{ "id": 5283258, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRYANT LONG, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Long", "decision_date": "1991-07-05", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-3462", "first_page": "940", "last_page": "951", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 940" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "1630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254843 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070652 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 1297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3644082 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996" }, { "page": "1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576240 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404417 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0201-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 927, "char_count": 26760, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0416133755040118e-07, "percentile": 0.5508983342272078 }, "sha256": "52ab8b01b79ff70b7e39c43c46fecc3931615f8a7b60c4a5169cc35f895d3713", "simhash": "1:b68fa8eaf36f3a47", "word_count": 4473 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:40:18.082759+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRYANT LONG, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LaPORTA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Bryant Long was arrested and charged with the murder of his two children. On February 1, 1990, prior to trial, defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress evidence, including incriminating statements he had made to police on the ground that defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements made by him and found defendant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.\nThe State appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nDefendant was charged with the first degree murder of his daughter Cord Long, who died of suffocation on June 6, 1989. Defendant was also charged with the first degree murder of his daughter Charnelle, who died on the same date in a fire started in their Chicago home. Defendant also was charged with arson and aggravated arson.\nOn February 1, 1990, defendant filed a motion to quash his June 30, 1989, arrest and to suppress evidence obtained as the product of his arrest including incriminating statements made by defendant, the names of witnesses and physical evidence. Defendant also filed a motion to suppress any and all oral or written statements made by defendant prior to the time of his arrest or subsequent to his arrest, contending that he was unable to appreciate and incapable of understanding the full meaning of his Miranda rights.\nThe evidence on defendant\u2019s motion heard by the trial court included a report filed by a staff psychiatrist from the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Matthew S. Markos, in which he stated that he was unable to render an opinion on Long\u2019s ability to understand the meaning of Miranda rights because of the \u201cinconsistency of [Long\u2019s] reports with respect to his involvement in the alleged offense and *** the fact that the exact nature of his cognitive deficits is perhaps unclear.\u201d\nPsychologist Karen P. Smith, who was also an attorney, testified for the defense and filed a report summarizing the results of the testing she performed. Her report stated, in pertinent part, that on December 15, 1989, defendant was 29 years old, \u201chad a history of special education due to mental retardation\u201d and had no prior experience with the criminal justice system. \u201cAlthough alert and oriented as to time, place and person, Mr. Long\u2019s understanding of the purpose of our visit seemed tenuous. His report of the arrest incident was circumstantial and difficult to follow, and Mr. Long was unable to tell this examiner the name of the charge against him. When asked questions about various aspects of his case, Mr. Long often gave the impression of trying to answer, only to draw a blank after mumbling incoherently.\nOn the day of the testing when I questioned Bryant Long about his case, and specifically about his experiences with police, he was unable to tell a coherent story of what happened. When I asked him if he understood what it meant to \u2018have the right to remain silent,\u2019 he could supply no answer at all. *** It was my impression during the interview, confirmed by the defendant\u2019s performance on intelligence testing, that the concept of a \u2018right\u2019 was much too abstract for him to comprehend on his own. Many of the other words contained in the Miranda warning seemed beyond the reach of Mr. Long\u2019s very limited vocabulary, and would have required explicit explanation for him to have understood them at the time of his arrest.\u201d\nThe report summarized her findings, stating that she believed defendant was emotionally immature, needed to depend on others, had poor practical judgment and lacked the capacity to understand Miranda warnings. Smith testified that her report was based not only on her interviews with him but also on a review of his elementary and high school records of his special education classes, police reports pertaining to the investigation of the case and intelligence tests done on defendant when he was eight years old that indicated an IQ of 56.\nSmith testified that her intellectual tests on defendant showed an IQ of 67. Smith testified that her screening ruled out any brain damage or psychosis. She testified that defendant was \u201cfunctioning in a mildly retarded range of intellectual functioning.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Smith acknowledged that defendant lived with his wife and three children in a home without any other adult supervision. She testified that defendant told her he had been employed in the past at a \u201cfast food place, a fried chicken place.\u201d She acknowledged that defendant knew enough to know that two young children should not play with matches and that the only matches in his house were kept on the refrigerator.\nSmith stated that defendant\u2019s speech was \u201csurprisingly poor.\u201d She stated: \u201cWhen I did ask him to tell in his own words what had happened and how he happened to be where he was, it was very confusing, the account. I found myself having to ask questions to get why he was talking about one thing instead of another. He didn\u2019t give a good narrative.\u201d\nOn redirect examination she stated that she asked him what it meant to \u201cremain silent\u201d but she never explained the Miranda rights further or attempted to break down the rights into simpler language to see if defendant would understand those simpler words.\nDetective Michael Kill testified that defendant voluntarily accompanied him to the police station on the day of the fire and deaths of his children, June 6, 1989, where Kill read defendant his Miranda rights once through and then again, asking defendant if he understood each right individually. Kill testified that in each instance, the defendant responded, \u201cYes.\u201d Through a series of questions and answers from the prosecutor, Kill told the court how he then further explained the Miranda rights to defendant in simpler language.\n\u201cThen I went: Do you understand that anything you say may be used against you in court or other proceedings. I told him anything he tells me, not only may it be used against him in court; that if he did something wrong, it would be used against him in court. *** And I told him that he had a right to the lawyer and he didn\u2019t have to answer anything. And if he needed one, we would contact one or if he had a choice of one. And if he didn\u2019t have a choice of one, then I would stop right there. *** I said if you cannot afford or otherwise obtain a lawyer if you want one, a lawyer will be appointed to you and we will not ask questions until he has been appointed. Again I told him without his attorney, I wouldn\u2019t talk to him and that would be it. That he didn\u2019t have to say anything. And at that point, he wanted to start the conversation right there. But I wanted to finish what I was doing to make sure he understood each one *** I told him, if I start talking to you and it becomes apparent to you that you suddenly think you want an attorney, to tell me and we will stop right there and we won\u2019t ask any further questions at that point. In other words, he could stop \u2014 I told him, you can stop me me [sic] from asking you anything at any time and I will just stop and leave the room. And he said he still wanted to talk to me.\u201d\nKill testified that in the 90 minutes he interviewed defendant, defendant told him facts in a chronological manner and understood and answered questions about his children\u2019s inability to climb up and get matches off of the refrigerator. Kill testified that defendant\u2019s speech was \u201cdeliberate\u201d and not slurred. Kill testified: \u201cHis sentence structure was that which I found comparable to a person who achieved a freshman year of high school education.\u201d\nKill acknowledged that defendant never heard, read or signed the summary of his statement that Kill prepared during the interview. Defendant\u2019s sister, Felicia Brooms, also testified that her brother voluntarily went with Kill to the police station.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Diane Dickett testified that she too interviewed defendant on the day he was arrested, about 15 to 20 minutes after Kill finished his interview. She stated that she gave defendant his Miranda rights, saying each individually and asking him if he understood each. She stated that the only deviation she made from the Miranda wording was to explain to defendant that \u201cattorney\u201d meant lawyer and that \u201cappoint\u201d meant they would get him a lawyer. Dickett was asked, \u201cAfter he indicated to you that he understood his rights, did you ask him anything further?\u201d She replied, \u201cYes. I asked him if he was willing to tell me about what happened.\u201d Then Dickett was asked, \u201cDid he respond to you at that time?\u201d And she replied, \u201cHe said he would tell me about the fire.\u201d\nShe stated that when he told her about the fire, he spoke in a coherent and chronological fashion and had no difficulty speaking. She acknowledged that before she spoke to defendant, Kill told her not to ask compound questions because defendant was slow. Kill remained in the room when she interviewed defendant.\nOn November 2, 1990, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to quash. The court found that defendant was not coerced into giving a statement but that he was incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights.\nThe trial judge stated that she was impressed with Smith\u2019s testimony. The judge stated: \u201cShe did tell this court that when she discussed the various Miranda rights with Mr. Long that he looked blank and scratched his head, and it was obvious to her that he did not understand his rights.\u201d The court granted the motion to suppress defendant\u2019s statements and the State filed a motion to reconsider which was denied. The State appealed, contending the trial court erred when it granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements made by defendant.\nThe purpose of advising an accused of his rights is to enable him to make an intelligent decision, and to understand the consequences of that decision, and the fact that the advice was given and repeated and he said he understood it is of little consequence unless the defendant possessed the intelligence to understand the warning. (People v. Turner (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 201, 205, 306 N.E.2d 27.) Each case must be considered on its own facts, and mental deficiency, while not decisive, is a relevant factor. Turner, 56 Ill. 2d at 206.\nDefendant contends his situation is similar to that of the defendant in Turner. Turner is distinguishable on its facts from this case. The defendant in Turner made no incriminating statement prior to being closeted with the polygraph examiner. He stated to the examiner that he thought he should have a lawyer but then proceeded with the polygraph test without consulting an attorney. The interrogation should have stopped when he indicated he wanted an attorney.\nThe trial court found defendant\u2019s case \u201con all fours\u201d with People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958. In Bernasco, the court found a 17-year-old defendant\u2019s confession was inadmissible because defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Defendant Bernasco, as with defendant Long in this case, was of subnormal intelligence, had left school after the ninth grade and had no prior experience with police. At Bernasco\u2019s suppression hearing, a psychologist testified that Bernasco could not understand certain Miranda terms and the defendant testified himself that he had not paid attention to his Miranda waiver form and had not understood it. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the suppression of defendant\u2019s confession, stating that \u201cto waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail.\u201d Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d at 363.\nOn appeal, defendant relies on the Bernasco decision, noting that it was reasonable for the trial court to find more credible the opinion of a psychologist than the police officer and assistant State\u2019s Attorney. Defendant also discounts the State\u2019s contention that the psychologist\u2019s report was somehow of lesser value because the interviews and testing took place five months after defendant\u2019s arrest. Defendant argues that nothing in the record suggests defendant\u2019s intellectual ability was impaired as a result of the delay, for the psychologist was testing his cognitive abilities, not his memory.\nWe disagree. Smith asked defendant to relate his experiences with the police at the time he was taken into custody some five months before. Clearly she was testing his memory as well as his cognitive abilities.\nThe State contends this court should reverse the trial court\u2019s order suppressing defendant\u2019s statements because the trial court\u2019s finding is unsupported by the evidence and because the trial court incorrectly based its decision on Bernasco, which is not \u201con all fours\u201d with the present case. Moreover, the testimony of the detective and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney who took defendant\u2019s statement establishes that defendant gave the statements after being fully advised of his Miranda rights twice and after having those rights explained in terms sufficient to allow defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive those rights.\nSpecifically, the State contends that Smith\u2019s testimony was weak because she interviewed defendant for a two-hour period some five months after he was arrested and she did not \u201cextensively\u201d examine his background. The State contends that a review of his background establishes that defendant was accustomed to functioning day to day without adult supervision. In addition, Smith testified that defendant understood the concept of a lawyer.\nThe State points to the evidence presented through the testimony of Kill and Dickett, who both testified that they took special care to advise defendant of his Miranda rights in language he could understand and that defendant answered questions. Both testified that defendant stayed calm and exhibited no stress while being questioned since he did not need his inhaler for his asthma while being interviewed.\nThe State argues that the court should have considered not only defendant\u2019s mental capacity, but also defendant\u2019s age, physical condition, the length and intensity of the interrogation and whether any coercion was involved. (People v. Madden (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 988, 996, 501 N.E.2d 1297.) The trial court specifically found no coercion was involved when defendant gave his statement. He was in custody and interrogated for only a few hours by police before he gave the incriminating statements.\nThe State distinguishes Bernasco initially by noting that the defendant in Bernasco was 17 and living with his father. Here, defendant was 29 and living together with his wife and three children without any adult supervision. In addition, the trial court in Bernasco heard testimony from a school psychologist, but here Smith had only school records to look at and did a minimal review of defendant\u2019s background.\nThe State argues that the most obvious distinction between the two cases is that in Bernasco the defendant himself testified about what he understood and how he felt. Here, defendant did not testify. The trial judge acknowledged this difference when hearing arguments on the motion to reconsider. She noted that she had seen Mr. Long on several occasions and had the opportunity to observe him. \u201cMy personal observations of Mr. Long would be that he appears very slow. I have given him directions and he reacts very slowly to very simple directions. He stares off blankly during the court proceedings ***.\u201d\nThe resolution of contradictory testimony and determination of its weight is for the trier of fact. (Madden, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1000.) And findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress will be affirmed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, 521, 404 N.E.2d 181.\nThough Bernasco outlines the supreme court\u2019s most recent explanation of the test for a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, it is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Bernasco, the defendant, age 17, still dependant on his father and living at home, was handed a copy of the standard Miranda rights to read along with the officer. The officer had defendant initial each section as the rights were read to him. Bernasco was asked if he understood his rights and he said, \u201cYes.\u201d He then signed a waiver of rights form witnessed by two detectives. Bernasco himself testified that he did not understand his rights as listed on the piece of paper handed to him, was scared and was not paying attention.\nThe defendant here did not testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The trial judge stated that during the hearing on the motion she had observed defendant\u2019s inattentiveness and slow reaction to directions. But we believe such observations are not an appropriate test to determine whether a person has \u201cknowingly and intelligently\u201d waived his Miranda rights.\nDefendant also cites People v. Reid (136 Ill. 2d 27, 554 N.E.2d 174) for our consideration of whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. In Reid, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court\u2019s decision to deny defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his pretrial statements because defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDefendant Reid was found guilty of armed robbery and murder. Before the 15-year-old\u2019s trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made to police on the ground that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicated that defendant was read the Miranda rights on several occasions and they were shown to him in written form. His mother was present during the interrogations.\nDefendant had the reading and comprehension skills of an eight-year-old. He testified that he understood the meaning of several words including lawyer, silent, can, will, used, against and present, all words used in the Miranda warnings. Evidence established that defendant had no prior experience with the criminal justice system, had never worked and had always lived at home with his family.\nIn Reid the trial court found no reason to suppress defendant\u2019s statements. This decision was upheld on appeal. The defendant in Reid lived in a much more sheltered environment than our defendant. Here, defendant had both lived and worked outside the home for several years. Though Reid was given the Miranda warnings verbatim, the defendant here was given both the verbatim Miranda warnings and a simplified explanation of each warning.\nDickett testified that defendant\u2019s warnings were given orally because defendant indicated he could neither read nor write. Though Dickett deviated only briefly from the standard Miranda warnings, Kill\u2019s explanation of rights was much more extensive and occurred in the same interrogation session. Kill\u2019s testimony demonstrated that the language used to explain the defendant\u2019s rights was simplified from the formal language of Miranda to a level easily understood by defendant.\nIn addition, Dickett testified that she asked defendant if he wanted his statement to be put into writing and defendant \u201cindicated that he did not wish that.\u201d This indicates defendant had the ability to make choices.\nWe do not find the same persuasiveness in Smith\u2019s testimony, which the judge relied upon heavily. By her own admission, Smith only asked defendant if he knew what it meant to \u201cremain silent.\u201d She testified that she did not explain the Miranda rights further or attempt to break down the formal language of the Miranda rights into simpler language to determine if defendant would understand them when translated into simpler words within his ability to understand. We note that Smith determined the defendant had an IQ of 67 and concluded that \u201che functioned in a mildly retarded range of intellectual functioning.\u201d This IQ does not render him incapable of any ability to ever understand his privilege against self-incrimination if it is explained in language he can comprehend.\nThe Miranda Court enunciated the mandatory warnings to be given a defendant before a custodial interrogation could take place:\n\u201cHe must be warned-prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. [5] Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.\u201d (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630.)\nThe standard warnings given by the police track the specific language of the Supreme Court.\nThis language was the basis for the psychologist\u2019s questions to test defendant\u2019s understanding. Smith concluded that he did not understand the concept of a \u201cright,\u201d which was too abstract for him to comprehend on his own, and that many of the other words in the Miranda warnings would have required explicit explanation for defendant to understand them.\nIn contrast to Smith\u2019s questioning put to the defendant, Kill then testified extensively about the manner in which he explained defendant\u2019s rights to him, telling him that they could stop talking whenever defendant wanted and that if defendant wanted a lawyer, they would stop talking and Kill would obtain one for him. The comparison between knowing what it means to \u201cremain silent\u201d and advising defendant they could stop talking whenever defendant wanted or would stop talking if defendant wanted a lawyer is the difference between the formal language of Miranda and its simplest translation.\nThe record establishes that Kill translated the Miranda warnings into simple language as follows: (1) You have the right to remain silent \u2014 \u201cI told him, you don\u2019t have to talk to me about the death of your children if you don\u2019t want to.\u201d (2) Anything you say may be used against you in court or other proceedings \u2014 \u201cI told him, anything you tell me, not only may it be used against him in court, but if he did something wrong it would be used against him in court.\u201d (3) You have a right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning \u2014 \u201cI told him, he had a right to a lawyer and he didn\u2019t have to answer anything. And if he needed one, we would contact one or if he had a choice of one. And if he didn\u2019t have a choice of one then I would stop right there.\u201d (He said he didn\u2019t want a lawyer present at that time.) (4) If you cannot afford or otherwise obtain a lawyer, if you want one, a lawyer will be appointed to you and we will not ask questions until he has been appointed \u2014 \u201cI told him, without his attorney I wouldn\u2019t talk to him and that would be it. That he didn\u2019t have to say anything.\u201d (He said he didn\u2019t want a lawyer.) (5) If you decide to answer now with or without a lawyer, you have the right to stop questioning at any time or stop questioning and consult a lawyer \u2014 \u201cI told him, if I start talking to you and it becomes apparent to you that you suddenly think you want an attorney to tell me and we will stop right there and we won\u2019t ask any further questions at that point. In other words, he could stop me from asking anything, at any time and I will just stop and leave the room.\u201d (He said he still wanted to talk to me.)\nDickett testified that she gave defendant the Miranda warnings one at a time, speaking slowly. After each one she asked defendant if he understood and he said he did. She testified that she told him the word attorney meant lawyer and instead of the phrase, \u201cappoint a lawyer,\u201d she told him the court would give him a lawyer.\nIn contrast to this questioning by Kill and Dickett, Smith testified that she interviewed defendant on December 15, 1989, six months after the fire. In questions she posed which were intended to determine \u201cwhether or not he could intelligently waive what are commonly known as \u2018Miranda rights or Miranda warnings,\u2019 she would ask him \u201cwhat does this mean, and then I would say what the particular right was\u201d and his reaction would be to \u201clook around, scratch his head and draw a blank. He didn\u2019t say anything.\u201d From these reactions she concluded that \u201che didn\u2019t understand what these rights meant.\u201d\nThe contrast in the manner in which the police officer and assistant State\u2019s Attorney advised the defendant and the form of the questions posed to the defendant by the psychologist lead us to the conclusion that the record does not support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant did not understand his rights and therefore did not knowingly and intelligently waive them. The court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is not supported by the record.\nHere we find the defendant was advised of his right to remain silent and his right to have an attorney present in language he could understand. He was advised that anything he told the officer could be used against him in court. Defendant then stated that he wanted to tell the police about the fire. He repeated the story to the officer and to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney in a coherent manner. Although he was asked to do so, he chose not to have his statement taken down verbatim in writing. Since he was unable to read, he could not verify what a written statement contained.\nWhile the State has a heavy burden to show that a defendant has waived his constitutional rights in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner (Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d at 516), we find the State has met that burden. We find the weight of the evidence establishes that defendant waived his Miranda rights in a knowing and intelligent manner. For all of the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements is reversed.\nReversed.\nRAKOWSKI, P.J., and EGAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LaPORTA" } ], "attorneys": [ "John O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Carmen K. Aguilar, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRYANT LONG, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 90\u20143462\nOpinion filed July 5, 1991.\nModified on denial of rehearing August 30, 1991.\nJohn O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Carmen K. Aguilar, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0940-01", "first_page_order": 962, "last_page_order": 973 }