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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587359 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "court finds State's explanation that potential black juror resides near home of defendant to be race-neutral reason for exclusion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 18, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93-94" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "1721" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1724" }, { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "1724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2130, "char_count": 70069, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0916237287589645e-07, "percentile": 0.760467695220841 }, "sha256": "7d9579f40156e4d67065da05bd37c2397b8fcf0df46263f893e41d371d98cea1", "simhash": "1:2f4d2d74bf062baf", "word_count": 11759 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:01:44.666066+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LORENZ, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTON JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Anton Johnson, was tried by a jury and found guilty of murdering John O\u2019Neal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9\u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2).) He was sentenced to a term of 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the State failed to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination, and instead, proffered reasons that were merely a pretext for excluding prospective black jurors on account of their race; (2) he was denied a fair trial due to the prosecutor\u2019s irrelevant and prejudicial insinuations that he was a member of a gang and as a result was motivated to kill; (3) he was denied a fair trial resulting from prosecutorial misconduct and overreaching; and (4) he was denied a fair trial because the trial court refused to submit his proffered eyewitness identification instructions to the jury.\nTHE VOIR DIRE\nOn July 27, 1987, the trial court conducted a voir dire examination of prospective jurors. The record on appeal discloses that of the 25 venire members who were reached for voir dire, four were black. However, the record does not indicate either the number or the racial composition of those venire members in the array who had not reached the voir dire stage. During the voir dire, the State peremptorily challenged five prospective jurors. Of those five, three were black and two were white. Defendant, who is black, exercised peremptory challenges to excuse four prospective jurors. Of those four, three were not black, while the race of the fourth is not reflected in the record. Twelve jurors and two alternates were selected. Of the selected jurors, one was black while the remaining 11 were not black, although the record does reflect that at least two were Hispanic. The trial court itself discharged two venire members.\nThe three black venire members excused by the State were Shirley McGee, James Norwood, and David Neely, and they possessed the following characteristics:\n(1) Shirley McGee lived with her son on West Wallon in Chicago, was single and had never been married. She had been unemployed for approximately one year. She had been burglarized three years before. She had no prior jury service. Her landlord was a sergeant in the Chicago police department.\n(2) James Norwood was married and had lived on South Ash-land in Chicago for five years and had never served on a jury. He worked as a paint filler in a manufacturing company. He personally knew no one who worked in the law enforcement or in any law-related field, and neither he nor any members of his immediate family had been victims of crime.\n(3) David Neely was single and had lived at 6200 South Saint Lawrence in Chicago for five years. Prior to living there, he had lived at 5700 South Bishop for 10 years. He graduated from Chicago State University, which is located on 95th and King Drive. For two years, he had been a fifth-grade teacher at the Saint Alberts School located on 90th and Harper in Chicago. He never before served on a jury, knew no one who worked in law enforcement or in any law-related field, and neither he nor any members of his immediate family had been victims of crime. (Neely was initially accepted by the State as a juror; however, after the defense excused three other jurors, the State excused Neely.)\nBefore the voir dire examination had been completed, defense counsel objected to the jury selection on the ground that the State had exercised peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. Defense counsel specifically referred to one of the peremptorily challenged black prospective jurors, David Neely, and compared him to one of the accepted white jurors, Peggy Sutorious. (In regard to Su-torious, voir dire questioning revealed that she had lived in North Lake, Illinois, for 25 years; lived with her parents; had never been married; taught math for three years in District 88, and prior to that taught in Districts 83 and 87 in Berkley and Franklin Park. Sutorious\u2019 father worked as a salesman at Marshal Fields in Oak Brook; and her mother was a secretary for The Baseball School of USA.)\nWithout explicitly articulating whether or not a prima facie case of racial discrimination in juror exclusion had been established, the trial judge then asked the State to respond to the defense counsel\u2019s objection. The State pointed out that of the five prospective jurors peremptorily challenged by the State, two were white, and the trial court asked why the State had excluded Neely. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney explained he felt that Neely \u201cwould be more inclined to lean toward the Defense than to the State\u201d because he lived, taught and had gone to college in the inner city.\nThe trial judge then inquired about the remaining two prospective jurors peremptorily challenged by the State. Before giving the State an opportunity to respond, the trial judge remarked, \u201cOne was a woman who apparently had an illegitimate child, Miss McGee.\u201d Defense counsel countered that McGee was \u201csingle, employed and worked as a phone operator.\u201d The trial judge then initially concluded, \u201cI can\u2019t see any systematic exclusion, there are two Latinos on the Jury who are minorities but there is one other Juror, one black, I can\u2019t see systematic exclusion.\u201d Yet, despite his conclusion that there was no \u201csystematic exclusion,\u201d the trial judge then asked the prosecutor why the State had peremptorily challenged Norwood. He replied:\n\u201cI don\u2019t believe he was attentive during the questioning, he appeared to be disinterested, he appeared to be sleeping when other people were being questioned.\u201d\nThe trial judge then remarked, \u201cWell, he didn\u2019t bother me because he was rather quiet there, I don\u2019t know about him.\u201d The trial judge then denied defendant\u2019s motion, noted that the sworn panel contained three \u201cminority\u201d jurors, and the case proceeded to trial.\nTHE TRIAL\nThe pertinent testimony adduced at trial is as follows. Flora O\u2019Neal, the victim\u2019s mother, testified that the victim, John O\u2019Neal, had lived with her at 9215 South Woodlawn in Chicago, prior to his death on September 13,1986.\nTony Rice, the victim\u2019s friend, testified that he lived at 4101 South Federal in Chicago. Shortly after 6 p.m. on September 13, 1986, he was in front of a food store on 43rd and State Streets with his brother, John Rice, and his friends, Tony Pierce, Sammy Jones, and the victim. Together they walked northbound towards the intersection of 42nd and State Streets.\nSuddenly defendant appeared from behind a field house, 25 feet away, and began shooting at the group. Tony shouted a warning, then he and all his companions ran. As Tony ran, he fell behind an automobile, and he watched with an unobstructed view as the defendant continued shooting. Defendant then ran behind the field house. Tony discovered that the victim had been shot. Tony told the police on the night of the shooting that he had previously seen defendant three or four times \u201cin the neighborhood,\u201d although he did not know defendant\u2019s name.\nTony further testified that at approximately 10 p.m. on the following day, while he and Sammy Jones were riding around the neighborhood with two police officers, he spotted the defendant and pointed him out.\nOn cross-examination, Tony testified that immediately after the incident he described the defendant to Officers Argenbright and Scan-nell. He told both officers that the defendant had a light mustache, shoulder-length hair and \u201che had his hair slick back into the wave.\u201d Tony added on redirect that he told the police that defendant wore blue jeans and a gray jacket; he had \u201cslick hair and a wave,\u201d i.e., \u201cprocessed\u201d hair which was shoulder-length; he was thin, brown skinned, and about 5 feet 9 inches tall. Tony denied telling the police there were three offenders, or that the offenders wore their hats to the right side.\nJohn Rice, the victim\u2019s friend, testified that he also lived at 4101 South Federal Street, as had the victim. John Rice testified for the State on-direct examination that he was familiar with street gangs called the \u201cCobra Stones\u201d (Stones) and the \u201cBlack Gangster Disciples\u201d (Disciples), admitting to having once been a member of the Stones. He stated that the Stones, who controlled the building where he lived, and the Disciples, who controlled the building next to his, at 4037 South Federal, were rival gangs and at war. He stated that the Disciples controlled the park area from which the defendant had emerged when he began shooting.\nJohn further testified that while he walked with his brother and the victim on State Street, he saw defendant pull out a gun, heard him shout something, and saw him fire approximately six shots. John had previously seen defendant \u201ca few times around the neighborhood.\u201d John described defendant to the police as being 5 feet 9 inches tall, 150 to 160 pounds, wearing a gray jacket and blue jeans, with shoulder-length hair \u201cslick back.\u201d He identified the defendant in a lineup the night after the shooting. Previously, John had been convicted of aggravated battery in 1981 and armed robbery in 1982.\nOn cross-examination, John denied telling the police there had been more than one offender.\nSammy Jones, along with the two Rice brothers and the victim, lived at 4101 South Federal. Jones testified to essentially the same events as Tony except that he did \u201c[n]ot exactly\u201d see the shooter. When he heard the first shot, he ran. On cross-examination, he initially testified that he informed the police officers that a group of three individuals fired those shots. He later testified that he did not specify a precise number of individuals. \u201cI couldn\u2019t see how many it was, I didn\u2019t see.\u201d\nDetective William Murphy of the Chicago police department testified that on the evening of September 14, 1986, he drove Tony and Sammy around the neighborhood to look for the offender and any witnesses. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Tony saw the defendant at the park located at 4200 South State Street and identified him as the offender. Defendant was placed under arrest. John later identified defendant in a lineup. The police telephoned Pierce, who reported that he would not be able to identify the shooter.\nAfter the State rested its case, several witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant. James Scannell, who had been a Chicago police officer for one year, testified that he was the first to arrive at the scene. He interviewed Tony Rice, John Rice, Sammy Jones, and other witnesses. He did not see Pierce. The victim\u2019s companions told Scan-nell that the shots were fired by only one individual. Scannell, however, acknowledged that his police report seemed to indicate that the shots had been fired by three offenders, who all wore their hats to the right. The police report did not note the names of any witnesses who might have reported more than one offender.\nWilliam Henderson, a friend of the defendant, testified for the defense that he lived in apartment 1309 at 4037 South Federal Street and that Fred Khaton lived next door in apartment 1308. William stated that from 1 p.m., when he first saw defendant, until 11:15 p.m. on September 13, 1986, he was in and out of Fred\u2019s apartment. Defendant, Fred and Tessie Khaton were in the apartment during the entire period. When William heard a gunshot, he and defendant were on the couch watching television. They stepped out onto the porch and saw people running towards a garage. William\u2019s mother, Fannie, and his cousin George Henderson were already on the porch. William denied telling the police that he and defendant were already on the porch when the shots were fired.\nWilliam testified that he and defendant never left the building. When William left at 11:15 p.m., defendant was still at Fred\u2019s apartment. William denied telling the police that Fred left at 5 or 6 p.m.; he actually left at 8 p.m. William denied telling the police that he and defendant left the building at 2 p.m.\nOn cross-examination, William testified that he did not know if Disciples ran his building, or any gang ran any of the nearby buildings, although he had heard of the Disciples. When asked if he had heard of the Cobra Stones, William replied, \u201cI\u2019m in no gang.\u201d He was unsure if the Stones and Disciples were enemies. \u201cI guess they are. I don\u2019t know.\u201d\nHerman Jackson, a tow truck driver, testified for the defense that on September 13, 1986, he brought an automobile to a repair shop at 42nd and State Streets. At about 4 or 4:30 p.m., he heard five or six shots and saw two men running across the street. One of them said he had been shot. A dozen people were on the other side of the street. Jackson also saw another man who was \u201ckind of husky\u201d and with short hair running west toward the railroad tracks. Jackson did not see the shooter.\nEdith Scanlan, who lived in apartment 1510 at 4037 South Federal Street, testified that at about 6:45 p.m. on September 13, 1986, she was looking out her window at the porch outside of apartment 1308, two floors below, because she was going to ask either her son or defendant to go to the store. She could see the defendant, who was not wearing a shirt, standing on the porch in front of apartment 1308. She then heard a single gunshot and asked the defendant if he had heard it. She also asked defendant to see if her son was in Fred\u2019s apartment. Defendant went in to check and was gone \u201ca few minutes.\u201d He then returned to the porch. \u201cThen we heard a couple of more shots ring out.\u201d At that point, Fannie Henderson and Tessie Khaton joined defendant on the porch. She did not see William or Fred on the porch.\nFannie Mae Henderson, William\u2019s mother, testified that she lived at 4037 South Federal in apartment 1309. After 7 p.m. on September 13, 1986, she saw defendant standing with her son on the porch. She heard no shots. On September 12, defendant had slept overnight at her house and thus was there in the morning on September 13. Defendant was with her son ail day.\nThe defendant testified on direct examination that at 5 p.m. on September 13, 1986, he was in Fred\u2019s apartment with William, Fred and Tessie. Shortly after 6 p.m., and while still in that apartment, he heard a gunshot. He went out on the porch and saw police cars and an ambulance on 42nd and State Streets. He stayed on the porch with William, and Fred went back inside. He denied either being in the park between 6 and 7 p.m. or firing any shots.\nAt the time of his arrest, the defendant had long hair which was slicked back. He was 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighed 145 pounds. He wore a black leather jacket and grey pants on September 13, 1986.\nOn cross-examination, the State inquired as follows:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Johnson, do you belong to any gangs?\nA. No.\nQ. You do not belong to a gang?\nA. No.\nQ. You are not a member of the Black Gangster Disciple[s]?\nA. No.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge. He\u2019s asked and answered.\nTHE COURT: That answer is no.\n[PROSECUTOR]: Do you affiliate with any people that are Black Gangster Disciples?\nA. Yes.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What difference does that make?\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\n[DEFENDANT]: Yes.\u201d\nThe State continued asking questions concerning defendant\u2019s knowledge of gang activity in the area of Chicago where the shooting occurred. Defense counsel\u2019s repeated objections were overruled.\nDefendant denied that he initially informed the police officers that he was with his girl friend for the entire day and that he changed his version of his whereabouts when the police officers told him that they were going to verify his statements with his girl friend. Instead, he said that he informed the officers that he had been waiting for his girl friend all day at his grandmother\u2019s and Uncle Fred\u2019s apartment at 4307 South Federal. He told the police officers that he had spent the night at William Henderson\u2019s apartment, and on the morning of the shooting, he was at his grandmother\u2019s apartment.\nDefendant stated that when he heard the shots, he was watching television with William. Defendant, William and Fred went out onto the porch. George was already there. He heard several more shots. Scanlon asked him to see if her son was at Fred\u2019s, and he did so. Defendant later added that Fannie was on the porch; then added that some of Fred\u2019s friends were there; and then added that his cousin Calvin was on the porch, too.\nFred left the apartment after the shots were heard and went to see his girl friend. From her house, he telephoned to say he had discovered someone was shot. Defendant left the building briefly at 8 p.m. to go to the store. He later left the building before 11 p.m. to go home.\nDefendant testified that he had seen Tony Rice in the building at 4101 South Federal but he did not know him, or the victim, or their companions. He had never had problems with Tony Rice. He did not know why John Rice would identify him in a lineup.\nDetective Murphy was then recalled by the State to testify in rebuttal. He stated that defendant initially told him that he had spent the day with his girl friend on September 13, 1986. When he asked the defendant for his girl friend\u2019s telephone number and address, defendant then responded that he was at his grandmother\u2019s apartment on that day and not at his girl friend\u2019s place. Defendant told him that he and William were on the porch at about 7 p.m. talking about females when they heard shots. At that point, Fred came out and told him that a boy had been shot. Defendant also told Murphy that he first left the building at 8 p.m to go to a drug store. Defendant left his grandmother\u2019s apartment at approximately 10 p.m. on that day.\nMurphy further testified that on September 15, 1986, he spoke to William Henderson, who told him that at 2 p.m. on September 13, he and the defendant left Fred\u2019s apartment to meet with their girl friends. They were with their girl friends for a couple of hours and then returned to the apartment. Fred left between 5 and 6 p.m., and they did not hear from him again until about 8 p.m. when he called them and told them that a boy had been shot. According to Murphy, William also stated that he and defendant were sitting on the porch watching a basketball game being played below them in the park, and talking about women, when they heard the gunshots.\nDefendant then called Detective McGuire to testify. McGuire stated that Tony and John Rice told him that the individual who fired the shots wore a gray jacket, dark pants, and had on a light-colored hat. According to McGuire, neither John nor Tony ever told him that they had seen the defendant on a prior occasion. On cross-examination, he testified that John and Tony informed him that the person who fired the shots had slick hair of shoulder length.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant now appeals his conviction.\nOpinion\nDefendant first contends that he was denied equal protection when the State violated the rule under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, by exercising its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from the jury.\nUnder Batson, defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 86, 106 S. Ct. at 1721.) In order to establish a prima facie case, defendant must show he is a member of a cognizable racial group, demonstrate that the State exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of that group, and show other relevant circumstances raising an inference that the prosecutor used a jury selection practice to exclude venirepersons due to their race. People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 388, 412-13, 539 N.E.2d 1172.\nOnce a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the State bears the burden of coming forward with a neutral explanation for excluding each black venireperson, and the explanation must be related to the particular case to be tried. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.) The State must show more than an intuitive judgment that black jurors will favor black defendants. (People v. Batchelor (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 316, 323, 559 N.E.2d 948.) However, the State\u2019s explanations need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.\nAfter the State has presented its race-neutral basis for exercising peremptory challenges against venirepersons, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.) This determination is one of fact, turning largely on questions of credibility, and thus the trial court\u2019s findings must be afforded great deference. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 89 n.21, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 n.21.\nA reviewing court may not make an \u201cindependent\u201d review of a trial court\u2019s rejection of a Batson claim. (Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. __, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 410, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1870.) The court on appeal may not overturn the trial court\u2019s finding on the issue of discriminatory intent unless its determination is clearly erroneous. That is, the evidence must be such that a \u201c \u2018reviewing court on the entire evidence [would be] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha[d] been committed.\u2019 \u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1871, quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948), 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542.) Where there are \u201c \u2018two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1871-72, quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer (1985), 470 U.S. 564, 574, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518, 528, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511.\nApparently 3 of the 12 jurors here were minorities, including one black juror. The State exercised three of its five peremptory challenges on blacks. The other two members who were peremptorily challenged by the State were white.\nDefendant maintains that he established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges. He asserts that \u201c[i]n asking the State for race-neutral reasons, the judge implicitly found the existence of a prima facie case.\u201d The State counters that the trial court found that defendant failed to make out a prima facie case when it asked the State to provide reasons for its challenges.\nIn People v. Hope (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 430, 560 N.E.2d 849, our supreme court held that the trial court must not collapse the Batson procedural steps into an undifferentiated review of defense contentions and prosecutorial explanations. Instead, the trial court must first make a finding on the threshold question of defendant\u2019s prima facie case.\nIn Hope v. Illinois (1991), _ U.S. _, 115 L. Ed. 2d 966, 111 S. Ct. 2792, however, the United States Supreme Court granted defendant\u2019s writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment in Hope and, without explanation, remanded it to the Illinois Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Hernandez v. New York.\nThe Court in Hernandez held that where the trial court collapsed the Batson procedural steps, such a \u201cdeparture from the normal course of proceeding need not concern us.\u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.) \u201cOnce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made aprima facie showing becomes moot.\u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.) The Court concluded that the \u201cstandard inquiry into the objecting party\u2019s prima facie case was unnecessary given the course of proceedings in the trial court.\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 414, 111 S. Ct. at 1873.\nIn the present case, the trial court made no finding on the question of whether or not defendant had established a prima facie case, but instead asked the State for its explanation. Thus, the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing became moot and merged into the question of whether the explanations offered by the State were race-neutral. This brings up defendant\u2019s next contention.\nDefendant maintains that the State failed to offer racially neutral reasons for dismissing the black jurors Norwood, McGee and Neely.\nBoth the trial court and defendant focused mainly on juror Neely. (Defendant\u2019s post-trial motion states that the court erred in overruling defense objections to the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges, \u201cparticularly in the case of Juror Neely.\u201d) The State offered the following explanation to the trial court:\n\u201cTHE COURT: State, what do you wish to say?\n[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, first we have used five peremptory challenges, we have challenged two whites in addition\u2014\nTHE COURT: No, the sole issue is why you excused the last one.\n[PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Neely?\nTHE COURT: Yes.\n[PROSECUTOR]: I just feel he would not be a good Juror for the State, I do not feel that he would be impartial and for my own personal belief I do not feel that he \u2014 I feel that he would be more inclined to lean toward the Defense than to the State.\nTHE COURT: Why?\n[PROSECUTOR]: Just because of the fact of where he lives, 62nd South St. Lawrence which, as you know, is in the inner city, he is also teaching at 90th and Harper which again is inside the inner city, he went to Chicago State University, 95th and King Drive and for those reasons I do not feel that he would be a fair and impartial Juror.\u201d\nIn determining whether discriminatory intent existed, it is significant that Neely was initially accepted by the State. The State accepted a panel of jurors which included Neely. The State tendered the panel to defendant. Defendant then excused three of the jurors. It was only then, after defendant had altered the makeup of the panel, that the State excluded Neely.\n\u201cThat a prosecutor had peremptory challenges remaining but did not use them to strike a black venireperson can also indicate an absence of an intent to discriminate. The prosecutor accepted and tendered to the defendant a panel containing a black woman. The prosecutor excused the black woman only after the defendant exercised 10 peremptory challenges, which altered the panel gender. The black woman was excused along with two other women in an attempt, the prosecutor says, to change the gender balance of the panel.\u201d People v. Hooper (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 469, 511, 552 N.E.2d 684.\nWhile the State never articulated the reason that defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges altered the panel\u2019s makeup (see People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 123, 184-85, 544 N.E.2d 357 (court cannot presume or infer neutral explanation where State did not articulate it)), a reviewing court can consider facts which the trial court \u201ccould have relied on.\u201d Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1872.\nDefendant argues that the fact that Neely was from the inner city \u201cis merely a euphemistic way of saying that Mr. Neely is black.\u201d Moreover, the scene of the crime was 20 blocks from Neely\u2019s home; 48 blocks from the school where he taught fifth grade; and 53 blocks from his alma mater. Defendant maintains that \u201c[i]f an \u2018inner city\u2019 connection, even one miles [sic] from the scene of the crime, were to suffice as a racially neutral explanation for excluding black venireper-sons, then the protections of Batson v. Kentucky would be meaningless.\u201d This disproportionate impact would result because \u201cmany black people\u201d live on the south side of Chicago.\nSignificantly, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Hernandez v. New York that disproportionate intent, not impact, was the key in evaluating the race-neutrality of the prosecutor\u2019s explanation. (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 407, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.) \u201c[Disparate impact should be given appropriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent, but it will not be conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry.\u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 407, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.) \u201cWhile the disproportionate impact on [the minority in question] resulting from the prosecutor\u2019s criterion for excluding these jurors does not answer the race-neutrality inquiry, it does have relevance to the trial court\u2019s decision on\u201d the ultimate question of whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 408, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.) Thus, the Court found an \u201c \u2018invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the [classification] bears more heavily on one race than another.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 408, 111 S. Ct. at 1868, quoting Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229, 242, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608-09, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2048-49.\nIn People v. Baisten (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 64, 560 N.E.2d 1060, the court found the State\u2019s reasons to be race-neutral where one juror lived close to the scene of the crime and may have overheard things about the case in the neighborhood. The trial court in that case agreed with the State that there was a danger that \u201csuch a juror may infer certain characteristics about the -witnesses merely because of where they reside.\u201d (People v. Baisten, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 72.) The court on appeal similarly rejected the defendant\u2019s argument:\n\u201c[Defendant argues that] by excluding [the juror] because she resides near the scene of the crime, the State impermissibly engaged in \u2018a group-based exclusion\u2019 which would effectively eliminate blacks from the jury simply because they live on the South Side of Chicago, a predominantly black neighborhood. We recognize the State\u2019s concern that a juror who lives in close proximity to the area where the offense took place may overhear certain information about the offense during the pendency of the trial and thereby lose his or her objectivity. [Citations.] Although the fact that [the juror] lives approximately Jive miles from [the crime scene] makes the State\u2019s position more tenuous, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding that the prosecutors\u2019 exclusion of [the juror] was not racially motivated is contrary to the evidence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Baisten, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 81, citing United States v. Andrade (8th Cir. 1986), 788 F.2d 521; People v. Hooper, 133 Ill. 2d at 509-10.\nThus, under the reasoning of Baisten, the trial court in the present case was not required to conclude from defendant\u2019s assertion of disproportionate impact that the State had a discriminatory purpose in excluding a juror who lived 20 blocks from the scene of the crime and the home of several alibi witnesses.\nMoreover, if a juror\u2019s residence in the inner city (where the defendant lived, the crime occurred, and alibi witnesses lived) were found to be a racial classification on its face, then a trial judge could never excuse a juror for cause even if convinced that the juror could not be impartial due to his knowledge of the neighborhood. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 407-08, 111 S. Ct. at 1868 (Court finds the fact that a peremptory strike explanation corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will demonstrate its race-neutral character).\nSimply living in a high crime area has often been presented as an explanation for exclusion of a potential juror. One prosecutor stated: \u201cI just asked him to look down my list \u2014 and he\u2019s lived here for a long time \u2014 and pick out what was [sic] bad addresses, bad in the sense of high crime areas, areas where we probably would not want jurors for the State who perhaps might be sympathetic with the defendant.\u201d Harrell v. State (Ala. 1989), 555 So. 2d 263 (remanded to hold a Batson hearing). See also, e.g., People v. Harvey (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 733, 743, 568 N.E.2d 381 (no prima facie case established in case where black venireperson was challenged on basis that she lived in high drug crime area and she did not establish eye contact with prosecutor); People v. Jenkins (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 115, 141, 545 N.E.2d 986 (court holds trial counsel was not ineffective when he did not object on Batson grounds at voir dire where valid reasons given for the exclusion of potential juror were that he lived in a high-crime area, dressed inappropriately for coming to court and had a cavalier attitude); Taitano v. Commonwealth (1987), 4 Va. App. 342, 347, 358 S.E.2d 590, 592-93 (court found it was a clear and specific nonracial reason that the prosecutor was \u201cconcerned because [four potential jurors] lived near the defendant or near the scene of the crime, or in areas of \u2018high crime\u2019 generally\u201d).\nOther courts have found peremptory challenges race-neutral where the challenges were based on the potential juror\u2019s residence or employment being near the defendant\u2019s or witnesses\u2019 residences, or near the scene of the crime. For example, in People v. Williams (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 787, 532 N.E.2d 1044, the court held it was race-neutral to exclude two black potential jurors where one lived within a block of the place where the offense took place, which was in a \u201cgang area,\u201d even though the offense was not gang related, but the defendant and one codefendant were members of street gangs in that area. In that case, the prosecutor was also concerned that the potential juror would react to a transsexual witness who lived in the same area. The other potential juror worked in the vicinity occupied by defendant\u2019s gang and some gang members sought employment at the place where the potential juror helped unemployed persons obtain jobs; and the prosecutor \u201cthought that she did not want to serve\u201d; and her questionnaire showed she had served on a jury but during voir dire she stated she never served on a jury. Williams, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 789.\nIn Williams, the defendant argued that the State\u2019s geographical explanation was pretextual in that the jurors\u2019 connection with a gang area was an extraneous concern since gang membership was not an issue in the case. The court found the State\u2019s explanation race-neutral, explaining:\n\u201cCommon life experience teaches us that gang members often protect one another, and consequently the implication that the jurors\u2019 safety might be in question is legitimate in this case. Furthermore, experience with criminal trials teaches that a juror\u2019s daily association in the neighborhood where the crime occurred would be a common reason for a peremptory challenge with or without gang activities in the area.\u201d Williams, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 792.\nIn People v. Hooper, one potential black juror was stricken because she resided in an area frequented by a gang to which one of the codefendants belonged. The court commented: \u201cStriking a juror because of geographic proximity to the scene of the crime or to the residence of one of the codefendants has been accepted as a race-neutral and legitimate reason for excusing a prospective juror.\u201d People v. Hooper, 133 Ill. 2d at 509-10, citing People v. Williams, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 792-93.\nIn People v. Jones (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 440, 559 N.E.2d 112, the court found to be race-neutral the explanation that one potential juror lived in the same neighborhood as defendant and another juror lived in the same neighborhood as the incident. The court noted that \u201c[t]rial judges are especially well-suited to make this determination because they are familiar with local conditions and prosecutors, and can draw upon their power of observation and judicial experience as a guide in distinguishing a true case of discrimination from a false one.\u201d (People v. Jones, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 446-47.) The court also noted that the division of neighborhoods in Chicago can encompass a very small area, or an area as large as a square mile or two. People v. Jones, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 447. See also United States v. Davis (8th Cir. 1989), 871 F.2d 71 (no Batson violation found where prosecutor considered residence of venire members because of concern that they might be within defendant\u2019s sphere of influence if they lived in his neighborhood).\nIn People v. Hope (137 Ill. 2d at 471), the court noted that \u201c[w]ith or without a factual basis, the State represented that it had reason to believe that a certain witness could be found near or in the building where [juror] lived.\u201d The court deferred to the trial court\u2019s finding that the prosecutor\u2019s uncontradicted assertion was credible. See also People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 178 (court stated that it might not agree, but found trial court\u2019s conclusion not contrary to the evidence where trial court had agreed with State that venireperson could be stricken because she lived in Hyde Park, where residents were more scholarly and open to new ideas and thus would be less likely to base their findings on facts in evidence); People v. Batchelor, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 324 (court finds State\u2019s explanation that potential black juror resides near home of defendant to be race-neutral reason for exclusion); People v. Jones (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 440, 559 N.E.2d 112 (court finds State\u2019s explanation that potential black juror lived in defendant\u2019s neighborhood and another lived in same neighborhood as incident to be race-neutral explanations for exclusion).\nThe ultimate determinative factor is whether the trial judge chose to believe the prosecutor\u2019s race-neutral explanation. The question of intent to discriminate is a \u201cpure issue of fact, subject to review under a deferential standard.\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869.\n\u201c[T]he decisive question will be whether counsel\u2019s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor\u2019s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies \u2018peculiarly within a trial judge\u2019s province.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 428, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 854, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854.\nBecause there are two permissible views of the evidence here, we cannot find that the trial court\u2019s choice between them is clearly erroneous. (See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1871-72.) Moreover, in addition to the fact that Neely was originally accepted as a juror by the State, the court \u201ccould have relied on the facts that\u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1872) the race of the \u201cvictim[ ] and prosecution witnesses tended to undercut any motive to exclude [blacks] from the jury.\u201d (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1872), even though the sameness of race by no means obviates the Batson prerequisites. This case does not involve an interracial crime \u201cin which specific racial groups would be prone to take sides of prejudice.\u201d People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 50, 65-66, 530 N.E.2d 1360.\nThus, the fact that the prosecutor excluded Neely on the basis that he might be influenced due to the address of his home or school, does not leave us \u201cwith the \u2018definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at _, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 111 S. Ct. at 1871, quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395, 92 L. Ed. at 766, 68 S. Ct. at 542.\nIn regard to Neely, defendant argued that Neely was similar in most respects to a white juror, Sutorius, who was also a teacher. Defense counsel argued:\n\u201cThere was nothing unusual brought out, no contact with the law, no prejudice against law enforcement individuals, Mr. Neely is a teacher residing on the far South Side. I believe he is similar to [sic] in most respects to Miss Sutorious who is a teacher, other than his sex and race.\u201d\nThat argument is hardly persuasive in light of the obvious differences in their residence and place of employment, the factors upon which the State\u2019s challenge to Neely pivoted. The only common characteristic which the record shows to be shared by these two jurors was their general occupation as teachers. Neely lived, and taught fifth grade, in the inner city, not far from the scene of the crime. In contrast, Sutorious lived in North Lake, Illinois, for 25 years, taught in Franklin Park, Berkley and District 88, far from the scene of the crime. Moreover, the State\u2019s rejection of a black venireperson and acceptance of a characteristically similar white member of the venire, even where demonstrated, does not automatically establish with conclusivity that the State\u2019s explanations were pretextual. (People v. Hooper, 133 Ill. 2d at 511.) The white juror may have exhibited some trait which the State could reasonably believe might make him desirable as a juror. \u201c \u2018This question and all others involved in the hearing were for the trial judge, who had also presided at the voir dire.\u2019 \u201d People v. Hooper, 133 Ill. 2d at 511, quoting People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 23, 538 N.E.2d 453.\nDefendant\u2019s arguments concerning the other two jurors, McGee and Norwood, are really contingent upon his argument concerning Neely. \u201cIn light of the prosecutor\u2019s specious explanation for excluding Mr. Neely[,] his purported reasons for excluding two other black venirepersons must also be viewed with extreme skepticism.\u201d Since we do not find sufficient cause to reverse the trial court\u2019s acceptance of the State\u2019s reasons for excluding Neely, this bootstrapping argument cannot provide a basis for rejecting the State\u2019s reasons for excluding the other two black jurors.\nMoreover, the existence of McGee\u2019s 12-year-old illegitimate child and her one-year unemployment status could reasonably be considered a neutral reason for dismissing a juror. (See United States v. Cartlidge (5th Cir. 1987), 808 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (reasonable explanation includes fact that prospective juror was single or divorced, in favor of married person, or unemployed, in favor of a professional); People v. Kindelan (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 548, 572 N.E.2d 1138 (unemployment).) In addition, McGee\u2019s landlord, whom she saw frequently, was a Chicago police sergeant.\nIn regard to Norwood, the prosecutor explained: \u201cJudge I don\u2019t believe he was attentive during the questioning, he appeared to be disinterested, he appeared to be sleeping when other people were being questioned.\u201d This is a racially neutral reason. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 175-76 (juror \u201cmeek and sleepy\u201d); People v. Talley (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 971, 987, 504 N.E.2d 1318 (demeanor of prospective juror is race-neutral reason for excluding him).\nDefendant asserts that the trial judge disputed whether Norwood was inattentive. The court commented: \u201cWell, he didn\u2019t bother me because he was rather quiet there, I don\u2019t know about him.\u201d Nothing in this statement indicates an unwillingness on the part of the trial judge to acquiesce in the State\u2019s reason for discharging Norwood because he was sleeping.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying defendant\u2019s Batson motion, because the judge \u201cnoted twice that there were Latinos left on the jury, and noted once that the defense had excused a juror who may have been black\u201d when these facts are not relevant to a Batson challenge. The court remarked, \u201cWe have three minorities [on the jury], and one guy, I don\u2019t know whether he was black or not that you excused, [defense counsel].\u201d The record does not indicate the judge predicated his ruling on the reasoning that the presence of minorities on the jury precluded a finding that defendant had established discriminatory intent under Batson. (Cf. People v. Lockhart (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 700, 558 N.E.2d 1345 (trial court used wrong standard where it believed 100% exclusion of. blacks was necessary to establish prima facie case).) Moreover, we are bound to review the correctness of the trial court\u2019s decision and not the correctness of its stated reasons (see People v. Lockhart, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 713), particularly where the remark at issue here appeared to be nothing more than a superfluous comment.\nAccordingly, we do not find the trial court\u2019s determination that no Batson violation occurred to be clearly erroneous.\nDefendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial by the State\u2019s \u201crepeated, unfounded insinuations that [defendant] was a member of a gang.\u201d He points to the subsequent cross-examination, after defendant denied being a member of a gang, regarding defendant\u2019s knowledge of gang-related activities, and two comments made by the State in closing argument. Defendant has not contended, either here or at trial, that the State did not have some reason to initially raise the issue of gangs. Moreover, neither the trial court nor the defense ever indicated during trial that the mention of gangs, or the attempted development of the issue in cross-examination, was creating undue prejudice to defendant, or outweighing the probative value of the inquiry.\nEvidence showing the defendant was a member of a gang or involved in gang-related activity is admissible to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. (People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 372, 263 N.E.2d 840; People v. Ayala (1990), 208 Ill. App. 3d 586, 567 N.E.2d 450.) Evidence of motive is not an essential element of the crime of murder, but it is relevant because it renders more probable that the defendant did kill the deceased. (People v. Smith (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 40, 56, 565 N.E.2d 900.) For the evidence to be competent, however, it must tend to establish the existence of the motive at least to a \u201cslight degree.\u201d People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 56.\nMoreover, where gang affiliation is alleged to be a motive, it must be recognized that, particularly in metropolitan areas, there may be a strong prejudice against street gangs. (People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58.) Thus, there must be sufficient proof that gang membership or activity is related to the crime charged. (People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d at 372.) Membership in a gang may be demonstrated either through a defendant\u2019s own admission (People v. McClendon (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 497 N.E.2d 849), or by the use of rebuttal evidence in response to the defendant\u2019s specific denial of membership. People v. Rivera (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 609, 495 N.E.2d 1088.\nHere, the State was unable to sufficiently establish gang membership or activity related to the crime charged. Our concern, however, is whether the State\u2019s exploration of the issue on cross-examination was excessive, as urged by defendant.\nA defendant who testifies subjects himself to cross-examination, the scope of which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Williams (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 478, 363 N.E.2d 801; People v. Burris (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605.) Reversal is required only where there is a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant. People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 478, 363 N.E.2d 801; People v. Torres (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 775, 474 N.E.2d 1305.\nMoreover, the limitation on the scope of cross-examination is construed liberally to allow inquiry into whatever tends to explain, qualify, modify, discredit, or destroy the testimony on direct. (People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221, 522 N.E.2d 1146; People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 478, 363 N.E.2d 801.) In addition, a \u201cgood-faith basis is required on the part of examining counsel as to the truth of the matter contained in leading questions propounded to a witness on cross-examination.\u201d M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7607.3, at 340 (5th ed. 1990), citing, e.g., People v. Fiorita (1930), 339 Ill. 78, 170 N.E. 690; People v. Strong (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 28, 502 N.E.2d 744.\nWe believe that the State had a good-faith basis for exploring on cross-examination of defendant and Henderson the issue of a gang-related motive for the otherwise inexplicable act of defendant shooting randomly into a group of five people. (See People v. Munoz (1984), 157 Cal. App. 3d 999, 204 Cal. Rptr. 271 (where similar exploratory questioning was found not to be prejudicial).) John Rice testified for the State, without contradiction, to the following facts. He had been a member of the Cobra Stones, a gang which controlled his building at 4101 South Federal. Of the five men defendant shot at, the two Rice brothers, Sammy Jones and John O\u2019Neal either now live or had previously lived in that building. John Rice testified further that a rival gang, the Disciples, was at war with the Stones. The Disciples controlled the next building, 4037 South Federal. John had seen defendant in the neighborhood. Moreover, the evidence shows that defendant\u2019s grandmother, aunt, uncle, cousins and friends, many of whom testified as alibi witnesses, all lived in that building and defendant claims to have been staying in that building during the time of the shooting.\nWith that evidence having been elicited from a witness for the State, we believe that the State could properly explore the issue with defense witnesses. Thus, it was not error for the State to question Henderson and defendant about gangs.\nMoreover, although defendant denied being a member of a gang, upon further questioning he did concede facts that would have provided a good-faith basis for further inquiry. Although the evidence did not eventually rise to the level of justifying the conclusion that defendant was a gang member or that the shooting was motivated by gang rivalry, it was not a clear abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion to permit the State to further explore gang membership in cross-examination of Henderson and defendant.\nDefendant admitted he knew \u201c[q]uite a few\u201d Disciples. \u201cI can\u2019t count. It\u2019s a numerous number. It\u2019s a lot of them.\u201d Defendant knew that \u201cmostly\u201d Disciples lived at 4037 South Federal (where defendant claimed he was during the shooting and where his alibi witnesses all lived). He knew that Cobra Stones ran 4101 South Federal (where the victim, the Rices and Jones lived). He had seen John Rice at 4101 South Federal. Defendant knew the Disciples and Stones were at war: \u201cI know they be fighting ***.\u201d He also testified: \u201cYou can go in any one of those [buildings] you want but they fight though, you know. *** Like if you\u2019re known over there by the building, you can go in any building you want. Won\u2019t nobody mess with you.\u201d If you do not know anyone in the building, however, \u201c[t]hey will mess with you if you come over there.\u201d\nWe also find some significance in the fact that the State never mentioned gangs in its opening statement or initial closing argument. Cf. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 60-61 (conviction reversed because cumulative prejudicial impact where, without establishing gang membership, the State\u2019s theory of gang-related motive was \u201cargued extensively to the jury in closing argument\u201d and focused on the gang issue in opening statement and introduced incompetent evidence of gang-related motive).\nAccordingly, we conclude that there was no clear abuse of discretion in permitting the cross-examination of defendant on gang issues. In so finding, we emphasize that any such cross-examination must be terminated when it becomes clear that the State will not be able to elicit sufficient proof to establish a basis from which to infer gang membership. Moreover, even if we were to find that the State\u2019s cross-examination extended beyond that threshold, we would find any error to be harmless in view of the strength of the eyewitness testimony supporting defendant\u2019s conviction, as discussed below in connection with defendant\u2019s next contention concerning prejudicial gang-related remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument.\nDefendant next points to comments made by the State in closing argument. We initially note that it was defense counsel who first raised the issue of gangs during closing argument. In arguing that John Rice had no credibility, counsel stated: \u201cWho are the gangbangers here? John Rice *** said, \u2018The building I live in and that all my friends live in is controlled by a street gang.\u2019 \u201d The defense emphasized: \u201cNo one said defendant is in a gang.\u201d The defense continued focusing on the issue, exploring why John Rice identified defendant as the shooter: \u201cAccording to John Rice, everyone in 4037 is a rival gang member. So he picked anyone in the building as a shooter.\u201d The defense also argued that it was inconsistent for John Rice, an \u201cadmitted gang member\u201d to say he had seen defendant in \u201canother gang[\u2019s] building.\u201d\nGiven that it was defense counsel who focused on these gang-related issues, it might have been proper for the State to make some comment in rebuttal. Defendant points to the State\u2019s closing rebuttal argument, where the prosecutor said:\n\u201cWhat else did he tell you, ladies and gentlemen? That that park at 4200 on South State Street is a Disciple park. And you\u2019ll get this picture back there, ladies and gentlemen, and you\u2019ll get to see the back of the field house as it looks out at State Street and you\u2019ll get to look at something real interesting. All that graffiti on the wall there.\nYou know what else I find interesting? *** He doesn\u2019t seem to have any problems there. The gang graffiti on the wall. Does that tell you a little something about him? Doesn\u2019t that show you the kind of person he is?\u201d\nWe agree with defendant that this rebuttal argument was improper. While defense counsel made remarks in his closing argument that would have justified some refutation of how Rice\u2019s past membership in a gang affected his credibility, it did not justify remarks alluding to defendant\u2019s gang membership.\nWe go on, however, to determine whether or not such error requires reversal.\nHere, we can safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result. (See People v. Parmly (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 386, 512 N.E.2d 1213.) Any error was harmless because defendant\u2019s guilt was established by overwhelming evidence. (See People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526.) On appeal, defendant has not raised the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We find, however, that the evidence was more than sufficient.\nTony Rice observed defendant begin shooting from a distance of only 25 feet, in daylight. Tony then lay behind a car and, with an unobstructed -view, watched as defendant continued firing the gun. Tony had seen defendant three or four times previously in the neighborhood and recognized him. On the night following the shooting, Tony rode with police officers and identified defendant on the street. He also identified defendant at trial. Tony had no criminal record.\nJohn Rice also observed defendant during the shooting itself and recognized him from the neighborhood. Without speaking with his brother Tony, John identified defendant in a lineup at the police station. John also identified defendant at trial.\nBoth eyewitnesses described defendant to the police as being 5 feet 9 inches tall, with shoulder-length, slicked back hair, wearing blue jeans and a gray leather jacket. John said defendant weighed 150 to 160 pounds; Tony said he was \u201cthin.\u201d Tony added that defendant had a light moustache. Consistent with these descriptions, defendant described himself as being 5 feet 9 inches tall, weighing 145 pounds, wearing his hair long and slicked back, and having a moustache at the time of the shooting.\nThis identification testimony was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction.\nIn his defense, defendant relied on Officer Scannell\u2019s testimony that there were three offenders. However, there was some confusion about that and the jury was not required to place any weight on that testimony. (In fact, the presence of three offenders, all wearing their hats \u201cto the right,\u201d and shouting out something before shooting might have lent some credence to a gang-related motive.) Moreover, even if defendant had been accompanied by two other men, it did not weaken the eyewitness testimony describing defendant as the shooter.\nDefendant also relied on Jackson\u2019s testimony that he saw a husky male run from the scene. Jackson, however, testified that he never saw the shooter. Instead, he saw a dozen people on the street, and after hearing shots fired, he looked over and noticed several people running, including a husky male with short hair. Moreover, Jackson\u2019s testimony was undermined by his statement that the shooting occurred at 4 or 4:30 p.m. when it was actually almost 7 p.m.\nDefendant relies most strongly on his alibi witnesses. Even disregarding Officer Murphy\u2019s rebuttal testimony, the alibi testimony offered by defendant was seriously undermined by contradictions among the alibi witnesses.\nDefendant says he slept at Henderson\u2019s on September 12; went to his grandmother\u2019s next door at 7 a.m., and stayed all day with William Henderson waiting for his girl friend. William Henderson testified to the contrary in regard to the time he spent with defendant. Defendant stated further that at 5 p.m., he was in Fred\u2019s apartment with William, Fred and Tessie, watching television. A little after 6 p.m., he heard a shot and went onto the porch with William and Fred. Scanlon\u2019s testimony contradicted this. Defendant stated on direct that William, George, Fred and Fannie were on the porch. On cross-examination, he first stated that these people, plus Tessie, were on the porch. Then he added that a few of Fred\u2019s friends were on the porch. Finally, he added that his cousin Calvin was also on the porch. Other defense witnesses disagreed on these facts. Contrary to William\u2019s testimony, defendant stated that he left the building before 11 p.m.\nThus, defendant\u2019s alibi evidence regarding whom he was with, where he was, and what he was doing before, during and after the shooting, was replete with contradictions.\nWe conclude that the evidence in this case strongly supported defendant\u2019s conviction. The trial, even absent the improper closing argument by the State, would not produce a different result.\nDefendant next contends that he was denied a right to a fair trial due to \u201crepeated instances of prosecutorial misconduct, coupled with extensive prosecutorial overreaching.\u201d Defendant points to five instances of alleged misconduct and overreaching.\nDefendant asserts that it was prejudicial for the prosecutor to inform the jury in opening statement that motive \u201cis something that the People of the State never have to prove.\u201d Defendant\u2019s objection was overruled. This issue was not raised in defendant\u2019s post-trial motion and thus has been waived. (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 538 N.E.2d 453.) Moreover, the scope of opening statements is within the trial court\u2019s discretion (People v. Rader (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 453, 462, 532 N.E.2d 1365), and the jury was twice instructed by the court that opening statements are not evidence (People v. Vasquez (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 66, 71, 254 N.E.2d 617). We see nothing in the record here to indicate that the remark made in opening statement influenced the jury in a manner resulting in substantial prejudice to defendant. (See People v. Vasquez, 118 Ill. App. 2d at 71.) Moreover, the plain error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) does not apply here, where the evidence was not closely balanced. Finally, the State is not required to prove motive in a murder case. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 56.\nDefendant next maintains that it was prejudicial for the State to argue in its rebuttal argument that defendant could have subpoenaed Tony Pierce as a witness, and that the State had no reason to call him because he never saw the shooter. The remark in question was invited by defense counsel\u2019s repeated remarks during closing argument suggesting that Pierce described three offenders to the police but was never called by the State as a witness. See People v. Wheeler (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 474, 485-86, 126 N.E.2d 228 (where defense counsel has argued that the State did not produce a witness, the prosecutor may reply on rebuttal that defense counsel could have produced the same witness).\nDefendant next argues it was error for the State to use a leading question during redirect examination of Tony Rice regarding the defense of alibi. The State asked: \u201cMr. Rice, when you saw the defendant come out from behind the field house, that\u2019s not the first time you saw him, is it?\u201d A defense objection, without specification of grounds, was overruled. The State then rephrased the question: \u201cHad you ever seen the defendant before he came out from the side of the field house?\u201d We find no substantial injury to defendant resulted from this single question, particularly in view of the strong eyewitness testimony, and the prosecutor\u2019s immediate withdrawal of, and rephrasing of, the question. See People v. Camden (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 946, 414 N.E.2d 823 (error of single leading question promptly cured by State\u2019s withdrawal of question).\nDefendant next argues that the State erroneously was permitted to perfect the impeachment of defendant through the testimony of Officer Murphy on purely collateral matters. On rebuttal, Murphy offered testimony contradicting defendant\u2019s testimony regarding how defendant spent the day in the hours leading up to the time of the shooting.\nThe latitude to be allowed on rebuttal is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Peter (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 443, 451-52, 303 N.E.2d 398.) A matter is not collateral where it could be independently introduced for a purpose other than to contradict. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 269, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nIn Collins, our supreme court upheld the trial court\u2019s ruling in permitting rebuttal testimony, and rejected defendant\u2019s argument that the impeachment concerned collateral matters. Defendant Collins testified that on November 12, the day of the murders, he was with his girl friend. His girl friend testified similarly. On cross-examination, however, she testified that on November 9 she went to a Kung Fu movie with defendant at a certain theater. In rebuttal, the State called the theater\u2019s manager, who testified that no Kung Fu movie was shown on November 9. The court found no abuse of discretion in permitting this rebuttal testimony. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 270, citing People v. Byer (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 658, 394 N.E.2d 632; E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence \u00a747 (3d ed. 1984).\nPeople v. Byer recites the same test for defining \u201ccollateral\u201d matters and adds McCormick\u2019s broader test:\n\u201cSuppose a witness has told a story of a transaction crucial to the controversy. To prove him wrong in some trivial detail of time, place or circumstance is \u2018collateral.\u2019 But to prove untrue some fact recited by the witness that if he were really there and saw what he claims to have seen, he could not have been mistaken about, is a convincing kind of impeachment that the courts must make place for, although the contradiction evidence is otherwise inadmissible because it is collateral under the tests mentioned above. To disprove such a fact is to pull out the linchpin of the story. So we may recognize this third type of allowable contradiction, namely, the contradiction of any part of the witness\u2019s account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a matter of human experience he would not have been mistaken about if his story were true. This test is of necessity a vague one because it must meet an indefinite variety of situations, and consequently in its application a reasonable latitude of discretionary judgment must be accorded to the trial judge.\u201d E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence \u00a747, at 111-12 (3d ed. 1984), quoted in People v. Byer, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 669.\nIn the present case, under the rationale of Collins, the extrinsic testimony here was material in so far as it tended to rebut defendant\u2019s alibi defense. The case of People v. Deal (1935), 361 Ill. 225, 197 N.E. 772, is in point. There, the court found the State\u2019s evidence admissible to contradict defendant\u2019s alibi where the robbery occurred at 9 p.m.; defendants\u2019 alibi evidence concerned their whereabouts from 4 p.m. until midnight; and the State\u2019s evidence in rebuttal concerned the location of defendants at 7:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. The court held \u201cit was all properly admitted to refute the alibi testimony which preceded it.\u201d (Deal, 361 Ill. at 230.) Finally, \u201c \u2018[i]t was competent to show in contradiction of the testimony of the defendants and of their evidence of an alibi, that they were in Mulberry Grove on the occasion in question.\u2019 \u201d Deal, 361 Ill. at 230, quoting People v. Deal (1934), 357 Ill. 634, 641, 192 N.E. 649, later appeal (1935), 361 Ill. 225, 197 N.E. 772.\nSimilarly, in People v. Mannen (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 61, 360 N.E.2d 563, the court found testimony from the State\u2019s two rebuttal witnesses to be admissible to contradict defendant\u2019s alibi, which was limited to the time between 6:45 p.m. and 1 a.m. The State\u2019s inquiry on cross-examination went to defendant\u2019s activities earlier that afternoon; and the State\u2019s rebuttal witnesses testified about defendant\u2019s location at 3:30 that afternoon. The court found the time span was \u201cnot so remote in time as to constitute a collateral matter or to be irrelevant.\u201d (Mannen, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 63-64.) It concluded that the challenged \u201ccross-examination and rebuttal evidence discredited defendant\u2019s assertions that he had not taken part in the robbery and his alibi defense.\u201d (Mannen, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 64.) The court continued: \u201cQuestioning him on the topic of the afternoon meeting before the robbery certainly questions defendant\u2019s credibility which was put in issue by his direct denial of facts testified to earlier by witnesses for the State. Defendant put his own credibility in issue by taking the stand and contradicting the State\u2019s evidence.\u201d Mannen, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 64. See also People v. Lenhardt (1930), 340 Ill. 538, 173 N.E. 155 (evidence admissible to contradict defendant\u2019s alibi, covering time span of several days); People v. Olbrot (1969), 117 Ill. App. 2d 366, 254 N.E.2d 569. See generally 14A Ill. L. & Prac. Criminal Law \u00a7267, at 192 (1968 and Supp. 1991) (\u201cIn rebuttal, the prosecution may prove any other fact which tends to contradict accused or to disprove the alleged alibi\u201d).\nWe therefore conclude that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in permitting Officer Murphy to testify in rebuttal. Moreover, even if the extrinsic impeachment testimony offered by Murphy was not otherwise admissible, we would find any error harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence supporting defendant\u2019s conviction, which we have previously discussed and analyzed.\nDefendant next maintains it was improper for the prosecutor, while cross-examining defendant, to insinuate defendant had lied to the police by asking defendant whether he had \u201ctold the police officers a third story.\u201d Although the State would have been better served by using a word that carried a less pejorative connotation, we nevertheless hold that no error occurred, particularly where it only amounted to a single word in a lengthy cross-examination, and where the trial court was in the best position to hear the tone of voice and demeanor used by the prosecutor. See People v. Grodkiewicz (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 192, 199, 157 N.E.2d 16 (State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s remark, if improper, was brief and of little significance).\nDefendant finally contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury either defense-tendered instruction on the reliability of eyewitness identification. The first instruction addressed the reliability of eyewitness identification based on United States v. Hodges (7th Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 650. The second instruction was based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (2d ed. 1981) (IPI Criminal 2d). This court has found that IPI Criminal 2d Nos. 1.02 and 2.03 are adequate for the jury to judge the credibility of identification testimony. (People v. Hirschmann (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 150, 529 N.E.2d 760.) Both of these instructions were given here. Moreover, it is recommended that special instructions on eyewitness identification not be given. (IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.15, Committee Note; People v. Hirschmann, 175 Ill. App. 3d 150, 529 N.E.2d 760.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant\u2019s instructions.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLORENZ, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur.\nBut see Lynn v. Alabama (1989), 493 U.S. 945, 947, 107 L. Ed. 2d 338, 340, 110 S. Ct. 351, 352 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (\u201c[m]ere place of residence, or any other factor closely related to race, should not be regarded as a legitimate basis for exercising peremptory challenges without some corroboration on voir dire that the challenged venirepersons actually entertain the bias underlying the use of that factor\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ruth A. McBeth, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Timothy F. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTON JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1-87-2751\nOpinion filed September 6, 1991.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ruth A. McBeth, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Timothy F. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0967-01", "first_page_order": 989, "last_page_order": 1018 }