evidence is not the applicable standard of review, because the reasonableness of the sanction, not the correctness of the agency\u2019s findings or reasoning, is the issue. E.g., Brown v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39, 478 N.E.2d 541, 544.\nIn any event, however, courts will not hesitate to grant relief from an adverse agency decision if that decision is not supported in the record by sufficient evidence. (Basketfield v. Police Board (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 351, 359, 307 N.E.2d 371, 375; Feliciano v. Illinois Racing Board (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1003, 443 N.E.2d 261, 266.) Thus, a court may reverse an order for imposing an unwarranted sanction. See Feliciano, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1005, 443 N.E.2d at 267; Cartwright, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, 400 N.E.2d at 586.\nOn the questions of Letourneau\u2019s residency and Rizzo\u2019s activities, which clearly were the most important to the Department and the Director, the Director\u2019s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence. We believe that the Director\u2019s decision to revoke plaintiffs\u2019 licenses, based as it was primarily on such unsupported findings, represented an arbitrary and unwarranted sanction.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which reversed the Director\u2019s revocation of plaintiffs\u2019 licenses.\nAffirmed.\nCERDA, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.\nPlaintiffs received their licenses under the present Act by derivation from previous licensure under the 1933 Act. (See 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. Ill, par. 2656.) Plaintiffs have made no issue of whether derivative licenses may be revoked on account of any breached present obligation of derivative licensees not to have violated the 1933 Act, even though nonderivative licensees arguably have no such present obligation. Thus, we may deem any such issue waived. Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7), (f) (113 Ill. 2d Rules 341(e)(7), (f)). But compare 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1, pars. 1001, 1101, 1103 (unless contradicted by terms of particular statute, general rule is that identical new statutory provisions continue old ones and that new law is not construed as repealing old law for purposes of offenses or claims under old) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 2656 (derivative licensees have \u201csame rights and obligations\u201d as nonderivative licensees).\nIf the company was operating without a certificate of authority as a detective agency, the operation violated section 3a of the 1933 Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111, par. 2604) rather than section 3. However, the Director\u2019s eventual finding of fact was that both Letourneau and the company had practiced without licensure as a private detective and a detective agency, respectively \u2014 which in Letourneau\u2019s case did violate section 3. The Director\u2019s conclusion of law was merely that Letourneau violated section 3, the company going unmentioned.\nBecause plaintiffs have made no issue of variances between the formal charges and the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the question may be deemed waived. But see Bruce v. Department of Registration & Education (1963), 26 Ill. 2d 612, 620, 187 N.E.2d 711, 715-16 (respondent entitled to notice of charges that must be met); Jim M\u2019Lady Olds, Inc. v. Secretary of State (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 959, 961-62, 516 N.E.2d 346, 347-48 (same).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WHITE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Deborah L. Ahlstrand, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.", "Carr & O\u2019Rourke Associates, of Chicago (Donald A. Carr and Roland R Ernst, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ARTHUR LETOURNEAU et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION AND EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20143823\nOpinion filed April 3, 1991.\nNeil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Deborah L. Ahlstrand, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.\nCarr & O\u2019Rourke Associates, of Chicago (Donald A. Carr and Roland R Ernst, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0717-01", "first_page_order": 739, "last_page_order": 753 }