{ "id": 5297671, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY RIAL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rial", "decision_date": "1991-06-05", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201490\u20140082", "first_page": "420", "last_page": "427", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 420" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991135 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 U.S. 12", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1105068 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/351/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3278156 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1065", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 1030", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3211054 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/1030-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3108266 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3128740 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3442757 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650335 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 567, "char_count": 13361, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3029308400848126e-07, "percentile": 0.6225957575132759 }, "sha256": "1670d36602053a4d1cf691b880c62767077881021afe7f13d2add7634d4bcea3", "simhash": "1:c3ef9d0eb3ca1d90", "word_count": 2166 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:26:06.259068+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY RIAL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nA jury convicted the defendant, Larry Rial, of attempted murder, armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and armed violence. The trial court vacated the armed violence conviction and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 30, 30, and 15 years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively. This court affirmed his conviction on appeal. (People v. Rial (3d Dist. 1983), No. 3\u2014 83\u20140276 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).) Thereafter, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing. The defendant appeals that dismissal. We affirm.\nThe record shows that the defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition and thereafter counsel was appointed to represent him. The defendant continued to file pro se supplemental and amended petitions. Thereafter, defendant\u2019s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that no amendments to the defendant\u2019s pro se petitions could be made and that no constitutional issues existed which could be presented to the court.\nThe trial court granted defense counsel\u2019s motion, and the defendant proceeded on his pro se petitions. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petitions, and the trial court granted the motion.\nOn appeal, the defendant first argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to the trial court\u2019s error in allowing his post-conviction counsel to withdraw.\nIn a post-conviction case, compliance with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (87 Ill. 2d 651(c)), which requires certification that the attorney consulted with the petitioner, examined the record, and made any necessary changes in the petition, is sufficient representation. People v. Robinson (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 366, 513 N.E.2d 603.\nHere, the record shows that the defendant\u2019s counsel complied with Supreme Court Rule 651(c). In his motion to withdraw, counsel certified the following: (1) he had consulted with the defendant on two occasions; (2) he had examined the entire record of the trial proceedings and the common law record; and (3) it was his opinion no amendments to the defendant\u2019s pro se petition were necessary based on counsel\u2019s conclusion that no constitutional issues existed which could properly be presented to the court in a post-conviction proceeding. The record also shows the trial court conducted a hearing on counsel\u2019s motion before granting it.\nBased on the record, we find that defense counsel adequately consulted with the defendant and would have been aware of any necessary amendments to the petition. As such, we conclude defendant\u2019s counsel complied with Rule 651(c) and rendered effective assistance.\nThe defendant next argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing. He alleges he was entitled to a hearing due to the fact his petition raised eight errors that occurred below.\nThe defendant\u2019s first two alleged errors concern ineffective assistance of counsel.\nA defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition alleging incompetency of counsel. (People v. Hanrahan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 640, 478 N.E.2d 31.) Conclusional allegations concerning the competency of counsel are not sufficient to require a post-conviction hearing. (People v. Howard (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 797, 419 N.E.2d 702.) Furthermore, a defendant who alleges incompetency must show that counsel\u2019s shortcomings affected the outcome of the proceedings. (People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) Denial of an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is discretionary with the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Hanrahan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 640, 478 N.E.2d 31.\nIn the case at hand, the defendant first contends that his counsel was ineffective because counsel was running for public office and as such was not able to devote adequate time to the defendant\u2019s case. He alleges that due to this, counsel failed to adequately interview witnesses and investigate.\nWhen the defendant attacks the competency of his counsel for failing to call or contact witnesses, he must attach affidavits from those witnesses to his post-conviction petition and explain the significance of their testimony. (People v. Carmickle (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 917, 424 N.E.2d 78.) Here, the defendant has failed to support his allegations with affidavits from witnesses pointing out testimony that would have been favorable to him or would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. As such, we cannot say his counsel was ineffective.\nThe defendant next alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, he states that evidence found in his home was improperly admitted because he never gave the police consent to search his home.\nThe record shows that Deputy Sheriff Raymond Compton testified the defendant gave him permission to search his home. The defendant does not cite, nor were we able to find, any evidence in the record contradicting Compton\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, we find the defendant\u2019s contention to be without merit.\nThe defendant raises a number of different issues wherein he contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing due to errors of constitutional dimension.\nA defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right, but has the burden of showing a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. (People v. Hanrahan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 640, 478 N.E.2d 31.) The denial of an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is discretionary with the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. People v. Reed (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 405 N.E.2d 1065.\nThe defendant first argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the State withheld evidence favorable to him. He contends that four witnesses conspired against him and the State failed to turn over a diary which contained evidence of the conspiracy. In addition, the State withheld information regarding the victim\u2019s criminal history.\nThe suppression by the State of material evidence favorable to an accused which was requested by the defense is a violation of due process. (People v. Morgan (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 302, 395 N.E.2d 103.) In the case at hand, the defendant has failed to support his claim the State withheld evidence. Regarding his contention the State failed to provide him with information on the victim\u2019s criminal history, the record shows the State did give him that information.\nAs to his contention the State withheld a diary, we note the defendant has failed to supply this court with a record cite showing he requested the State to provide it. More importantly, he has failed to file any affidavits from witnesses testifying that such a diary actually existed or, if it did exist, that the State knew about it and withheld it from the defendant.\nThe defendant next argues that he is entitled to a hearing because of the State\u2019s use of perjured testimony. He alleges that witnesses Bales, Keagle, Harris, and Buie all conspired against him and perjured themselves at his trial.\nAt the onset, we note Buie and Keagle did not testify at the defendant\u2019s trial. Once again, the defendant has supplied us with mere conclusions of errors. He has failed to provide record cites showing what testimony was allegedly false. Furthermore, he has failed to file affidavits or point to any evidence that supports his contention that the witnesses perjured themselves or conspired against him.\nThe defendant next contends he is entitled to a hearing due to trial court misconduct. He alleges the court committed the following errors: (1) denied him a copy of his codefendant\u2019s trial transcripts; (2) denied his attorney the right to impeach a witness; (3) withheld information regarding his codefendant\u2019s mental instability; and (4) responded to two jury questions without notifying the defendant that questions had been posed.\nWe find the defendant\u2019s allegations to be without merit. Regarding the first contention, the record shows the trial court held that the defendant could have a copy of the codefendant\u2019s transcripts. The court found, however, the defendant was not entitled to a free copy of it and if he wanted it he would have to pay the expenses.\nWe find the trial court\u2019s decision was correct. While the law holds that an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript of his own trial (Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585), it does not hold he is entitled to a free transcript of someone else\u2019s trial.\nThe defendant\u2019s second contention is the court erred in not allowing defense counsel to impeach a witness. However, he has failed to provide this court with a record cite showing where this alleged error occurred. In addition, he has failed to file affidavits showing what witness could have been impeached and what evidence could have been used to impeach the witness. As such, we cannot conclude any error occurred.\nThe defendant\u2019s third contention is the trial court erred in withholding information from him. The defendant is apparently arguing a trial court has the responsibility of supplying a defendant with evidence. However, he has failed to cite any cases that support this proposition, and as such, we find his contention to be without merit.\nThe defendant\u2019s fourth contention regarding court misconduct is that the trial court answered two questions posed by the jury without notifying him.\nOnce again the defendant has failed to provide a record cite showing where these errors occurred. Our review of the record shows the jury sent one question to the court. In addition, the record tends to show the defendant and his attorney were present to discuss the answer that was given to the jury.\nThe defendant next argues he is entitled to a hearing because of police misconduct. Specifically, he alleges the police threatened Stacie Rial in connection with this case.\nThe defendant filed an affidavit from Stacie stating the police threatened to arrest her unless she gave them some letters. However, he has failed to show how this amounts to a substantial denial of a constitutional right since he did not establish that these letters were used against him at trial.\nThe defendant next argues he is entitled to a hearing because he was not properly informed of all his rights regarding a speedy trial. Specifically, he contends he was not told that if he waived his right to a speedy trial in the case at hand, it would affect his rights in all other pending cases wherein he was a defendant.\nWe find the defendant\u2019s contention to be irrelevant. He has not shown how his waiver in this case prejudiced him or how it possibly affected the outcome of this proceeding.\nThe defendant next argues he was denied meaningful access to the courts. He alleges the trial court improperly allowed his post-conviction counsel to withdraw and then improperly denied his repeated requests for appointment of new counsel.\nAs we have previously held, the trial court properly allowed defense counsel to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651. Regarding the defendant\u2019s contention that other counsel should have been appointed, we find the record does not support this. Here, the defendant told the trial court he was prepared to represent himself for the remainder of the hearings on his post-conviction petition. As such, we decline to allow the defendant to complain of a procedure he himself requested.\nThe defendant next contends his petition was improperly dismissed since the court\u2019s decision was based solely on defense counsel\u2019s statement that no constitutional issues existed.\nOnce again the record fails to support the defendant\u2019s contention. Instead, it shows the State filed a motion to dismiss which included a memorandum that addressed each of the issues raised in the petitions.\nThe defendant\u2019s final argument is that the jury instruction for attempted murder was defective because it did not state that the intent to kill was a necessary element of the crime.\nThis same issue was addressed in People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331. There, the court held that the giving of the defective attempted murder instruction did not constitute the denial of a constitutional right cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122\u20141 et seq.). We agree and as such find the defendant was not entitled to a hearing on this issue.\nIn conclusion, we find the defendant\u2019s allegations did not sustain his burden so as to require an evidentiary hearing. His allegations were either mere conclusions not supported by the record or affidavits, or were allegations regarding matters that did not raise a constitutional issue.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and BARRY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Larry J. Rial, of Joliet, appellant pro se.", "Edward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Elizabeth A. Klug, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY RIAL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201490\u20140082\nOpinion filed June 5, 1991.\nRehearing denied July 2, 1991.\nLarry J. Rial, of Joliet, appellant pro se.\nEdward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Elizabeth A. Klug, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0420-01", "first_page_order": 442, "last_page_order": 449 }