{ "id": 5287587, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CEDRIC FIGURES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Figures", "decision_date": "1991-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20141225", "first_page": "398", "last_page": "404", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 398" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466716 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2472796 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/127/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2640311 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2518847 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 1077", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2693911 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141251 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470220 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082226 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121756 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598843 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554869 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092555 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 1136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3078334 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/1136-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434206 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2785113 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641469 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3118953 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" }, { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0680-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 13472, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.959374480804576e-07, "percentile": 0.7378013158296102 }, "sha256": "6f4a07947a23d677eef8ff1c149995c9671353abc713ba7794fb75ce9bdc7125", "simhash": "1:639ddcdd6e556ee2", "word_count": 2260 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:24:26.558535+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CEDRIC FIGURES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was convicted at a bench trial of aggravated battery, armed violence, and attempted murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 4, 33A \u2014 2, 8 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 1(a).) On appeal, he argues that (1) aggravated battery, which served as the predicate felony for armed violence, was not proved because the State failed to show that he caused \u201cgreat bodily harm\u201d; (2) his aggravated battery conviction based on use of a deadly weapon and his armed violence conviction were both premised upon the same act and the former must be vacated; (3) his conviction of attempted murder based on an accountability theory was improper; and (4) the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him. We affirm defendant\u2019s convictions for aggravated battery and attempted murder, vacate his conviction and sentence for armed violence, and remand for resentencing, for reasons which follow.\nThe State\u2019s evidence established that on July 19, 1988, David Tayloer, Fred Thornton, and several others were playing basketball in an outdoor lot. Many of those present, including Tayloer and Thornton, were members of a \u201csocial club\u201d called the Gigolos. Defendant, who was a member of a rival club, approached the area with 8 to 10 other men, including Kenyatte Freeman, and members of the two groups began shouting at each other. Defendant had been involved in a fight earlier in the day -with one of the Gigolos. Tayloer and Thornton both testified that no one among their group had any weapons. Defendant and two of the men who were with him, however, drew handguns and attempted to fire them. According to Thornton, defendant yelled \u201cthese ain\u2019t no \u2018blank-blank\u2019 blanks.\u201d The guns only clicked at first, and Tayloer, along with several others, began advancing toward defendant\u2019s group. Defendant and Freeman continued to pull the triggers as they retreated. Defendant aimed at Tayloer and the gun discharged; the bullet hit Tayloer\u2019s shoe but did not pierce his skin. Thornton was shot in the abdomen by Freeman and consequently was hospitalized for 10 days. After several shots were fired, defendant and his companions fled.\nLadonna Shaw testified for defendant. She lived adjacent to the lot in which the shooting occurred and watched the incident from her front porch. Defendant was present at the scene but did not have a gun; two other men were responsible for the shooting. She also said that the men who had been playing basketball did not have any weapons.\nDefendant testified in his own defense. He had been involved in a fight earlier in the day with Carson Ross, a member of the Gigolos. Ross and another had attacked defendant with a baseball bat and chased him to his house, where more fighting occurred. Later, defendant and several others confronted his assailants. After a bottle had been thrown at defendant\u2019s group, Freeman and another of defendant\u2019s friends fired their handguns into the crowd. Defendant drew his gun, which he had brought from his house, and fired it once into the air. He said that he was afraid and was only trying to scare the rival group, although he admitted that none of them was armed.\nThe court found defendant guilty of aggravated battery, armed violence, and attempted murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 4, 33A \u2014 2, 8 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 1(a).) He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 12 years for armed violence, 12 years for attempted murder, and 5 years for aggravated battery.\nI\nDefendant\u2019s armed violence conviction was based upon the predicate felony of aggravated battery. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 33A \u2014 2, 12 \u2014 4.) Defendant, however, argues that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery because the State failed to establish that he inflicted \u201cgreat bodily harm\u201d upon Tayloer.\nInfliction of great bodily harm is an essential element of the offense of aggravated battery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 4(a).) It has been held repeatedly that the term is not susceptible of a precise legal definition; it requires, however, an injury of a greater and more serious character than an ordinary battery. (People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 684, 420 N.E.2d 592; People v. Carmack (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 983, 986, 366 N.E.2d 103; People v. Lyons (1974), 26 Ill. App. 3d 193, 199, 324 N.E.2d 677.) The question of whether the victim\u2019s injuries rise to the level of great bodily harm is a question for the trier of fact (People v. Cochran (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 728, 738, 533 N.E.2d 558), which is neither dependent upon hospitalization of the victim, nor the permanency of his disability or disfigurement (People v. Jordan (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 1140, 430 N.E.2d 389). Instead, the determination centers upon the injuries which the victim did, in fact, receive. Costello, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 684.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has provided some guidance in defining the term \u201cbodily harm\u201d as it relates to simple battery:\n\u201cAlthough it may be difficult to pinpoint exactly what constitutes bodily harm for the purposes of the statute, some sort of physical pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether temporary or permanent, is required.\u201d (People v. Mays (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 251, 256, 437 N.E.2d 633.)\nBecause great bodily harm requires an injury of a graver and more serious character than an ordinary battery, simple logic dictates that the injury must be more severe than that set out in the Mays definition. The word \u201cgreat\u201d must be given effect in construing the aggravated battery statute; statutes should be interpreted so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless. People v. Parvin (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 519, 525, 533 N.E.2d 813.\nThe State relies on People v. Matthews (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 710, 467 N.E.2d 996, in which the victim was struck on the head with a gun and received several full-force blows on the head and arms with a baseball bat. Despite the victim\u2019s statement that \u201cI only had a bruise on my head,\u201d the jury determined that she had suffered great bodily harm and convicted defendant of aggravated battery. That finding was affirmed on appeal. 126 Ill. App. 3d at 714-15.\nIn this case, Tayloer\u2019s injury is not as severe as those suffered by the victim in Matthews. Defendant fired a shot at Tayloer which pierced his shoe but did not penetrate his skin. One witness saw Tayloer limping after the shot, but no one saw any blood on his shoe. Tayloer himself admitted that his foot did not bleed as a result of the shot. Although he was treated at the hospital, Tayloer\u2019s testimony indicates that his injury required very little attention:\n\u201cThey put a little iodine on my foot. At first they cut the little blood clot open, and then they put iodine on there and patched it up.\u201d\nThe injury clearly rises to the level of \u201cbodily harm\u201d as defined in Mays. We find, however, that Tayloer did not suffer great bodily harm. The circuit court\u2019s finding in that regard is not supported by the evidence.\nDefendant\u2019s armed violence conviction, therefore, must be vacated. Because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed aggravated battery based on great bodily harm, that offense cannot serve as the predicate felony for armed violence.\nII\nDefendant was convicted of aggravated battery for intentionally or knowingly causing bodily harm through the use of a deadly weapon. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4(b)(1).) Although the State conceded in its brief that this conviction should be vacated, it did so based on the assumption that defendant\u2019s armed violence conviction would stand; both convictions cannot be predicated on the same act. (People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45, 54-55, 456 N.E.2d 44.) Because we have vacated defendant\u2019s conviction for armed violence, aggravated battery is the only offense predicated upon defendant\u2019s shooting of Tayloer.\nThe evidence established that defendant pointed his handgun at Tayloer and pulled the trigger several times. The gun misfired at first, but eventually discharged, sending a shot toward Tayloer. The bullet penetrated his shoe and grazed his foot, causing a small blood clot. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports the circuit court\u2019s finding that defendant committed aggravated battery. People v. Pintos (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 286, 291, 549 N.E.2d 344; People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nThis felony, however, cannot serve as the basis for armed violence, as that would constitute an improper double enhancement. The use of a dangerous weapon which serves to enhance a charge of battery to aggravated battery cannot also serve to further enhance the latter charge to armed violence. People v. Van Winkle (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 220, 222, 430 N.E.2d 987; People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 278, 422 N.E.2d 627.\nBased on the preceding reasoning, defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated battery predicated upon the use of a deadly weapon is affirmed.\nIll\nDefendant contends that his conviction for attempted murder, which was based on an accountability theory, must be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kenyatte Freeman had intent to kill.\nAn accused commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4(a).) In order to sustain a conviction for attempted murder, the State must prove that the accused had specific intent to kill the victim. (People v. Mitchell (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 473 N.E.2d 1270.) Because it can rarely be proved by direct evidence, specific intent to kill may be inferred from the circumstances, such as the character of the assault or use of a deadly weapon. (People v. Tyler (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 547, 553, 544 N.E.2d 1077.) Further, a person who fires a gun at or towards another, with either malice or total disregard for human life, may be convicted of attempted murder. People v. Starks (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 503, 510, 546 N.E.2d 71, appeal denied (1990), 129 Ill. 2d 571.\nDefendant relies on three cases in which the reviewing court reversed the finding of specific intent to kill. All three cases, however, can be distinguished. In Mitchell (105 Ill. 2d 1, 473 N.E.2d 1270), defendant beat her 16-month-old baby with her hand, fist, and a belt until the child was comatose. In People v. Jones (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 412, 541 N.E.2d 132, defendant and two others entered a family\u2019s apartment and beat the man, his wife, and their child. One assailant was armed with a knife and another had a handgun, although no shots were fired. In People v. Thomas (1970), 127 Ill. App. 2d 444, 262 N.E.2d 495, defendant entered a woman\u2019s apartment, stabbed her in the shoulder, beat her, and raped her. In each of those cases, the defendants were all within the confines of a private residence and had the opportunity to commit murder, if they had so intended. Further, no gun was discharged in any of the three cases.\nHere, the evidence established that Freeman, along with defendant, approached several unarmed men and drew his handgun. When he attempted to fire, the gun only clicked, and the unarmed men began to advance. Freeman continued to pull the trigger, and his gun discharged, striking Thornton in the abdomen. Immediately after shooting Thornton, Freeman and the others fled. The circuit court held that Freeman pointed his gun and fired at an unarmed man with total disregard for human life. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have convicted defendant of attempted murder on an accountability theory, in that he facilitated the commission of this offense. See Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d at 291; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, eh. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).\nIV\nDefendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 12 years for attempted murder, 12 years for armed violence, and 5 years for aggravated battery. As we cannot determine with any degree of certainty whether or not the conviction vacated herein may have influenced the circuit court in imposing sentences for the remaining convictions of attempted murder and aggravated battery, the sentence should be considered in a new hearing. (Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d at 16; People v. Olsen (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951, 514 N.E.2d 233.) In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to address defendant\u2019s argument that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him.\nAccordingly, the judgments of conviction for attempted murder and aggravated battery based on the use of a deadly weapon are affirmed, the sentences vacated, and the cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing as to those offenses. The conviction and sentence for armed violence are vacated.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded.\nDiVITO and COCCIA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Joseph M. Gump and Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "John O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and David Stabrawa, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CEDRIC FIGURES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 89\u20141225\nOpinion filed June 28,1991.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Joseph M. Gump and Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and David Stabrawa, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0398-01", "first_page_order": 420, "last_page_order": 426 }