{
  "id": 2604169,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL L. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thompson",
  "decision_date": "1991-05-31",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL L. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Michael L. Thompson was charged by information on August 14, 1989, with the offense of attempted burglary. On November 9, 1989, a pretrial hearing was held on the State\u2019s motion to allow defendant\u2019s juvenile records into evidence. The State contended that the juvenile records were admissible to impeach defendant in the event he chose to testify and to establish modus operandi. The trial court concluded that section 1\u201410 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801\u201410) prevented the admission of the records into evidence under either theory.\nThe State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). Defendant contends that we lack jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) to review the trial court\u2019s decision. He asserts that the trial court\u2019s order preventing the use of the juvenile records for impeachment purposes in no way impairs the State\u2019s ability to prosecute the case. Defendant also asserts that the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the juvenile records for modus operandi purposes is not a proper subject for appeal under Rule 604(a)(1) because the trial court\u2019s order was based on \u201cthe relevance of the evidence excluded.\u201d Defendant also argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling was proper. We shall address defendant\u2019s jurisdictional arguments first.\nSupreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) provides:\n\u201cRule 604. Appeals from Certain Judgments and Orders\n(a) Appeals by the State.\n(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).\nOur supreme court has interpreted this provision to allow the State to appeal from a pretrial suppression order\n\u201cwhenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial court that the suppression substantially impairs the State\u2019s ability to prosecute the case.\u201d People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247, 412 N.E.2d 501, 512.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that the use of defendant\u2019s juvenile records at trial would be contingent upon defendant testifying and, therefore, the suppression of the records for impeachment purposes cannot affect the State\u2019s ability to prosecute its case. We agree and therefore conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the trial court\u2019s order excluding the juvenile records for impeachment purposes.\nWe are mindful that our supreme court in Young stated that courts should \u201crely solely upon the good-faith evaluation by the prosecutor of the impact of the suppression order on his case.\u201d (Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 512.) However, we do not feel that we are bound to exercise jurisdiction over a cause when, as in this case, it is obvious that the trial court\u2019s order has no impact on the State\u2019s ability to prosecute the case.\nWe note that the prosecutor's certificate of impairment did not specifically say that the exclusion of the evidence substantially impaired his ability to prosecute the case, and we can appreciate the lack of such an inclusion on the impeachment issue. However, a more substantial statement by the State\u2019s Attorney would have been appropriate on the modus operandi issue, at least for purposes of establishing the State\u2019s ability to prosecute this appeal. We do not decline jurisdiction of the modus operandi issue on the basis of any failure in the State\u2019s certificate. We merely point this out for purposes of future appeals.\nDefendant next contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the trial court\u2019s order preventing the State from introducing his juvenile records into evidence to establish modus operandi because it relates to the relevance of the evidence excluded. We disagree.\nWhen considering the propriety of an appeal brought under Rule 604(a)(1), the focus is on the effect of the suppression order and not on the nature of the evidence involved. (People v. Carlton (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 187, 193, 455 N.E.2d 1385, 1388.) In People v. Hatfield (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 401, 514 N.E.2d 572, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal of the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion in limine to suppress or exclude from evidence certain statements of witnesses:\n\u201cWe deny defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 604(aXl) [citation]. The pretrial suppression order need not be premised on evidence illegally obtained; rather, it may concern evidentiary rulings regarding hearsay and relevancy where the prosecutor certifies to the trial court, as was done here, that the suppression substantially impairs the prosecution.\u201d (Hatfield, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 404-05 514 N.E.2d at 574.)\nWe conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the trial court\u2019s decision to prevent the State from admitting into evidence defendant\u2019s juvenile records to establish modus operandi.\nThe trial court\u2019s decision to exclude defendant\u2019s juvenile records was based on section 1 \u2014 10 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801\u201410). Section 1\u201410 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cAdmissibility of evidence and adjudications in other proceedings. (1) Evidence and adjudications in proceedings under this Act shall be admissible:\n* * *\n(b) in criminal proceedings when the court is to determine the amount of bail, fitness of the defendant or in sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections; or\n(c) in proceedings under this Act or in. criminal proceedings in which anyone who has been adjudicated delinquent under Section 5 \u2014 3 is to be a witness, and then only for purposes of impeachment and pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, pars. 801 \u2014 10(l)(b), (l)(c).\nThe plain language of sections 1 \u2014 10(l)(b) and (l)(c) clearly prevents the State from admitting into evidence defendant\u2019s juvenile records to establish modus operandi. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s decision must be affirmed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the State\u2019s appeal from the circuit court\u2019s ruling excluding the juvenile records for impeachment purposes is dismissed. The court\u2019s ruling excluding the records for modus operandi purposes is affirmed. .\nAffirmed.\nRARICK, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Charles Garnati, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Debra A. Buchman, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Daniel M. Kirwan and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL L. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201489\u20140764\nOpinion filed May 31, 1991.\nCharles Garnati, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Debra A. Buchman, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1027-01",
  "first_page_order": 1049,
  "last_page_order": 1052
}