{ "id": 2606472, "name": "ROBERT L. QUICK, by Michael L. Jones, his Guardian and Legal Representative, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. JOANN HAMBURG QUICK, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Quick v. Quick", "decision_date": "1991-05-15", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201490\u20140037", "first_page": "97", "last_page": "102", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 97" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466411 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628893 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2646346 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3101623 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3479316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477924 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0953-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 630, "char_count": 12059, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.3535584507050411 }, "sha256": "33ef52713efb68ca7d8ad2586c57532d931e44865f41acebfe8ef4586bcd369a", "simhash": "1:82b62533cc5d7eb7", "word_count": 1981 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:27.836966+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT L. QUICK, by Michael L. Jones, his Guardian and Legal Representative, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. JOANN HAMBURG QUICK, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Robert L. Quick, by and through his guardian and legal representative, Michael L. Jones, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Marion County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint which sought an order declaring invalid the marriage between Robert L. Quick and defendant, Joann Hamburg Quick. Additionally, defendant has cross-appealed the order of the circuit court substituting the guardian as plaintiff\u2019s special administrator for purposes of pursuing this appeal. We reverse and remand.\nWhen a case is on appeal from dismissal of a complaint, all well-pleaded facts must be taken as true. (Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 953, 955, 527 N.E.2d 1281, 1283; Morris v. Faulkner (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 625, 627, 361 N.E.2d 112, 113.) We, therefore, accept as true the facts alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Sometime before February 20, 1989, plaintiff developed lung cancer with brain metasteses, which resulted in plaintiff being in a coma or semi-coma from September 18, 1989, until his death on October 17, 1989. On September 2, 1989, a marriage ceremony was performed at plaintiff\u2019s residence between plaintiff and defendant. The instant action was initiated by Wilbert Quick, plaintiff\u2019s brother, and Joyce White, plaintiff\u2019s daughter. Both sought to have plaintiff declared a disabled adult and to have his marriage to defendant declared invalid. On September 26, 1989, Michael Jones was appointed temporary guardian of Robert Quick. On that same day, Jones filed a complaint on behalf of plaintiff to have the marriage declared invalid on the grounds that plaintiff lacked capacity to consent to the marriage and/or that he was induced by defendant through fraud or duress to enter the marriage. Defendant was served with a copy of the complaint. Before an evidentiary hearing could be held, plaintiff died. On October 23, 1989, defendant filed her motion to dismiss due to plaintiff\u2019s death. Defendant\u2019s motion was granted on January 16, 1990. The circuit court also granted plaintiff\u2019s motion to substitute Michael L. Jones as special administrator of plaintiff\u2019s estate for the purpose of pursuing this appeal.\nThe issue plaintiff asks us to address is whether the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint to invalidate the marriage pursuant to section 302(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 302(b)). While plaintiff agrees that the statute may be interpreted to require automatic dismissal of a pending action upon the death of either party, he, nevertheless, contends that such a narrow construction is contrary to the legislative intent and that the legislative scheme of sections 301 and 302 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, pars. 301, 302) is unjust and is inequitable. We agree.\nSection 301 of the Act requires a court to declare a marriage invalid if:\n\u201c(1) a party lacked capacity to consent to the marriage at the time the marriage was solemnized, either because of mental incapacity or infirmity or because of the influence of alcohol, drugs or other incapacitating substances, or a party was induced to enter into a marriage by force or duress or by fraud involving the essentials of marriage.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 301(1).)\nSection 302 of the Act states that an action to declare a marriage invalid for lack of capacity to consent must be filed no later than 90 days after the petitioner obtained knowledge of the described condition. The action may be brought by either party to the marriage or by the legal representative of the party who lacked capacity to consent. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 302(1).) In the instant case, plaintiff\u2019s guardian brought the action 24 days after the ceremony was performed, which is within the proper time frame dictated by the Act. However, the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss because plaintiff had died before an evidentiary hearing could be held, and section 302(b) of the Act provides that \u201c[i]n no event may a declaration of invalidity of marriage be sought after the death of either party to the marriage under subsection^ (1).\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 302(b).) In its order, the circuit court determined that whether the case could proceed depended on the meaning of the word \u201csought.\u201d The circuit court relied on Webster\u2019s definition of the word \u201csought\u201d and determined that the case could not be pursued after the death of a party. The circuit court stated:\n\u201cSought is the past tense of the word seek which is defined in Webster\u2019s Dictionary as follows: To try to get or acquire; to pursue.\nTherefore the statute provides that the case may not be pursued after the death of a party. While in this case, this ruling may result in an injustice, it is not within the Court\u2019s prerogative to rewrite the statutes.\nIt is therefore ordered that the Motion to Dismiss is granted.\u201d\nThis is a case of first impression. We can find no cases which have interpreted section 302(b) under circumstances similar to the present case. Like the circuit court, we believe that the question that must be determined is what the General Assembly intended when it used the word \u201csought.\u201d\nIn construing statutes, the judicial role is to ascertain and to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. The entire statute must be examined in order to find the legislative intent, not only in the plain language of the statute, but also in the objectives of the legislation and the evils it sought to remedy. (Baksinski v. Corey (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1019, 529 N.E.2d 232, 234.) Courts consider the historical and practice notes to the annotated statutes helpful when ascertaining the legislative intent. (Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 208, 212, 443 N.E.2d 563, 565.) The consequences resulting from various constructions of an Act must be taken into consideration in construing the statute, and the court should select the construction which leads to a logical result and avoid the construction which the General Assembly could not have contemplated. In re Marriage of Burke (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258, 541 N.E.2d 245, 248-49.\nSection 302 of the Act is derived from section 208 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 302, Historical and Practice Notes, at 89 (Smith-Hurd 1980).) A review of the comments to section 208 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is helpful in determining what the drafters had in mind when writing this section. The comments explain that \u201c[sjubsection (b) states a general policy against declarations of invalidity after the death of either party to the marriage.\u201d (9A U.L.A. \u00a7208, Comment, at 171 (1987).) The Comment goes on to explain:\n\u201cThe provisions of subsection (b), stating that no declaration of invalidity may be \u2018sought\u2019 after the death of either party is intended to prohibit such a collateral attack upon the marriage, in lieu of a declaration, in all proceedings, including probate proceedings. Moreover, the use of the word \u2018sought\u2019 rather than \u2018commenced\u2019 implies that the death of a party to the marriage at any time before the entry of final judgment would terminate a proceeding attacking the marriage. The underlying policy reasons for this principle are clear: the traditional \u2018void marriage\u2019 doctrine often imposed unwise and unfair penalties on innocent \u2018spouses\u2019 in stable family situations long after the questioned marriage had occurred. The penalties serve no effective deterrent purpose, but cause severe economic dislocations; a spouse may be denied workmen\u2019s compensation and social security benefits, or even a share in a spouse\u2019s estate, after the marriage has been terminated by the death of the other spouse, despite the fact that the surviving spouse had no reason to suspect the invalidity of the marriage.\u201d (9A U.L.A. \u00a7208, Comment, at 172 (1987).)\nThe historical notes to the Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes adopt the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act Comments and clearly explain that the rationale for section 302(b) was to abolish the void marriage doctrine and thereby prohibit the invalidation of a long-standing marriage, which, if allowed, can cause a host of economic troubles for the surviving spouse who had long assumed that his or her marriage was valid and that he or she was entitled to the deceased spouse\u2019s death benefits. Apparently, our General Assembly and the drafters of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act did not contemplate a situation such as the one before us where the deceased spouse married only weeks before his death and where an action to invalidate the recent marriage was filed by his legal representative before his death, but an evidentiary hearing on the matter could not be held before the incompetent spouse died. In this situation, if defendant is in fact an \u201cinnocent spouse,\u201d she would not suffer the hardships noted by the drafters of the language of section 302(b), as she did not enjoy a long-standing marriage with plaintiff. If defendant is not an \u201cinnocent spouse,\u201d but is in fact guilty of securing her marriage to plaintiff through fraud or duress, she certainly does not need the protection of section 302(b); instead, plaintiff\u2019s family should be protected.\nA reading of the circuit court\u2019s order in this matter shows that the court recognized the injustice which could occur by its dismissal of the complaint. We, too, recognize the injustice that would occur by dismissal of this action if the allegations made in plaintiff\u2019s complaint are true. Because we do not believe that the General Assembly contemplated this situation, and because we believe it is logical under the present circumstances to allow the invalidity action to survive the plaintiff\u2019s death, we construe the word \u201csought\u201d to mean that if the invalidity action is initiated prior to the decedent\u2019s death, it will survive.\nThe only other issue we are asked to consider is defendant\u2019s cross-appeal. Defendant contends that the circuit court erred when it substituted plaintiff\u2019s guardian, Michael L. Jones, as special administrator of plaintiff\u2019s estate for the purpose of pursuing this appeal. Defendant is correct that \u201c[i]f letters of administration are issued to another on a petition filed, letters may not be issued to the person who was guardian.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110\u00bd, par. 24\u201419(b).) However, both the record and the briefs are void of any information concerning the previous issuance of letters to one other than Michael L. Jones. It is not the function of a reviewing court to read beyond the record and to engage in speculation. (In re Marriage of Glessner (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 306, 313, 456 N.E.2d 311, 316.) The burden rests on the appellant, in this instance the cross-appellant, to provide a sufficient record to support her claim of error, and in the absence of such a record, the reviewing court will presume that the circuit court\u2019s order was in conformity with established legal principles and had an adequate factual basis. (Fischer v. Mann (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 424, 425-26, 514 N.E.2d 566, 567.) Because we must concern ourselves only with the record before us, we find that the circuit court did not err by substituting plaintiff\u2019s guardian for purposes of this appeal.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Marion County is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nRARICK, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Eric L. Terlizzi, of Pfaff, Garner & Terlizzi, of Salem, and Harold H. Pennock, Jr., of Hodson, Jones & Pennock, Ltd., of Centraba, for appellant.", "Marvin G. Miller, of Crain, Cooksey & Veltman, Ltd., of Centraba, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT L. QUICK, by Michael L. Jones, his Guardian and Legal Representative, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. JOANN HAMBURG QUICK, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201490\u20140037\nOpinion filed May 15, 1991.\nEric L. Terlizzi, of Pfaff, Garner & Terlizzi, of Salem, and Harold H. Pennock, Jr., of Hodson, Jones & Pennock, Ltd., of Centraba, for appellant.\nMarvin G. Miller, of Crain, Cooksey & Veltman, Ltd., of Centraba, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0097-01", "first_page_order": 119, "last_page_order": 124 }