{ "id": 5282834, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY S. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allen", "decision_date": "1991-08-27", "docket_number": "No. 5-90-0203", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "743", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3503237 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 S. Ct. 1789", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 1140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6442881, 6442243, 6441896, 6441578, 6441995, 6442348, 6442770, 6442579, 6442134, 6441689, 6442459, 6442686 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/1140-12", "/us/475/1140-06", "/us/475/1140-03", "/us/475/1140-01", "/us/475/1140-04", "/us/475/1140-07", "/us/475/1140-11", "/us/475/1140-09", "/us/475/1140-05", "/us/475/1140-02", "/us/475/1140-08", "/us/475/1140-10" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126780 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 884", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2501065 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0884-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 918", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505645 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922-23" }, { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 1228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3490707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 464, "char_count": 7996, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.343491648654732e-08, "percentile": 0.48095506726453935 }, "sha256": "217b24310d2b442f4199dc7cf4e16699707218a643a94ad2863e05afdcd68e53", "simhash": "1:95a630970e7dadf7", "word_count": 1315 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:40:18.082759+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY S. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301) from final judgment of the circuit court of Effingham County granting defendant Gregory S. Allen\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. Defendant has not filed a brief with this court. We proceed to address the merits of the State\u2019s appeal. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493; Haeflinger v. City of Wood Dale (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 674, 472 N.E.2d 1228.\nOn December 25, 1989, defendant was arrested and charged by a uniform traffic ticket with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501). Defendant received a statutory summary suspension pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1) for failure to submit to chemical tests at the request of the arresting officer. Confirmation of that suspension was filed on January 5, 1990, and the suspension was to become effective on February 9, 1990, the 46th day following the arrest. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. ll-501.1(g).\nOn January 16, 1990, defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension and a hearing on the petition was scheduled for February 15, 1990. The State\u2019s Attorney filed a motion on January 17, 1990, requesting substitution of judge for the assigned judge, the Honorable Richard H. Brummer, pursuant to section 114\u2014 5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 5(c)). Thereafter, on February 8, 1990, the chief judge assigned the Honorable E.C. Eberspacher as the trial judge in the case. On that date, Judge Eberspacher entered an order on his own motion removing the Effingham County State\u2019s Attorney and her office from the prosecution of the case and requiring that she surrender her files to the sheriff.\nOn February 15, 1990, the date originally set for the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to rescind the suspension, defendant appeared before the daily call judge, the Honorable Steven P. Seymour, and announced his readiness to proceed with the hearing. Judge Seymour stated that he had no authority to hear the petition to rescind because the case had been assigned to Judge Eberspacher. Although an assistant State\u2019s Attorney was present in the courtroom, Judge Seymour noted that due to Judge Eberspacher\u2019s order removing the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office from the case, no one appeared on behalf of the State.\nOn February 20, 1990, Judge Eberspacher entered an order reinstating the State\u2019s Attorney as the prosecuting authority and reinstating Judge Brummer as the trial judge in defendant\u2019s case. Later that day, defendant and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney appeared before Judge Seymour and the State\u2019s motion for continuance was granted because the prosecutor had not had control of the State\u2019s file and had had no opportunity to subpoena witnesses.\nOn March 1, 1990, the parties appeared for the hearing on defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the suspension and defendant filed a second motion to rescind based on a failure to hold a rescission hearing within 30 days of defendant\u2019s January 16, 1990, request, as required under section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1). The State argued that, due to Judge Eberspacher\u2019s order, the State had no control over the failure to hold a timely hearing and should not be held accountable for its absence. Further, the State contended that the mandatory time requirement of section 2 \u2014 118.1 was not intended to apply when circumstances beyond the State\u2019s control precluded it from proceeding.\nJudge Seymour agreed that the failure to hold the hearing within the time limits of the statute was not the result of a lack of diligence either by the State or by defendant. However, the court stated that based on In re Summary Suspension of Driver\u2019s License of Trainor (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 918, 510 N.E.2d 614, it was compelled to grant defendant\u2019s motion to rescind the statutory summary suspension.\nWe agree with the trial court that Trainor is dispositive of the instant case. Section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code provides in relevant part as follows:\n\u201cUpon the notice of statutory summary suspension served under Section 11 \u2014 501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. *** Within 30 days after receipt of the written request or the first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket issued pursuant to a violation of Section 11 \u2014 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction. This judicial hearing, request or process shall not stay or delay the statutory summary suspension.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2-118.1(b).)\nThe Trainor court interpreted this 30-day time period as mandatory and held that the failure to hold a hearing within 30 days of the request, unless the delay was occasioned by defendant, violated defendant\u2019s right to due process. (Trainor, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 922-23, 510 N.E.2d at 617.) In so holding, the Trainor court commented that the time frame specified in the statute reflected the legislature\u2019s determination of what constitutes a prompt hearing for due process requirements, and that the only appropriate remedy for noncompliance with this rule was to require the rescission of the motorist\u2019s suspension. 156 Ill. App. 3d at 922, 510 N.E.2d at 617.\nWe further agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that because the statutory time period has been determined to be mandatory, rescission of defendant\u2019s suspension was required because defendant did not cause the delay. In statutory construction, the use of the word \u201cshall\u201d generally indicates a mandatory meaning and will not be given a permissive meaning when it is used with reference to a person\u2019s right or benefit, as here, and the right or benefit depends on the mandatory meaning. (People v. Rideout (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 884, 890, 550 N.E.2d 632, 635; Newkirk v. Bigard (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 28, 33, 485 N.E.2d 321, 323, cert, denied (1986), 475 U.S. 1140, 90 L. Ed. 2d 335, 106 S. Ct. 1789.) Although the State argues that the legislature could not have intended that a suspension be rescinded under the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, where the language of the act is certain and unambiguous the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. It is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. Carswell v. Rosewell (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 168, 172, 501 N.E.2d 695, 697.\nIn the present case, the record shows that the hearing on defendant\u2019s petition was held well after 30 days had elapsed from the date of his request, and after his driving privileges had already been rescinded. Therefore, applying the Trainor court\u2019s reasoning to the case at bar and considering the intent of the legislation and the circumstances at the time the rescission order was entered in this case, we conclude that defendant did not have the benefit of the prompt hearing contemplated in the statute to satisfy due process requirements. The statutory summary suspension was therefore properly rescinded. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Effingham County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOWERTON and WELCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paula Phillips, State\u2019s Attorney, of Effingham (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY S. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 90\u20140203\nOpinion filed August 27, 1991.\nPaula Phillips, State\u2019s Attorney, of Effingham (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 762, "last_page_order": 765 }