{ "id": 5289195, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF SHOSHANA WINTON, Petitioner-Appellee, and JEFFREY B. WINTON, Respondent-Appellant (David I. Grand, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Winton", "decision_date": "1991-04-19", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140592", "first_page": "1084", "last_page": "1093", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 1084" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512645 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512144 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3418456 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650387 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569492 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2588128 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3129637 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464033 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5665546 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3223967 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535687 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471265 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3172938 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2523181 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2607439 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0832-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 801, "char_count": 17774, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.544274331888968e-07, "percentile": 0.8137171317710029 }, "sha256": "9ff936e21cae25b117e46436e3fe11eada7090179921ab0f9c68ef3cbfa35f26", "simhash": "1:3dea11145341bf6c", "word_count": 2928 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:24:26.558535+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF SHOSHANA WINTON, Petitioner-Appellee, and JEFFREY B. WINTON, Respondent-Appellant (David I. Grand, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Jeffrey B. Winton, is appealing two orders entered in a dissolution proceeding wherein his marriage to petitioner, Shoshana Winton, was dissolved. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ordering him to pay attorney fees to one of petitioner\u2019s attorneys, David Grund, in the amount of $13,205.56 based, in part, on an hourly rate of $250 for court time, a rate which the trial court found to be excessive; (2) whether the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $6,029.33 for expert\u2019s fees when there was no proof of the reasonableness of the fees; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding respondent in contempt for violation of court orders.\nA judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered February 13, 1990, which incorporated an agreement of the parties as to the division of marital property and other issues. That same day, petitioner\u2019s attorney, David Grand, filed a petition for attorney fees and costs, stating his customary and reasonable charge for representation in such actions was $175 per hour for noncourt time and $250 per hour for court time, and he had expended 100.4 hours of office time and 33.4 hours of court-related time in handling the case. The petition further stated that other persons in his office had expended time on the case. The itemized statements attached to the petition showed that his office had billed petitioner a total of $34,308.35 for attorney fees and costs. This included $2,500 paid to Jerome Lipman, an accountant retained by Grand for the purpose of auditing and evaluating respondent\u2019s businesses. The itemized billings also reflected that petitioner had paid Grand a $2,500 retainer. Pursuant to a court order which followed a petition for temporary attorney fees and expert costs, respondent had paid $8,000, and petitioner had paid an additional $4,000. The balance claimed by Grand was $19,808.35.\nThe petition further stated that attorney Stephen H. Katz was hired as co-counsel for petitioner and that his fees totalled $4,860, based on an hourly rate of $175. The petition further stated that Jerome Lipman was still owed a balance of $9,044.90. Lipman\u2019s invoice was attached to the petition. It showed total charges of $11,544.90, and reflected the payment of $2,500. The statement listed the services performed by Lipman but did not state the date any of the services were performed, the amount of time spent on any of the listed activities, or the hourly rate charged. Lipman\u2019s nine-page curriculum vitae is also included in the record.\nA hearing regarding the attorney fees petition was held on April 23, 1990. No court reporter was present, but a bystander\u2019s report of the proceedings was certified by the trial judge. According to the report, respondent challenged various items included in Grand\u2019s billings and the reasonableness of the fees in general. He also presented to the court a copy of the \u201cvaluation report\u201d prepared by Lipman and testified that, in his opinion, the value of Lipman\u2019s work was perhaps $2,500, but not $11,000.\nThe five-page report prepared by Lipman is included in the record. The first two pages consist of Lipman\u2019s opinion of the value of respondent\u2019s 50% interest in a corporation, Radionic Hi-Tech, Inc., and a short statement of the documents reviewed and the accounting method used in making his determination. Page three of the report states:\n\u201cRADIONIC HI-TECH, INC.\nSCHEDULE OF TOTAL VALUE JULY 31, 1989\nBOOK VALUE 231,941\nROYALTY RECEIVABLE 27,800\nTOTAL VALUE 259,741\n50% INTEREST 129,871\u201d\nPage four is a copy of the balance sheet of the corporation showing the $231,941 figure, and page five is a five-line computation of the royalty receivable figure.\nFollowing the hearing, an order was entered on May 3, 1990, in which the court found that, under the circumstances of this case, $175 per hour was the appropriate rate of compensation for Grand for both court and office time. It further found that \u201c[w]hile [respondent] disputes some double counting of items and disputes the value of Jerome Lippman\u2019s [sic] services, the record is devoid of evidence that such double counting took place or that Lippman\u2019s [sic] services were overpriced or otherwise unreasonable.\u201d The court then found that respondent should pay two-thirds of the fees of Grand, Katz, and Lip-man and ordered that he pay $13,205.56 to Grand, $3,240 to Katz, and $6,029.33 to Lipman.\nOn April 16, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for rule to show cause alleging that respondent failed to pay $316 in court-ordered child support and maintenance and $11,500 for a new car pursuant to the terms of the marital settlement agreement. A hearing was held regarding the petition, and an order was entered May 18, 1990, nunc pro tunc to May 3, 1990, which found respondent in contempt for failing to comply with the judgment of dissolution of marriage. The order further stated that \u201c[tjhis cause is continued to May 18, 1990 for the purpose of conducting a hearing on appropriate sanctions to be imposed upon [respondent] in connection with findings of contempt.\u201d A subsequent order, also dated May 18, 1990, stated that respondent had purged himself of contempt by making the required payments. No penalty was therefore assessed.\nRespondent has appealed from the orders awarding attorney and expert witness fees and the orders which found him in contempt.\nRespondent contends the court erred in finding him in willful contempt of court. We note that neither the order finding respondent in contempt nor, as far as we can discern, anything else in the record shows that the court characterized respondent\u2019s contempt as willful. Respondent, however, cites People v. Boucher (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 832, for the following principles: (1) only willful violations of court orders constitute contempt, and (2) insofar as the nature of the contempt found against respondent was criminal, his innocent and well-justified state of mind in refusing to pay was relevant. Respondent evidently concludes that the court must have found him in willful contempt and argues that the court wrongly disregarded evidence that his conduct was not willful in nature. Specifically, respondent focuses on (1) evidence which showed that his refusal to pay petitioner\u2019s claim was the result of a good-faith and well-founded dispute over the amount owed, and (2) evidence of his motivation and right to withhold part of a support payment.\nWe observe initially that respondent errs in characterizing the finding of the trial court as criminal contempt. A \u201ccriminal contempt\u201d is conduct directed against the majesty of the law or the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting judiciously, whereas a \u201ccivil contempt\u201d ordinarily consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of an opposing party therein. (Sullivan v. Sullivan (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 549, 551-52.) The test for determining if a contempt proceeding involves criminal contempt or civil contempt is whether the proceeding, in the totality of the circumstances, is coercive or punitive. In re Marriage of Miller (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 370, 373.\nIn light of these principles the instant contempt proceeding appears to have involved civil contempt. The record reveals that respondent admitted withholding maintenance payments and failing to provide a formulated amount of money to purchase a new automobile for petitioner as required by the judgment of dissolution of marriage. He justified withholding the maintenance payments because petitioner allegedly owed him money for debts incurred after entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage, and he disputed the amount of money owed petitioner pursuant to the formula set out in the judgment of dissolution of marriage.\nThe only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the record before us is that the trial court found respondent in civil contempt for failing to make payments as provided by the judgment of dissolution of marriage. The record is void of conduct by the respondent directed against the majesty, dignity, or authority of the court which would justify a finding of criminal contempt.\nWe note additionally that the case respondent relies on, People v. Boucher (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 832, is inapposite. Boucher is a criminal case involving a violation of probation by defendant. The central issue therein relates to whether the alleged violation of probation must be prosecuted as provided by the Unified Code of Corrections rather than by means of contempt of court.\nBecause respondent has premised his argument on a finding of criminal contempt, citing one inapposite criminal case in support of such argument, we deem respondent\u2019s argument and citations of authority to be a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe appellant\u2019s brief shall contain the following parts ***:\n* * *\n(7) Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities ***. Points not argued are waived ***.\u201d\nA court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and to be cited to pertinent authority. (Rockford Memorial Hospital v. Schueler (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 358, 361-62.) The appellate court is not a depository in which the appellant may drop the burden of argument and research. (Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719.) Arguments which do not satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal. (Rockford Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 362.) In consideration of these rules and respondent\u2019s failure to present properly his argument on this issue, we find respondent\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s finding of contempt waived.\nRegarding the order awarding attorney fees, respondent first argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay two-thirds of the entire fee requested by Grand when the court found that a rate of $250 for court time was excessive. We note that petitioner has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief. However, Grand has filed a brief on his own behalf. He concedes that the award of attorney fees must be modified based on the trial court\u2019s findings. We agree that the amount charged for 33.4 hours of court time must be reduced from $8,350, based on $250 per hour, to $5,845, based on the $175-per-hour rate which the court found appropriate. Thus, the dollar amount of the fees requested by Grand must be be reduced to $17,303.35. Respondent is therefore required to pay two-thirds of that amount or $11,535.56, rather than $13,205.56 as stated in the order.\nRespondent next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a portion of Lipman\u2019s fees in the absence of proof of the reasonableness of the fees.\nGrand has argued that \u201ca party is not required to prove the reasonableness of hourly rates or any itemizations of the time spent of an expert witness.\u201d He contends that cases requiring that an attorney must provide detailed itemized records of services rendered simply do not apply to an expert witness. He further argues that, as he entered into a contract with Lipman, on behalf of his client, petitioner, to evaluate respondent\u2019s business, it must be presumed that the fees charged are reasonable. We cannot agree.\nInitially, we note that the cases cited by Grand do not support his position. The reasonableness of witness fees was not an issue in Hallmark Personnel, Inc. v. Pickens-Kane Moving & Storage Co. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 18, cited by Grand for the proposition that \u201cthe cost of witness fees are [sic] in the trial court\u2019s discretion.\u201d Also, while the court in Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 621, 623-24, does state that, \u201c[i]n Illinois, *** where there is a contract, express or implied, under which one party supplies articles or services to another and there is no provision setting out the amount the supplier is to be compensated, the law implies that there is an agreement to pay a reasonable price for the goods and services,\u201d it goes on to state: \u201c[t]herefore, to recover under such a contract, the supplier has the burden of proving that its charges were reasonable.\u201d This case cannot be read, as Grand has suggested, to provide authority for the proposition that the fees must be presumed reasonable.\nThe request for payment of Lipman\u2019s fees was part of a petition for attorney fees filed by Grand pursuant to section 508(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 508(a)). The statute provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order either spouse to pay a reasonable amount for his own costs and attorney\u2019s fees and for the costs and attorney\u2019s fees necessarily incurred *** by the other spouse, which award shall be made in connection with the following:\n(1) The maintenance or defense of any proceeding under this Act.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 508(a).\nTherefore, under the statute, the court may order the other spouse to pay a reasonable amount for attorney fees for services rendered in a proceeding under the Act. (In re Marriage of Bashwiner (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 531, 535.) \u201cThe awarding of attorney fees and the proportion to be paid are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d (In re Marriage of Bussey (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 286, 299.) However, the amount awarded should be fair compensation only for those services which were reasonable and necessary to the action. In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 111.\nThe criteria for determining whether fees are reasonable include: the number of hours expended; the skill and standing of the attorneys; the difficulty of the questions at issue; the importance of the subject matter, especially from a family law standpoint; the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the case; the usual and customary charge in the community; and the benefit resulting to the client. (In re Marriage of Malec (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 273, 285; In re Marriage of McFarlane (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 721, 729.) Of these factors, the most important is the amount of time necessarily spent on the case. Malee, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 285.\nThe fees allowed should only be in the amount necessary to compensate for services actually rendered and should be fair to both the party required to pay and the attorney requesting them. (Malec, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 285; Gasperini v. Gasperini (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 578, 582.) Justification of a fee requires more than the presentation of a compilation of hours multiplied by a fixed hourly rate. (Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 112.) A petition for fees must specify the services performed, by whom they were performed, the time expended on the services listed, and the hourly rate charged. Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 112; see also In re Marriage of Ackerman (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444.\nAlthough Grand is obviously correct that Lipman\u2019s fees cannot be properly characterized as attorney fees, Grand was seeking to recover the fees under section 508(a) of the Act, apparently as necessary costs in the proceeding. Expert fees have been awarded under section 508(a). (See, e.g., Head v. Head (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 697, 703-04.) We hold that, in order to recover expert fees as necessary costs under section 508(a), the reasonableness of the fees must be established. The case law setting out the standards for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees provides useful guidelines for making this determination.\nIn order to recover the cost of the expert\u2019s fees, it was therefore Grand\u2019s burden to show that they were reasonable. We decline to put the burden on respondent, as Grand suggests, to \u201cconduct the proper discovery\u201d and present evidence to dispute the reasonableness of the fees. The trial court therefore erred in putting the burden on respondent to show that Lipman\u2019s fees were unreasonable.\nWe conclude that, under these facts, Grund did not meet his burden to establish the reasonableness of Lipman\u2019s fees. The record contains only Lipman\u2019s curriculum vitae, which established that he has sufficient credentials to be considered an expert, Lipman\u2019s invoice, which does not indicate the time spent on any of the listed services or the hourly rate charged, and the rather unimpressive five-page report Lipman prepared. The bystander\u2019s report of proceedings does not relate any testimony regarding Lipman\u2019s fees. This record does not contain facts to establish the necessity and reasonableness of the expert witness\u2019 fees.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we modify that portion of the trial court\u2019s order which ordered respondent to pay Grund\u2019s attorney fees to state that the amount owed is $11,535.56, and we reverse that portion of the order which ordered respondent to pay Lipman\u2019s fees in the amount of $6,029.33.\nAffirmed in part as modified; reversed in part.\nREINHARD, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Kenneth Suskin, of Suskin, Menaehof & Associates, Ltd., of Libertyville, and Matthew Kaplan, of Waukegan, for appellant.", "Stephen H. Katz, of Waukegan, and David I. Grund, of Grund, Marcus, McNish, Knabe & Nadler, and Gerald L. Fishman, of Fishman & Merrick, P.C., both of Chicago, for appellee David I. Grund." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF SHOSHANA WINTON, Petitioner-Appellee, and JEFFREY B. WINTON, Respondent-Appellant (David I. Grand, Appellee).\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 90\u20140592\nOpinion filed April 19,1991.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied June 11,1991.\nE. Kenneth Suskin, of Suskin, Menaehof & Associates, Ltd., of Libertyville, and Matthew Kaplan, of Waukegan, for appellant.\nStephen H. Katz, of Waukegan, and David I. Grund, of Grund, Marcus, McNish, Knabe & Nadler, and Gerald L. Fishman, of Fishman & Merrick, P.C., both of Chicago, for appellee David I. Grund." }, "file_name": "1084-01", "first_page_order": 1106, "last_page_order": 1115 }