{ "id": 5294390, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON TROWERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Trowers", "decision_date": "1991-06-12", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20140528", "first_page": "862", "last_page": "867", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 862" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179606 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5480104 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 1020", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2433195 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1022" }, { "page": "1022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/1020-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515833 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 546, "char_count": 10496, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15746246209721107 }, "sha256": "867f40dad6260386ed079e3a2edf507aac3438ebf558f2a707209f8c433718cb", "simhash": "1:8a3efddedc07fe61", "word_count": 1744 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:50.210219+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON TROWERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Gordon Trowers was found guilty of possession of controlled substance, armed violence and bribery. The trial court merged the conviction for possession of controlled substance into the armed violence conviction and sentenced defendant to serve a concurrent sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment on the armed violence count and three years on the bribery count. On appeal defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the offense of armed violence; (2) the evidence presented at trial on the offense of bribery did not conform to the charging instrument; and (3) he was not proven guilty of possession of controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.\nThe State called three witnesses to testify at trial: Chicago police officer Robert O\u2019Neill, Detective Brad Williams, and Sergeant Carl Edenfield. On May 13, 1986, the officers were assigned to the Gang Crimes South Unit of the Chicago police department. The officers testified that at approximately 1:30 p.m. on that date, they, along with two other Chicago police officers and a Calumet Park police officer, went to 12342 South Bishop, Calumet Park, to execute a search warrant. The warrant sought an individual named Gordon who resided in the garden apartment at that address.\nWilliams testified that Officer O\u2019Neill knocked on the door to the apartment with his flashlight and stated, \u201c[0]pen the door, police, we have a search warrant.\u201d No one responded to the officer\u2019s knock, but Williams heard running and glass breaking inside of the apartment. At that point, Williams broke down the apartment door with a sledgehammer and O\u2019Neill entered the apartment with Williams and the other officers following. When Williams entered, he observed a man, later identified as Josh Bolton, standing a few feet inside the apartment blocking the doorway. Williams also observed defendant near the rear of the living room, running toward the kitchen. Officer O\u2019Neill pushed Bolton aside and chased defendant into the kitchen. Williams testified that he followed O\u2019Neill and defendant into the kitchen, where he observed defendant flicking the white powdered contents of a plastic bag onto the kitchen counter, floor, and into a sink filled with dishes and water.\nWilliams testified that he observed defendant holding a gun in his hand. O\u2019Neill told defendant to drop the gun. Defendant dropped the gun, and Williams recovered it from the floor. The gun was a .25 caliber automatic weapon with seven live cartridges in the clip. The gun was cocked and had a bullet in the chamber.\nO\u2019Neill handcuffed defendant. Williams observed a white powdery substance on the sink, countertop and the floor and a clear plastic bag floating in the kitchen sink. Williams removed a plastic bag from the kitchen table and filled it with white powder from the sink area and placed it in his pocket. O\u2019Neill took a piece of aluminum foil from the kitchen table, scraped some white powder into it and gave the aluminum foil to Williams.\nWilliams testified that defendant was read his Miranda rights and shown a copy of the search warrant. Thereafter, defendant told Williams and O\u2019Neill that there was from $500 to $700 in a shoe box in the bedroom which they could have if they just forgot about the case. Defendant motioned to the bedroom, and Williams retrieved the shoe box from underneath the bed and brought it to defendant. Williams opened the box and observed what was later determined to be $747 in cash. Defendant motioned with his head toward the box and stated, \u201c[J]ust forget the case.\u201d\nFollowing closing argument, defendant was found guilty of possession of controlled substance, armed violence and bribery. The trial court vacated the finding of guilty on the charge of possession of a controlled substance and merged it into the greater offense of armed violence. Thereafter, judgment was entered on the armed violence and bribery counts and defendant was sentenced to serve a concurrent sentence of six years on the armed violence count and three years for bribery. This appeal followed.\nOn appeal defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of armed violence. It is his position that the legislature did not intend the armed violence statute to apply to situations where a person is lawfully in possession of a gun in his or her own home. We disagree.\nThe armed violence statute provides that a person commits the offense when, \u201cwhile armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois Law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 2.) A person is considered \u201carmed with a dangerous weapon *** when he carries on or about his person or is otherwise armed\u201d with a handgun. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 1.) The mere physical presence of a weapon while a crime is being committed is sufficient to bring the defendant\u2019s acts within the proscription of the statute. (People v. Alejos (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 502, 508, 455 N.E.2d 48, 50; People v. Bond (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1022, 534 N.E.2d 156, 158.) The statute was designed in part to deter the conduct of carrying a weapon while committing a felony. Bond, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 1022.\nHere, the evidence indicated that defendant was armed with a handgun in the kitchen of his home, while he attempted to dispose of a controlled substance as police officers executed a search warrant on his apartment. Under these circumstances, the danger which the armed violence statute seeks to prohibit was present. This danger was not abated by the fact that defendant was inside rather than outside of his home. Defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon while committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in finding defendant guilty of armed violence predicated on his finding of guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.\nDefendant next argues that the evidence presented at trial on the offense of bribery did not conform to the allegations contained in the information charging the offense. We disagree.\nA person commits bribery when:\n\u201c(a) With intent to influence the performance of any act related to the employment or function of any public officer, public employee, juror or witness, he promises or tenders to that person any property or personal advantage which he is not authorized to accept.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33 \u2014 1(a).\nDefendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he physically tendered to any police officer any of the money contained in the shoe box. However, the word \u201ctender\u201d as used in the statute has been held to include the mere offer or promise made with the requisite intent. The act of offering or promising the tender of a prohibited commodity or act is sufficient to constitute the completed offense of bribery. People v. Brandstetter (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 259, 269, 430 N.E.2d 731, 738-39.\nThus, the evidence in the present case that defendant directed the police to the bedroom location where there was a hidden quantity of cash, and stated to the officers that they could have the money if they would forget about the case, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant \u201ctendered\u201d the money to the officers in violation of the bribery statute. We therefore conclude that the evidence introduced at trial on the offense of bribery conformed to the information charging that offense.\nFinally, defendant argues that he was not proven guilty of possession of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\nIt is for the trier of fact to judge the credibility of witnesses and decide the weight to be given their testimony. (People v. Titone (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 413, 422, 505 N.E.2d 300, 303.) On review, the appropriate standard when a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is presented is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 276.\nDefendant argues that the testimony of the officers should not be believed because there were discrepancies between the arresting officers\u2019 arrest report, inventory sheets and trial testimony. Specifically, defendant argues that Williams and O\u2019Neill both testified that Williams scooped up a white powdery substance from the side of the sink while O\u2019Neill picked up white powder from the floor with a piece of aluminum foil. However, the police report did not indicate that white powder was recovered from the side of the kitchen sink. In addition, defendant asserts that the inventory sheets made out on that day indicate that one plastic bag and one aluminum foil packet were recovered from Josh Bolton and not defendant.\nDefendant argued this position at trial and the court stated as follows:\n\u201cI am going to believe that the police officer made a mistake on that. And I\u2019m going to find that the defendant was the one on the scene, and he did have a plastic bag, and he was dropping some white powder either in the sink, or on the floor, or both places. I believe the evidence was completed [sic] uncontested that he was the one at the sink.\n* * *\nAnd they all place the defendant at the sink. They didn\u2019t place the co-arrestee at the sink, and they didn\u2019t place the coarrestee with the plastic bag, and they didn\u2019t place the co-ares-tee [sic] with the gun.\u201d\nThe trial court weighed the discrepancies between the police officers\u2019 testimony and their reports, and concluded that despite some minor inconsistencies, their testimony was credible. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAccordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court.\nAffirmed.\nCERDA, P.J., and WHITE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sam Adam, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and David R. Butzen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON TROWERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20140528\nOpinion filed June 12, 1991.\nSam Adam, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and David R. Butzen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0862-01", "first_page_order": 884, "last_page_order": 889 }