{ "id": 5293985, "name": "SANDY BIEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOX MEADOW FARMS LTD. et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bien v. Fox Meadow Farms Ltd.", "decision_date": "1991-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140844", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "342", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 337" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472487 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3516563 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523544 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "375-76" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2629119 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 902", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491651 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2436576 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/315/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193584 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "548-49" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2433120 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477528 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0637-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 621, "char_count": 12508, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.185499846772707e-08, "percentile": 0.32548866748601946 }, "sha256": "a4242624da35828921aab9c7f4291a602959d9b890da55fde2533de8a7e3a27d", "simhash": "1:78ff528c5f684603", "word_count": 2058 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:50.210219+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SANDY BIEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOX MEADOW FARMS LTD. et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Sandy Bien, appeals from an order granting the defendants, Fox Meadow Farms Ltd. (Fox Meadow), Elizabeth A. Yackley, and Patty Johnson, summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff released her right to recover in negligence against them. The plaintiff\u2019s contested issues can be summarized as whether the release that she signed relieves the defendants of liability. We affirm.\nThe facts necessary to this appeal are as follows. The plaintiff had been taking horseback riding lessons weekly at Fox Meadow from August 2, 1986, until the date of her injury. On August 2, 1986, the plaintiff was told to sign a document \u201cfor insurance purposes.\u201d She did not remember reading the document before signing it, but thought that she needed to sign it so that Fox Meadow could \u201cadd her to their insurance.\u201d The document, entitled \u201cRELEASE,\u201d contained the following language:\n\u201cThe undersigned being of lawful age *** desires to enter upon the premises of FOX MEADOW FARM LIMITED, *** and/or to use horses and the facilities either owned or controlled by the owners of said FOX MEADOW FARM LIMITED, and being duly aware of the risk of injury and hazards inherent upon entering upon said premises and/or the riding of horses ***, hereby elects voluntarily to enter upon said premises and to participate in said hazardous activities.\nTherefore, each of the undersigned for and in consideration of their permission to enter upon said premises, ride said horses and/or participate in said equestrian activities, do hereby voluntarily assume all risks of loss, damage, or personal injury, including death, that may be sustained by any or each of the undersigned which may hereinafter occur on account of, or in any way growing out of *** said equestrian activities.\nThe undersigned further expressly understands and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless FOX MEADOW FARM LIMITED, Elizabeth A. Yackley, *** their employees and agents, against any and all further claims or damages, costs or expenses incurred by FOX MEADOW MEADOW FARM LIMITED, their employees and agents, as a result of any accident, injury or property loss which may incurr [sic] while the undersigned is upon said premises or is engaged in equestrian activities and which may result from the negligence of the undersigned, FOX MEADOW FARM LIMITED, Elizabeth A. Yackley, *** and their employees, agents, third parties or any combination thereof.\n* * *\nCAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING.\u201d\nThere was a lesson schedule on the back of the document.\nThe plaintiff signed the document, and defendant Yackley signed above a line designated as \u201cWitness.\u201d The plaintiff then paid a $15 fee for the day\u2019s activities. She never signed another document during the time that she took lessons, but continued to pay $15 each time she entered Fox Meadow\u2019s property.\nOn February 28, 1988, the plaintiff had a lesson. Defendant Johnson, an independent contractor for Fox Meadow and the plaintiff\u2019s instructor, directed her to ride a horse named Scout. Although the plaintiff did not want to ride Scout because he had a tendency to thrash his head after a jump, she did ride Scout to avoid having to ride Sunny, a horse that the plaintiff found to be \u201creckless and unpredictable.\u201d\nJust after her first jump, the plaintiff observed that Scout thrashed his head. She told Johnson about her problem with the horse. Johnson told her to pull the reins tighter after the jump. After her second jump, the plaintiff pulled the reins tighter, but again observed that Scout thrashed his head. Johnson then told her to pull the reins even tighter after the jump. As the plaintiff was completing her third jump, she adhered to Johnson\u2019s suggestion and pulled even tighter on the reins. She completed the jump and rode approximately 20 feet past it. Scout began violently thrashing his head and ultimately threw the plaintiff off his back. She fell and was injured.\nThe plaintiff brought this case, initially against Fox Meadow and Yackley. She later amended her complaint to include Johnson. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. After the trial court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for reconsideration, this appeal followed.\nBefore reaching the issue on appeal, we must first address the plaintiff\u2019s motion to strike the defendants\u2019 statement of facts. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 341(eX6).) We have taken the motion with this case, and we deny it.\nThe plaintiff argues that the defendants have inaccurately portrayed the facts of this case. She points to a sentence in the defendants\u2019 statement of facts that does not have a record citation. The plaintiff then contends that a phrase, \u201cthe release clearly states,\u201d in the defendants\u2019 statement of facts is argumentative. She further finds fault in the defendants\u2019 \u201cbolding\u201d certain words in the release. We find that the statement of facts does not hinder or preclude review. (See Oakleaf v. Oakleaf & Associates, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 637, 646.) We deny the plaintiff\u2019s motion to strike.\nWe now turn to the substantive issues raised in the appeal. They can be summarized as whether the trial court properly found that the release relieved the defendants of liability.\nExculpatory agreements are generally enforceable unless their enforcement would be against the settled public policy of this State or there is something in the social relationship of the parties which militates against upholding the agreement. (Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc. (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602.) We note that a release to go horseback riding has been upheld, with the court\u2019s reasoning that the risk of being thrown from a horse is apparent to all but the most inexperienced of horseback riders. See Harris v. Walker (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50.\nThe plaintiff first argues that the release had a fixed duration. According to that argument, the release terminated when the plaintiff left the Fox Meadow premises on August 2, 1986, the day that she signed it.\nThe trial court, however, found that the language of the release, as a matter of law, provided that the release was to be effective each time that the plaintiff entered Fox Meadow\u2019s property, even though the release does not specify its duration. Where no definite time is fixed during which a contract continues, it is terminable at the will of either party. (Gage v. Village of Wilmette (1924), 315 Ill. 328, 331; First National Bank v. Sylvester (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 902, 910.) The construction of a release is governed by the rules of law for contracts. Polo National Bank v. Lester (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 411, 414.\nHere, after the plaintiff signed the release, neither party elected to terminate it. Further, the language of the release states that the plaintiff assumed \u201call risks of loss *** that may be sustained by *** each of the undersigned which may hereinafter occur on account of, or in any way growing out of *** said equestrian activities.\u201d (Emphasis added.) We find that the release continued until either party exercised its right to terminate it. Since the release had not been terminated by either party, we therefore agree with the trial court that the release continued to be effective on the day of the accident.\nThe plaintiff next argues that her injuries do not fall within the scope of the release.\nIn Harris v. Walker (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 542, the plaintiff rented a horse from the defendants\u2019 riding stables. (119 Ill. 2d at 545.) The horse became \u201cspooked or \u2018side-shocked\u2019 \u201d and threw the plaintiff. (119 Ill. 2d at 549.) Before riding the horse, the plaintiff signed an exculpatory agreement relieving the defendants from liability that might be incurred \u201cwhile on the premises or for any injury which may result from horseback riding.\u201d (119 Ill. 2d at 548-49.) The trial court granted summary judgment in the defendants\u2019 favor. The appellate court reversed the judgment, but the supreme court affirmed the trial court\u2019s granting of summary judgment. (119 Ill. 2d at 545.) The supreme court found the terms of the release to contain broad language which would encompass the plaintiff\u2019s injury. (119 Ill. 2d at 549.) We find the Harris case to be controlling here.\nThe plaintiff argues that the Harris case is distinguishable from this case. She first argues that, unlike in Harris where the plaintiff was an experienced rider, she classified herself as a \u201cbeginner.\u201d We note that she had been taking horseback riding lessons from the defendants for over two years before the accident. Further, the Harris court found \u201cthat only the most inexperienced of horseback riders would not understand that under certain circumstances a horse may *** cause a rider to fall from the horse.\u201d (119 Ill. 2d at 549.) As the trial court correctly found here, the plaintiff was not \u201cthe most inexperienced of horseback riders.\u201d She, like the Harris plaintiff, could appreciate the risk of being thrown from a horse.\nThe plaintiff then argues that Harris is inapplicable since the plaintiff there merely rented a horse, while she was on Fox Meadow\u2019s property for riding lessons. Again, we see no basis to distinguish the case. The question is whether the plaintiff could appreciate the risk that a horse could throw her. The release, as worded, is broad enough to encompass \u201cany accident, injury or property loss.\u201d\nFinally, the plaintiff argues that Harris is inapplicable here since the plaintiff there admitted that he read and fully understood the release that he signed. The plaintiff here stated that she may neither have read the release before signing, nor understood that she was signing a release.\nA release or exculpatory agreement may be set aside if there is either fraud in the execution or fraud in the inducement. (Rudolph v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc. (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 372, 374.) Fraud in the execution occurs where the party was induced to sign the agreement not knowing it was a release, but believing it to be another type of document; fraud in the inducement is where the party is induced to enter into the release by false representations by the other party. (Koch v. Spalding (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 692, 697.) A party has a general duty to read documents before he signs them, and his failure to do so will not render the document invalid. Rudolph, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 375-76.\nThe plaintiff here argues that she thought that she signed the release so that she could be included in Fox Meadow\u2019s insurance coverage. However, she still failed to read the document even though the words, \u201cCAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING,\u201d appeared just above her signature. Further, the document is captioned \u201cRELEASE.\u201d The plaintiff has not raised a question of fact that she was fraudulently induced to sign the release. The plaintiff is not entitled to relief simply because she has failed to exercise reasonable care before signing the release. See Rudolph, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 376.\nBy following Harris, we reach the same conclusion that the tidal court did, i.e., that the broad language of the release relieves the defendants from liability. We find that the trial court did not err in granting the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nWe quickly dispose of the plaintiff\u2019s three remaining arguments. The arguments are the following: (1) whether defendant Yackley, who signed the release under the heading of \u201cWitness,\u201d could \u201caccept\u201d the release on behalf of all the defendants; (2) whether the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment is inadequate because the defendants initially failed to attach a copy of both sides of the release; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant Johnson is covered under the release.\nThe plaintiff offers no case citation to support her arguments. Thus, she has not complied with Supreme Court Rule 341(eX7) (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(eX7)). We are entitled to be cited pertinent authorities (see Lazy \u2018L\u2019 Family Preservation Trust v. First State Bank (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 624, 627), and we therefore reject these arguments.\nThe decision of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carr & O\u2019Rourke Associates, of Chicago (Glenn J. Jazwiec, of counsel), for appellant.", "Aries, Hoyt & Taden, of Chicago (Lisa Lantero, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SANDY BIEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOX MEADOW FARMS LTD. et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140844\nOpinion filed June 28, 1991.\nRehearing denied August 1, 1991.\nCarr & O\u2019Rourke Associates, of Chicago (Glenn J. Jazwiec, of counsel), for appellant.\nAries, Hoyt & Taden, of Chicago (Lisa Lantero, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 359, "last_page_order": 364 }