{ "id": 2599727, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hawkins", "decision_date": "1991-04-19", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201488\u20142749, 1\u201489\u20142585 cons.", "first_page": "973", "last_page": "984", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 973" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600-01" }, { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "Barry, J., dissenting on other grounds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 949", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3292461 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1375" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2629240 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2695011 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 951", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3187846 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3479336 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2762972 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0002-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1336" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811748 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0423-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 916, "char_count": 23906, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4732474707352994e-07, "percentile": 0.6596674169034565 }, "sha256": "e2fae6d8cc3a820188daa230c44041c567aab7bb8149d0532a36d10a4f284848", "simhash": "1:2bf4f1ac36580bb5", "word_count": 4134 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:59:33.778469+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LaPORTA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was found guilty of the armed robbery at a Chicago bar and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. In a consolidated action he appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his post-conviction petition for relief and the conviction itself.\nIn defendant\u2019s direct appeal he contends that he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to move for a speedy trial discharge though more than 120 days of delay not occasioned by defendant elapsed from the date defendant was taken into custody until the date of his trial, and that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and admission of hearsay evidence denied defendant his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights.\nDefendant appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his post-conviction petition contending that the trial court\u2019s failure to move for a speedy trial discharge on the added armed robbery count denied defendant his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.\nDefendant was arrested on June 1, 1987, and charged with robbery of Tate\u2019s Pub. On August 25, 1987, the State amended the information filed against defendant to include a charge of armed robbery.\nThe trial began August 9, 1988. Before the trial, defendant\u2019s case was called in court 18 times and each time was continued for various reasons. The State contends that three of those times, January 6, 1988, March 9, 1988 and May 4, 1988, the case was continued by agreement. The defense contends those continuances should have been charged to the State. As part of his appeal, defendant contends that these delays, not occasioned by him, caused him to be tried after the 120-day limitations period had run and in violation of this speedy trial right guaranteed by statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, 103\u20145(a).\nOn November 15, 1987, defendant\u2019s case was called and a possible plea to the charges was discussed, then rejected by defendant. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial judge set defendant\u2019s case for trial stating: \u201cI have a jury set on January 6. We are going to put this as a back-up to that one. January 6, 1988. That is the soonest I can do it Mr. Hawkins. I really would like to get it quicker, but I can\u2019t.\u201d\nOn January 6, 1988 defendant\u2019s case was called and the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Hawkins, how are you doing?\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: Judge it was set for trial for today.\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s been set for a jury for today, okay.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: Whatever the next available date is.\nTHE COURT: February.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: Can we make it sooner than February, judge?\nTHE COURT: We are starting a trial [that] will last all week as far as I can see.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: All right judge.\nTHE COURT: February 1st.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s case was continued February 1 and February 18 by agreement and rescheduled for trial March 9, 1988. On that day defendant\u2019s case was called and the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay. We have Mr. Hawkins before the court. This case is marked ready. And we\u2019re going to try it, but we\u2019re in the middle of another jury trial. So, still a jury, Mr. [defense attorney]?\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: I believe so. Is that correct Mr. Hawkins?\nHAWKINS: Yes sir.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Let\u2019s see. I can give you Monday, April 4th. That\u2019s the first time that we\u2019re going to be able to do something like that.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: That\u2019s okay. April 4th should be fine judge.\nTHE COURT: We have a bench but this will take priority.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: April 4th is fine for me.\nTHE COURT: Okay. April 4, 1988 with subpoenas for jury trial. We\u2019ll see you then, Mr. Hawkins.\u201d\nThe case was continued again April 4, and April 8 by agreement as defendant and the State discussed the possibility of a plea agreement. No agreement was reached and again the case was set for trial with the judge stating: \u201cWhat if we put this on for the 4th [of May], hold it day-to-day until the Raoul trial is over?\u201d Both attorneys agree to the May 4 date.\nOn May 4, 1988 defendant\u2019s case was called and the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: We have Mr. Hawkins before the court. This case was set for trial today. However, as you are aware Mr. [defense attorney], this court is engaged in a jury trial that began on Monday and will not end until Friday and then we have the companion case supposed to go on Monday again for another week. So.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: We would simply ask this be set down for the next available jury date judge.\nTHE COURT: Okay. I am going to suggest June 8. That is a Wednesday. You have got that other case, a Dwayne Cheers is a lower number case on Monday and if that one does not go, well how about putting this one on Monday also; either this or Cheers. The 6th. You want to put this on for the 6th or put it over until the 8th?\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: Why don\u2019t we leave it on the 8th judge.\nTHE COURT: Okay. That is the first date and I wish it was not \u2014 I wish [I] could get to you earlier Mr. Hawkins but it is beginning to get a little crowded on the calendar. June 8, 1988 with subpoenas for a jury.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: That is a by agreement date.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: Are you going to be ready for trial on that date?\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Fine. Okay. Thank you.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s case was continued four more times before trial. On one occasion, June 22, 1988, the defendant asked for a one-day delay. On the three other occasions, June 8, June 23 and July 21, the defendant demanded a trial but the case was continued after the State asked for a continuance. Defendant\u2019s case went to trial August 8,1988.\nAt trial, the bar owner, Tate, testified that he and about 15 customers were in the bar at 12:10 a.m. on June 1, when he looked up and saw a man standing on the end of the bar. He stated that the man had an object wrapped in clothing, pointed it toward him and said \u201cstick up.\u201d Tate testified that the thief\u2019s face was covered at the time but later was uncovered in a skirmish. After the thief took money out of the cash register, Tate testified that the thief grabbed him by the collar and walked backwards toward the door. Tate grabbed the cloth-covered object and slung it across the bar. As he struggled with the thief and rolled over the bar, his customers came to his aid. He stated that the thief\u2019s facial covering came off and that he recognized defendant as the thief. The defendant asked Tate and the customers to \u201cgive him a break, let him go\u201d but Tate testified that he and his customers detained defendant until police arrived. They also discovered that the covered object was a baseball bat, which they turned over to police.\nJoan Derden, a customer in the bar that night, testified that she saw the thief jump up on the bar, point something that looked like a shotgun at Tate and then heard him demand money. Derden stated that she slid down behind the bar, heard a struggle begin and saw an object fly over the bar. Tate and the thief then went over the bar and came into her view. Derden testified that other customers then came to Tate\u2019s aid and the thief was held at bay until police arrived. Derden identified defendant as the thief.\nCalvin Marks, also a customer, testified that on the night of the robbery he saw a man in the door of the bar holding what looked like a wrapped-up shotgun. The man stated, \u201cThis is a stickup.\u201d Marks testified that when the thief grabbed Tate by the collar he eased off his bar stool at the end of the bar and crawled out the back door. He testified that he flagged down a police car and the officers returned with him to Tate\u2019s Place. Once in the bar, Marks saw the defendant, his face now uncovered, being held down by bar patrons.\nChicago police officer Annette Buday testified that she and her partner arrived at Tate\u2019s Place at around 12:10 a.m. on June 1 and found Tate and another man holding the defendant down. Without objection, Buday testified that various people in the bar told her defendant had \u201cjust stuck up the place.\u201d\nDarryl Hawkins testified in his own defense. He stated that he pled guilty in 1981 to a burglary charge and in 1983 to a possession of a controlled substance charge. Hawkins testified that he was in Tate\u2019s bar twice on the night of the alleged burglary. He stated that he went to the bar around 11:45 p.m. to buy $100 worth of cocaine from Tate but went back 15 or 20 minutes later when he discovered the substance he bought was not cocaine. He testified that Tate gave him $10 back but that he wanted all $100 back. The two began to argue, then fight, and threw each other behind the bar. He testified that the two saw a baseball bat behind the bar and grabbed for it at the same time, tossing it over the bar. He testified that they struggled again, going over the bar toward the patrons. Hawkins testified that at that time, some of the patrons began hitting him with chairs and \u201cwhatever they had their hands on.\u201d He testified that he asked the patrons to give him a break and then the police arrived and arrested him. He denied threatening Tate, stealing from Tate or entering the bar with a bat wrapped up in a raincoat.\nThe jury found Hawkins guilty of armed robbery and he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition seeking a new trial, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to file a motion to dismiss the charges based on a violation of the speedy trial act. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion, stating that even if the defense attorney miscalculated the length of defendant\u2019s term, it would not find that conduct to be ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court rejected defendant\u2019s argument that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the State added an armed robbery charge to an existing robbery charge and then attributed those delays occasioned by defendant on the initial charge to the 120-day term on the later armed robbery charge.\nThe speedy trial act guarantees every person in custody a trial on the merits within 120 days of the date the accused is taken into custody unless the delay is occasioned by the accused. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(a).) The speedy trial act is to be construed liberally so as to give effect to the constitutional right to speedy trial and each case is to be decided on its facts. People v. Beyah (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 423, 427, 367 N.E.2d 1334, 1336.\nDefendant contends on the appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition that defense counsel\u2019s failure to move for speedy trial discharge on the added armed robbery count denied him his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.\nDefendant was arrested June 1, 1987, and the additional charge of armed robbery was brought 12 weeks later on August 25, 1987. Defendant contends that since the two charges stemmed from the same incident, the State knew of its ability to file an armed robbery charge at the time it filed the original robbery charge against defendant. Defendant argues that the 85 days between his arrest and the new information must all be charged to the State because no delay during that time could have been caused by the defendant when he was not yet charged with the additional offense. Defendant argues that this 85-day delay, coupled with the 60-day delay the State concedes it caused from June 8, 1988, to June 22, 1988, and from June 23, 1988, to August 8, 1988, resulted in defendant being tried on the armed robbery charge beyond 120 days following his arrest in violation of the speedy trial act.\nDefendant cites People v. King (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 2, 288 N.E.2d 672, which held that the State must prosecute within 120 days after the accused is taken into custody on all known offenses. Defendant cites People v. Williams (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 241, 248-49, 418 N.E.2d 840, 846, which held that where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charge and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charge. The court held that continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the original charge cannot be attributed to defendant with respect to the new and additional charge even if sought by defendant or agreed to by him because the charge was not before the court when the continuances were obtained. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 249. See People v. Parker (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304, 375 N.E.2d 465.\nDefendant contends that since his attorney submitted his affidavit in which he admitted to the court on defendant\u2019s behalf that there was no speedy trial violation, counsel\u2019s conduct fell below the permissible standards and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant cites People v. Staton (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 230, 231-32, 507 N.E.2d 62, where the court reversed a judgment for armed robbery and found defense counsel\u2019s failure to move to dismiss the armed robbery charge on similar grounds resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant because the defendant was charged and tried after the statute of limitations expired. Defendant cites People v. Alcazar (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354-55, 527 N.E.2d 325, 332, which found defense counsel\u2019s conduct sufficiently grave so as to prejudice defendant\u2019s defense by his failure to move for a speedy trial discharge.\nThe State limited its response on this argument to distinguishing three cases cited by defendant, Williams, King and Alcazar. The State contends that in these three cases prosecutors added a second count on or after the 120th day of the defendant\u2019s term. The State argues that in this case the armed robbery charge was added well before the 120-day term expired, giving defendant plenty of time to prepare for trial, and that he was not prejudiced by the delay.\nWe find this argument by the State to be irrelevant. The 120-day rule that binds the State has nothing to do with whether the defendant has adequate time to prepare for trial. The fact that defendant did or did not have time to prepare for trial is not controlling. The speedy trial act was adopted to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration. People v. Sanders (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 457, 407 N.E.2d 951.\nWe find the initial days of defendant\u2019s confinement cannot be charged to defendant under the law enunciated in Williams, King and Alcazar. The clock begins to tick at the filing of the first charges against defendant, but where new charges are subsequently filed, no delay can be attributed to him on the new charge until after the charge is filed.\nWe hold that defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial on the armed robbery charge was violated when the additional charge was filed on August 25, 1987, and the trial did not take place until August 9, 1988. We also find defense counsel\u2019s failure to move for a dismissal of the charge was a violation of defendant\u2019s right to effective assistance of counsel.\nIn defendant\u2019s direct appeal of his conviction, he also raises the issues of violation of the speedy trial statute and ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to move for his dismissal on the ground of such violation.\nIf we were to find no speedy trial violation based on the post-conviction petition, we would still find a violation based on the facts presented in defendant\u2019s direct appeal. Both sides agree that at least 104 days of defendant\u2019s term ran before defendant\u2019s trial.\nAt issue is whether the three continuances which occurred January 6, 1988, March 9, 1988, and May 4, 1988, should have been charged to the defendant to toll the running of the 120-day speedy trial requirement. The January 6 continuance resulted in a 26-day delay. The March 9 continuance resulted in a 25-day delay. The May 4 continuance resulted in a 35-day delay. Consequently, if any one of the continuances was charged to the State instead of to the defendant, then defendant\u2019s trial was commenced after the 120-day limit had expired.\nDefendant contends that he should not be charged for these delays because the continuances were caused by the court\u2019s crowded trial docket and therefore the time must be charged to the State. Defendant maintains that his counsel never agreed to a continuance but concurred only to the court\u2019s suggestion of a specific later date on which his case would be tried.\nDefendant argues that his lawyer\u2019s failure to file a speedy trial motion because the lawyer simply miscalculated defendant\u2019s term was not a knowledgeable or tactical decision on the lawyer\u2019s part but in fact was an error. Defendant contends that this failure to move for dismissal for violation of the speedy trial statutory protection constituted ineffective assistance by counsel and violated his sixth amendment right.\nDefendant cites Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, which established a two-part test to determine whether counsel\u2019s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction. \u201cFirst, the defendant must show that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u2018counsel\u2019 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nIneffective assistance of counsel is established by a showing of actual incompetence on the part of an attorney to carry out his duties at trial which resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant without which the outcome would probably have been different. A trial counsel\u2019s competency, however, will not be judged by a court of review on the basis of errors in judgment or trial strategy. People v. Staton (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 230, 231, 507 N.E.2d 62.\nDefendant cites People v. Morris (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810, which held that there can be no justifiable excuse for an attorney\u2019s conduct when he fails to protect a defendant\u2019s right to be tried within the time limit prescribed by statute. Defendant cites People v. Alcazar (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354-55, 527 N.E.2d 325, 332, which held that the failure to move for a speedy trial discharge could constitute an error in counsel\u2019s performance sufficiently grave to prejudice defendant\u2019s defense.\nDefendant refers this court to transcripts of the conversations that occurred between counsel for the State and for the defendant and the court on the three dates in question and contends that each shows it was not at defendant\u2019s request nor was it defendant\u2019s fault that the cases were delayed. Defendant argues that his counsel agreed only to specific trial dates suggested by the court but that cannot be construed.as agreeing to a continuance. Responsibility for delays caused by crowded dockets rests with and was chargeable to the State and not to the defendant. People v. Wiegand (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 216, 218, 538 N.E.2d 1374, 1375.\nDefendant cites People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 949, 951, 396 N.E.2d 876, 877, which states that where a defendant requests or agrees to a continuance, he is charged with occasioning delay, but when the record is silent, the delay cannot be attributed to defendant. Defendant cites People v. Reimolds (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 598, 600-01, 426 N.E.2d 1234, 1237, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 101, 440 N.E.2d 872, which found no affirmative act by defendant or motion for continuance by him which contributed to the actual delay of the trial. The court held that no presumption of defendant\u2019s fault could be raised from the silence of the record on this issue. Reimold, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 602 (Barry, J., dissenting on other grounds).\nDefendant cites People v. Parker (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 302, 375 N.E.2d 465, where the court noted that the trial court faced an ongoing jury trial and found no abuse of discretion when the trial court dismissed indictments against defendant because the State failed to comply with the speedy trial requirement. Parker, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 304.\nRegarding the propriety of charging the January 6, March 9, and May 4 dates to the defendant, the State cites page references to the court transcripts and states that all three trial dates were continued by agreement, and concludes that these delays therefore are not included in the running of the 120 days and that defendant was brought to trial within the 120-day time limit. The State notes that both defense attorneys involved in defendant\u2019s trial and post-trial hearings filed affidavits which state that 107 days had run on defendant\u2019s 120-day term. We note, however, that the affidavits do not state whether any given continuance was granted on the State\u2019s motion, on defendant\u2019s motion or by agreement.\nThe State cites People v. Pearson (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 210, 430 N.E.2d 990, and People v. Perez (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 901, 905, 427 N.E.2d 229, for the proposition that defendant has waived his right to be discharged on speedy trial grounds by failing to move for discharge prior to his trial.\nThe State argues that since the defendant\u2019s case was heard within the 120-day time limit, the defendant has no foundation for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cites Strickland for the proposition that a court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69, see also People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 273, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nOn all three dates in question the trial court was involved in a jury trial when defendant and counsel appeared ready for trial. On January 6, 1988, the court stated that it could reschedule defendant\u2019s trial for February and defense counsel asked if the court could find an earlier time and was told no. On March 9, 1988, the trial court noted that defendant\u2019s case was ready for trial but then told defendant that the first time he could get a jury trial would be April 4. On May 4, 1988, defendant was told that June 8 was the first date he could get a jury trial and the court stated: \u201cI wish I could get to you earlier Mr. Hawkins, but it\u2019s beginning to get a little crowded on the calendar.\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney present commented that the June 8 date was by agreed order, but we note that the court did not acknowledge that comment nor did defense counsel object to the statement.\nWe believe these three delays cannot be found to have been occasioned by defendant and conclude therefore that defendant was tried after the 120-day period had passed. As with defendant\u2019s contention in his post-trial conviction, we find defense counsel\u2019s failure to move for a speedy trial dismissal violated defendant\u2019s right to effective assistance of counsel and for that reason defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed.\nSince we are reversing the conviction, we need not address defendant\u2019s contention that prosecutorial errors interfered with the jury\u2019s ability to fairly weigh the credibility of witnesses.\nJudgment reversed.\nRAKOWSKI, P.J., and EGAN, J., concur.,", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LaPORTA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Pelletier and Patricia Unsinn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarh, Carol L. Gaines, and Michael D. Oppenheimer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNos. 1\u201488\u20142749, 1\u201489\u20142585 cons.\nOpinion filed April 19, 1991.\nMichael Pelletier and Patricia Unsinn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarh, Carol L. Gaines, and Michael D. Oppenheimer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0973-01", "first_page_order": 995, "last_page_order": 1006 }