{ "id": 8498443, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE VILLAGE OF FOREST VIEW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF LYONS, Defendant-Appellee (Lake River Corporation, Amicus Curiae)", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Village of Forest View v. Village of Lyons", "decision_date": "1991-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-0896", "first_page": "159", "last_page": "167", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045584 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 N.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2541951 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/81/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 903", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5634880 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650730 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994547 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2767882 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3441678 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 N.E. 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5210760 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/331/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2499218 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5306693 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 Ill. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5306671 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0082-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 720, "char_count": 15265, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.011620893327796e-08, "percentile": 0.3730014761478372 }, "sha256": "b862603040aee9a11b333b7a8ad1886bb0c8b5ce35dd88b7f0c9ded2988acd36", "simhash": "1:ed55a636abc11c76", "word_count": 2527 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:01:44.666066+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SCARIANO, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE VILLAGE OF FOREST VIEW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF LYONS, Defendant-Appellee (Lake River Corporation, Amicus Curiae)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COCCI A\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a quo warranto action. Plaintiff, the Village of Forest View, appeals from an order entering summary judgment in favor of defendant, the Village of Lyons, which voided Forest View\u2019s annexation of land which Lyons had previously annexed.\nOn appeal, Forest View contends that the court erred in granting Lyons\u2019 summary judgment motion and in denying Forest View\u2019s summary judgment motion, because Lyons\u2019 previous annexations were illegal because Forest View\u2019s quo warranto action is not barred by the statute of limitations as Lyons\u2019 annexation did not meet statutory contiguity requirements, and Lyons\u2019 annexation is barred by the doctrine of estoppel because Lyons\u2019 counterclaim is barred by a contiguity requirement, and by the doctrine of laches; and because Lyons lacks standing to challenge the Forest View annexation.\nThe record in this summary judgment action sets forth the following allegations and facts.\nAs a matter of convenience, the parties have referred to the relevant property as parcel \u201cA\u201d through parcel \u201cE.\u201d (See the map included herein as an appendix.) The \u201csubject property\u201d which Forest View wishes to annex is parcel \u201cE.\u201d The subject property is owned by the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (Metropolitan). The property is leased to the Lake River Corporation, which filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Forest View\u2019s position.\nIn 1945, Lyons began passing a series of 26 ordinances which purported to annex all of the unincorporated territory bounded by four municipalities, including Lyons on the northern border and Forest View on the eastern border. Each ordinance purported to accomplish an involuntary annexation (pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 11, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 1\u2014 13) of a 20-acre parcel of land south of Lyons\u2019 47th Street village limits. (The strip annexations were done on approximately a monthly basis, one strip at a time, because the involuntary annexation statute at that time prohibited the annexation of more than 30 acres at a time.)\nBetween November 1945 and July 1946, Lyons\u2019 first 10 ordinances annexed land marked as parcel \u201cA\u201d on the attached map.\nOn March 28, 1947, quo warranto proceedings were filed against Lyons, challenging the first series of 10 strip annexations. On March 18, 1948, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinances purporting to annex these strips of land (marked as parcel \u201cA\u201d on the map) were a nullity. (People ex rel. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Village of Lyons (1948), 400 Ill. 82, 79 N.E.2d 33.) The court explained that, under the statute, a 30-acre parcel of territory to be annexed must be wholly bounded by one or more municipalities or navigable waters. (Universal Oil Products, 400 Ill. at 87, 79 N.E.2d at 36.) The parcel \u201cA\u201d strips were not wholly bounded by municipalities or navigable waters.\nBetween August 1946 and March 1947, the next eight ordinances of the Village of Lyons attempted to annex land marked as \u201cParcel B.\u201d On June 24, 1948, the circuit court of Cook County entered a judgment declaring this second group of eight ordinances to be nullities, as the land sought to be annexed was not \u201cwholly bounded\u201d by municipalities or navigable waters since the attempted annexation of the land comprising parcel \u201cA\u201d had been declared void in Universal Oil. People ex rel. Gortsch v. Village of Lyons (1948), No. 47-C-6153.\nBetween October 1947 and June 8, 1948, the next eight ordinances adopted in Lyons attempted to annex the land marked as parcels \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD\u201d on the attached map.\nThe annexation of these last eight strips has never been judicially declared invalidly annexed.\nDesignation of the last eight parcels is separated into \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD\u201d as the strips in \u201cD\u201d were annexed after the Illinois Supreme Court filed its decision in Universal Oil on March 18, 1948.\nThe property, an irregularly shaped parcel of land marked as \u201cParcel E,\u201d extends from Forest View\u2019s eastern boundary, to the west, across a portion of the five most eastern strips of parcels \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD.\u201d\nIn 1984, Metropolitan and the Lake River Corporation petitioned that parcel \u201cE\u201d be annexed to Forest View.\nOn July 10, 1984, pursuant to an annexation agreement, Forest View enacted an ordinance annexing the subject property.\nPrior to 1984, Forest View provided fire, police, water and all governmental services to the subject property. Lyons provided no services to the property.\nOn August 26, 1986, Lyons\u2019 attorney wrote to the Lake River Corporation that Lyons had become aware that the subject property, where \u201cyou are doing business,\u201d is \u201clocated within the corporate limits of the Village of Lyons.\u201d\nIn November 1987, Lyons issued a revised zoning map, showing for the first time that the subject property fell within the boundaries of the Village of Lyons. George Kucharchuk, the village inspector and a board of trustees member, testified at a deposition that all of Lyons\u2019 official maps prior to November 1987 did not include the subject property within the limits of Lyons. The map was prepared by the village engineer at the direction of Kucharchuk.\nOn March 21, 1988, Forest View filed a complaint in quo warranto, challenging the validity of Lyons\u2019 purported annexations of numerous parcels of land, including the subject property.\nForest View\u2019s first amended complaint in the present action sought a declaration that these final eight ordinances were void, pursuant to Universal Oil Products. Forest View also sought a declaration that its own annexation of the subject property was legal and an order requiring Lyons to account for and return to Forest View all tax revenues received by Lyons subsequent to Forest View\u2019s annexation of the subject property.\nBoth parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment.\nOn February 26, 1990, the circuit court: (1) granted Lyons\u2019 motion for summary judgment; (2) denied Forest View\u2019s motion for summary judgment; (3) declared Lyons\u2019 annexations of the eight strips (marked as \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD\u201d on attached map) valid; (4) declared Forest View\u2019s annexation of the subject property invalid and void; (5) ousted Forest View from asserting any jurisdiction over the subject property; and (6) found Forest View\u2019s action was barred by the statute of limitations. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court recited two bases for its decision in favor of Lyons.\nFirst, Lyons\u2019 final eight ordinances were valid because the first six parcels were annexed prior to the June 24, 1948, judgment of ouster in People ex rel. Gortsch and had never been the subject of a judgment of ouster. The court reasoned that the annexations of parcels \u201cA\u201d and \u201cB\u201d were not invalid ab initio; instead, they were only invalid from the date of the order of ouster on June 24, 1948. Since the parcel \u201cC\u201d strips were annexed between October 1947 and March 1948, before the June 24, 1948, ouster order, then parcel \u201cC\u201d could be considered \u201cwholly bounded\u201d and validly annexed. Since parcel \u201cC\u201d was validly annexed, parcel \u201cD\u201d was also validly annexed. Consequently, Forest View was prevented from annexing parcel \u201cE,\u201d which cut across parcels \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD.\u201d\nThe trial court erred in finding parcel \u201cC\u201d was \u201cwholly bounded by *** one or more municipalities,\u201d as required by the relevant statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 11, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 1\u201413 (involuntary annexation).\nThe map clearly shows that the territory lying to the east of parcel \u201cC,\u201d i.e., the strips labeled parcel \u201cD,\u201d was not incorporated territory. (Notably, these strips were not annexed by Lyons until May 1948 and June 1948, after the March 18, 1948, Illinois Supreme Court decision finding parcel \u201cA\u201d was not validly annexed.)\nAt the time of the attempted annexation of the strips in parcel \u201cC,\u201d between October 1947 and March 1948, the territory lying to the east of \u201cC\u201d (including all of parcel \u201cD\u201d) was not incorporated.\nAnother erroneous basis for the trial court\u2019s decision is that an order finding an annexation ordinance invalid is not void ab initio. This reasoning is not supported by the previous decisions which nullified Lyons\u2019 annexation ordinances for parcels \u201cA\u201d and \u201cB.\u201d\nIn Gortsch, the court expressly found the ordinances were \u201cillegal, null and void and of no force and effect for the reason that the defendant village did not have lawful authority to annex such ordinances.\u201d Moreover, the parcels \u201care not now and never have been within the lawful territorial limits of the defendant, Village of Lyons.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn Universal Oil, our supreme court found the ordinances \u201cwere invalid in their entirety.\u201d (Universal Oil, 400 Ill. at 92.) The annexation ordinances were each \u201ca nullity, and in legal effect no ordinance at all.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Universal Oil, 400 Ill. at 87.\nMoreover, Illinois case law consistently indicates that the finding that an annexation ordinance is null necessarily makes it void ab initio. See, e.g., People ex rel. Village of Northbrook v. City of Highland Park (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 435, 440, 342 N.E.2d 196, 199 (where statute of limitations has run, annexation must be challenged on the ground that it was \u201cvoid ab initio for want of subject matter jurisdiction\u201d); People ex rel. Des Plaines v. Village of Mt. Prospect (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 807, 814, 331 N.E.2d 373, 379 (challenge must be that annexation was \u201cvoid ab initio\u201d).\nHere, the purported annexations of the strips in parcels \u201cA\u201d and \u201cB\u201d were void ab initio. The annexations were not void merely from the date of the judicial declaration of ouster.\nThus, the later attempts to annex land in parcels \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD\u201d were also void, since they were never \u201cwholly bounded by one or more municipalities.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 11.\nThe trial court cited Emery v. Hennessy (1928), 331 Ill. 296, 304, 162 N.E. 835, 838, for the proposition that a judgment of ouster is not retroactive. Emery concerned voters\u2019 rights to have their votes counted where their district was declared invalidly annexed after the election. The court in Emery found that as a practical matter, the status of voters must be determined at the time of the election. The case at bar contains no similar possibility of prejudice due to rights acquired by intervening third parties. In fact, as evidenced by Lyons\u2019 failure to render governmental services or even include it in its official maps for over 30 years, Lyons has never tried to exercise rights over the subject property.\nAs a second ground for its decision, the trial court found that the action by Forest View was barred by the statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 1\u201446). We disagree.\nThe applicable statute of limitations provides that no action contesting an annexation shall be initiated more than one year after the annexation becomes final. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 24, par. 7\u2014 1 \u2014 46.) One exception exists. The one-year limitation does not apply \u201cto annexations of territory which was not contiguous at the time of annexation and is not contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest such annexation.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 1\u2014 46.\nIn order to determine whether the one-year limitation is a bar to this action, this court must determine whether the attempted annexation was of contiguous land, which in turn means it must look at the strip annexation program of Lyons in the 1940\u2019s. The very nature of the central issue, then, is whether the land was contiguous to Lyons at the time of the October 1947 \u2014 March 1948 purported annexation of strips in parcels \u201cC\u201d and \u201cD.\u201d Thus, the one-year limitation is not applicable. Accord People ex rel. Village of Hazel Crest v. Village of Homewood (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 632, 478 N.E.2d 426.\nFurthermore, \u201ccontiguity\u201d is not satisfied by a mere touching of the annexed territory to the annexing municipality. People ex rel. Adamowski v. Village of Streamwood (1959), 15 Ill. 2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635.\nLyons tried to annex rectangular strips of land which were 300 feet in an east-west direction by 2,675 feet in a north-south direction, jutting out from Lyons. The parcels are approximately nine times longer than wide. These are not considered \u201ccontiguous\u201d under the relevant case law. See, e.g., City of Mount Carmel v. Partee (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 371, 385 N.E.2d 687 (court found no contiguity between strip of land 60 feet wide by 1,587 feet long, which bordered city for only 60 feet); People ex rel. Village of Long Grove v. Village of Buffalo Grove (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 455, 513 N.E.2d 408 (no contiguity where 95-acre tract of land shares only a 600-foot boundary with village, and remainder of parcel surrounded by another municipality); Westcom, Inc. v. Woodridge Park District (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 903, 364 N.E.2d 721 (court found no contiguity where a common boundary at one end was only 120.5 feet long, and strip then extended perpendicularly for 2,640 feet to another parcel; People ex rel. Coojar Realty Corp. v. Village of Burr Ridge (1967), 81 Ill. App. 2d 203, 225 N.E.2d 39 (court found an improper strip annexation and invalidated annexation of road adjoining village for 300 feet, then extending out from village for one-half mile).\n\u201c[S]trip or corridor annexations *** do not satisfy the contiguity requirement because they are merely a subterfuge to reach outlying areas.\u201d (Long Grove v. Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 462, 413 N.E.2d at 412.) The attempted annexation by Lyons can hardly be said to fulfill the contiguity requirement\u2019s purpose of permitting \u201cthe natural and gradual extension of municipal boundaries to areas which \u2018adjoin one another in a reasonably substantial physical sense.\u2019 \u201d People ex rel. County of St. Clair v. City of Belleville (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 417 N.E.2d 125, 130, quoting Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1968), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 352.\nThus, the various strip annexations were not contiguous to Lyons, and the one-year statute of limitations does not bar this action.\nIn conclusion, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the Village of Lyons. Summary judgment should be entered in favor of the Village of Forest View.\nIn view of our holding, we need not address additional contentions raised by Forest View.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Forest View.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nSCARIANO, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.\nAPPENDIX wuoifliii IWM 1IWI mmmmm \u00ab1 fl-M-CI WOIX9M C/I M ONV Cl-CC-lt M0IX9N >/\u00bb M Maaii.'iify/V.i. MHtw tmoixrxamn", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COCCI A" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Janega, of Chicago (John B. Murphey and Katherine S. Janega, of counsel), for appellant.", "Thomas J. Cisar and Eugene J. Berkes, both of Cisar & Mrofka, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellee.", "Carol B. Manzoni, Arthur F. Radke, and Shannon S. Sullivan, all of Ross & Hardies, of Chicago, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE VILLAGE OF FOREST VIEW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF LYONS, Defendant-Appellee (Lake River Corporation, Amicus Curiae).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1-90-0896\nOpinion filed July 30, 1991.\nRosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Janega, of Chicago (John B. Murphey and Katherine S. Janega, of counsel), for appellant.\nThomas J. Cisar and Eugene J. Berkes, both of Cisar & Mrofka, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellee.\nCarol B. Manzoni, Arthur F. Radke, and Shannon S. Sullivan, all of Ross & Hardies, of Chicago, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0159-01", "first_page_order": 181, "last_page_order": 189 }