{ "id": 5293635, "name": "JOHN W. WIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Wixon v. Edgar", "decision_date": "1991-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201490\u20140634", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "499", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 1145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639447 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 N.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2466464 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0384-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 20540, "ocr_confidence": 0.811, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.03064477862558e-07, "percentile": 0.5479769283846279 }, "sha256": "21f323636f3334928ae7f6f8816dd5044cfb0dc8d3cb68307e19e33b8a2cf66e", "simhash": "1:65e741f7bc03e346", "word_count": 3189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:50.210219+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHN W. WIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff John W. Wixon petitioned the Secretary of State (Secretary) seeking full reinstatement of his driving privileges, or in the alternative, a restricted driving permit (RDP). On April 23, 1990, the Secretary, upon the recommendation of the hearing officer, denied plaintiff both full reinstatement of his driving privileges and the RDP. Plaintiff sought administrative review of this decision in the circuit court of Sangamon County, which affirmed the Secretary\u2019s decision on August 8, 1990. Plaintiff appeals that order, contending the Secretary\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and the Secretary erred in giving \u201cno weight\u201d to an alcohol evaluation submitted by plaintiff at the hearing. We reverse.\nFor reasons hereinafter stated, it is unnecessary to address the denial of the RDP.\nAt the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 32 years old and lived in Cissna Park, Illinois. He was married with two stepchildren and his wife was expecting a child in April 1990.\nPlaintiff worked for 5V2 years at Stockland Nitrogen Service, a business which sells fertilizers, chemicals, and seeds to farmers, as well as provides various repair and spraying services. Plaintiff\u2019s place of employment is located in Stockland, Illinois, which is approximately 20 miles from plaintiff\u2019s residence. Co-workers alternate in providing plaintiff transportation to and from work. While at work, when called upon to travel to various farmsteads to provide supplies or services, plaintiff is driven by another worker. Plaintiff has not possessed a driver\u2019s license during the course of his employment at Stockland Nitrogen Service. In the spring and fall, plaintiff worked seven days a week from 4 a.m. to 9 or 10 p.m. During the summer and winter months, plaintiff\u2019s day lasts from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m.\nPlaintiff\u2019s wife does not drink alcohol; and plaintiff has been abstinent since February 1988, except he admitted to his wife and his alcohol counselor that he consumed one can of beer on December 24, 1989.\nPlaintiff\u2019s driving record revealed several arrests beginning in 1976. Plaintiff has four speeding convictions, one reckless driving conviction, and one conviction for disregarding an official traffic-control device. Plaintiff\u2019s license was suspended on October 1, 1976, for having three moving violations in a 12-month period of time. Plaintiff had his license suspended on May 30, 1978, pursuant to a conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. In 1978, plaintiff was convicted for not yielding the right-of-way at an intersection and illegal transportation of alcohol. The driving record shows defendant has two arrests for driving while under the influence (DUI), which occurred on October 13, 1979, and October 5, 1985. Plaintiff\u2019s license was revoked on July 22, 1986, pursuant to his DUI conviction for the October 5, 1985, incident. Plaintiff had two formal hearings in 1988 and 1989 seeking reinstatement of his license, both of which were denied. The driving record shows no traffic violations since October 5, 1985.\nAt the hearing, the Secretary submitted plaintiff\u2019s driving record, plaintiff\u2019s request for a hearing, and plaintiff\u2019s notice of hearing into evidence. The Secretary also asked the hearing officer to take judicial notice of plaintiff\u2019s files of his two prior hearings, to which the hearing officer acquiesced. The Secretary presented the original alcohol evaluation and two updates, a remedial-education verification, and a character letter from plaintiff\u2019s employer, as well as letters from various acquaintances of plaintiff.\nPlaintiff testified at the hearing he had been abstinent from alcohol since February 1988, with the exception of one beer on December 24, 1989. Plaintiff stated he immediately told his wife and also told his alcohol counselor. Plaintiff testified he began counseling for his alcohol problem in February 1988. Plaintiff attended individual sessions with his counselor weekly, which lasted approximately lVz hours each. Plaintiff attended these sessions for two months, but stopped attending after his counselor informed him he no longer needed to attend. Plaintiff stated he has no future intention of using alcohol because of his desire to eliminate the problem alcohol created for him and also because of a need to support his family. Plaintiff stated he wished to keep his job and obtain a driver\u2019s license.\nPlaintiff underwent an alcohol evaluation on April 21, 1987. The evaluator wrote: \u201cClient reports two DUI arrests, one illegal transportation arrest, and one reckless driving arrest.\u201d The evaluation stated plaintiff spent 30 days in jail in connection with his latest DUI arrest. The evaluator classified plaintiff at Level II \u2014 problematic use. 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.410 (Supp. 1988).\nTwo subsequent updates of this evaluation were conducted to be used at plaintiff\u2019s hearing. Both of these updated evaluations placed plaintiff at Level I \u2014 nonproblematic use. (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.410 (Supp. 1988).) The latest update, dated February 13, 1990, was done for the current hearing. At the hearing, plaintiff further testified he provided his evaluator with the prior decisions of the Secretary with respect to his previous two applications for reinstatement of driving privileges. Finally, plaintiff testified his evaluator had a copy of his driving record when she conducted the evaluations.\nPlaintiff\u2019s wife also testified at the hearing. She stated she was aware of her husband\u2019s prior problems with substance abuse, but that he quit drinking just before they were married in June 1988. She testified she had not seen her husband drink alcohol since February 1988 and she herself does not drink alcohol. Plaintiff\u2019s wife testified she was unable to transport her husband to and from work because she also worked and she did not wish to leave their children home alone in order to drive plaintiff to his place of employment. Finally, she stated plaintiff plays with his children in his spare time and is in the process of remodeling their home.\nThe hearing officer took official notice of the files from plaintiff\u2019s previous hearings and particularly noted the alcohol evaluations submitted at those hearings. The hearing officer found plaintiff successfully completed an alcohol-drug remedial-education course and plaintiff submitted an updated alcohol evaluation performed by a licensed agency.\nHowever, the hearing officer afforded \u201cno weight\u201d to this evaluation. Specifically, the hearing officer found plaintiff had been arrested four times for DUI, but found the first evaluation only addressed two such arrests. This \u201cmajor discrepancy\u201d caused plaintiff\u2019s two previous applications for driving relief to be denied. The hearing officer concluded since there was no indication in the evidence that the evaluator was aware of four DUI arrests, no weight was to be afforded to the evaluation. Therefore, the hearing officer found the evidence at the hearing did not support the level of classification contained in the evaluation.\nThe hearing officer further found plaintiff had completed all the treatment recommended by the evaluator, but since the recommendation was based on erroneous information, the hearing officer questioned the appropriateness of the treatment recommendation. Because of these discrepancies in the evidence, the hearing officer found plaintiff could not be considered for relief and doubted plaintiff\u2019s credibility.\nBased on these findings, the hearing officer concluded plaintiff failed to prove he would be a safe and responsible driver and that he would not endanger the public safety and welfare. Thus, the hearing officer recommended plaintiff\u2019s petition for full reinstatement of driving privileges or RDP be denied.\nThe Secretary adopted these findings, conclusions and recommendations on April 23, 1990. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking administrative review of this decision on April 30, 1990. On August 8, 1990, the circuit court of Sangamon County held the Secretary\u2019s decision was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and affirmed the Secretary\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s petition. Plaintiff subsequently filed this appeal on September 6,1990.\nFindings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110.) A court may not overturn the decision of an administrative body unless the authority of the administrative body was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner or the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 469 N.E.2d 1085.) A reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or make factual findings, and an agency\u2019s decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence merely because the court would have decided the case differently. Kennedy v. Edgar (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 138, 556 N.E.2d 830.\nPlaintiff contends the Secretary\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, plaintiff argues the Secretary presented no evidence other than his driving record prior to 1985 to establish that plaintiff would not be a safe and responsible driver and would not endanger the public safety and welfare. The Secretary responds the decision was proper because the hearing officer correctly questioned the validity of the alcohol evaluation submitted by plaintiff. The Secretary asserts since the evaluator did not possess full knowledge of plaintiff\u2019s driving record, the classification of plaintiff at Level II and then a subsequent reclassification of plaintiff at Level I was questionable. Thus, plaintiff failed to prove he would not endanger the public safety and welfare.\nWe have searched the record, specifically the driving record provided by the Secretary of State. The record shows only two DUI arrests, October 13, 1979, and October 5, 1985. Contrary to the hearing officer\u2019s findings, the plaintiff was completely open and honest in informing the evaluator of his alcohol and drug abuse background. At the first evaluation, dated April 21, 1987, plaintiff acknowledged he first tasted alcohol at the age of 14, a first episode of intoxication at age 16 and was a problematic heavy drinker from 1980 to 1982. He painted a very poor picture of himself during this time. It is readily apparent the evaluator was keenly aware of plaintiff\u2019s prior abuse of alcohol and drugs.\nSection 1001.440(bX2) of the Illinois Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.440(bX2) (Supp. 1988)) lists the necessary requirements for an applicant classified at Level II seeking any driving relief. Such applicant must document successful completion of an alcohol-drug remedial-education course and the treatment recommended by the evaluator. Clearly plaintiff has met both of these requirements. Plaintiff attended the remedial-education program from March 23, 1987, through April 21, 1987. Plaintiff\u2019s counselor verified completion of this treatment on April 21, 1987. Further, the evaluator recommended plaintiff attend outpatient alcohol treatment, which he did from February 1, 1988, through May 9, 1988. The evaluator indicated this successful completion in her May 16, 1988, update of the original evaluation.\nAn applicant seeking any driving relief must also prove he does not have a current problem with alcohol, that he is a low or minimal risk to repeat past abusive behaviors and the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and comply with all other regulations. (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.440(b) (Supp. 1988).) Plaintiff has remained abstinent (with one minor deviation) since early 1988 and has had no traffic violations since October 1985. Between the time of his first report and the current hearing, plaintiff had dramatically altered his life-style. He married, now has three dependents, is gainfully employed and has a better outlook on life. Thus, plaintiff has done everything required of him to regain his driving privileges.\nSection 1001.410 of the Illinois Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.410 (Supp. 1988)) provides the definitions of the terms used throughout the regulations. Level II \u2014 problematic use indicators include impairment in one or more significant life areas, a blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the most recent DUI arrest of 0.15 or greater, the ability to stop or control the use of alcohol, and the absence of withdrawal symptoms. (See also 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a72056.310(cX2) (Supp. 1987).) Clearly, an applicant\u2019s driving record alone does not constitute the entire basis for classification.\nThe evidence supports the original classification of plaintiff at Level II. The evaluator found impairment in three significant life areas, family, legal, and marital. The evaluator thoroughly noted plaintiff\u2019s history of alcohol abuse as well as illicit drug abuse. Plaintiff had the ability to control his alcohol abuse as shown by his decrease in consumption between 1980 and 1982 as well as his nearly complete withdrawal from alcohol use after February 1988. Plaintiff experienced no withdrawal symptoms when he chose to quit consuming alcohol. Plaintiff\u2019s test scores support a Level II classification. These factors indicate problematic use (Level II), but not alcohol dependency.\nAdditionally, the updated evaluations classified plaintiff a Level I (nonproblematic use). Level I, as defined by the Illinois Administrative Code \u201cmeans no impairment in family, social, emotional, vocational, physical or behavioral functioning as a consequence of alcohol or other drug use. There is also an ability to stop or control use and an absence of serious withdrawal symptoms after stopping or reducing use. This pattern must be consistent over the past twelve months for an individual classified at this Level.\u201d 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.410, at 3518 (Supp. 1988).\nThe Secretary suggests the present case is similar to Cusack v. Edgar (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 505, 484 N.E.2d 1145. Cusack is distinguishable. First, the evaluation in the present case cannot be characterized as incomplete. It contains plaintiff\u2019s complete history of alcohol abuse as well as objective test scores. Next, in Cusack, the court stated there was no evidence to suggest the alcohol counselor was aware of the full extent of plaintiff\u2019s driving history. In contrast, plaintiff here testified he told his evaluator about his DUI arrests and provided her with copies of the orders from his two previous hearings which both indicate his total driving record. Plaintiff also testified his evaluator had a copy of his driving record. The plaintiff in Cusack had not taken any steps toward resolving his alcohol problem. The Cusack court stated:\n\u201cWe feel that the issuance to plaintiff of such permit a little more than [a] year after his last drunken driving conviction would deprecate the seriousness of plaintiff\u2019s poor driving record and would impose a significant risk to the public.\u201d (Cusack, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 511, 484 N.E.2d at 1149.)\nHere, at the time of the administrative hearing, April 23, 1990, it had been over 4^2 years since plaintiff\u2019s last driving violation. The legislature has mandated a one-year revocation of driving privileges. Plaintiff had completed all the treatment recommended by his evaluator. For those reasons, we are not persuaded by the court\u2019s reasoning in Cusack in application to the facts of this case.\nAlthough in Murdy the Secretary made a determination that the petitioner there was a chronic alcoholic, we adopt the following statement of the supreme court:\n\u201cWe conclude that the Secretary\u2019s determination that plaintiff is a chronic alcoholic is not supported by the evidence. To the contrary, the evidence showed that he recognized the drinking problem and has controlled it.\u201d Murdy, 103 Ill. 2d at 394, 469 N.E.2d at 1090.\nAfter thoroughly examining the original evaluation along with the two updates, we conclude the classification of plaintiff at Level I was proper. Plaintiff was, by all indications on this record, very candid with the evaluator as to his past abuse of alcohol and illicit drugs. Plaintiff testified he informed the evaluator about his complete driving history. Nothing in these evaluations suggests plaintiff attempted to conceal any negative information about himself. When a plaintiff has done everything necessary to regain his driving privileges, he should not be penalized for the inadequate reporting methods of his alcohol evaluator. Inasmuch as the Secretary\u2019s decision adopting the hearing officer\u2019s recommendations and conclusions was against the manifest weight of the evidence, it must be reversed. The Secretary is ordered to reinstate plaintiff\u2019s full driving privileges.\nReversed.\nSPITZ, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN,\ndissenting:\nPlaintiff argues on appeal that the Secretary\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The basis of this argument is that the Secretary presented no evidence other than plaintiff\u2019s driving record (prior to 1985) to establish that plaintiff (1) would not be a safe and responsible driver, and (2) would endanger the public safety and welfare. In my judgment, nothing beyond that driving record is required to establish these two propositions. Given how bad plaintiff\u2019s driving record is, I am unwilling to find the Secretary\u2019s conclusion (that plaintiff\u2019s driving privileges should not be restored) to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, particularly regarding the issue of whether plaintiff would endanger the public safety and welfare.\nIn my judgment, this is not even a case of undue hardship; instead, it is a case of serious inconvenience. The record shows that plaintiff is getting to work and that his employer is making accommodations due to plaintiff's having no driving privileges. Undue hardship ought to mean that plaintiff is going to lose his job if he does not get his driving privileges restored, not merely that his circumstances will be difficult, seriously inconvenient, or expensive. Plaintiff is not even entitled to a RDP, let alone restoration of full driving privileges.\nThe majority opinion twice makes reference to defendant\u2019s having no driving violations since October 1985, suggesting thereby that this should have been a significant factor in April 1990, when the Secretary was deciding whether plaintiff\u2019s driving privileges should be restored. I disagree. Because defendant had no driver\u2019s license from October 1985 to April 1990, the absence of any traffic violations during this period shows only that plaintiff had not violated (or had not been caught violating) the prohibition against his driving a motor vehicle. It seems strange to me that an individual\u2019s forbearance from committing a Class A misdemeanor (driving while license revoked, in violation of section 6 \u2014 303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303)) should earn him the approbation of the Secretary or this court.\nI confess I have no sympathy for the plight of this plaintiff or other convicted drunk drivers who whine to the courts about the Secretary\u2019s reluctance to restore their driving privileges. The costs and inconveniences associated with the loss of their driving privileges are the product of their dangerous criminal behavior. Too many drunk drivers, like this plaintiff, \u201cget religion\u201d too late; they are stuck with the consequences of their driving records, and they have earned society\u2019s skepticism regarding whether and when they may safely be returned to the highways.\nIn the present case, given plaintiff\u2019s miserable traffic record, I would require many years of both total abstinence and a demonstrable lack of criminality before I would feel comfortable seeing him back on the highways. Reversing the Secretary and restoring plaintiff\u2019s driving privileges, as the majority has done, suggest that this society is not yet serious about addressing the havoc on our highways created by drunk drivers.\nI respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald E. Boyer, of Boyer & Thompson, Ltd., of Watseka, for appellant.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Eve Moran, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN W. WIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201490\u20140634\nOpinion filed June 26, 1991.\nRehearing denied August 1, 1991.\nSTEIGMANN, J., dissenting.\nRonald E. Boyer, of Boyer & Thompson, Ltd., of Watseka, for appellant.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Eve Moran, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 512, "last_page_order": 521 }