{
  "id": 5294213,
  "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF GLORIA HAAS, Petitioner-Appellant, and THOMAS O. HAAS, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Haas",
  "decision_date": "1991-07-02",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201490\u20140478",
  "first_page": "959",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:50.210219+00:00",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re MARRIAGE OF GLORIA HAAS, Petitioner-Appellant, and THOMAS O. HAAS, Respondent-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner appeals from orders entered March 16, 1990, and June 5, 1990, wherein the trial court awarded maintenance, divided property and denied petitioner\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nPetitioner commenced this action by filing for legal separation on March 23, 1987. By temporary order dated April 10, 1987, petitioner was awarded $l,000-per-month maintenance and the question of petitioner\u2019s medical bills was reserved. Respondent later filed an answer and counterclaim for dissolution. Temporary maintenance was reduced to $800 per month commencing March 1, 1988, with the question of petitioner\u2019s temporary attorney fees being reserved. On June 20, 1989, an evidentiary hearing was held on property disposition, maintenance and other issues resulting in petitioner being awarded certain marital property and $600-per-month maintenance for 18 months. Petitioner appeals and we affirm in part and reverse in part.\nThe parties were married November 27, 1974. At the time petitioner commenced this case, she was 49 years old and respondent was 47 years old. The parties adopted one child during the course of the marriage who is now emancipated. Petitioner is employed by Quails Meadows Country Club and her gross income is $558.62 every two weeks. Respondent is employed by Continental Insurance with a yearly gross income of $49,000. He additionally has the use of a company car and receives bonuses from the company during profitable years. In 1987, respondent received a $6,000 bonus and an additional $10,000 \u201cstay-put\u201d bonus when Continental became respondent\u2019s employer. The record is silent whether this money was placed in an account or in any other way has specifically contributed to the accumulation of marital assets. We therefore assume that this money is incorporated into the assets disclosed by the record.\nBy stipulation, the parties submitted two appraisals of the marital home in the respective amounts of $68,000 and $75,000. The mortgage against the residence was $9,584. The evidence presented revealed additional assets as follows:\nTravelers Savings Plan $57,117\nTom Haas IRA 11,259\nTom Haas IRA 3,988\nGloria Haas IRA 10,193\nHousehold furnishings 3,000\n1982 Chevrolet Caprice 3,275\nGloria Haas IRA 4,000\nCar Sold By Tom Haas 3,700\nSilver Bar 600\nTom Haas Retirement Account Amount Unknown\nEvidence was also presented regarding the monthly living expenses for both parties. Petitioner\u2019s monthly living expenses were $1,273.35, and respondent\u2019s monthly living expenses were $1,315. Petitioner\u2019s counsel additionally filed two separate affidavits of attorney fees and costs totaling $5,647.82.\nThe trial court, by judgment dated March 9, 1990, divided the marital property as follows:\nPetitioner Equity Value\nMarital Home & Accompanying Mortgage $60,000\nGloria Haas IRA 10,193\nGloria Haas IRA 4.000\nHousehold Furnishings Chevrolet Caprice 3.000 3,275\nTotal Equity Value $80,468\nRespondent Equity Value\nTravelers Savings Plan $57,117\nTom Haas IRA Tom Haas IRA 11,259 3,988\nSilver Bar 600\nTotal Equity Value $72,964\nThe trial court also awarded certain other items of personal property which perhaps have more sentimental than dollar value and required a qualified domestic relations order to be entered granting petitioner one half of the value of marital accumulation in respondent\u2019s pension. Lastly, the trial court granted petitioner maintenance in the amount of $600 per month subject to review at the end of 18 months. No order was made regarding the payment of attorney fees.\nThree issues are raised on appeal: first, whether the trial court erred in dividing marital property; second, whether the trial court erred in awarding petitioner $600-per-month maintenance; and third, whether the trial court erred in not awarding petitioner her attorney fees.\nPetitioner first argues that the trial court failed to consider that respondent removed $12,000 from his Travelers savings plan when dividing marital property and further asserts that the $12,000 withdrawal constituted a dissipation of marital assets. We need not consider whether dissipation occurred because the record clearly shows that the trial court considered the $12,000 withdrawal when dividing property. Much testimony was presented and argument made regarding the appropriate balance of respondent\u2019s Travelers savings plan. Petitioner maintains that the proper amount should be $57,117. Respondent, on the other hand, testified that the balance of the account on the hearing date was $42,000, and that he had previously withdrawn $12,000. Nonetheless, petitioner argues that respondent received $12,000 from the account which was unaccounted for in the trial court\u2019s division of assets. We disagree. No evidence suggested the balance of the account was ever greater than $57,117. In dividing the assets, the trial court used the $57,117 as the balance of the account awarded to respondent. The trial court, therefore, added back respondent\u2019s apparent withdrawals) from the account without considering whether the respondent dissipated assets. Petitioner was in no way prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s failure to determine whether respondent dissipated $12,000 of marital assets.\nPetitioner additionally argues that the trial court failed to consider the economic circumstances of the parties and the value of the property awarded to each party when dividing assets. Regarding the valuation of property, our calculations of the trial court\u2019s award actually grant petitioner more assets than respondent. Part of petitioner\u2019s argument again related back to her improper calculation that when respondent was awarded his savings plan of $57,117, he should also be considered as having received the additional $12,000.\nPetitioner also argues that respondent ought to be credited in the distribution of the marital assets with an additional $16,000 based on receipt of his \u201cstay-put\u201d payment and bonus received from his employer. We consider that these payments were incorporated as a part of the marital estate divided by the court because the record is otherwise silent. By our calculations, petitioner has been awarded $80,468 and respondent $72,964 in marital assets.\nWe agree with petitioner that respondent has a greater earning capacity than does petitioner. Aside from this, however, the award of marital property is not inequitable under section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 503(d)). While the parties resided together for 11 or 12 years in duration, this is not a situation where one party has spent considerable time out of the job market to care for young children. Both parties have been employed throughout the course of the marriage, and both are currently employed full time. The value of the property awarded petitioner exceeds that awarded to respondent, and the court has made this award in addition to maintenance. Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning property dispositions (In re Marriage of Legge (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 198, 443 N.E.2d 1089), and such decisions will not be set aside absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Wolf (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 998, 536 N.E.2d 792; In re Marriage of Partyka (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 545, 511 N.E.2d 676.) Although reasonable men may differ regarding the propriety of the trial court\u2019s allocation of property herein, we find no abuse of discretion.\nRegarding maintenance, petitioner argues that she is unable to maintain her standard of living with an award of $600-per-month maintenance. Under section 504(b) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 504(b)), there is no question that respondent has the financial ability to pay maintenance. His net income each month is roughly $2,500 and his monthly living expenses are $1,315. He also has benefits available through his employment which petitioner does not have through her employment. On the other hand, petitioner had about $860 per month net income with monthly expenses of $1,255 and, without maintenance, she would not at this time be able to meet her current obligations without depleting her assets.\nMaintenance, however, is designed to be rehabilitative in nature and to allow a dependent spouse to become financially independent. (In re Marriage of Heller (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 224, 505 N.E.2d 1294.) Permanent maintenance is appropriate where it is evident that the recipient spouse is either unemployable or employable only at an income substantially lower than the previous standard of living. Nonetheless, the recipient spouse has a good-faith obligation to become self-sufficient (In re Marriage of Wade (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 255, 511 N.E.2d 156), with an award of maintenance being used to help the recipient spouse during this transition period. In this case, permanent maintenance is not justified as petitioner has been employed throughout the marriage and seemingly has the potential to become self-sufficient.\nThe primary testimony regarding petitioner\u2019s present standard of living revolves around her ability to take vacations and dine out in the manner she had become accustomed to. During the pendency of this cause, however, petitioner has been able to dine out, take numerous vacations and still save money. Although this award of maintenance may provide respondent with more disposable income per month than petitioner, there is no requirement in the law that the parties are to permanently maintain the same standard of living. Section 504(b)(3) primarily concerns the standard of living established during the marriage in relation to the recipient spouse\u2019s ability to maintain that standard of living without maintenance. Again, our standard for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. An award of $600 per month does not appear to cause petitioner a decreased standard of living. Moreover, she seemingly has all of the education and training she needs to find appropriate employment, there being no contrary indication in the record. Keeping in mind that the maintenance award was reviewable in 18 months, the trial court\u2019s award to petitioner of $600-per-month maintenance is not an abuse of discretion.\nFinally, regarding attorney fees, section 508 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 508) allows for an award of fees where one party lacks the financial resources and the other party has the ability to pay. (See In re Marriage of Carini (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 375, 445 N.E.2d 412.) Financial inability exists where requiring payment of attorney fees would strip that party of her means of support or undermine that party\u2019s financial stability. (In re Marriage of Bentivenga (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 967, 441 N.E.2d 336.) In this case, it is clear that petitioner will be unable to pay her attorney fees and costs without depleting part of the marital assets awarded to her. Respondent, however, appears to be able to pay his fees as well as petitioner\u2019s fees without depleting assets, based on his income and additional bonuses. Requiring petitioner to deplete her assets is not equitable in this case where respondent is able to meet both expenses. The trial court abused its discretion in not allocating attorney fees and not directing that respondent pay petitioner\u2019s attorney fees and costs of $5,647.82.\nThe judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in all respects except for the trial court\u2019s failure to award attorney fees. Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner\u2019s attorney fees and costs of $5,647.82.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and GORMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SLATER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard W. Zuckerman, of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "Kelly & Brady, of Peoria (William R. Kelly, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF GLORIA HAAS, Petitioner-Appellant, and THOMAS O. HAAS, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201490\u20140478\nOpinion filed July 2, 1991.\nRichard W. Zuckerman, of Peoria, for appellant.\nKelly & Brady, of Peoria (William R. Kelly, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0959-01",
  "first_page_order": 981,
  "last_page_order": 987
}
